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ABSTRACT 
ARBITRATION AND THIRD PARTIES 
Stavros Brekoulakis 
Modern international transactions have become extremely complicated, requiring 
the participation of several parties for the delivery of large-scale projects. However. 
multiparty commercial projects are invariably executed through several bilateral 
contracts providing for bilateral dispute resolution arrangements. Some of the 
contracts might include a jurisdiction clause, certain others might provide for 
arbitration, while others may not contain any dispute resolution provisions at all. This 
practice leads to "jurisdictional fragmentation of the multiparty commercial project" 
where the several parties of a single business plan will fall under the jurisdiction of 
different adjudicatory fora. Thus. a dispute arising between two persons bound by an 
arbitration agreement in connection with the multiparty project will have to be 
resolved exclusively by arbitration between these two parties. Other persons cannot 
take part in the resolution of the dispute, even if they play an active role in the actual 
business project. and thus have an interest in the outcome of the dispute. These 
persons will remain third parties, both to the arbitration agreement and the arbitral 
award. 
This study focuses on the role and the interests of the wide group of third parties 
exhibiting an interest in the dispute pending before a tribunal between two genuine 
parties. The thesis, in particular, examines whether arbitration agreements can affect 
persons which are not contractually bound by these agreements. In addition, the thesis 
explores whether arbitral awards can affect persons that have not participated in the 
arbitration proceedings 
The thesis challenges the prevailing contractual approach to the issue of 
arbitration, focusing exclusively on the contractual characteristics of arbitration 
ag eements. According to this view, the main question is whether a non-signatory can 
be contractually bound by an arbitration agreement. The study demonstrates that 
focusing exclusively on the contractual nature of arbitration agreements obscures the 
real issue here, which is whether arbitration agreements may have any jurisdictional 
implications vis-a-vis `third parties'. Accordingly, the thesis takes a jurisdictional 
approach, and argues that the discussion should be focused on the dispute and on any 
implications this may have to third parties, rather than on the requirement of consent 
to arbitration agreements. 
Regarding the effect of arbitral awards on third parties, the thesis argues for a 
third-party effect of arbitral awards specially designed for the needs of international 
arbitration. More specifically, the case is made for the application of an arbitral effect 
different from that of res judicata, both in terms of quality and intensity, but that is 
nevertheless conclusive. It is also suggested that the third party effect of an arbitral 
award should be analogous to the degree of substantive association between the 
genuine and the false third parties. This is consistent with the basic premise of the 
whole thesis: the relations between several parties, in terms of jurisdiction and more 
generally in arbitration procedure, should correspond to the extent of association 
between those parties, in terms of substantive rights, interests and liability. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION 
.......................................................................................................... 
4 
Arbitration and third parties: setting out the framework of the discussion ........................ 
4 
Scope of the thesis- Research questions ............................................................................. 
7 
Theoretical Background of the discussion on arbitration and third parties- suggestions of 
the thesis ............................................................................................................................. 
9 
First, the concept of "false third parties" ........................................................................ 
9 
Second, the effect of arbitration agreements upon third parties .................................... 
10 
Third, the effect of arbitration awards upon third parties ............................................. 
14 
Research methodology ...................................................................................................... 
16 
Structure of the thesis ....................................................................................................... 
17 
PART I: PARTIES AND ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS ............................................ 19 
CHAPTER 1: GENUINE PARTIES TO ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS- NOTION AND 
RELEVANCE TO THE THESIS ..................................................................................... 
20 
1.1 Agency - representation .............................................................................................. 
21 
1.2. Assignment 
................................................................................................................. 
22 
1.3 Succession - novation ................................................................................................. 
24 
1.4 Specific consent to arbitrate and genuine parties to arbitration agreements ............ 
24 
CHAPTER 2: THE NOTION OF FALSE THIRD PARTIES .............................................. 
28 
2.1 Different groups offalse third parties ........................................................................ 
29 
2.2 String construction contracts ...................................................................................... 
32 
2.3 Web-type construction contracts ................................................................................ 
41 
2.4 Guarantees and other security agreements ................................................................ 
43 
2.5 Several companies with close corporate links: the case of the "group of companies" 
in particular. ..................................................................................................................... 
49 
CONCLUSIONS OF PART I ......................................................................................... 
55 
PART II: ARBITRATION AND THIRD PARTIES: THE CONTRACTUAL 
APPROACH ........................................................................................................................... 
57 
CHAPTER 3: THIRD-PARTY MECHANISMS ............................................................... 
60 
3.1 Third party mechanisms and consent ......................................................................... 
60 
3.1.1 Equal treatment of the several co-respondents or co-claimants in the constitution 
of the tribunal ................................................................................................................ 
62 
3.1.2 Effective interpretation of multiparty arbitration clauses .................................... 
63 
3.2. Third party mechanisms in arbitration rules and laws ........................................... 
64 
CHAPTER 4: EXTENSION DOCTRINES- THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL68 
4.1 general Overview of the doctrine ............................................................................... 
68 
4.2 Commentary on the doctrine: content and conditions of application ........................ 
69 
4.2.1 The application of the doctrine presupposes a thorough analysis of the dispute 
and its factual circumstances ........................................................................................ 
69 
4.2.2 Moving away from its equitable origins: the "intertwined factor" and the 
conditions for the application of the doctrine ............................................................... 70 
4.2.2.1 First, the dispute between the signatory and the non-signatory party must be 
intertwined with the contract between the signatories .............................................. 
72 
4.2.2.2 Second, the non-signatory party must have close contractual or corporate 
links with one of the signatory parties ....................................................................... 77 
4.2.2.3 Concluding remarks on the intertwined version of the equitable doctrine.... 78 
4.2.3 Equitable estoppel doctrine and consensual origins of arbitration ....................... 79 
4 
. 
2.4 The court rather than the tribunal will determine whether the dispute between the 
signatory and the non-signatory party is arbitrable or not ............................................ 
82 
CHAPTER 5: THE DOCTRINE OF GROUP OF COMPANIES ......................................... 
84 
5.1 OVER VIEW OF THE doctrine 
................................................................................... 
85 
5.2 Legal basis of the doctrine .......................................................................................... 
86 
5.3 Conditions for the application of the doctrine ............................................................ 88 
5.3.1 First, the group corporate structure ...................................................................... 92 
5.3.2 Second, active role of the non-signatory companies in the negotiations, 
performance or termination of the contract ................................................................... 94 
5.3.3 Third, legitimate impression of the co-contracting party that the non-signatory 
companies are genuine contracting parties ................................................................... 95 
CHAPTER 6: CRITIQUE ON THE EXTENSION DOCTRINES ........................................ 
9ö 
6.1 Positive contribution of extension doctrines ............................................................... 
98 
6.2 Conceptual inefficiencies of the extension doctrines ................................................. 
99 
6.2.1 The extension doctrines fail to distinguish between the different types of third 
parties ............................................................................................................................ 
99 
6.2.2 Limitations of the extension doctrines based on consent (consensual extension 
doctrines) .................................................................................................................... 100 
6.2.2.1 Deduction of implied consent is not always justified .................................. 102 
6.2.2.2 Specific arbitral consent is required for the non-signatory to be bound by the 
arbitration agreement ............................................................................................... 104 
6.2.2.3 Misapplication of traditional principles of contract law in the context of the 
extension doctrines .................................................................................................. 110 6.2.2.4 Conclusions on the extension doctrines based on consent .......................... 112 6.2.3 Limitations of extension doctrines not based on consent (non-consensual 
extension doctrines) .................................................................................................... 113 
6.2.4 The extension doctrines and the "writing requirement" .................................... 118 6.3 Conclusions on the extension doctrines and the contractual approach ................... 120 
PART III: THE SUGGESTION FOR A JURISDICTIONAL APPROACH TO THE 
ISSUE OF THIRD PARTIES AND ARBITRATION ...................................................... 123 
CHAPTER 7: THE CONCEPTUAL PREMISES OF THE JURISDICTIONAL APPROACH: 
EFFECTIVE ARBITRAL JURISDICTION AND EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL JURISDICTION 
.............................................................................................................................. 
127 
7.1 The extra-contractual lis pendens effect of arbitration agreements in the context of 
multiparty relationships .................................................................................................. 
127 
7.2 National courts and extraterritorial jurisdiction: the case for application by analogy 
in the context of arbitration ............................................................................................ 
134 
CHAPTER 8: THE UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES AND RATIONALE OF THIRD-PARTY 
MECHANISMS .......................................................................................................... 
139 
8.1 The importance of third party mechanisms in international arbitration ................. 138 8.1.1 Third-party mechanisms and functional equilibrium between substance and 
procedure in multiparty relationships ......................................................................... 140 8.1.2 Efficiency in arbitration: regulating overlapping parallel proceedings .............. 142 8.1.3 Third-party mechanisms and the interests of the several parties to arbitration.. 144 
8.2 Comparative analysis of third party mechanisms in the context of national and 
international litigation: underpinning rationale and general principles ....................... 
146 
8.2.1 Overview and different groups of third-party mechanisms ............................... 
146 
8.2.2 Policy analysis of the third-party mechanisms: distinctions and underpinning 
rationale ...................................................................................................................... 1 3 
8.3 Conclusions of Chapter 8 ......................................................................................... 
164 
CHAPTER 9: THIRD-PARTY MECHANISMS IN THE CONTEXT OF ARBITRATION AND 
THE PRINCIPLE OF PROCEDURAL PARTY AUTONOMY ........................................... 
165 
9.1 Relevance of the principle of procedural party autonomy ....................................... 
165 
9.2 Procedural party autonomy, as a rule, will prevails over third party mechanisms. 167 
9.3 Third party mechanisms in the context of multiparty projects where parties are 
contractually interrelated but not strongly associated in substantive terms .................. 
170 
CHAPTER 10: THE EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE THIRD-PARTY 
MECHANISIMS SHOULD APPLY IN ARBITRATION ................................................... 
176 
10.1 The fundamental role of the pending dispute for the determination of the jurisdiction 
of a tribunal .................................................................................................................... 
174 
10.2 Co-liability or community of rights between the several parties as a threshold for 
extra-contractual jurisdiction and third party mechanisms ........................................... 
179 
10.2.1 First: co-liability resulting from the contractual arrangements of the several 
parties .......................................................................................................................... 
178 
10.2.2 Second: co-liability resulting from the applicable substantive law ................. 187 
10.2.3 No lower threshold than co-liability or community of rights and duties warrants 
extra-contractual jurisdiction and third-party mechanisms ......................................... 
190 
CHAPTER 11: FINAL REMARKS ON THE JURISDICTIONAL APPROACH .................. 
201 
11.1 applying third party mechanisms in arbitration: The third party remains a party not 
bound by the arbitration agreement.. ............................................................................. 
201 
11.2 Examining the dispute at the stage of determination of the jurisdiction does not lead 
to prejudgment of the merits of the dispute .................................................................... 
203 
11.3 Practical relevance of the jurisdictional approach ................................................ 
205 
11.3.1 The law applicable to the validity and the interpretation of the arbitration 
ab eement .................................................................................................................... 
205 
11.3.2 Jurisdiction in accordance with the jurisdictional approach is determined on a 
basis closer to commercial reality ............................................................................... 
210 
CHAPTER 12: THE EFFECT OF AN ARBITRAL AWARD AND THIRD 
PARTIES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION ......................................... 215 
12.1 THE ARBITRAL EFFECT ...................................................................................... 
217 
12.1.1 Legal Framework Regarding Arbitral Effect ................................................... 
218 
12.1.2 National Regimes on Res Judicata: Differences and Constituent Elements 220 
12.1.2.1 Differences ............................................................................................. 
220 
12.1.2.2 Constituent Elements of Res Judicata .................................................... 
218 
12.2 RES JUDICA TA AND THIRD PARTIES ................................................................ 
220 
12.2.1 The "Same Parties" Requirement: Rule and Exceptions ................................. 220 
12.2.2 False Third Parties: The Problem .................................................. 
223 
12.2.2.1: Solutions in the context of litigation: unification and harmonisation 
mechanisms ............................................................................................................. 
224 
12.2.2.2 Solutions in the context of Arbitration ...................................................... 
228 
12.3 THE SUGGESTED THIRD-PARTYARBITRAL EFFECT ..................................... 
230 
12.3.1. Examination of the Suggested Effect .............................................................. 
234 
12.3.2 Characteristics of the Third-Party Arbitral Effect- Distinction from Res 
Judicata 
....................................................................................................................... 
234 
12.3.3 Requirements of the Arbitral Effect ................................................................. 
236 
12.3.4 The Parties Affected ........................................................................................ 
238 
12.4. THE LEGAL BASIS OF THE EFFECT OF AN INTERNA TIONAL A WARD ....... 
245 
12.5. CONCLUSION 
...................................................................................................... 
248 
CONCLUSIONS 
................................................................................................... 
250 
Remarks on existing views on arbitration and third parties ........................................... 
246 
Suggestions of the thesis on "arbitration and third parties .......................................... 254 
Table of cases and awards .................................................................. 
267 
Bibliography ................................................................................... 
284 
INTRODUCTION 
............................................................................................................ 
4 
Arbitration and third parties: setting out the framework of the discussion............ 4 
Scope of the thesis- Research questions .................................................................. 
7 
Theoretical Background of the discussion on arbitration and third parties- 
suggestions of the thesis .......................................................................................... 
9 
First, the concept of "false third parties" ............................................................. 9 
Second, the effect of arbitration agreements upon third parties ........................ 10 
Third, the effect of arbitration awards upon third parties .................................. 14 
Research methodology .......................................................................................... 
16 
Structure of the thesis ............................................................................................ 
18 
INTRODUCTION 
ARBITRATION AND THIRD PARTIES: SETTING OUT THE FRAMEWORK OF THE 
DISCUSSION 
The study of the interrelation between arbitration and third parties is an integral 
part of any discussion touching upon elements of arbitration. This owes to the very 
definition of arbitration as a consensual dispute resolution mechanism binding only 
those persons that have unequivocally consented to an arbitration agreement. I 
The contractual foundations of arbitration constitute the fundamental difference 
between arbitration and litigation. In litigation the capacity to become a party to court 
proceedings is determined on the basis of interest(s). Provided that it is subject to the 
territorial jurisdiction of the particular national court, ' a legal or a natural person is 
entitled to commence court proceedings whenever it needs to protect its legal or 
financial interest. 3 
See J. Lew, L. Mistelis and S. Kroell, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration. (Kluwer 
Law International 2003), para 7-3 et seq; P. Fouchard, E. Gaillard and B. Goldman, On International 
Commercial Arbitration, E. Gaillard and J. Savage (eds. ) (1999), para. 498. 
2 Which is usually determined on the basis of the domicile, residency or even presence of the 
defendant. 
See in US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. r. 17: 
"Parties Plaintiff and Defendant- 
Capacity (a) Real Party in Interest: 
Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest" 
Cf English Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) r. 19.6: 
"Representative parties with same interest: 
(1) Where more than one person has the same interest in a claim- 
(a) the claim may be begun; or 
(b) the court may order that the claim be continued. 
4 
By contrast, in the context of arbitration, it is generally accepted that the capacity 
to take part in proceedings is exclusively determined on a contractual basis. 4 Entering 
into an arbitration agreement is the indispensable requirement for a person to 
participate into the arbitration proceedings and be bound by the resulting arbitral 
award. 
The principle of procedural party autonomy provides parties with the freedom to 
determine in their contract the circle of the persons that can participate in the arbitral 
proceedings. Parties not bound by an arbitration agreement, i. e. third parties, are 
excluded from the arbitration process. Any legal or financial interest that a third party 
might have in the dispute between the parties bound by the arbitration agreement is in 
principle irrelevant. 
The principle of procedural party autonomy and the contractual foundations of 
arbitration make arbitration a very flexible dispute resolution mechanism, allowing 
the parties to establish a dispute resolution mechanism in accordance with their 
commercial needs. This has proved a significant advantage of arbitration over 
litigation, and it has contributed to the increasing popularity of the former amongst 
members of the international commercial community, particularly in the last thirty 
years. 
By the same token, in the context of multiparty commercial relationships, the 
contractual, and thus relative, nature of arbitration frequently leads to unfavourable 
results. Modern international transactions have become extremely complicated, 
requiring the participation of several parties for the delivery of large-scale projects. 
For example, a typical construction project will usually involve, apart from the 
employer and the main contractor, an engineer and/or an architect, several 
subcontractors, suppliers, financiers and possibly more commercial parties. 
Multiparty situations may also result from finance and security agreements, such as 
guarantees, indemnities or performance bonds, where a bank, an insurance company 
or a protection and indemnity association will come into play providing security for 
the main contract exclusively concluded between two other parties. Particular mention 
should also be made to the modem corporate structure of multinational companies. 
Nowadays the typical form of business organisation views large corporations carrying 
by or against one or more of the persons who have the same interest as representatives of any 
other persons who have that interest". 
Russell, On Arbitration. D. Sutton, J. Gill. M. Gearing (23rd ed. Sweet & Maxwell London 2007). 
para 3-002. 
out their affairs through a number of subsidiaries in several countries. Thus, several 
companies (affiliates, or subsidiary companies, or officers, directors, stockholders and 
members of that legal entity) of the same group will often take part in the execution of 
a contract concluded by only one company of the group. 
However, multiparty commercial projects are invariably executed through several 
bilateral contracts rather than through a single agreement applicable to the several 
parties to the project. Accordingly, the several bilateral substantive contracts will 
usually provide for bilateral dispute resolution arrangements. Some of the contracts 
might include a jurisdiction clause, certain others might provide for arbitration, while 
others may not contain any dispute resolution provisions at all. Even those contracts, 
including jurisdiction or arbitration clauses will usually fail to provide for the same 
national court or the same type of arbitration. Thus, it often happens that the several 
parties make jurisdictional arrangements on a bilateral basis, against the backdrop of a 
multiparty commercial project. In other words, the parties will opt for a scheme of 
several bilateral proceedings rather than a single set of multiparty proceedings. This 
practice leads to what is called, here, "jurisdictional fragmentation of the multiparty 
commercial project", which occurs when the several parties of a single business 
project are subject to the jurisdiction of different adjudicatory fora. 
Thus, a dispute arising between two persons bound by an arbitration agreement in 
connection with the multiparty project will have to be resolved exclusively by 
arbitration between these two parties, which for the purposes of the thesis are named 
genuine or original parties to an arbitration agreement and arbitration proceedings. 
Other persons than the genuine parties cannot participate in the resolution of the 
dispute, even if they play an active role in the actual business project, and, therefore, 
they have an interest in the outcome of the dispute. These persons will remain third 
parties both to the arbitration agreement and the arbitral award between the genuine 
parties. 
Therefore, procedural fragmentation leads to a discrepancy between the circle of 
persons taking part to the resolution of a dispute by arbitration, and the circle of 
persons not entitled to participate therein despite the fact that they have a legal and 
financial interest in the dispute. 
To give some examples: 
"A guarantor may remain outside the arbitration between a creditor and a 
debtor. This may be the case despite the fact that this arbitration may well 
6 
determine that the guaranteed debt has been extinguished, in which case the 
guarantor would cease to be liable. 
9A subcontractor may not take part in the arbitration between an owner and 
a contractor, although this arbitration may well determine that the work 
actually delivered by the subcontractor is defective. 
9A team of stockholders may not take part in the arbitration between the 
corporation and another party, although the arbitration may find against the 
corporation with considerable financial repercussions for the stockholders. 
Conversely, the parties to the arbitration process are denied the chance to confront 
other parties that play an active role in the actual business project: 
"A parent company of one of the parties to an arbitration agreement would 
stay out of the arbitration between its subsidiary and the other genuine 
party, although the parent company might have taken a decisive role in the 
performance of the contract. 
9A guarantor would stay outside the arbitration between the creditor and the 
principal debtor, although, the arbitration might well determine that the 
guaranteed debt exists, in which case the creditor would have an obvious 
interest in seeing the guarantor be bound by the award. 
Consequently, jurisdictional fragmentation of multiparty commercial transactions 
excludes parties with a significant interest in a particular transaction from taking part 
in the resolution of the disputes arising out of this transaction. Additionally, it leads to 
multiplicity of legal proceedings, either arbitral or judicial, which in turn, may result 
in a considerable waste of legal and financial resources. More importantly, though, 
jurisdictional fragmentation may result in inconsistent, if not conflicting, decisions. 
This outcome will eventually frustrate parties' expectations from arbitration and may 
well undermine the tribunal's main goal, namely the effective resolution of the 
dispute. 
SCOPE OF THE THESIS- RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This study focuses on the wide group of third parties with an interest in the dispute 
pending before a tribunal between two genuine parties. Third parties of this group are 
not bound by an arbitration agreement, but they are not strangers to the dispute and 
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the arbitration proceedings either. Since their interests are related to the outcome of 
the dispute, any factual or legal determination in the arbitral proceeding may well 
affect their legal position. Therefore, third parties having an interest in the dispufe 
between to other parties bound by an arbitration agreement are labelled by the thesis 
"false third parties". The main research questions that will be addressed here are: 
" The role and the interests of false third parties 
" Whether an arbitration agreement can have an effect on any persons not 
contractually bound by it 
" If yes, under which circumstances this would come into effect and what 
potential results would arise 
" Whether an arbitral award can affect any person that has not participated 
in the arbitration proceedings 
" If yes, what would the specific conditions and possible outcomes of such 
circumstances be 
Generally speaking, the thesis explores whether it is possible for arbitration to 
interact with persons that are neither contractual parties to an arbitration agreement, 
nor parties to arbitration proceedings. Ultimately, the thesis tests the consensual 
boundaries of arbitration. 
Thus, the thesis will not be looking into cases where all the parties involved in the 
same commercial project have consented to arbitration. Even in situations when 
consent to multiparty proceedings is not disputed, several issues may well arise. For 
example, matters with regard to the constitution of the tribunal, the allocation of the 
costs of the arbitration or the conduct of the arbitral proceedings will often arise in the 
context of multiparty arbitrations. However, these issues are in the periphery of the 
conceptual boundaries of this work, and therefore, they will only briefly be mentioned 
in the thesis. 
Equally, the thesis will not focus on matters that, although touch on arbitration and 
involve more than two parties, predominantly relate to general contract law. Thus, for 
example, problems concerning the succession of arbitration agreements or the 
conclusion of arbitration agreements by an agent are more relevant to general 
principles of succession applicable to all substantive contracts than to principles of 
arbitration law. Accordingly, they will only shortly be discussed in the first Chapter of 
8 
the thesis, but they will not be examined any further. The discussion in the thesis is 
based on the assumption that a third party has not consented to arbitration. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND OF THE DISCUSSION ON ARBITRATION AND 
THIRD PARTIES- SUGGESTIONS OF THE THESIS 
Arbitration and third parties, or multiparty arbitration as is usually referred to, is 
one of the most pervasive topics in arbitration law and practice. However, in spite of 
the extensive relevant literature, the issue is far from settled. In particular, further 
study pertains to three relative areas, namely the notion of "false third parties", the 
effect of arbitration agreements upon third parties and the effect of arbitration awards 
upon third parties. At this stage, it is useful to explain and briefly discuss the existing 
theoretical background of these issues and, at the same time, outline the main 
suggestions of this study, which will be then presented in analytical detail in the main 
part of the thesis. 
First, the concept of "false third parties" 
It is essential to establish a theoretical basis for defining the notion of "false third 
parties" as opposed to that of third parties in general. Strictly speaking, every person 
not bound by an arbitration agreement is a third party. However, not all third parties 
would be relevant in an arbitration between the two original parties. Only third parties 
that have a legal or financial interest in the dispute pending before the tribunal may be 
relevant, namely the "false third parties". 
Thus, the interest that a third party may have in the pending dispute is a key factor 
to determine which persons are pertinent to the discussion on arbitration and third 
parties. From this perspective, the thesis explores in detail the notion of "false third 
parties". The aim here is to canvass the interests of false third parties, and, on that 
basis, distinguish between different types of false third parties. The analysis takes a 
substantive viewpoint, focusing on the association between the genuine and the false 
third parties, in terms of contractual rights, duties and liabilities. In the light of the 
findings of this analysis, it will be argued that we should distinguish between two 
groups of false third parties: those that share the same rights, duties and liabilities 
with the genuine parties to the arbitration, and those that are merely contractually 
interrelated with them. It will be shown that the interests of the former in the 
9 
arbitration between the two genuine parties are stronger and, thus, more relevant than 
the interests of the latter. 
This distinction is essential for the purposes of the thesis, as it provides the 
conceptual grounds for the working hypothesis of the thesis, namely whether 
arbitration agreements and arbitral awards may have any effect upon false third 
parties depends on the degree of the association between the genuine and the false 
third parties, in terms of substantive liability and interests. 
Second, the effect of arbitration agreements upon third parties 
To date, the legal discourse and arbitral practice have opted for two different 
viewpoints on this matter. The first suggests that arbitration agreements cannot have 
any impact whatsoever on any person who has not clearly consented to arbitration, as 
this consent is evidenced by their signature. According to this view, non-signatory 
parties are total strangers to an arbitration agreement and the ensuing proceedings 
between the signatories. 
The second stance proposes that arbitration agreements, as substantive contracts, 
may be "extended", under certain circumstances, even to persons that have not signed 
them. This is the view taken by what is called in the thesis "extension doctrines", the 
most prominent of which are the "group of companies" doctrine in the European 
continent and the "equitable estoppel" in the USA. According to extension doctrines, 
signature should be distinguished from consent to arbitrate. Thus, it is possible under 
certain conditions for non-signatories to enter into an arbitration agreement, 
notwithstanding the fact that they have failed to sign it. In the context of "group of 
companies" doctrine, in particular, it has been argued that the existence of consent of 
a non-signatory party to arbitrate may even be presumed. 
As will be demonstrated, neither of the above mentioned views succeed in giving 
satisfactory answers to the problem of arbitration agreements and third parties. This is 
largely because they both take a strict contractual approach to the issue, focusing 
exclusively on the contractual characteristics of arbitration agreements. In this 
contractual context, the main question is whether a non-signatory, rather than a stricto 
sensu third party can be contractually bound by an arbitration agreement. As will be 
explained, not even the extension doctrines challenge "consent" as an indispensable 
requirement for the participation of the non-signatory party to the arbitration between 
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the signatories. The core argument of the extension doctrines is merely that signature 
on an arbitration agreement is not the only means to assert consent to arbitrate. 
Effectively, the whole discussion on arbitration agreement and third parties, until 
now, is limited to issues of "signature" and "evidence of consent". In other words, 
from the viewpoint of the prevailing contractual approach, the debate on arbitration 
and third parties relates only to the boundaries of the arbitration agreement as a 
substantive contract. Thus, this discussion is mainly related to contract law and 
principles of contract interpretation, rather than arbitration law. In the context of the 
prevailing contractual approach, arbitration agreements are exclusively viewed as 
ordinary substantive contracts. 
The thesis examines the contractual approach in detail and at, the end, 
demonstrates its theoretical and practical limitations. The attention is particularly 
focused on the extension doctrines the conceptual premises of which, the thesis 
argues, are undermined by a conceptual contradiction: although they adhere to the 
requirement of consent, they violate fundamental principles of contract law and 
contract interpretation as they effectively establish presumptions for the existence of 
the intention of the non-signatories to arbitrate. 
If arbitration agreements are exclusively viewed as ordinary substantive contracts, 
any discussion on arbitration agreements and third parties is necessarily rendered 
superfluous or contradictory in terms. From a strict contractual viewpoint, an 
arbitration agreement, as any other ordinary contract, have inherent constrains: they 
bind only those persons that have clearly consented thereto. In such terms, consent 
constitutes the indispensable requirement for a person to be bound by an agreement, 
and can neither be substituted nor presumed. In other words, in this contractual 
context there is no room for third parties to come into play at all. 
By contrast, the thesis argues that a jurisdictional approach to the issue of 
arbitration and third parties should be adopted. Arbitration agreements have important 
jurisdictional effects. Arbitration law is not, and should not be viewed merely as an 
advanced version of contract law. Arbitration agreements differ from ordinary 
contracts in that they provide tribunals with significant jurisdictional powers. These 
jurisdictional powers are necessary for the tribunal to achieve their primary goal, 
namely the authentic determination of the dispute at hand. Focusing exclusively on 
the contractual nature of arbitration agreements obscures the real issue, which is 
whether arbitration agreements may have any jurisdictional implications vis-a-vis 
third parties. 
The thesis does not dismiss the relevance of contractual foundations of arbitration. 
However, it does argue that the issue of third parties in arbitration can be better 
addressed, if the focus is shifted from the contractual nature of arbitration agreements 
to their jurisdictional effects. In particular, it is suggested that the focus should be 
shifted from whether arbitration agreements as ordinary contracts may bind third 
parties to whether arbitral tribunals may assume jurisdiction over third parties and if 
so, under what circumstances. In this jurisdictional context, the dispute pending 
before the tribunal rather than the arbitration contract is the key factor to determine 
the boundaries of the jurisdiction of the tribunal. 
In the light of this jurisdictional approach, the thesis focuses on the dispute and on 
any implications this dispute may have for third parties, rather than on the 
requirement of consent to arbitration agreements. On this premise, the thesis examines 
whether a tribunal may assume jurisdiction over parties not bound by an arbitration 
agreement and under which circumstances this can be feasible. 
More specifically, the concept of effective arbitral jurisdiction is introduced, which 
comes as a necessary corollary of the jurisdictional approach. According to the 
concept of effective arbitral jurisdiction, a tribunal should be able to assume as much 
jurisdiction as is necessary for a tribunal to achieve its main goal, namely the 
determination of the pending dispute. Therefore, it is argued that a tribunal in order to 
assert its jurisdiction should not only examine the contractual scope of an arbitration 
agreement but it should also take into account the full implications of the pending 
dispute. This is particularly necessary when third parties are integral part of the 
dispute pending before the tribunal. Indeed, as will be demonstrated, when the 
pending dispute necessary implicates third parties, arbitration agreements may 
produce jurisdictional effects that stretch beyond their contractual boundaries and the 
parties thereto. In fact, it is argued that arbitration agreements may have collateral 
jurisdictional effects on third parties. 
Since tribunals should be able to assume as much jurisdiction as is necessary for 
them to resolve the pending dispute and since arbitration agreements may stretch 
beyond their contractual origins, the thesis concludes that it is possible for a tribunal 
to assume extra-contractual jurisdiction. As will explained, extra-contractual 
jurisdiction can be achieved in practice by the application of third-party mechanisms, 
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which constitute the procedural means for a tribunal to assume jurisdiction over a 
third party by way of joinder, interpleading, intervention or consolidation. 
To prevent misinterpretation, this argument is delimitated by a caveat: it is only in 
extremely exceptional circumstances and with particular caution that a tribunal 
should assume extra-contractual jurisdiction. Furthermore, the thesis by reference to 
national procedural systems, determines the exceptional character of extra-contractual 
jurisdiction and third-party mechanisms. Nevertheless, the principle of the argument 
is established: extra-contractual jurisdiction is not incompatible with arbitration, and 
therefore tribunals may assume jurisdiction over third parties. 
Once the principle is set out, the thesis addresses some equally important issues: 
first, it examines whether the tribunal should assume extra-contractual jurisdiction 
and apply third-party mechanisms. Here, the thesis embarks on a policy-oriented 
analysis, which demonstrates that third-party mechanisms are necessary in the context 
of international arbitration. As will be shown, there are important policy reasons 
suggesting that arbitration despite its contractual basis should not remain a closed 
system, reserved only for parties that have agreed to an arbitration agreement. Instead 
it should be a dispute resolution system, which -under particular circumstances- 
should be open to pertinent third parties. A procedural system of communication 
between the genuine and third parties should be established in arbitration. 
Secondly, it explores the rationale behind third party mechanisms as procedural 
tools, and looks into the way they operate and the purposes they serve. The 
exploration of these questions takes place against a comparative background of 
several national litigation and regional procedural systems. Again here, it is suggested 
that the key-element for the operation of third-party mechanisms is the pending 
dispute and its implications for the third parties. 
In particular, it will be shown that the extent to which a third party may participate 
in the proceedings between two original parties is directly relevant to the degree of 
association between the third party and one of the original parties, in terms of 
substantive liability and interests. Here, the rule is: the closer the substantive 
association between the original and the third party, the more effective third-party 
mechanisms are provided by procedural systems. More specifically, third-party 
mechanisms of compulsory character are provided when the third party and the 
original parties are strongly associated in substantive terms, whereas third-party 
mechanisms of permissive character are provided when the third party and the 
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original parties are contractually interrelated but not strongly associated in 
substantive terms. 
The findings of this analysis are then tested on arbitration against the background 
of the principles prevailing in arbitration and, in particular, the principle of procedural 
party autonomy. The question here is whether extra-contractual jurisdiction and third- 
party mechanisms are compatible with the freedom of the parties to determine the 
forum and the procedures for the resolution of their disputes in the way it best serves 
their commercial interests (procedural party autonomy). It is argued that in the 
majority of the cases the principle of procedural party autonomy should prevail, 
rendering third-party mechanisms inapplicable to arbitration. As will be 
demonstrated, the right of the parties to opt for a scheme of several bilateral 
proceedings rather than third-party mechanisms should be observed, even if this 
scheme would result to the jurisdictional fragmentation of the multiparty relationship. 
Jurisdictional fragmentation, despite its unfavourable consequences, should be 
accepted as a legitimate collateral inconvenience. 
However, as already indicated, the thesis argues that there are exceptional 
circumstances where third-party mechanisms should take precedence over procedural 
party autonomy. It is suggested that this should happen whenever the third parties are 
strongly interrelated with the parties to the arbitration, so that third and genuine 
parties are co-liable or co-holders of rights and duties. As will be demonstrated, in 
such a case the several parties (third and genuine) constitute an inseparable unit in 
terms of jurisdiction. This jurisdictional unit, due to the strong substantive 
interrelations of the several parties, should not be separated and, thus, should prevail 
over the scheme of bilateral dispute resolution agreements of the several parties. 
Therefore, it is concluded that the tribunal should be able to assume jurisdiction over 
the whole jurisdictional unit, consisting of the several genuine and false third parties. 
Third, the effect of arbitration awards upon third parties 
This issue has been relatively overlooked since the interest of academic doctrine 
and jurisprudence has focused principally on the effect of arbitration agreements 
rather than the effect of arbitral awards upon third parties. The sole viewpoint here is 
that arbitral awards should be equated to national decisions. Accordingly, the question 
of whether the arbitration award may have any sort of impact upon third parties 
depends on the national provisions regarding res judicata. As will be shown, national 
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provisions invariably provide that the res judicata effect is strictly limited to the 
persons taking part in the proceedings. The only persons, apart from the parties to the 
proceedings, which are bound by the res judicata effect of a national judgment and, 
therefore, an arbitral award are third parties with identical interests with the parties to 
the proceedings, namely the privies to the parties to the proceedings. 
The thesis challenges the prevailing view on the grounds that it overlooks the 
differences, in nature and purpose, between international awards and national 
decisions. Most importantly though, the prevailing view fails to accommodate the 
systemic problems arising in international arbitration with regard to multiparty 
commercial relationships. 
Instead, the thesis argues for a third warty effect of arbitral awards specially 
designed for the needs of international arbitration. The case is made for the 
application of an arbitral effect different from that of res judicata, both in terms of 
quality and intensity, which is nevertheless conclusive. 
Accordingly, it is argued that arbitral awards should be able to affect a wider circle 
of third parties than the one affected by national judgments. A wider arbitral effect 
would compensate for the lack of unification mechanisms at an earlier stage 
analogous to the mechanism provided in the context of litigation. It is suggested, in 
particular, that arbitral awards should somehow affect the false third parties rather 
than just the privies to the parties in the proceedings. 
However, it is noted that the substantive links between the privies and the original 
parties to the proceedings are stronger than those between the false third parties and 
the original parties. Therefore, it is argued that the third-party arbitral effect vis-ä-vis 
false third parties should be different and certainly less drastic than the res judicata 
effect upon privies. This suggestion accords to the overarching argument of work 
here, namely that the procedural relationships between several parties must correlate 
to their relationships in substantive terms. 
More specifically, it is submitted that arbitral awards should have both conclusive 
and preclusive effects on false third parties. Thus, the preclusive effect of the award 
between two parties will prevent the re-litigation of any factual and legal issue that 
might arise again in the second set of proceedings between a false third party and one 
of the parties in the first set of proceedings. In addition, the conclusive effect of the 
award between two parties will provide the logical and legal basis for the second 
forum, be that a national court or an arbitral tribunal, to reach a decision in 
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accordance with the determination of the first award. Applied in this way, the 
combination of preclusive and conclusive effects of an arbitral award will harmonise 
the several sets of proceedings, in the context of a multiparty relationship, and it will 
ensure that any conflicting awards are avoided. 
Despite its conclusive and preclusive consequences, the third-party arbitral effect 
suggested here is less effective than the res judicata effect. The award will merely 
affect rather than bind a false third party, and, therefore, any issues in terms of due 
process will not arise. The award given in proceedings between the two genuine 
parties will not be able to be enforced by or against the false third parties. Thus, this 
third-party effect will not pre-empt rights or duties of the third party. A second trial 
will still be indispensable for the claims of the third party to be determined. 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The basic methods employed in this study were research and qualitative analysis of 
primary and secondary legal sources, including national and international laws and 
rules, case law of national courts and arbitral tribunals, and academic treatises. 
More specifically, as far as arbitration rules are concerned, the rules of all the 
major arbitration institutions are examined. Attention, of course, is particularly 
focused on the United Nations Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958 (the New York Convention), the international 
arbitration treaty that has been enjoying an unprecedented success, and has been 
immensely influential to the development of arbitration doctrine and practice. 
In terms of national jurisdictions, the research takes an international comparative 
viewpoint. The legislation and case law of different countries are reviewed, although 
emphasis is especially placed on England, the USA, France, and to a lesser extent on 
Switzerland, Germany and the European Union. The selection of the above 
jurisdictions was mainly made for two reasons. First, it provides equilibrium between 
common and civil law legal traditions. Second, it covers almost all the major 
arbitration centres with advanced arbitration laws and procedural systems. 
The following notes should also be made with regard to the methodological 
approach of the thesis: 
First, as already indicated, despite the fact that the literature on "third parties in 
arbitration" is extensive, the discussion is still largely open. Additionally, regulation 
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on the topic is lacking in a national, regional or international level. Accordingly, the 
analysis performed here is policy orientated, whereas the final suggestions go beyond 
black letter law. 
Secondly, the analysis on arbitration agreements draws to some extent on material 
regarding jurisdiction agreements. Arbitration and jurisdiction are very similar, if not 
identical, in nature, while they also have the same objective. In particular, they are 
both of contractual origins and they both serve procedural party autonomy. Procedural 
party autonomy provides the parties with the ability to choose in advance the forum 
that suits them best, instead of having their disputes resolved by the default forum, 
which in many cases is difficult to predict. Arbitration and jurisdiction agreements 
give effect to procedural party autonomy and, thus, constitute fundamental tools for 
commercial parties to establish an effective dispute resolution policy. Therefore, case 
law on jurisdiction agreements is occasionally used to support, by analogy, 
suggestions regarding arbitration agreements. 
Similarly, part of the research focuses on national and regional civil procedural 
systems. It is true that arbitration is in many respects a very different adjudicatory 
system from litigation, and an arbitral tribunal will normally try the case differently 
from a national court. Nevertheless, both arbitral tribunals and national courts are, in 
principal, equal adjudicatory fora vested with the same power: jurisdiction to 
determine the dispute and issue an authoritative binding decision. Therefore, in 
jurisdictional terms, national courts and arbitral tribunals perform a very similar 
function. 
Accordingly, the thesis makes an in-depth comparative analysis of national 
litigation systems with regard to the participation of third parties in court proceedings. 
The aim of this comparative study is to reveal the rationale behind third-party 
mechanisms in dispute resolution systems in general. The outcome of this analysis is 
used as a policy guideline in order for the thesis to determine the right impact of 
arbitration agreements and awards upon third parties. 
It should be highlighted that the thesis merely seeks guidance from the study of 
litigation procedural systems to arbitration. It does not suggest the ad hoc application 
of litigation systems to arbitration. Due attention is always paid to the existing 
differences between the two dispute resolution systems. 
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STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The thesis is divided into three parts. 
Part I consists of two chapters and focuses on the notion of third parties and false 
third parties in particular. Chapter 1 looks into some particular types of parties, whose 
status in relation to arbitration agreements is not clear. This is in particular the case 
for a principal, when an arbitration agreement is concluded by an agent; an assignee, 
after the assignment of an arbitration agreement; a consignee in a bill of lading 
containing an arbitration agreement; a successor in a contract containing an arbitration 
agreement. It is argued that, although they are some times taken as third parties, the 
above persons should be considered genuine parties rather than third parties, because 
they will be contractually bound by an arbitration agreements by reference to rules of 
contract law. 
Chapter 2 then focuses on "false third parties", which ratione personae define the 
scope of this study. Here the attention is focused on the different types interests of 
"false third parties". Thus, false third parties are distinguished into two groups on the 
basis of the difference in the degree of association between the genuine and the false 
third parties, in terms of contractual interests and liability. The chapter examines each 
group in detail and presents some typical examples of false third parties, which are 
then used throughout the thesis as case studies. 
Part II consists of four chapters, dealing in detail with the prevailing contractual 
approach to the issue of arbitration and third parties. Chapter 3 explains the role of 
consent in this contractual approach and gives a brief overview of the existing 
arbitration laws and rules relating to third-party mechanisms. Chapter 4 and 5 explore 
the two most important extension doctrines: the doctrine of "Equitable Estoppel" 
developed in USA, and the Continental doctrine of "Group of Companies". Chapter 6 
further discusses the extension doctrines adopting a more critical stance. This, chapter 
highlights the conceptual and practical limitations of the extension doctrines and of 
the contractual approach in general. The discussion in Chapter 6 will demonstrate that 
a different approach to the issue of arbitration and third parties needs to be adopted: 
the jurisdictional approach that will be presented in Part III. 
Part III is the largest part. It consists of six chapters and it puts forward the main 
suggestion of the thesis: the substitution of the contractual with a jurisdictional 
approach to the issue of arbitration and third parties. Chapter 7 presents the 
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conceptual premises of the suggested jurisdictional approach and introduces the 
concept of effective arbitral jurisdiction, according to which a tribunal should be able 
to assume as much jurisdiction as is necessary for the tribunal to determine the 
pending dispute. Here, particular attention is focused on the role of the "dispute" for 
the determination of the jurisdiction of the tribunal. It is argued that whenever the 
dispute has jurisdictional implications for third parties, arbitral tribunals may assume 
extra-contractual jurisdiction over third parties and apply third-party mechanisms. 
While Chapter 7 establishes the principle that a tribunal may assume extra- 
contractual jurisdiction, Chapter 8 addresses some equally important issues: first, it 
examines whether the tribunal should assume extra-contractual jurisdiction and apply 
third party mechanisms, and secondly, it explores the rationale behind third party 
mechanisms in general. The exploration of these questions takes place against a 
comparative background of several national litigation and regional procedural 
systems, where various third-party mechanisms such as joinder, consolidation, 
intervention, are examined in detail under the light of national case law. 
The findings on the rationale behind third-party mechanisms as procedural tools is 
applied in the next two chapters to arbitration against the backdrop of the particular 
principles prevailing in arbitration and, in particular, the principle of procedural party 
autonomy. More specifically, Chapter 9 shows that in the majority of the cases the 
principle of procedural party autonomy should prevail, rendering third-party 
mechanisms inapplicable to arbitration. Jurisdictional fragmentation, despite its 
unfavourable consequences, should be accepted as a legitimate repercussion of 
procedural party autonomy. 
However, Chapter 10 argues that there are exceptional circumstances where third- 
party mechanisms should take precedence over procedural party autonomy. It is 
suggested that this should happen whenever the third parties are strongly interrelated 
with the parties to the arbitration, so that third and genuine parties are co-liable or co- 
holders of rights and duties. 
Chapter 11 makes the final remarks on the jurisdictional approach and discusses its 
practical relevance and advantages over the contractual approach, whereas in Chapter 
12 the attention is shifted from the arbitration agreements to the arbitral awards. In 
particular, the chapter examines first the effects that arbitral awards may have on third 
parties and second the legal basis of the arbitral effect at an international level. 
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PART I: PARTIES TO ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS 
The aim of Part I is to define the notion of false third parties and delimitate the 
group of persons that are relevant for the discussion on arbitration and third parties 
and, therefore, for the purposes of this study. 
Chapter 1 distinguishes the group of false third parties from that of genuine parties 
to arbitration agreements. The focus here is on particular types of persons whose 
status in relation to arbitration agreements is not clear. This is, for example, the case 
with a principal, whenever an agent concludes an arbitration agreement, an assignee, 
after the assignment of an arbitration agreement, a consignee in a bill of lading 
containing an arbitration agreement and a successor in a contract containing an 
arbitration agreement. These types of persons are sometimes regarded as `third 
parties'. However, the thesis revisits this view, arguing that all persons, such as the 
above, who are bound by an arbitration agreement by reference to general principles 
of contract law should be regarded as genuine rather than third parties to an 
arbitration agreement. In effect, the question of which parties are contractually bound 
by an arbitration contract is a matter that mainly relates to contract law, and, 
therefore, it falls outside of the scope of this work. Here, the only question pertinent 
to arbitration law is whether separate consent to arbitrate is required for the above 
types of persons to become bound by the arbitration agreement included in a 
substantive contract, or general consent to the latter as a whole would suffice. Chapter 
1 look into this issue in the light of the principle of separability and the principle of 
autonomy of arbitration agreements. 
Chapter 2 differentiates the notion of false third parties from that of third parties in 
general. Strictly speaking, every person not bound by an arbitration agreement is a 
third party. However, not all third parties would be relevant in an arbitration between 
the two original parties. Only third parties that have a legal or financial interest in the 
dispute pending before the tribunal may be relevant, namely the "false third parties". 
Thus, based on the criterion of interest, Chapter 2 explores in detail the notion of 
"false third parties", focusing on their association with the genuine parties, in terms of 
contractual rights, duties and liabilities. 
19 
CHAPTER 1: GENUINE PARTIES TO ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS- NOTION AND 
RELEVANCE TO THE THESIS ........................................................................................ 
20 
1.1 Agency - representation .................................................................................. 
21 
1.2. Assignment 
..................................................................................................... 
22 
1.3 Succession - novation ...................................................................................... 
24 
1.4 Specific consent to arbitrate and genuine parties to arbitration agreements. 24 
CHAPTER 1: GENUINE PARTIES TO ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS- 
NOTION AND RELEVANCE TO THE THESIS 
Arbitration agreements must meet specific requirements of formal and substantive 
validity. While the formal requirements are determined by specific arbitration 
provisions, ' the substantive requirements of validity of arbitration agreements are 
governed by ordinary principles of contract law. 2 As a rule, any individual or 
corporate body validly entering into an arbitration agreement becomes a party 
thereto. 3 In effect, the question of whether a person is a party to an arbitration 
agreement is relevant to principles of contract rather than arbitration law. Therefore, it 
would be fair to argue that arbitration law becomes pertinent only after contract law 
rules have irrevocably determined which parties are contractually bound by an 
arbitration agreement. 
Naturally, thus, the discussion about which persons are bound by an arbitration 
agreement in accordance with principles of contract law is only peripheral to this 
study, which principally focuses on jurisdictional issues related to arbitration rather 
than contract law. Although the issue of substantive validity of arbitration agreements 
and the requirement of consent, in particular, are touched upon in many chapters, the 
scope of the thesis goes beyond them. 
For example United Nations Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, at New York, 1958 (hereafter NY Convention) Art. I1(2), or English Arbitration Act 1996 
(hereafter EAA) s. 5, UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (hereafter 
Model Law) art. 7(2) etc. 
2 J. Lew, L. Mistelis and S. Kroell, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration. (Kluwer Law 
International 2003), para 7-34 et seq; G. A. Born. International Commercial Arbitration, (Kluwer 
Law International 2°d ed. 2001), chapter 3: Williston, On Contracts, (4th ed), ed. R. Lord, 
(WestGroup 2001) para 57: 1. 
Russell, On Arbitration, D. Sutton, J. Gill. M. Gearing (23d ed. Sweet & Maxwell London 2007), 
para 3-002. 
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Nonetheless, it would be useful to look briefly into some particular types of parties, 
whose status in relation to arbitration agreements is not clear. This is in particular the 
case for a 
" Principal, when an arbitration agreement is concluded by an agent 
" Assignee, after the assignment of an arbitration agreement 
" Consignee in a bill of lading containing an arbitration agreement 
" Successor in a contract containing an arbitration agreement 
The above types of persons are sometimes incorrectly regarded as `third parties'. 
However, as this section shows a principal, an assignee, a consignee and a successor 
should be considered genuine rather than third parties to arbitration agreements, since 
they are contractually bound by the arbitration agreements by reference to rules of 
contract law. Here, the term "genuine party" equally applies to persons who have not 
personally concluded an arbitration agreement, but who nevertheless are bound by it 
in accordance with general principles of contract law. More specifically. 
1.1 AGENCY - REPRESENTATION 
Here the position is reasonably straightforward. It is a well-established principle in 
the theory of contract law that the person in whose name and on whose behalf the 
contract was made is bound by all the rights and obligations deriving from this 
contract. 4 An agent is not ordinarily liable under the contract he executes on behalf of 
his principal, so long as his agency is disclosed. ' 
This fundamental principle of agency will equally apply to arbitration agreements. As 
is generally accepted both by legal discourse and case law, it is the principal rather 
than the agent who is entitled to enforce an agreement to arbitrate by referring the 
dispute to arbitration in his own name. 6 It is clear, thus, that the principal becomes the 
4 Bowstead and Reynolds. On Agency. 17`h ed. (Sweet & Maxwell London 2001), p. 67 
The agent will be personally liable only in case it has undertaken an independent duty, see 
Westmoreland v Sadoux, 299 F. 3d 462 (5th Cir. 2002); Intel-bras Cavman Co. v Orient Victory 
Shipping Co., S. A., 663 F. 2d 4,6-7 (2nd Cir. 1981); A/S Custodia, 503 F. 2d at 320; Carl Fisser and 
Martha Fisser v International Bank, F. 2d 231 (2°d Cit. 1960) at 233-38; Keystone Shipping Co. v 
Textport Oil Co. 782 F. Supp. 28, (NrYDC 1992) at 31-32. 
6 P. Fouchard. E. Galliard and B. Goldman. On International Commercial Arbitration, E. Gaillard and 
J. Savage (eds. ) (Kluwer Law International 1999), para. 498: M. Mustill and S. Boyd, Commercial 
Arbitration. (2nd ed. Butterworths London-Edinburgh 1989 and 2001 Companion) p. 136; Domke, 
On Commercial Arbitration, (NY 1993) p. 125.; Williston, supra n. 2, para 57: 19. 
For case law in the US see Berlage Co. i Littlejohn & Co., 20 App Div 2d 697,698,247 NYS2d 58, 
60, affd 15 NY2d 530,254 NY2d 122,202 NE 2d 566 (1964): Rieger v Elco Coat Co., 34Misc 2d 
359,228 NYS2d 242 (1962): David 1, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 440 N. W. 2d 
269 (N. D. 1989): Westmoreland v Sadoux. 299 F. 3d 462 (5th Cir. 2002); Merrill Lynch Inv. 
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genuine party to the arbitration agreement from the time this agreement is concluded, 
while the agent is in essence a third party thereto. 
1.2. ASSIGNMENT 
Although was disputed for some time, it is generally accepted nowadays that 
arbitration agreements can be transferred by way of assignment. ' Thus, after the 
assignment of the main contract including the arbitration agreement is completed, the 
assignee is entitled to enforce the arbitration agreement on its own name and in its 
own right. In other words, the assignee becomes a genuine party to the arbitration 
agreement. This is the view taken by the courts in several countries. This is for 
example the case in England, 8 the USA, 9 France, 1° Switzerland" and other 
jurisdictions. '` 
Managers v Optibase, Ltd 337 F. 3d 125 (2"a Circ 2003); Contra Pritzker v Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith, Inc. 7 F. 3d 1110 (3rd Cir 1993) holding that not only the principal was bound under 
terms of a valid arbitration clause but also its agents, employees, and representatives. 
In France it also is accepted that the principal rather than the agent is bound by an arbitration 
agreement, see Cass. 2e civ., Oct. 14,1987, Ampafrance v. Wasteels, 1988 Rev. Arb. 288, with note 
J. -L. Goutal. 
The same is accepted in arbitral case law: ICC award case no 6519 of 1991,118 (1991) JD. I 
(Clunet) 1065. 
In England, see Charles M Willie v Ocean Laser Shipping [1999] 1 Lloyd's Re. 225, for an example 
of the relationship between agent and principal in the context of arbitration. 
See, in general, D. Girsberger and C. Hausmaninger, "Assignment of Rights and Agreement to 
Arbitrate", (1992) 8 Arb Int'l 121; S. Jagusch and A. Sinclair, "The Impact of Third Parties on 
International Arbitration -Issues of Assignment" in L. Mistelis and J. Lew (eds), Pervasive Problems 
in International Arbitration, (Kluwer Law International 2006) Chapter 15; see also VV Veeder 
"Towards a possible solution: Limitation, Interest and Assignment in London and Paris", in A. van 
den Berg (ed) Planning Efficient Arbitration Proceedings: The Law Applicable to Arbitration, 
(ICCA Congress Series No. 7, Kluwer Law Arbitration International 1996) p. 268 et seq. 
8 At one time English courts considered arbitration agreements as personal covenants, rejecting the 
possibility of their assignment: Cottage Club Estates v Woodside Estates, [1928] 2KB 463. This 
position changed in Aspell v Seymour [1929] W. N. 152 and Shayler v Woolf, [1946] Ch 320, were 
courts recognized arbitration agreement's assignability. This was further accepted in Montedipe v 
JTP-Ro Jugotanker (The Jordan Nicolov), [1990] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 11 and in Schiffahrtsgesellschaft 
Dedlev Von Appen v Voest Apline Trading, [1997] 2Lloyd's Rep 279; however, see the recent The 
London Steamship Owners v Bombay Trading (The Felicie) [1990] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 21, where Phillips 
J expressed doubts about the assignability of arbitration agreements: "I am driven to the conclusion 
that there is no wholly satisfactory explanation for the basis upon which [... ] by assignment inter 
parses the transferee acquires the right and obligation to arbitrate in his own name". Note that under 
English law (s. 82(2) Arbitration Act) the assignee is considered to be a person "claiming under or 
through a party to the [arbitration] agreement" (although in essence the assignee claims instead (in 
place on rather than under or through the assignor): see also R. Merkin, Arbitration Law, (Lloyd's 
London 1991), para. l. 37 and 2.33; Mustill and. Boyd, supra n. 6, p. 137 et seq. 
Star-Kist Foods v Diakian Hope, 423 F. Supp. 1220 (C. D. Ca 1976); Asset Allocation and Management 
v Western Employer, 892 F. 2d 566 (7th Cir. 1989); Asset Allocation and Management v Western 
Employer, 892 F. 2d 566 (7th Cir. 1989). 
10 Cour de cassation. 5 January 1999, Banque Worms v Bellot, (2000) Rev. Arb. 85, with note Mayer; 
Cour de cassation, 8 February 2000, Soc. Taurus Films v les Films du Jeudi, (2000) Rev. Arb. 280, 
with note Gautier: u la clause d'arbitrage international s'impose ä toute partie venant aux droits de 
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However, unlike the principal, the assignee becomes a genuine party to an 
arbitration agreement only after the assignment of the arbitration agreement is 
completed rather than from the time of its conclusion. It is the assignor who is the 
original real party to the arbitration agreement. However, according to the most 
convincing view, once the assignment is completed, the assignor ceases to be a party 
to an arbitration agreement, 13 since he also ceases to be a party to the substantive 
contract containing the arbitration agreement. 14 
The same applies to the case of an arbitration agreement contained in a bill of 
lading. Here, a consignee, according to the prevailing view, is considered an assignee 
of the shipper. 15 Accordingly, the former by holding the bill of lading becomes the 
new genuine party to the arbitration agreement incorporated thereto, taking the place 
of the shipper. 
Fun des contractants) [... ] la convention d'arbitrage stipulee dans le mandat [... ] devait recevoir 
application ä 1'egard des mandataires substitues» ; Cour d'appel de Paris, 28 January 1988, (1988) 
Rev Arb 565; Cour d'appel de Paris, 25 November 1999, SA Burkinabe des ciments et materiaux v 
soc. Des ciments d 'Abidjan, (2001) Rev Arb 165; see also Delebecque, "La transmission de la clause 
compromissoire", 1991 Rev. Arb. 19,26 arguing that arbitration agreements are incidental to the 
substantial claims. 
See cases of Swiss Tribunal Federal: Muller v Bossard, (1977) 103 II AFT 75, and Clear Star v 
Centromor, (1991) 8(2) J Int Arb 21. 
12 The same is accepted in Sweden, see for example, Sweden Supreme Court of Sweden, Oct. 15 1997, 
MS Emja Braack Shiffahrts v Wärtsilä Diesel Aktiebolag, (1998) Rev Arb 431, with note Jarvin, and 
in Greece ATI 176/1976, (1976) NoB 706; EcpA8 4830/1977, (1978) Eid 720; EcpA6 1343/1995, 
(1998) A 473, and, Mavraxou, H Karapricrl iris wptpwvias dtata)7uiac 6zrl Ate6vti . ava2Aayii, 
(ABijva 1998), p. 260. 
13 See Read v Brown (1889) LR 22 QBD 128; The Jordan Nicolov, supra n. 8; See also Jagusch- 
Sinclair, supra n. 7, para 15-22. However, there is US authority, holding that the assignor may still 
enforce the arbitration agreement against its original co-contractor, on the condition that the assignee 
would be the person entitled to any rights arising out of the award American Renaissance Lines v 
Saxis, 502 F2d 674 (CA2 1974). Cf also Lew-Mistelis-Kroell, supra n. 2, par. 7-57, arguing that the 
extent to which the assignor remains bound by the arbitration agreement is primarily an issue of 
interpreting the arbitration agreement. 
It is the assignee, rather than the assignor or both jointly, that will be liable vis-ä-vis its original co- 
contractor after the assignment. See The Jordan Nicolov, supra n. 8, Hobhouse J: "The legal 
assignment extinguishes the legal cause of action of the assignor against the party liable so that the 
assignor cannot thereafter himself ask for an award against the party liable" and "... a joint award 
could not be right since on any view there was no joint right in the plaintiffs, ie the charterers and 
insurers; only one or the other could be entitled to an award". 
15 Cf R. Goode, Commercial Law, 2nd ed. (Penguin 1995), p. 1075: "... the consignee or indorsee 
becomes the statutory assignee of the shipper's rights under the carriage contract... " (referring to 
both Bills of lading Act 1855, s. land Carriage of Goods by Sea 1992, s. 2). See Also Remond- 
Gouilloud. "Des Clauses de Connaissements Maritimes Attribuant Competence ä une Juridiction 
etrangere; Essai de Demystification", (1995) DMF 339. 
For the various theories regarding the legal nature of a consingee see Rodiere, Traite General de 
droit Maritime, Affr- Cement et Transport, (1968) par 408; Rodiere et du Pontavice, Droit Maritime, 
11' ed (Precis Dalloz 1991) par 359; Remond-Gouilloud. Droit Maritime, 2e ed (1993) par 610; note 
Goutal on Mediterranean Shipping. (1995) Rev Arb, at 624. 
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1.3 SUCCESSION - NOVATION16 
Here the position is also relatively straightforward. Whenever a person succeeds 
either by law or by contract in the rights and obligations of another person, who is a 
party to an arbitration agreement, the former becomes the new party to that arbitration 
agreement. 17 As in the case of assignment, here the original party cannot enforce the 
arbitration agreement, as he no longer has any status in the contractual relationship. '8 
Thus, a successor takes the place of the original party to the arbitration agreement and 
becomes a genuine party thereto. 19 
1.4 SPECIFIC CONSENT TO ARBITRATE AND GENUINE PARTIES TO 
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS 
Agency, assignment and succession are sometimes wrongfully considered as cases 
involving third parties. 20 However, as was explained, a principal, an assignee, a 
consignee and a successor are genuine parties to an arbitration agreement by reference 
to rules of contract law. These persons become parties to the substantive contract and, 
therefore, genuine parties to the arbitration agreement included therein. Thus, the 
question of whether these persons are entitled to take part to arbitration proceedings is 
effectively a matter of consent which will be exclusively determined by rules of 
contract law and general principles of contract interpretation. In this discussion, 
arbitration law is largely irrelevant. 
In this discussion, the only question pertinent to arbitration law is whether separate 
consent to arbitrate is required for the above persons to be bound by the arbitration 
agreement in the main contract, or general consent to the main contract as a whole 
would suffice. Here, arbitration principles such as the principle of `separability' or the 
principle of `autonomy of arbitration agreements' will come into play. According to 
Novation is a contract that transfers both rights and obligations from one of the original parties to a 
new party, whereas an assignment is a contract where the original party transfers only contractual 
rights. 
See Smith v Pearl Assurance co Ltd, [1939] 1 All ER 95; Oakland Metal co Ltd vD Benaim d, Co 
Ltd, [1953] 2 Lloyd's Rep 192; Socony, Mobil Oil Co Ltd v West of England Ship Owners Mutual 
Insurance Association Ltd (The Padre Island) [1984] 2 Loyd's Rep 408. 
Mustill and Boyd, supra n. 6 p. 137; the same B. Hanotiau, Complex Arbitrations, Multiparty, Multi- 
contract, Multi-issue and Class Actions. (Kluwer Law International 2005) para 35; The same has 
been held in arbitral case law: see for example ICC award no. 7154 of 1993,121 JDI (Clunet) 1059. 
19 Cf Damon Compania Naviera S. A. v Hapag-Lloyd International S. A. (The Blankenstein), [1985] 1 
Lloyd's Rep. 93; [1985] 1 W. L. R. 435. 
20 See for example, Mustill and Boyd, supra n. 6, dealing with agency, succession and assignment under 
"Chapter 8: Arbitration and Third Parties". 
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one view, evidence for distinct intention to arbitrate of a principal, an assignee etc is 
required rather than just evidence for general intention to be bound by the main 
contract. 21 Otherwise, this view argues, the principles of separability and `autonomy 
of arbitration agreements' would be violated, and the independent status of the 
arbitration agreement from the main contract would be undermined. 
However, the prevailing view in arbitration is that general consent of the above 
persons to the whole transaction would be enough for them to become parties to the 
arbitration agreement too. This is especially the case with regard to assignment where 
the rule of "automatic transfer of the arbitration agreement" seems to prevail in the 
context of international transactions, in particular. 22 According to this rule an 
See for example Cour de cassation, 6 November 1990, Fraser v Compagnie Euorpeene de Petroles, 
(1991) Rev Arb., p. 73, holding that: 
"an arbitration clause remains subject to the principles of privity of contracts and cannot 
therefore circulate in a chain of contracts, unless the parties have expressly provided 
otherwise" (translation by the author) 
The same was held by the Paris Cour d'appel, 22 March 1995, SMABTP v Statinor, (1997) Rev Arb., 
p. 550 in the context of assignment; cf also Article 1989 of the French Civil Code that forbids the 
agent to bind the principle with an arbitration agreement unless there is express mandate for that: 
"an agent may act only within the scope of its mandate, and the power to settle disputes does 
not confer a power to enter into arbitration agreements". (" Le mandataire ne peut rien faire au 
delä de ce qui est pone dans son mandat; le pouvoir de transiger ne renferme pas celui de 
compromettre" note that in French "compromettre" means both "reach a settlement" and 
"agree to resort to arbitration"). 
For the US see Lachmar v Trunklin LNG, 753 F 2d 8 (2d Cir 1985). 
For arbitral case law, see the Award of the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission of the USSR 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 9 July 1984, All Union Foreign Trade Association 
("Sojuzneftexport") v Joc Oil Ltd, (1993) XVIII YBCA, p. 92. 
Lew Mistelis and Kroell, supra n. 2, par. 7-52 and see also Jagusch and Sinclair, supra n. 7, para 15- 
50; cf. however, Girsberger- Hausmaninger, supra n. 7, p. 136, who argue that a uniform international 
substantive rule on this issue does not exist; see also Fouchard-Galliard-Goldman, supra n. 6, par. 707 
et seq., who argue that on the one hand the express acceptance of the assignee is required for the 
completion of the assignment, but on the other hand that this express acceptance should be presumed. 
In the context of agency, Fouchard Galliard and Goldman argue that a liberal approach should be 
taken so that a general authorization to the main contract would suffice for principal to be bound by 
the arbitration agreement signed by the principal, supra n. 6, para 468. 
In England, see The Jordan Nicolov, supra n. 8, "... the assignee is bound by the arbitration clause in 
the sense that he cannot assert the assigned right without also accepting the obligation to arbitrate". 
In the US see for example the Star-Kist Foods v Diakian Hope, supra n. 9; Asset Allocation and 
Management v Western Employer, supra n. 9; contra Lachmar v Trunline, 753 F. 2d 8 (2d Cir. 1985), 
on the basis that an arbitration agreement confers duties as well as rights, requiring the acceptance of 
the co-contractor. In Switzerland, for example, see the Clear Star case, supra n. 11. In France, for 
example, see Cour de cassation. Banque Worms v Bellot and Cour d'appel de Paris, SA Burkinabe 
des ciments et materiaux v soc. Des ciments d' Ahidian, supra n. 10: «une cession de creance ou de 
contrat implique necessairement la transmission par le cedant au cessionaire du benefice dee la 
clause compromissoire, laquelle est indissociable de 1'economie du contrat initial».... (contra Fraser 
v Compagnie europeene des Petrles, 6 November 1990, (1991) Rev Arb. p. 73 where the Cour de 
cassation held that an arbitration agreement. contained in a contract between an intermediate seller 
and its buyer in a chain sale could not be enforced by former against the ultimate buyer who had not 
accepted whatsoever the arbitration clause); the same view in Delebecque. "La transmission de la 
Clause Compromissoire". (1991) Rev Arb. p. 25. In Sweden, for example, see MS Emja Braack 
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arbitration agreement, due to its subsidiary character is transferred automatically to an 
assignee alongside the substantive rights of the contract. 23 The rule of automatic 
assignment effectively means that no specific consent of an assignee to arbitrate is 
required. An assignee will be bound by an arbitration agreement automatically. 
Otherwise it would possible for the assignee to escape an otherwise valid arbitration 
clause unilaterally by the mere fact of the assignment. 24 Similarly, no previous 
consent of a debtor to arbitrate with the specific assignee is required either. 
Therefore, a debtor cannot argue that it has agreed to arbitrate specifically with the 
assignor "but not with some outsider". 25 The automatic transfer of an arbitration 
agreement can only be prevented if the latter has been concluded in view of a specific 
assignor (intuitu personae). However, arbitration agreements are in general 
considered not to be personal covenants (intuitu personae). 26 
The rule of "automatic transfer of the arbitration agreement" applies equally to 
bills of lading. Although there is a view arguing that a consignee must be aware of the 
arbitration agreement and must specifically accept the arbitration agreememnt before 
he takes delivery of the goods, 27 the prevailing view dispenses with the prior consent 
Shiffahrts v Wärtsilä Diesel Aktiebolag, supra n. 12. In Greece. a decision of a court of first instance, 
IIoý, AB 2690/1976, (1977) NoB 220, held in obider that a notice to debtor rather than the consent of 
the debtor would suffice. 
23 The intuitu personae arbitration clause can either be provided expressly in the contract or be inferred 
from the factual circumstances surrounding the contract, see Fouchard Galliard and Goldman, supra 
n. 6, para 720 et seq. An arbitration agreement could be intutu personae for example when an 
arbitration agreement provides for a personal appointment of an arbitrator by the assignor. see 
Corbin, On Contracts, (1951 Supplement 1991) par. 892. See also the US cases Star-Kist Foods v 
Diakian Hope, supra n. 9; Asset Allocation and Management v Western Employer, supra n. 9. See also 
the position taken by the Swiss Tribunal Federal in: Muller v Bossard, and Clear Star, supra n. I I., 
which, in the context of assignment, reaffirmed the ancillary; character of the arbitration agreement to 
the substantive rights and held that a conditional prohibition of the assignment of the substantive 
rights was also covering the arbitration agreement; in the same vein, Werner, "Jurisdiction of 
Arbitrators in Case of Assignment of an Arbitration Clause", (1991) 8(2) JInt Arb, p. 13. Cf also the 
Shayler v Woolf, supra n. 8, by Lord Greene M. R "the arbitration clause also follows the assignment 
of the subject matter of the contract". 
24 See the MS Emja Braack Shiffahrts v Wärtsilä Diesel Aktiebolag, supra n. 12 and Hosiery Mfg Corp 
v Golston, (1924) 143 NE 779; 238 NY 2d 22; cf Girsberger and Hausmaninger, n. 7, p. 138. 
25 Mustill and Boyd, supra n. 6, p. 138. 
26 See Shayler i' Woolf, supra n. 8, at 324 and the MS Emja Braack Shiiffahrts v Wärtsilä Diesel 
Aktiebolag, supra n. 12; cf Lew, Mistelis and Kroell, supra n. 2, par 7-53 and Jagusch - and Sinclair, 
supra n. 7, para 15-14. 
27 See in the context of arbitration clauses Cour de cassation. Mediterranean Shipping v GAFL 
assurance et autres. 20 June 1995, (1995) Rev Arb 622, with note Goutal who criticizes the decision. 
and Cour de cassation. The navire Stolt Osprey, 29 November 1994, (1995) DMF 218. note Tassel. 
in the context of jurisdiction clauses. In the past, US courts have held, on different grounds, that 
arbitration agreements stipulated in a bill of lading are not opposable to the consignee. The argument 
was that these arbitration agreements were negated by US COGSA s. 3(8), on the ground that they 
were unduly limiting the liability of the shipowner, eg Indussa Corp. i, SS Randborg. 377 F . 
2d 200 
(SC 1967). However. the US courts now take the opposite view. see the following note. 
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of the consignee. 28 Thus, arbitration agreements are transferred to the holder of the 
bill of lading automatically together with the substantive rights on the goods. 
Otherwise, the negotiability and commercial effectiveness of the bill of lading would 
be compromised. 29 
It follows from the above that the principle of separability or "autonomy of 
arbitration agreement" does not create any theoretical difficulties to the automatic 
transfer of the arbitration agreement. In effect, an assignee, a consignee or a successor 
`gets into the shoes' of the original party to the main contract as a whole. Therefore, 
the former assumes the contractual position of the latter in exactly the same terms, 
which of course include the arbitration clause. In all the above cases, the transfer of an 
arbitration agreement is mainly linked with the transfer of the substantive contract 
including the arbitration agreement and, therefore, it remains predominately a 
question of contract law. Accordingly, the thesis will not discuss the issue of `genuine 
parties' to arbitration agreements any further. It will focus on the impact of arbitration 
upon persons not contractually bound by arbitration agreements. The following 
section defines the notion of `third parties' and determines which particular groups of 
persons will be examined by the thesis. 
28 In the US, courts require only the actual notice of the consignee rather than its consent; see for 
example Amoco Oil Co. v. M. T. Mary Ellen, 529 F. Supp. 227 (S. D. N. Y. 1981); Vimar Seguros v 
Reaseguros S. A v Shy Reefer. 29 F. 3d 727 (1994 U. S. App. ); affirm. by 515 U. S. 528 (U. S. S. C. 
1995) Japan Sun Oil v M/V Maasdijk, 864 F. Supp. 561 (U. S. Dist. 1995); Japan Sun Oil v M/V 
Maasdijk, 864 F. Supp. 561 (U. S. Dist. 1995). 
In England see The Rena K [1978] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 545 The Nerano [1994] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 50, upheld 
[1996] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 1 (C. A. ); The Delos [2001] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 703. 
The same in Greece, (02, )A17 8/1996. (1997) EEµnO 85; (OX)AII 236/1986,17 EEµnA 290; E pBc 
1602/1983.25 EEµtO 311. 
The same view has been taken by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the context of jurisdiction 
clauses: 19 June 1984, C-71/1983, Partenreederei Tilh" Russ v Haven, [1984] ECR 2417. 
29 See note Goutal on the Mediterranean Shipping, above note, at p. 626. Cf also Remond and 
Gouilloud, supra n. 15. 
ý- 
CHAPTER 2: THE NOTION OF FALSE THIRD PARTIES 
Chapter 2: The notion of False third parties ............................................................. 
28 
2.1 Different groups of false third parties ............................................................. 
29 
2.2 String construction contracts ........................................................................... 
32 
2.3 Web-type construction contracts ..................................................................... 
41 
2.4 Guarantees and other security agreements ...................................................... 
43 
2.5 Several companies with close corporate links: the case of the "group of 
companies" in particular ........................................................................................ 
49 
Conclusions of Part I ................................................................................................ 
55 
As already mentioned, not every third party falls under the scope of this work. The 
thesis focuses on "false third parties", i. e. third parties with an interest in the dispute 
between two other persons bound by an arbitration agreement. 
False third parties are typically found in the context of multiparty contractual 
relationships, which are jurisdictionally fragmented. Jurisdictional fragmentation 
occurs when several parties involved in a single commercial project conclude 
different bilateral dispute resolution agreements. Thus, a person participating in a 
multiparty commercial project may be left unable to participate in the arbitration 
proceedings between two other persons involved in the same project, if the former is 
not party to the arbitration agreement binding the latter. In other words, persons with 
an active role and a significant interest in a project might not be able to take part in 
the resolution of the dispute arising out of the project, the outcome of which might 
affect their own interests. These persons cannot take part in the determination of the 
dispute since they are not parties to the arbitration agreement, which has exclusively 
been concluded between two other persons (genuine parties). Nevertheless these 
persons are not strangers to the dispute between the genuine parties, as they are 
closely involved in the execution of the project from which the dispute arises. Hence, 
they can be named false third parties. 
This chapter examines in detail the notion of false third parties. The analysis takes 
a substantive viewpoint, focusing on the contractual rights, duties and liabilities of the 
several parties involved the same commercial project. From this substantive 
perspective, the chapter distinguishes between two different groups of false third 
parties: those who share the same rights, duties and liabilities with the genuine parties 
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to the arbitration, and those who are merely contractually interrelated with them. It 
will be shown that the interests of the former group in the arbitration between the two 
genuine parties are stronger and, thus, more relevant than the interests of the latter 
group. Furthermore, the chapter looks into each of the two groups in detail and 
presents some typical examples of false third parties. These typical examples are used 
throughout the thesis as case studies in order to test and demonstrate its main 
arguments. 
The emphasis on the substantive status of the parties is a key point for this work. 
As will be argued in Part III, there is a direct relevance between the substantive and 
the jurisdictional status of the several persons in a multiparty commercial relationship: 
the closer the several persons are associated in substantive terms the less likely is for 
them to be separated in terms of jurisdiction. Whenever several persons constitute a 
substantive unit, they should also be regarded as a jurisdictional unit, and, therefore, 
they should be subject to the jurisdiction of a single adjudicatory forum. Therefore, 
the findings on the interests of false third parties and their substantive association with 
genuine parties will provide the conceptual basis for the final suggestions of the thesis 
regarding the impact of arbitration on third parties. In fact, the analysis performed 
here provides the groundwork for the whole thesis. 
2.1 DIFFERENT GROUPS OF FALSE THIRD PARTIES 
Depending on how closely they are associated with the genuine parties, in terms of 
interests and liability, the false third parties may be distinguished in the following two 
groups: 
The first group includes persons that are strongly associated with a genuine party 
to an arbitration agreement or arbitral proceedings, in terms of contractual interests 
and liability. Here, genuine and false third party will have concurrent interests in the 
pending dispute and the commercial project they are both involved in. In particular, 
genuine and false third party will usually be co-liable or co-holders of rights or duties 
(community of rights and liability). They will typically be joint or joint and severally 
liable vis-ä-vis the other genuine party to the arbitration proceedings. ' These two 
Joint or indivisible rights or obligations may occur in two cases. First, when the object of the 
obligation cannot be actually divided; this is the case, for example. when two persons undertake the 
same obligation with regard to the same property. Second. when the parties have expressly agreed to 
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types of liability, joint and joint and several, are similar in that in both cases the co- 
promisors are jointly rather than cumulatively liable, so that the performance of the 
obligation by one promisor will discharge all them. 2 It should be noted however, that 
the terms "joint" and "joint and several liability" have a very strict technical meaning 
which varies, sometimes significantly, from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Thus, for the 
purposes of the thesis, which adopts an international viewpoint, reference to `joint' or 
`joint and several' liability should be should be understood as a reference to 'co- 
liability'. Typical examples of this group are: 
" Co-holders of rights in property3 
" Partners in a legal entity4 
" Persons involved in the making and transfer of the same negotiable instrument 
(e. g. promissory notes, bills of exchange, bonds etc). 5 
undertake an obligation jointly. In either case, each of the promisors is liable for the whole 
performance. For more details on joint obligations: 
In England, see Halsbury's, Laws of England, (Lexis Nexis Butterworths 2007), para 1080; 
In the US, see Restatement (Second) Contracts, para 289; 
In France see Bacache in Rep. Civ. Dalloz (2007), Indivisibilite, art. 1217-1225, cf also French Code 
Civil art. 1217 «L'obligation est divisible ou indivisible selon qu'elle a pour objet ou une chose qui 
dans sa livraison, ou un fait qui daps ]'execution, est ou n'est pas susceptible de division, soit 
materielle, soit intellectuelle >>. 
On the other hand, joint and several liability arises when two or more persons join in the same 
instrument in making a promise to the same person, and at the same time each of them individually 
makes the same promise to that same promisee. Joint and several liability is similar to joint liability 
in that the co-promisors are not cumulatively liable, so that the performance of the obligation by one 
promisor will discharge all them. 
For more details on joint and several liability: 
In England, see Haisbury's, ibid, para. 1079. 
In the US, see Restatement (Second) of Contracts, para 288. 
In France, see Tourneau and Julien, in Rep. Civ. Dalloz (2007), Solidarite ; cf also Code Civil art. 
1197 <<I obligation est solidaire entre plusieurs creancier lorsque le titre donne expressement ä 
chacun d'eux le droit de demander le payement du total de la creance, et que la payement fait a Fun 
d'eux libere le debiteur, encore que le benefice de ]'obligation soit partageable et divisible entre les 
divers creanciers ». 
2 See Halsbury's, ibid. para 1079. 
3 For example, two purchasers of real property will joint and several obligors under the agreement of 
sale, see Converse vJames, 89 Hawai'i 461,974 P. 2d 1051, (Hawaii App. 1997). 
In France a typical example of such type of liability will come from when several people share 
property rights, such as servitutes reelles (real servitude i. e. a burden imposed upon one estate in 
favor of another estate of another proprietor). 
4 For example. in the US, section 15 of the Uniform Partnership Act provides that partners are liable 
jointly and severally for tort or breach of trust, but jointly on partnership contracts: see also Bullis v Bear, Stearns & Co Inc, 553 N. W. 2d 599 (Iowa 1996). 
In England see the Partnership Act 1890 s 9, The liability of the partners of a firm on contracts 
entered into by the firm is joint, not joint and several cf also Halsbury's, supra n. l. para 1083. 
5 For example. the maker, the acceptor or drawer or indorser of the same negotiable instrument. 
In the US. see section 3-118(e) of the Uniform Commercial Code that provides that "unless the 
instrument otherwise specifies" two or more persons who sign commercial paper as maker. acceptor 
or drawer or indorser and as part of the same transaction are jointly and severally liable. 
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The second group includes persons that are contractually linked but not strongly 
associated with a genuine party to an arbitration agreement or arbitration proceedings, 
in terms of contractual interests and liability. Here, genuine and false third party will 
have related but not concurrent interests in the pending dispute and the commercial 
project they are both involved in. In particular, genuine and false third party will be 
contractually linked but they will not be sharing the same rights or duties. They will 
not be co-liable vis-ä-vis the other genuine party to the arbitration agreement and the 
proceedings. Either they will be liable in the alternative or one of them only will be 
liable vis-ä-vis the other genuine party. Here, the contractual obligations of genuine 
and false third party relate to the same commercial project. However they will assume 
distinct duties to deliver distinct performances. In short, genuine and false third party 
will be "commercial partners" but not co-liable or co-holders of the same rights and 
duties. Consequently, although contractually associated, the degree of their 
association, in terms of contractual interests and liability will be lesser than in the first 
group. 
Typical examples of this group are: 
" Several persons contractually linked by bilateral contracts with regard to 
the same construction project. Here, the several persons may be linked 
o Either, in several string contractual relationships, where for 
example an owner is contractually related with a contractor who in 
turn is contractually related with a subcontractor. 6 
o Or, in web type contractual relationships, where an owner is 
contractually related an architect/engineer, a contractor and a 
financial institution regarding the same construction work. 
" Several persons contractually linked in the context of security agreements. 
A typical example here is the contractual relationships between a creditor, a 
debtor and a guarantor. 
In England, the makers of a promissory note may be liable on it either jointly, or jointly and 
severally, according to the tenor of the note; but the acceptors of a bill of exchange can only be liable 
jointly: see the Bills of Exchange Act 1882 ss 6(2), 85: cfHalsbury's. supra n. l, para 327. 
String contractual relationships can also be found in the context of commercial transactions with 
regard to the same goods: the typical example here would be the consecutive transactions between 
the manufacturer, the wholesaler, the retailer and the consumer. Thus, any suggestion made by the 
thesis in connection to construction string contracts will be equally applicable by analogy to the case 
of string transactions between the manufacturer, the retailer and the consumer. 
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0 Several corporate entities with close corporate links, as for example the 
links between the several companies belonging in the same group. 
Arbitration agreements are very frequently used in the context of all the above 
types of contractual relationships that involve several parties. Naturally, thus, the 
question of whether, for example, a subcontractor will be bound or in some way 
affected by an arbitration agreement or arbitral proceedings between an owner and a 
contractor arises very often. The same question arises 
In the context of web-type construction contracts: will a contractor, for example, 
be bound or affected by an arbitration agreement or proceedings between an owner 
and an architect? 
In the context of security agreements: will a guarantor be bound or affected by an 
arbitration agreement or arbitral proceedings between a debtor and a creditor? 
In the context of several companies with close corporate links: will a parent 
company by bound by an arbitration agreement or proceedings between a subsidiary 
and another party? 
In more general terms, the question here would be whether a false third party (in 
the above scenarios: a subcontractor, a contractor, a guarantor or a parent company 
respectively) would be bound or in any way affected by an arbitration agreement or 
proceedings between the genuine parties? 
These questions are directly relevant to arbitration law and they will be in the heart 
of the discussion in this study. However, the exploration of these questions from an 
arbitration viewpoint requires first an analysis of the substantive status of the several 
parties involved in a commercial multiparty relationship. This is the aim of the 
following sections. 
2.2 STRING CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS 
Due to the increase in specialisation and technology in the construction industry, 
the completion of a construction work will invariably require the participation of more 
than two persons. In a typical construction project several different professionals may 
get involved: an owner, a contractor, a quantity surveyor, a civil or structural 
engineer, an architect, a project manager, a architectural or engineering consultants, 
several subcontractors (e. g. substructure subcontractor, superstructure subcontractor, 
mechanical and electrical subcontractor), suppliers, sureties and others. 
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The above persons will usually get linked in pairs by way of several bilateral 
agreements rather than a singe multilateral one. Typically, the several bilateral 
agreements will take the form of a contractual chain: an owner will enter into a 
contract with a contractor, who in turn will enter into a contract with a subcontractor, 
who may then agree with a supplier or another subcontractor and so on. 
The use of substantial subcontracts has become a general practice in construction 
industry nowadays. The proliferation of subcontracts in the last decades is due to the 
fact that contemporary construction industry becomes geographically dispersed and 
increasingly complex in terms of technology. Construction projects may require 
different types of skills, services and materials from different countries of the world. 
It is more economical for a contractor to employ local specialised subcontractors in 
view of a particular construction project each time than to keep permanently 
employed craftsmen in all of the necessary trades within each region of activity.? The 
use of subcontracts is commercially suitable for an owner too. The latter only needs to 
enter into a single contract and obtain a single price for the whole work. In general, 
the use of several subcontracts is considered more efficient than one multilateral 
contract for the completion of the project. Complicated problems of multiplicity of 
contracts and liability, which would arise if the works were to be carried out by 
various contractors each separately employed by an owner, are avoided by the 
execution of several bilateral contracts. 8 
A subcontractor may either be selected by or agreed with an owner under 
nomination arrangements in the main contract itself (nominated subcontractor), 9 or be 
left to the commercial discretion of the main contractor (domestic subcontractor). 10 
By getting the owner involved in the selection of a subcontractor, the main contractor 
seeks to minimise its own liability for defective work or other failures of the 
performance of the subcontractor. However, as is generally accepted, it is the main 
contractor that will be invariably liable under an express or implied obligation in the 
J. Murdoch and W. Hughes, Construction Contracts. (3`d ed Spon Press 2000), para. 19.1. 
8 Hudson's Building and Engineering Contracts. (11`t' ed Sweet & Maxwell London 1995), para. 13- 
022; see also F. Nicklisch. "Multi-Party Arbitration and Dispute Resolution in Major Industrial 
Projects" (1994) 11(4) J. Int'l. Arb., p. 69 et seq. 
' Hudson's, supra n. 8. para 13-002: I. N. D. Wallace. Construction Contracts: Principles and Policies in 
Tort and Contract, (Sweet & Maxwell London 1986), Ch. 21; Murdoch- Hughes. supra n. 7, para 
20.1 et seq. 
10 Murdoch- Hughes. supra n. 7 para 19.4. 
main contract for any default work performed by subcontractors. " Indeed, under the 
principle of "chain liability" the main contractor, whether or not personally in default, 
remains fully liable to the owner for any default of the sub-contractor. '2 The same 
principle, will in turn entitle the main contractor to hold a defaulting subcontractor 
responsible for his own damages. '3 
In general, it can be argued that the principle of chain liability sums up the delicate 
balance between the several contractual relationships in the case of string contracts: 
although contractually interrelated, the several bilateral contracts maintain a 
substantive degree of autonomy. This is evidenced in more detail by the following. 
On the one hand, the several string contracts are interrelated. Thus, both the 
contract between an owner and a contractor and the one between a contractor and a 
subcontractor have the same subject matter: construction works on the same project. 
The construction work of the specific project is the common denominator of both 
contracts, as it constitutes the commercial cause underpinning both agreements. In 
essence, the subcontract is concluded in view and in the light of the main contract. 
Hence, the main contract and the subcontract very often contain cross-references, 
resulting to a `direct communication' in contractual terms between the two 
agreements. This is achieved by various ways. For example, subcontracts frequently 
incorporate parts of the main contract by way of express reference thereto. 14 Also, 
subcontracts are very often drafted on the same contractual pattern of the main 
contract, a practice called drafting on back-to back terms. Some institutions well 
know in the construction industry have issued standard forms of subcontracts to be 
used in tandem with the standard forms of contracts issued by the same institution. 
For example, the International Federation of Consulting Engineers (FIDIC) has issued 
the FIDIC (Red Book) Conditions of Subcontract to be used back-to-back with the 
provisions of the FIDIC (Red Book) Conditions of Construction Contracts. '5 
Murdoch- Hughes, supra n. 7, para 19.5.2. 
iý Young & Marten Ltd. v McManus Childs Ltd, [1969] 1 AC 454; Hudson's. supra n. 8. para 13-002 et 
seq. 
13 Hudson's, idem: Murdoch - Hughes. supra n. 7, para 19.3. 
14 Without incorporation the terms of the main contract would not apply to the subcontractor, even if 
the terms are well known to both the contractor and the subcontractor. Also, imprecise or generic 
references, such as "the sub-contractor shall be deemed to have notice of all the provisions of the 
main contractor" will not have a full-scale incorporation effect. See Hudson's, surpa n. 8. para 13- 
100 et seq. 
15 The FIDIC (Red Book) Conditions of Construction Contracts is widely used in international 
construction practice and has obtained an international acceptance in the construction industry. It 
provides an international norm or standard by which construction works and contracts are 
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Similarly the Federation of Civil Engineering Contractors (FCEC) has issued a 
standard form of subcontract for use on contracts based on the Conditions of 
Contracts issued by the Institution Civil Engineers (ICE). " 
All these standard forms of subcontract are filled with express references to the 
corresponding standard forms of the main contract. For example, in the FIDIC 
conditions of subcontract: 
" Sub-clause 4.1 provides for the duty of the contractor to provide the 
subcontractor with a copy of the main contract. Sub-clause 4.1 adds that the 
subcontractor shall be deemed to have full knowledge of the main contract 
(except details of the contractor's price) 
" Sub-clause 4.2 provides that the subcontractor shall generally have all the 
obligations and liabilities of the contractor under the main contract in 
relation to the subcontract works. In particular it reads: 
"save where the provisions of the Subcontract otherwise require, the 
Subcontractor shall so design (to the extent provided for by the 
subcontract), execute and complete the Subcontract Works and 
remedy any defects therein that no act or omission of his in relation 
thereto shall constitute cause or contribute to any breach by the 
Contractor of any of his obligations under the Main contact. The 
Subcontractor shall, save as aforesaid, assume and perform 
hereunder all the obligations and liabilities of the Contractor under 
the Main Contract in relation to the Subcontract Works" 
" Subclause 7. provides that when the subcontractor is delayed in the 
execution of the subcontract works, he shall be entitled to extension of time 
for completion if the delay is due to any circumstances in regard to which 
the Contractor is entitled to receive an extension of his time for completion 
of the Main Work under the Main Contrac 
" Subclause 7.3 provides that the main contractor has to notify the 
subcontractor of all extensions of time obtained under the main contract, 
which affect the subcontract17 
determined. Thus. even when it is not incorporated into a particular contract it is generally accepted 
as a point of reference in construction contracts and works. 
See also the Joint Contracts Tribunals (JCT) standard conditions of subcontract issued for use on 
contracts based on Intermediate Form of Building Contracts (IFC) 98. 
;; 
9 Also Clause 8 and 9 of the FIDIC subcontract provide that, as regards 
instructions and variations, the subcontractor shall have similar rights and 
duties vis-ä-vis the contractor to those owed by the contractor vis-ä-vis the 
employer. 
Moreover, significant rights or duties of the subcontractor vis-ä-vis the contractor 
are often hinged upon rights and duties of the latter vis-ä-vis the employer. For 
example, the liability of the main contractor to make payments to subcontractor is 
frequently conditioned upon the certification of the sums in question by the owner's 
architect or engineer under the terms of the main contract. "A In the same vein, 
architects often indicate in their certificates for interim payments to the main 
contractor what proportion of the sums so certified is referable to nominated 
subcontractors. 19 
In addition, it is not unusual that the subcontract will contain "pay if and when 
paid" clauses, which provide that the subcontractor will be entitled to be paid the 
balance of the subcontract price only if and when the contractor has been paid by the 
employer under the main contract. This kind of clauses are rightly criticised and are 
expressly excluded by some standard forms of subcontracts, including the FIDIC 
subcontract provisions for example. 2° This is because "pay if and when paid" clauses 
largely hinder ultimate recovery of the subcontractor and totally shift the risk of the 
employer becoming insolvent to the latter who is not a in contractual terms with the 
employer. 21 Nevertheless, they are not unusual in the construction industry, especially 
in construction subcontracts in the countries of South-east Asia. -'- 
Although in principle no privity exists between the employer and the 
subcontractor, there are cases where either person will be entitled to a direct 
J. Winter "The FIDIC Conditions of Subcontract and the UK FCEC `Blue Form' of contract", (1997) 
14 ICLR. p. 435, who argues that by virtue of this provision any extension of the main contract 
should automatically extend the subcontract too, although this is not expressly provided in the 
provision. 
Hudson's. supra n. 8 para 13-108. 
19 Hudson's, ibid, para 13-121. 
20 See Sub-clause 16.5. 
21 The crucial question here is whether "the pay if and when paid" clauses hinge the liability of the 
main contractor vis-ä-vis the sub-contractor upon the payment of the former by the owner. see 
further on this, Hudson's supra n. 8, para 13-108 et seq and Murdoch -Hughes, supra n. 7, para 
19.6.1: the prevailing view in the US case law is that such clauses do not mean that the subcontractor 
will be paid if the main contractor is ever paid. This construction is accepted in order to ameliorate 
the consequences of such clauses. see for example Thomas J Dyer co i' Bishop katernational 
Engineering Co.. 303 F 2d 655 (1962). 
22 Murdoch - Hughes. supra n. 8 para 19.6.1. 
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contractual claim against the other. For example, the main contract may expressly 
provide that the employer has to pay the subcontractor directly, deducting the sums 
paid from the amount due to the main contractor. 23 Such a contractual provision will 
give the subcontractor the right to sue the employer directly. The same will apply, 
whenever the applicable substantive law expressly provides that the employer may be 
directly liable to the subcontractor. This is the case under French law24 and the law of 
some of the countries influenced by French law. 25 
Similarly, the employer will be entitled to a direct contractual claim26 against the 
subcontractor, in case the latter provides the employer with a direct warranty on the 
work. 27 Direct warranties are often provided in construction contracts and are even 
included in some standards forms of contraction contract. 28 Faced with an action from 
the employer, the subcontractor may raise defences arising out of the contract 
between the contractor and the subcontractor, or even defences arising out of the main 
contract between the contractor and the employer. 29 
The contractual interrelation between the main contract and the subcontract means 
that a dispute arising out of the former is likely to refer to the same factual and legal 
issues as a dispute arising out of latter. Thus, for example, the issue of causation or 
liability will probably arise in both disputes. Likewise, defects or delay in the work of 
the subcontractor will affect the liability of the contractor vis-ä-vis the employer, and 
23 Hudson's, supra n. 8 para 13-12 1. 
24 Law No. 75-1334 of December 31,1975. See further on this, C. Seppala, "French Law on 
Subcontracting" [1991] ICLR, p. 78. 
In Swiss law see F Chaix and S. Marchand, "The right of Recourse of an Employer against a 
Subcontractor", (1998) 15 ICLR, p. 21: there is no specific provision in Swiss law providing for a 
direct claim/relationship, but they argue that the Code of Obligations art. 339(3) ("if the agent has 
assigned the obligation to a third person (... ) the Principal may bring any claims which he has 
against his agent directly against the third person") regulating the relationships between agent- 
principal and the third party should be applied by analogy to the contractors for work and materials. 
25 See for example, Algerian Code art. 565, Egyptian Code art. 662, Libyan Code art. 661. 
26 The other option will be of course that the employer files tort claims against the subcontractor, in 
which case the employer must establish that the subcontractor owes him a duty of care, see in 
Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd, [1994] 3 All ER 506 HL; Halsbury's, supra n. 1, para 48 and 
Hudson's, supra n. 8, para 13-042 et seq. 
27 Greater Nottingham Co-operative Society Ltd. r Cementation [1988] Q. B. 71; see also Halsbury's, 
supra n. l. para 47 and Chaix - Marchand. supra n. 24. p. 227. According to Hudson the direct 
warranties provided by the subcontractor to the employer entirely subvert the no-privity subcontract 
objective of the English nomination system. Hudson's. supra n. 8 para 13-055. 
The same will apply when the manufacturer provides for warranty in the context of string contracts 
regarding the same goods. 
26 See for example in the RINA/JTC standard form: "execution sans defaut". 
29 However, the subcontractor cannot invoke the defences based on the personal relationship between 
the contractor and subcontractor. see Chaix - Marchand. supra n. 24. p. 223 et seq. 
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the amount of damages owed by him against the employer. 30 In case the contractor is 
found liable for works actually constructed by the subcontractor, the former will most 
likely sue the latter. It follows, that the interests of the contractor and the 
subcontractor in the project and the outcome of the proceedings between the 
contractor and the employer are closely related. 
On the other hand, the several string contracts remain distinct. As a matter of 
principle there is no privity between the employer and the subcontractor. 31 Even, 
when the subcontractor is nominated or selected by the employer, the main contractor 
is not regarded as the agent of the owner. 32 Acceptance by the employer of work done 
by a sub-contractor does not establish or even imply a contractual link between these 
two persons. 33 
The principle of no privity between the employer and the subcontractor in effect 
means that the economic risk and the contractual duty of performance of the main 
contract rest entirely on the main contractor. The latter rather than the subcontractor 
will be held liable for defective work performed by the subcontractor. 34 Equally, 
unless otherwise is expressly provided in law or in contract, the employer will not be 
liable to pay the subcontractor directly for work done or materials supplied with 
regard to the main work. 35 
The principle of no privity applies even to back-to-back standard forms of contract 
and subcontract. Thus, the FIDIC Subcontract provides in Sub-clause 4.3 that: 
"Nothing herein shall be construed as creating any privity of contract between 
the Subcontractor and the Employer"; 
While, Sub-clause 4.4 provides that: 
"If the Subcontractor commits any breaches of the Subcontract, he shall 
indemnify the Contractor against any damages for which the Contractor 
becomes liable under the Main Contract as a result of such breaches. In such 
Hudson's, supra n. 8, para 8-169. 
31 Unless the contractor assigns the subcontract to the employer, see FIDIC (Red book) clause 4.5: 
Assignment of Benefit of subcontract. See also Murdoch- Hughes, supra n. 7, para 19.3. Hudson's. 
ibid. para 13-016; Wallace, supra n. 9. para 21-02 et seq: Halsbury's, supra n. 1, para 47. Cf Davies 
& Co (Shopfitters) Ltd r William Old Ltd (1969) 67 LGR 395. 
32 See Murdoch- Hughes. supra n. 7, para 20.3 et seq and 20.4.1; Chaix- Marchand. supra n. 24. p. 223. 
See also Hampton r Glamorgan, [1917] A. C. 13; Vigers Sons & co Ltd r Swindell, [1939] 3 All ER 
590. 
33 Halsubry's. supra n. 1, para 47. 
34 Murdoch - Hughes. supra n. 7. para 19.5.2. 
35 See the seminal decision in Hampton v Glamorgan. [1917] AC 13. 
38 
event, the Contractor may, without prejudice to any other method of recovery, 
deduct such damages from monies otherwise becoming due to the 
Subcontractor. " 36 
The reason the parties draft the subcontract in back-to-back terms with the main 
contract is to ensure that the two contracts will be compatible and, thus, more 
effective. However, back-to-back terms by no means break the contractual autonomy 
of the main contract and the subcontract. The performance promised by the contractor 
to the employer is different from that promised by the subcontractor to the contractor, 
despite the fact that both performances concern the same project. 37 
The rights, duties and liability of the contractor in the main contract can never 
correspond exactly to those of the subcontractor in the subcontract. 38 This is because, 
the flow of the contractual rights and duties of the employer stops at the contractor. 
Unless there is an express provision in the subcontract, benefits that the contractor 
might obtain from the main contract cannot be passed over the subcontractor. 39 
In Lafarge Redland Aggregates Ltd. v Shephard Hill Civil Engineering Ltd. 40 the 
subcontract contained a preamble making express references to the main contract: 
"Whereas the contractor has entered into a contract (hereinafter called `the 
main contract') particulars of which are set out in the First Schedule hereto" 
and 
36 Cf also the SEA art. 29(2) Rule 118 providing that "Dann 1'execution de ses travaux, le sous-traitant 
n'a rapport contractuel qu'avec 1'entrepreneur". 
3' Nicklisch. supra n. 8, p. 68-69. 
3' Hudson's, supra n. 8, para 18-116. 
39 See Mooney v Heniy Boot Construction Ltd [1996] 80 B. L. R. 66; 53 Con. L. R. 120; see also the 
Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd v Kelston Spark-es Contractors Ltd, (No. 2) 2001 WL 753373, where 
the subcontractor claimed part of the sum awarded by an arbitral award to the contractor against the 
employer. Although the sum was awarded to the contractor for delay and disruption to planned 
drainage arrangements which were works undertaken by the subcontractor, it was disputable whether 
the subcontractor was entitled to any portion of this sum. This was the case in spite of the fact that, 
first the contract (a I. C. E. Standard Form of Contract for Civil Engineering Works, ) and the 
subcontract (a F. C. E. C. Standard Form of Subcontract) were designed as back-to-back contracts; 
second the subcontract expressly provided in cl. 10(2) for the contractor to take all reasonable steps to 
secure from the employer such contractual benefits, if any, as might be claimable in accordance with 
the main contract 'on account of any adverse physical conditions or artificial obstructions or any 
other circumstances that may affect the execution of the subcontract works', and that on receiving 
any such benefits the contractor was to pass on to the subcontractor a fair and reasonable proportion. 
Finally the Court of Appeal decided that the subcontractor was entitled to a fair and reasonable 
proportion of the sum that the contractor was awarded by the employer. However. H. Lloyd J at first 
instance had held that clause 10(2) was merely providing for a procedural rather than a substantive 
claim. 
40 [2000] 1 W. L. R. 1621 (L). 
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"whereas the subcontractor having been afforded the opportunity to read and 
note the provisions of the main contract (other than details of the contractor's 
prices thereunder), has agreed to execute upon the terms hereinafter appearing 
the works which are described in the documents specified in the Second 
Schedule hereto and which form part of the works to be executed by the 
contractor under the main contract. " 
Despite the above references to the main contract the House of Lords noted that: 
"These provisions have an important bearing on the contractual relationship 
between the contractor and the subcontractor. But it is not, and could not be, 
suggested that by entering into the subcontract with the contractor the 
subcontractor was entering into a contractual relationship of any kind with the 
employer"41 
And also that: 
"The only contract which binds the employer is his contract with the 
contractor under the main contract. The only contract which binds the 
subcontractor is his contract with the contractor under the subcontract. The 
doctrine of privity of contract inhibits the formation of any kind of implied 
contractual relationship between the employer and the subcontractor. , 42 
The same was held in the ICC award case no 6230 of 1990. Here, the subcontract 
included a clause providing that: 
"in the internal relationship the subcontractor will take upon himself and bear 
all obligations and risks arising from the contract to be concluded between the 
[employer] and [contractor] in such a way as if the subcontractor had 
concluded a direct contract with the [employer] for his scope of supply and 
services" 43 
Nevertheless, the tribunal was clear noting that the above provision was a "risk 
shifting" clause that should be construed narrowly since under Swiss construction 
law, applicable to both the main contract and the subcontract: 
"(a) the subcontract is treated as an independent contract vis-ä-vis the main 
construction contract. 
41 Ibid. at 1626. 
4'- Ibid at 1623. 
43 Unpublished. 
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(b) the subcontractor is not a person employed by the contractor for the 
performance of an obligation 
(c) Provisions of a main construction contract do not become automatically 
valid vis-ä-vis the subcontractor simply because the contractor made an 
obligation to the owner to adopt such provisions of the main contract in the 
subcontract 
(d) there are no direct legal relationship between the owner and the 
subcontractor" 
In the light of the above analysis, it is concluded that the several string contracts, 
although interrelated remain separate. Despite the fact that the general legal position 
of the subcontractor is in many ways affected by that of the contractor, the liability of 
the former is as a matter of rule from those the liability of the latter. 
2.3 WEB-TYPE CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS 
Here the position is usually more straightforward than in the case of string 
contracts. The two contracts, the one between the employer and the architect or 
engineer (the A/E contract)44 and the other between the employer and the contractor 
(the building contract), will be related in many ways. However, the autonomous 
character of each contract is even clearer than in the case of string contracts. More 
specifically: 
On the one hand, the two agreements are in principle connected, since the building 
contract is normally concluded in light of the A/E contract. The contractor undertakes 
the duty to construct the work in a "workmanlike manner" in accordance with the 
design specifications provided in the A/E contract. The latter sets out in detail the 
plans, the drawings, the materials and the working methods required to be followed 
for the construction of the work. 45 
44 Architects undertake the duty to design the building and. usually. to supervise and administrate the 
work until its final completion. The duties of the engineers, although not always the identical are 
similar to those of the architects as far as the design and supervision of the work is concerned: cf the 
description given by the Institution of Civil Engineers (ICE) for the profession of civil engineer as " 
the art of directing the great sources of power in nature for the use and convenience of man" (found 
in Hudson's, supra n. 8, para 2-016. 
45 Hudson's. ibid. para 4-080. 
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Moreover, the A/E undertakes the duty to administer the building contract. Thus, 
the A/E is continuously involved in the construction work, having to decide whether 
the work done by the contractor is acceptable or not. 46 
The building contract itself often requires the A/E to take a number of actions in 
connection with the construction work, in all of which the A/E owes a duty of care to 
the owner. Thus, for example, the A/E will undertake the duty to order variations, or 
check the contractor's final account on completion. 47 
The intersection of the two contracts, in terms of substantive rights and duties 
means that whenever the work turns out to be defective the question of whether there 
is a construction or design default inevitably arises. Therefore, the same legal and 
factual issues will come up in a dispute arising out of the A/E contract and a dispute 
arising out of the building contract. For example, the issue of whether the plans and 
drawings in the A/E contract were followed by the contractor will be directly relevant 
to both contracts and the disputes arising out thereof. The same applies to the question 
of whether the plans, drawings or other instructions were given by the A/E to the 
contractor in time; or whether the fact that a supplier or a sub-contractor, nominated 
by the A/E had refused to complete the work, affected the progress of the contractor's 
work; or whether further instructions that had been given by the A/E constitute 
variations, that would entitle the contractor to additional payment. Thus the courts or 
tribunals will have to pay considerable regard to the provisions of the building 
contract, which the A/E has agreed to supervise and administer, in order to ascertain 
the duties owed by the A/E to the employer. 48 
It is, therefore, evident that the A/E and the building contract are typically 
interconnected. Accordingly, the interests of the contractor and the A/E are related to 
those of the employer. Thus, for example, in proceedings between the employer and 
the A/E, the contractor has an interest in seeing the employer succeeding in its claim 
against the A/E. Otherwise the employer will most likely turn against the contractor. 
Equally, the A/E will have an interest in seeing the employer succeeding in its claim 
against the contractor. More generally, in the context of web-type construction 
contracts, the legal position of the third party, be that the architect or the contractor, 
will be associated to that of the "middle man" employer. 
46 Hudson's, ibid. para 2-058. 
4 Hudson's, ibid. para 2-198. 
41 Hudson's. supra n. S. para 2-004. 
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Notwithstanding the above, the main and the building contract remain distinct 
agreements. The A/E and the contractor assume separate duties vis-ä-vis the 
employer, stemming from different bilateral contracts. The A/E is solely bound by the 
A/E contract, often concluded a considerable time before the main building is 
concluded. 49 A/E and contractor are in no contractual relationships. 5° Termination of 
the contractual relationship between the employer and the A/E has no legal effect to 
the contractual relationship between the employer and the contractor, and vice versa. 
Consequently, the liability of the contractor vis-ä-vis the employer is distinct from 
that of the A/E. Contractor and A/E will normally be liable vis-ä-vis the employer in 
the alternative rather than jointly. Apart from exceptional cases, " the latter is usually 
free to elect to sue one over the other. 52 
It follows from the above that, despite the fact that they are in many ways 
interrelated, the A/E and the building contracts remain largely separate and 
autonomous. 
2.4 GUARANTEES AND OTHER SECURITY AGREEMENTS 
Very often, parties in their commercial transactions arrange for the security of the 
performance or the debt assumed therein. Thus, in accordance with the terms of the 
main contract, a third party will provide security for the performance of the 
transaction in a separate agreement (the `security agreement'). This third party may 
be a bank, an insurance company, protection and indemnity association or other 
guarantor. Naturally thus, security arrangements lead to multiparty situations: a third 
person comes into play providing security for the contract exclusively concluded 
between two other parties. 
The terms `security agreements' and `suretyship' are generic terms covering 
different types of contracts, such as guarantees, indemnities or performance bonds. 53 
Hence, the term `surety' will be used, here, collectively referring a person providing 
4' Hudson's, supra n. 8, para 2-005. 
so See for example Davies & Co (Shopfitters) Ltd v William Old Ltd (1969) 67 LGR 395. Hudson, 
however, argues that there is an implied warranty- dun- of the A/E vis-a-vis the contractor not to 
exceed his actual authority the breach of which will result to the liability of the A/E against the 
contractor, see Hudson's, supra n. 8, para 2-080. 
51 Where the employer may sue both the contractor. for construction fault, and the A/E for supervisory 
negligence (concurrent liability), see Townsend ,i Stone Toms & Partners (1984) 27 BLR 26. 
52 See Campbell Flour Mills v Bowes and Ellis (1914) 32 OR. 270. 
53 G. Andrews and R. Millett. Law of Guarantees, (3`a ed. Sweet & Maxwell London 2000). para. 1.01 
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security in all the above types of security contracts. In principle, the term can be also 
used with regard to insurance contracts. However, for the purposes of the thesis at 
least, guarantees, indemnities or performance bonds should be distinguished from 
insurance contracts. The latter provide security for a person "against damage caused 
by contingencies other than the non performance by another person of obligations or 
duties owed to the insured. 154 Therefore, insurance contracts are not usually 
concluded in view of a contract between two other persons. Thus, unlike the other 
security agreements, insurance contracts will not necessarily lead to multiparty 
situations. Accordingly, the main attention of this section will focus on guarantees, 
indemnities and performance bonds, while insurance contracts will be relevant only in 
cases the damage is caused by a third party, as, for example, in the case of an 
accident. 
On the one hand the main contract and the security agreement are interwoven. In 
fact, the two contracts are more closely interrelated than in the case of the several 
string or web-type construction contracts. Guarantees, indemnities and performance 
bonds perform similar commercial functions in providing compensation to the 
creditor for the failure of a third party to perform his obligations. 55 The security is 
provided in view of the debt or the performance undertaken in the main contract. 
Compensation in accordance with the security agreement will be provided only if the 
performance in the main contract is not fulfilled. The non-performance of the main 
contract is, thus, a condition precedent for the performance of the security agreement. 
This, in principle, applies to all the above three types of security contracts, 
although the interrelation will be stronger in the case of guarantee than in the case of 
indemnity or performance bond. This is because in a guarantee contract56 the 
54 Andrews- Millen, ibid, para. 1.08. 
ss Halsbury's, supra n. 1, para 343. 
56 Defined in Halsbury's, ibid, para 101, as "an accessory contract by which the promisor undertakes to 
be answerable to the promisee for the debt, default or miscarriage of another person, whose primary 
liability to the promisee must exist or be contemplated. For other definitions of a guarantee contract. 
In England See also Re Conley, ex p Trustee v Barclays Bank Ltd, Re Conley, ex p Trustee v Lloyds 
Bank Ltd [1938] 2 All ER 127 at 130 (CA). 
In the US. see Madison County Farmers 4ss'n v. American Employers' Ins. Co.. 209 F . 
2d 581 (8th 
Cir. 1954): 'J1 T. Rawleigh Co. iv. Warrington. 39 Del. 366.199 A. 666 (1938): "[s]uretyship may be 
defined as a contractual relation whereby one person engages to be answerable for the debt or default 
of another. " See also Restatement (Third) of Suretyship & Guaranty (1996) §1 et seq. 
In France, see Code Civil art. 2288 (as amended by the recent Ord. No346 of 23 March 2006): 
Celui qui se rend caution d'une obligation. se soumet envers le creancier a satisfaire ä cette 
obligation. se le debiteur n'y satisfait pas lui-meme »_ see further Delebecque. in Rep. Civ. (2007), 
Cautionnement, art. 2288 et seq. 
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guarantor undertakes an obligation that is dependent upon and collateral to the main 
obligation, while in an indemnity57 or a performance bond 58 the promisor undertakes 
an original and independent obligation to save the promisee from any loss caused by 
the claims of third parties. 59 
Thus, the guarantee and the main contract present a unique interrelation. This is 
particularly evidenced by the following. 
First, the obligation of the debtor in the main agreement is the main reason that 
security is provided in the security contract. 60 The obligation of the surety to perform 
instead of the debtor is activated only in case the latter fails to perform its own 
obligation. Secondly, under a contract of guarantee, the guarantor assumes a 
secondary liability to the creditor for the default of another who remains primarily 
liable to the creditor. 6' The surety is liable only to the extent that the debtor is. 62 For 
the surety to be held liable, the liability of the debtor must in any case exist or be 
contemplated. 63 Thirdly, the duration and the validity of the guarantee contract 
depend upon the duration and the validity of the main contract. 64 Fourthly, the surety 
is entitled to invoke against the creditor all the defences arising out of the main 
Indemnity, on the other hand, is a contract by one party to keep the other harmless against loss 
caused to him by the conduct of third parties see for example, Yeoman Credit Ltd v Latter, [1961] 2 
All ER 294 at 296, CA, per Holroyd Pearce LJ. 
In France, there is the autonomous ganantee or guarantee on first demant (garantie ä premiere 
demande), see Civil Code, art. 2331: «La garantie autonome est l'engagement par lequel le garant 
s'oblige, en consideration d'une obligation souscrite par un tiers, a verser une Somme soit ä premiere 
demande, soit suivant des modalites convenue >>. 
ss Performance bonds fall, in general, under the definition of indemnity, Halsbury's, supra n. 1, para 
343. This is particularly the case for performance bonds "on demand" as opposed to performance 
bonds "on default". The former can be called without proof of breach of contract by the contractor or 
of loss or damage suffered by the employer, whereas the latter operate as guarantee and requires 
proof of default on the part of contractor, see further, J. Jenkins and S. Stebbings, International 
Construction Arbitration Law. (Kluwer Law International 2006) p. 47. 
51 Halsbury's, supra n. 1, para 343. 
60 Lakeman v Mountstephen [1874] L. R. 7 H. L. 17, at 24: "there can be no suretyship unless there is a 
principal debtor. Nor can a man guarantee anybody else's debt unless there is a debt of some other 
person to be guaranteed". 
61 Yeoman Credit Ltd v Latter, supra n. 86: Goulston Discount Co Ltd v Clark [1967] 1 All ER 61 CA; 
Argo Caribbean Group Ltd v Lewis [1976] 2 Lloyd's Rep 289 at 296, CA, per Orr LJ. 
62 Andrews- Millet, supra n. 85, par. 1.04 and Wardens and Commonaltv of the Mvsten- of Mercers of 
the City of London v New Hampshire Insurance Company, [1991] 3 J. I. B. F. L. 144. Cf also The 
London Lion. [1980] 2 Lloyd's Rep 456 (CA) that held that the letter of undertaking was a contract 
subsidiary and secondary to the shipbuilding contract. 
In the US. see Restatement (Third) of Suretyship & Guaranty (1996) para 15(b). 
63 See, Halsbury's, supra n. 1, para 101. See also French Civil Code art. 2298 «La caution nest obligee 
envers le creancier ä le payer qu'ä defaut du debiteur >>. 
64 See in French Civil Code art. 2289 « La cautionnement ne peut exister que sure une obligation 
valuable; Andrews - Millet. supra n. 82. par. 6.01; cfJowitt v Callaghan [1938] 38 N. S. W. 512 and 
Vision v Churchfield Leasing [1988] B. C. L. C 623. 
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contract, except the ones that are personal to the debtor. This is the rule under both 
common65 and civil law. 66 Finally, any collateral supplied by the principal obligor to 
secure the duty to reimburse the secondary obligor also secures the principal obligor's 
duty to the secondary obligor to perform the underlying obligation. 67 
The above apply particularly to guarantee which, as already noted, is considered a 
contract dependant and ancillary to the main contract. 68 Nonetheless, the situation 
does not significantly differ in indemnities or performance bonds. Here, as in the case 
of guarantee, the creditor when suing the surety must prove that he has suffered a loss 
due to the principal's non performance. In other words, the difference between 
guarantees on the one hand and the indemnities and performance bonds on the other is 
that in the former compensation is due only if the principal debtor is found liable for 
non-performing, whereas in the latter compensation is due irrespective of whether the 
principal debtor is found liable for non-performing or not. In both cases, however, 
compensation under the security agreement follows the non-performance of the main 
contract. 69 
Thus, in all security agreements, the surety undertakes an obligation in view of the 
obligation undertaken by the debtor in the main contract. This is why the surety has to 
pay exactly the same amount of money or to perform exactly the same the 
performance that the debtor failed to pay or perform. 70 Hence, the creditor can only be 
paid once, either by the debtor or the surety. When the secured obligation is fulfilled 
the security contract is brought to an end, and the creditor does no longer have any 
65 A. L. Corbin, On Contracts, Int. ed. (Lexis Nexis 2002) and 2004 Spring Cumulative Supplement 
par. 937; The same in Restatement, (Third) of Suretyship & Guaranty (1996) para 34. 
66 In France, see Civil Code art. 2313 « La caution peut opposer au creancier touter les exceptions qui 
appartiennent au debiteur principal, et qui sont inherentes ä la dette; Mais eile ne peut opposer les 
exceptions qui sont purement personneiles au debiteur »; see also Civ 1st. 1 June 1983, (1984) D, 
p. 152. with note Aubert. 
In Germany. see Civil Code art. 768 and in Greece, see Civil Code art. 853 and BpEXXr1S, in EpiAK 
Feo pyuI& -Eta0öirou? ou ap. 853. 
67 Restatement (Third) of Suretyship & Guaranty (1996) para 25. 
66 Mountstephen i" Lakeman (1871) LR 7 QB 196 at 202. See also; Lougher v Molvneux [1916] 1 KB 
718. The same is accepted in France. see Com. 26 Jan 1988. Bull Civ. IV, no 49 :« La cautionnement 
est une obligation accessoire a ]'obligations du debater envers le creancier >). 
69 Sampson v Burton [1820] 4 Moo. C. P. 515: "The surety is under a secondary obligation which is 
dependent upon the default of the principal and which does not arise until that point". 
70 Corbin, supra n. 94, par 926: "one who guarantees payment of the debt of another person, may 
undertake a separate obligation, but he nevertheless always promises the same performance as the 
principal debtor. This is the case even where the guarantor limits the amount of his liability". The 
same in accepted in Greece. see BpcJ. %rj;. in Ep1iAK. Fec»pytäöriz sTa9öirouXo; ApOpo 847. 
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claim against either the debtor or the surety. 71 This is also why every jurisdiction 
provides that the surety is entitled to recover his payment from the debtor once he 
performs the secured obligation (subrogation). 72 
It follows from the above, that first, the legal position of the surety is strongly 
interwoven to that of the debtor and secondly, the interests of these two parties vis-a- 
vis the creditor are closely related. 
On the other hand, though, the interests of the surety remain dissimilar to those of 
the creditor. The legal status of the surety is distinct from that of the debtor. In 
particular, the security contract and the main contract are two separate bilateral 
agreements rather that one multiparty agreement. 73 The obligations undertaken by the 
surety and the debtor are different: the surety does not promise to deliver the 
performance undertaken by the principal; he promises to cover the risk that this 
performance is not delivered. 74 The obligation of the surety is to repair the damage 
caused by the failure of the debtor to perform. In Lee v Yano75 it was noted that: 
"a guarantor does not promise the same performance as the principal 
debtor. While a principal debtor promises to pay a specified amount, a 
guarantor promises to pay that amount only if it cannot be collected from 
the principal debtor. " 
Moreover, as is generally accepted no privity exists between the surety and the 
debtor. Surety and debtor do not constitute one person in law, and therefore they are 
not jointly or jointly and severally liable to the creditor. 76 This particularly applies to 
71 Halsbury's, supra n. 30, para 187-188: "Where the guaranteed obligation is properly discharged by 
performance, the obligations of a guarantor of that obligation are also thereby discharged. Similarly, 
the guarantor will be discharged where the underlying contract is discharged by frustration before the 
time for performance"; see also Corbin, supra n. 13 , par. 
931 and 947; Restatement (Third) of 
Suretyship & Guaranty (1996), para 39; see also Union M. L. v Handford, 12 S. Ct. 437 (U. S. 1892). 
It should be noted that in performance bonds provided with regard to construction projects the surety 
is not discharged until the he architect or engineer has issued a certificate that the work has been 
completed to his satisfaction, Eshelby v Federated European Bank Ltd [1932] I KB 423, CA: the 
liability of the surety does not arise if the contractor fails to show entire completion show. 
12 In England, see Halsbury's, supra n. 30, para 226. In the US, see Restatement (Third) of Suretyship 
& Guaranty (1996) para 27 In France see Code Civil, art. 2305 et seq. 
73, Cabrillac et Mouly, Droit des Sitrete (Litec 1990). par. 327; Simler, Le Cautionnement (Litec 1982). 
par. 44 
74 Cabrillac et Mouly, idem: E. Loquin, "Arbitrage et Cautionnement" . 
(1994) Rev. Arb., p. 236. cf also 
Simler, ibid, par. 232. 
75 93 Haw. 142,997 P. 2d 68, (Intermediate Ct. App. 2000) at 74. 
71 See for example, Rawstone i, Parr (1827) 3 Russ 539 at 541 and the more recent Moschi v Lep Air 
Services Ltd [1973] AC 331 (HL). The same is accepted in France. unless the guarantor has expressly 
undertaken a joint and several obligation with the principal (caution solidaire) see Code Civil art, 
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indemnity, where liability of the indemnitor vis-ä-vis the creditor is primary rather 
than ancillary to liability of the debtor. Here, the surety undertakes to indemnify the 
creditor in case the debtor does not perform. In other words, he undertakes the 
obligation to make good a loss suffered by debtor's failure to deliver rather than to 
deliver what the debtor has promised. Therefore, the liability of the surety is accepted 
to be independent rather than joint or joint and severally with the liability of the 
1 debtor. 
In the same vein, the English Court of Appeal held in McAlpine Construction v 
Unex, 78 that, unless an express wording to the contrary is stipulated in the suretyship 
contract, the liability of the surety is, in principal, independent from that of the debtor. 
In this case, a clause was inserted in the suretyship contract79 in question providing 
that 
"[... ] the Guarantor (a parent company of the employer) shall not be under any 
greater liability to the Contractor (the creditor) than the Employer (the 
principal debtor) would have been liable in contract pursuant to the express 
terms of the (main construction) Contract". 
Despite the fact that the liability clause in the suretyship contract was directly 
referring to the main contract and the debtor's liability (as the maximum limit of the 
surety's liability), the court held that wording was not explicit enough to link the 
liability of the surety to that of the principal debtor. Thus, this view concludes, the 
surety and the principal debtor are neither joint nor joint and several obligors vis-ä-vis 
the creditor, since a joint liability requires that more obligors promise the same 
performance. 80 
The same applies to performance bonds, which constitute a binding contractual 
undertaking given by a person to pay a specific amount of money to a named 
beneficiary, in case the principal fails to fulfil his contractual obligation to the 
beneficiary. 81 Therefore, the contractual oobligations arising under such bonds are 
2298 a fin. The same also in Greece, see BpckXrl;, in Ep sAK, Fswprl68rl; -! Ta06not) o; Apepo 847 
para 33. 
77 Andrews-Millet, supra n. 82, par 1.13. See also Western Credit Ltd v Albei-y' [1964] 2 All ER 938 
(CA) and Stadium Finance Co Ltd v Helm (1965) 109 Sol Jo 471 (CA). 
78 McAlpine Construction v Unex, [1994] 38 Con LR 63 (CA). 
79 Which the court held, to be a contract of indemnity although the form of contract employed by the 
parties bore the title "guarantee contract", ibid, at 66. 
80 Lee vi ano, supra n. 94. at 73: "a guarantor is not a co-obligor or a joint and/or several obligor with 
the principal obligor". 
81 Andrews-Millet. supra n. 82. para 1.16: see also Halsburv's. supra n. 30, para 359. 
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separate from, and not dependent on, those existing under the main contract. 82 As has 
been noticed, the obligations assumed by a bank under the performance bond are 
analogous to those assumed by a confirming bank to the seller under a documentary 
credit. 83 
This, in effect, means that, unlike guarantors, the person securing the debtor's 
obligation by an indemnity or a performance bond will remain liable even in the event 
that the main agreement is void or unenforceable. 84 Similarly, an insurer under an 
insurance contract undertakes a primary rather than a secondary obligation vis-ä-vis 
the insured. Thus, the liability of the insurer is accepted to be independent from that 
of the liability of the third person. 85 
In the light of the above it is concluded that the relationship between the surety and 
the debtor is a unique, sui generis one: their interests are related albeit distinct. The 
liability of the surety is affected by, or in the case of guarantor directly depended 
upon, the liability of the debtor. However, surety and debtor are by no means co-liable 
vis-ä-vis the creditor. Due to the warranty nature of a security agreement, the legal 
status of the surety is interrelated by that of the debtor. However, surety and debtor 
are not parties in privity. 
2.5 SEVERAL COMPANIES WITH CLOSE CORPORATE LINKS: THE CASE OF THE 
"GROUP OF COMPANIES" IN PARTICULAR 
Although not far from new, the idea that a corporation carries out business through 
a number of subsidiaries in several countries has become now the typical form of 
business organization. 86 The role of `subsidiaries' has become central to the way 
82 This is particularly the case with "performance bonds on demand", see supra n. 87. See also 
Themehelp Ltd r West [1996] QB 84 (CA); Wahda Bank v Arab Bank plc [1996] 1 Lloyd's Rep 470 
(CA). 
See Halsbury's, supra n. 30, para 359 and United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of 
Canada [1983] 1 AC 168 at 184 (HL). However, performance bonds, unlike letters of credit, do not 
provide any security to the issuer: see Potton Homes Ltd v Coleman Contractors Ltd (1984) 28 BLR 
19 (CA). Also, the principle "of strict compliance", applicable to letters of credit according to which 
the payment is allowed only if the documents, conforming precisely to the terms of the letter of 
credit, are presented to the bank does not apply to to performance bonds: see Siporex Trade AS i' 
Banque Indosuef [1986] 2 Lloyd's Rep 146. 
84 Yeoman Credit v Latter, [1961] 2 All ER 294. 
85 Halsbury's, surpa n. 1. para 110. 
See, in general, T. Hadden, The Control of Corporate Groups, (Institute Advanced Legal Studies- 
University of London 1983): P. Muchlinski. Multinational Enterprises and the Law, (Blackwell 
London 1999); P. Blumberg, The Law of Corporate Groups, Procedural Law (Little Brown and 
Company 1983): P. Blumberg, Tort, contract, and other common law problems in the substantive 
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international commerce is conducted nowadays. Trade operations very often split 
between a number of holding companies, or expand through the acquisition of 
established businesses, which they later incorporate into their group. 87 The several 
companies belonging in the same corporate group will usually have a wide range of 
interconnected relationships. However, each of them will typically have been 
established as a separate legal entity. Thus, the close financial or business links 
between the several companies belonging in the same group are not reflected in the 
formal legal structure of a multinational, as a group of several separate legal entities. 
There are clear advantages in terms of taxation and efficient business management for 
a multi-company international group to adopt a `separate corporate personality' 
structure. 
Although the traditional structure of a group of companies will be that of a parent 
company with several subsidiaries or sub-subsidiaries, groups may take different legal 
structures, depending on the business objectives of the group and the legal models 
available under the law of the state in which the different companies reside. In 
particular they may take the form of groups based on contract, or equity based 
corporate groups, joint ventures between independent firms, informal alliances, 
publicly owned multinationals and supranational forms of international business. 88 
Moreover, a group of companies will very often consist of companies of various 
nationalities, which gives the group a multinational character and makes the issue of 
liability within the group even more complicate. 
In any case, the groups will adopt the legal form that provides them with the 
maximum operational flexibility, which makes the groups commercially effective, 
and promotes international business in general. In most countries, the current trend in 
the national legislation regarding multinationals is moving towards a flexible, friendly 
regime for multinational groups. 89 This typically happens in developing countries in 
which the adoption of flexible company legislation is considered important for these 
countries to attract internationally mobile projects. The same, however, applies to all 
major industrial countries whose laws recognise the principle of `limited liability' and 
law ofparent and subsidiary corporations: Substantive Law of corporate groups. (Little Brown and 
Company 1987), P. Blumberg. On Corporate Groups, (Aspen 2004). J. Dine, Governance of 
Corporate Groups. (CUP 2000): J. H. Dunning, Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy, 
(Addison Wesley, 1992). 
87 Hadden, ibid. p. 10. 
Rs Muchlinski, supra n. 86. p. 62. see also Dine, supra n. 86, p. 39 et seq. 
81 Cf Muchlinski. ibid 115. p. 9. 
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`separate corporate personality'. 90 The adoption of a more liberal legal regime on 
group of companies, reflected on the rule of separate corporate personalities, has 
proved to some extent beneficial for the growth in the world economy, as it 
encourages investment even in relatively risky ventures. 91 
In England the principle was established very early in Salomon v Salomon & Co 
Ltd, 92 and has since been accepted to a large extent consistently. In Adams & Ors v 
Cape Industries plc & Anor, the English Court of Appeal was clear that: 
"Our law, for better or worse, recognises the creation of subsidiary companies, 
which though in one sense the creatures of their parent companies, will 
nevertheless under the general law fall to be treated as separate legal entities 
with all the rights and liabilities which would normally attach to separate legal 
"93 entities..... 
And that: 
"we do not accept as a matter of law that the court is entitled to lift the 
corporate veil as against a defendant company which is the member of a 
corporate group merely because the corporate structure has been used so as to 
ensure that the legal liability (if any) in respect of particular future activities of 
the group (and correspondingly the risk of enforcement of that liability) will 
fall on another member of the group rather than the defendant company. 
Whether or not this is desirable, the right to use a corporate structure in this 
manner is inherent in our corporate law"94 
In the US the rule is that, although shareholders were not immune from liability for 
corporate obligations at common law, the principle of limited liability and separate 
90 See OECD, Report on International Investment and Multinational Enterprise-Responsibility of 
Parent companies for their subsidiaries, (1980). 
91 See Easterbrook and Fischet, "Limited Liability and the Corporation" (1985) 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 103 et 
seq, who argue that the beneficial impact of the principle of limited liability and the entailing 
principle of separate liability between a parent and a subsidiary on capital markets outweighs the 
losses from its imperfections. From an political and ideological perspective, the argument for market 
driven economies has been now largely established as the prevailing and most effective economic 
practice. This has been particularly the case after the collapse of the Eastern Bloc in the late 1980's 
and early 1990's and the abandoning of state led economic policies even by countries such as China 
or Russia. 
92 [1897] AC 22, HL. See more recent cases in Adams & Ors i' Cape Industries plc & Anor., [1990] 
B. C. C. 786 (CA) and Ring ay Roadmarking v Adbruf [1998] 2 BCLC 625. 
93 Per Slade U at 820. 
04 Ibid at 826. 
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legal personality has been the cornerstone of corporate law since the nineteenth 
century, and is reflected in the legislation of every state. 95 
This was characteristically noted in Intergen N. V. v Grina: 
"the principle of limited liability ... [is] the corner stone of corporate 
law"96 
Similarly, in DeBreceni v. Graf Bros. Leasing, Inc97, it was underlined that: 
"Limited liability allows individuals to take a calculated risk when they engage 
in the investment and entrepreneurial ventures central to a capitalist economy. 
If the venture fails, corporate shareholders lose only their interest in the 
corporation, not their homes or life savings. "" 
This principle has been accepted by arbitral tribunals too. Thus, the tribunal in the 
ICC case no. 11160 of 2002 stressed that: 
"The Respondents have also explained in the record that Respondent 1 was 
organized with the specific purpose of qualifying for an exemption from the 
Value Added Tax introduced in Venezuela. This is perfectly lawful and valid 
business purpose. Contrary to what the Claimant believes, there is nothing 
devious or fraudulent about it. " 99 
However beneficial as it might have been, the principle of separate liability has 
been criticized for shifting the risk from the corporate owners to involuntary third 
parties. In fact, the argument goes, by reference to the principle of separate liability, 
the multinational groups evade liability altogether and accumulate extreme power, 
which on some occasions they have abused. '°° 
95 See the Revised Model Business Corporation Act (1984) para 6.22(a), expressly limiting shareholder 
liability to payment of the consideration for which the shares were authorized to be issued or 
payment of the consideration specified in the subscription agreement. It further provides that a 
shareholder is not personally liable for the acts or debts of the corporation except as provided in the 
articles of incorporation or except by reason of a shareholder's own acts or conduct. 
96 344 F. 3d 134 (ist Cir. 2003) at 150. 
97 828 F. 2d 877.879 (1s` Cir. 1987) at 879. 
9s See also, indicatively. Mills v USA Mobile Communications, Inc.. 190 W Va 209,438 SE2d 1 
(1993); Silva v Kinsho Intern. Corp., 210 F Supp 2d 241 (SD NY 2000); Dorsky Hodgson & 
Partners, Inc. v National Council of Sr. Citizens, 766 A2d 54 (DC 2001); Bujol v Entergy Services, 
Inc., 922 So 2d 1113 (La 2004): Salatin v Trans Healthcare of Ohio, Inc., 170 F Supp 2d 775 (ND 
Ohio 2001); Drilltec Tech., Inc. v Remp, 64 SW3d 212 (Tex App 2001); Reeves v Mohawk 
Factoring. Inc., 261 Ga App 629.583 SE2d 487 (2003): Rowland v Franklin Career Services. LLC, 
272 F Supp 2d 1188 (D Kan 2003). 
See also in more details the analysis of the principle and its limitations in the seminal work of Prof. 
P. Blumberg. The law of Coiporate Groups, Substantive Law, supra n. 86. 
99 16 (2005) 2 ]CC Bull., p. 100. 
100 Indeed. there is growing concern over the fact that the growing power of big multinational groups 
has in many occasions been abused. in terms of corruption or human rights. The effects of the 
multinational groups upon the underdeveloped or developing countries have also raised questions 
ýý 
The discussion on whether or not the principle of separate liability has created the 
legal environment for multinationals to accumulate and abuse their power goes 
beyond the scope of this work. What is necessary to note, here, is that a strict 
application of the principle would distort commercial reality: the several companies 
belonging in the same group maintain very close corporate links. In strict business 
terms they constitute a trading unit. It is often the case that the several companies will 
share the same financial or human resources: officers, premises, contract details, bank 
accounts intellectual property rights etc. In addition they will operate under the same 
business plan, working closely together on a day-to-day basis on the same commercial 
profects. lo1 
Thus, in many jurisdictions there have been attempts to restrain the principle of 
separate legal liability. In this regard, the main thrust of group liability theories and 
legislation is the same: to treat the several companies of the same group as a unit and 
hold either the parent company or the group as a whole liable for acts or omissions of 
the another company of the group. 
In particular, in common law countries a parent company may be held liable under 
the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, which however applies only as a matter of 
exception and under strict conditions. lo' 
In the US, where case law concerning the principle is extensive, the courts will 
mainly pierce the corporate veil of the subsidiaries and hold a parent company liable 
only when the former has been under the complete control of the latter or has been 
used as a `sham' or a `fraud' formalities. 103 Here, the courts will review a big list of 
various factors in order to determine whether the corporate veil should be pierced. 
They will examine for example: 104 the funds that have been channelled from the 
since the 1970's. The argument for more transparency and disclosure in the way multinational groups 
operate has gained more ground lately. See in particular, J. Dine, Companies, International Trade 
and Human Rights. (CUP 2005). 
101 See more details on that in Chapter 5 below. 
102 In Kodal Ltf v Clark [1903] 1 KB 505, for example, it was held that a 98 per cent controlling interest 
in a company does not itself give rise to an agency relationship so as to treat the parent and 
subsidiary as one enterprise. Other similar theories on parent liability developed by the US courts are 
the alter ego theory. the identity theory. the instrumentality theory. All these theories are not 
fundamentally different than the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil and in many cases apply 
interchangeably, see K. Hofstetter, "Parent Responsibility for Subsidiary Corporations: Evaluating 
European Trends", (1990) 391nt'l Comp. L. 0 . at p. 592, n. 130. 
103 See for example in R. Clark. Corporate Law, (Aspen Publishers 1986) p. 71-74. 
104 For this, see in general J. Purver. "Liability of Parent Corporation for Acts of Subsidiary", 16 Am. 
Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 67, and indicatively from case law: Trustees of Nat. Elevator Industry 
Pension, Health Benefit and Educational Funds 1, Lutvk. 332 F. 3d 188 (3d Cir. 2003): Thrift Drug, 
;; 
debtor corporation from the dominant stockholder; whether the companies of the 
group have failed to observe corporate formalities; whether a company of the group 
suffers from gross undercapitalization; the circumstances under which a debtor 
company of the group has been bankrupted; whether the corporation is merely a 
facade for the operation of the dominant stockholder. 
In England, the courts will also review similar factors for the application of the 
doctrine. Thus, they will particular examine whether the owner exercised complete 
domination over the corporation with respect to the transaction at issue (objective 
factor) and whether that such domination was used to commit a fraud or wrong that 
resulted in the plaintiffs injury (subjective factor). "' 
Civil law jurisdictions, where the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is 
unknown, provide also for exceptions from the principle of separate legal liability. 
Germany has traditionally been the most progressive jurisdiction in this respect. ' 06 
The German Act on stock corporations, 1°7 for example, provides that a parent 
company must integrate its subsidiary, when the parent owes more that 95% of the 
latter. In this way, parent and subsidiary become jointly and severally liable for any 
claim a third party creditor might have against the subsidiary. Although its scope is 
narrow and, therefore, its impact is limited, the German Act on stock corporations is a 
characteristic example of legislation where the several companies with corporate links 
are treated as group rather than as separate corporations. 108 
In France, in the context of bankruptcy proceedings, it is provided that the assets of 
a parent company and its subsidiary are integrated, if the parent company has been de 
facto directing ("dirigeant de fait") the subsidiary. ' 09 
To conclude, in the context of corporate law, the principle of limited liability and 
accordingly the principle of separate liability between the parent and its subsidiary 
remain the rule internationally. Therefore, the several companies in the same group 
Inc. r Universal Prescription Adm 5s, 131 Fad 95 (2d Cit. 1997); Bridas S. A. P. LC. v Government of 
Turkmenistan. 345 F. 3d 347 (5th Cit. 2003). 
105 See DHNFood Distributors Ltd v London Borough of Tower Hamlets [1976] 3 All ER 462. see also 
Dine, supra n. 115, p. 48 et seq. 
106 Blumberg. Substanive Law. supra n. 115, p. 642. 
107 "Aktiengesetz". 
101 See more in Hofstetter, supra n. 133, and M. Schiessl, "The liability of corporations and 
shareholders for the Capitalization and obligations of Subsidiaries under German Law" (1987) 
Northwestern Int. Law & Bus.. p. 480. 
109 Loi, 1985.25 January, no 85-98, Redressement et liquidation judicaires: art 180: see further, Roger 
Houin "Les Groupes de societe en droit francais", in K. Hopt (Ed. ), Groups of' Companies in 
European Laws, Legal and Economic Analvses on Multinational Enterprises. (1982), p. 45-58. 
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are generally accepted to be distinct legal entities with separate interests. Nonetheless, 
it is also accepted that the several companies of the same group are typically strongly 
interconnected in terms of corporate links and commercial interests. This is why 
many jurisdictions provide for limited exceptions from the principle of separate 
liability. 
CONCLUSIONS OF PART I 
The analysis in the Part I demonstrated: 
" First, that any person bound by an arbitration agreement as an ordinary 
contract, by reference to rules of contract law is a genuine party to that 
arbitration agreement. The term "genuine party" equally applies to persons, 
who have not personally concluded an arbitration agreement, but who 
nonetheless are bound by this agreement in accordance with general principles 
of contract law. This is in particular the case for a 
o Principal, when the arbitration agreement is concluded by an agent 
o Assignee, after the assignment of an arbitration agreement 
o Consignee in a bill of lading containing an arbitration agreement 
o Successor in a contract containing an arbitration agreement 
" Second, false third parties are not contractually bound by an arbitration 
agreement concluded by two other persons (genuine parties), but who 
nevertheless are involved in the same commercial project with the genuine 
parties and, therefore, they have a significant interest in the dispute arising out 
of the project between the genuine parties. 
" Third, false third parties can be distinguished in two different groups 
depending on how closely a false third party is associated a genuine party, in 
terms of interests and liability. 
o The first group includes false third parties that have concurrent interests 
with one the genuine parties and are co-liable with them vis-ä-vis the 
other genuine party to the arbitration agreement. 
o The second group includes false third parties that are contractually 
linked but not co-liable with one of the genuine parties to the arbitration 
agreement. Here, the genuine and the false third party have related but 
;; 
not concurrent interests in the pending dispute and the commercial 
project they both take part in. 
" Fourth, the Chapter focused on some typical examples of false third parties of 
the second group, and provided a detailed analysis of their substantive 
relationships with the genuine parties. The analysis confirmed that the 
substantive relationships between several parties in the context of construction 
contracts, security agreements and group of companies are closely interrelated 
but still distinct. 
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PART II: ARBITRATION AND THIRD PARTIES: THE CONTRACTUAL 
APPROACH 
The previous chapter distinguished between two different groups of "false third 
parties", depending on the degree of association between genuine and false third 
parties, in terms of substantive liability and interests. The focus of attention was, in 
particular, on the rights and duties resulting from the contractual relationships 
between each of the groups of false third parties and genuine parties, and the way in 
which these rights and duties become intertwined. As has been shown, false third 
parties are typically involved in the same commercial project with the genuine parties 
and, therefore, they have a significant interest in the dispute arising out of the project 
between the genuine parties. Therefore, false third parties may not strangers to the 
arbitration between the genuine parties. 
Many questions arise in this context. Should the arbitration process between two 
original parties remain an exclusive system, reserved only for those persons who have 
consented thereto? Alternatively, should the arbitration process affect the position of 
the false third parties? Is any kind of communication between arbitration and false 
third parties compatible with the contractual character of arbitration? Should there be 
any third-party mechanism applicable to international arbitration? 
To date, the discussion on arbitration and third parties has been limited to issues of 
"consent". A strict contractual approach to the subject has been adopted by legal 
discourse and case law focusing exclusively on the contractual characteristics of 
arbitration agreements as substantive contracts. 
From this contractual viewpoint, the answers to the above questions depend on 
whether a person is bound by an arbitration agreement as an ordinary contract or not. 
Any party not bound by an arbitration agreement, i. e. third party, may not take part 
into the arbitration process irrespective of any legal or financial interest that this third 
party might have in the dispute between the parties bound by an arbitration 
agreement. Therefore, according to the contractual approach, third-party mechanisms, 
such as joinder, intervention or consolidation, may not apply to arbitration unless all 
the relevant parties bound by an arbitration agreement. This approach is echoed in the 
vast majority of the existing arbitration rules and arbitration laws, which usually hinge 
the application of third-party mechanisms to arbitration proceedings on the condition 
that both genuine and third parties to an arbitration agreement have consented to the 
joinder or the consolidation. 
Consequently, according to the prevailing contractual approach, the discussion on 
arbitration and third parties relates only to the boundaries of the arbitration agreement 
as a substantive contract. Within this contractual approach two different views have 
been suggested. 
According to the first, arbitration agreements cannot have any impact whatsoever 
on any person, who has not clearly consented to arbitration, as this consent is 
evidenced by his signature. ' Thus, only those persons that have signed the arbitration 
agreement will have the right to take part in arbitration proceedings. Conversely, any 
person who has not signed an arbitration agreement is regarded as a total stranger to 
the arbitration process, which may affect only the signatory parties. This view is quite 
straightforward relating to the formal requirement of signature and, thus, the thesis 
will not explore it any further. 
By contrast, particular attention will be given to the second view taken by what is 
known as "extension doctrines". According to the extension doctrines, it is possible 
under certain conditions for non-signatory parties to enter into an arbitration 
agreement, notwithstanding the fact that they have failed to sign it. As is argued, the 
arbitration agreement between two signatory parties may be "extended" to non- 
signatories. Hence, the thesis refers to these doctrines as "extension doctrines". As 
will be shown, the extension doctrines do not challenge "consent" as a requirement 
for the participation of the non-signatory party to the arbitration between the 
signatories. The core argument of the extension doctrines is that signature on an 
arbitration agreement is not the only means to assert consent to arbitrate. Consent, 
which is necessary for a non-signatory party to participate in the arbitral proceedings, 
may be inferred, or even presumed by reference to other factual circumstances. 
Therefore, extension doctrines are in accord with the prevailing contractual approach. 
This Part examines the contractual approach in detail. Chapter 1 explains the role 
of consent in this contractual approach and gives a brief overview of the existing 
arbitration laws and rules relating to the third-party mechanisms. Chapter 2 and 3 
explore the two most influential and intellectually intriguing extension doctrines: the 
For example, O. Sandrock, "Extending the Scope of Arbitration Agreements to Non-Signatories", in 
Arbitration Agreement - Its Multifold Critical Aspects, (1999) ASA Special Series No 8, p. 167 and 
0. Sandrock. "Arbitration Agreements and Group of Companies" (1993) 27 International Lawyer, p. 
945. 
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doctrine of "Equitable Estoppel" developed in the USA, and the Continental doctrine 
of "Group of Companies". Chapter 4 further discusses the extension doctrines 
adopting a more critical stance. This chapter highlights the conceptual and practical 
limitations of the extension doctrines and the contractual approach in general. The 
discussion in Chapter 4 will demonstrate that a different approach to the issue of 
arbitration and third parties needs to be adopted: the jurisdictional approach that will 
be presented in Part III. 
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CHAPTER 3: THIRD-PARTY MECHANISMS 
3.1 THIRD-PARTY MECHANISMS AND CONSENT 
There is a plethora of legal discourse and case law relating to third party 
mechanisms, particularly consolidation, in the context of international arbitration. ' 
The prevailing view as taken by the majority of the authorities is that third-party 
mechanisms are not applicable to arbitration. 2 This view is generally based on two 
arguments. 
See I. Dore, Theory and Practice of Multiparty Commercial Arbitration, (Graham & 
Trotman/Marinus Nijhoff London/Dordrecht/Boston 1990); Multiparty Arbitration, ICC (ed. ) (1991); 
G. Bernini. Arbitration in Multi-Party Business Disputes, in Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 
(Kluwer Deventer 1980) p. 291; Commission on International Arbitration, Final Report on Multi- 
party Arbitrations, Paris, June 1994, by the Working Group under the Chairmanship of M. Jean- 
Louis Delvolve, in (1995) 6 ICC Bull. 26 ("Delvolve Report"); G. A. Born, International Commercial 
Arbitration, (Kluwer Law International 2°a ed. 2001), chapterlO; P. Level "Joinder of Proceedings, 
Intervention of Third Parties, and Additional Claims and Counterclaims", (1996) 7(2) ICC Bull. 38; 
P. Fouchard, Multi-Party Business Disputes, Institute of International Business Law and Practice, 
ICC Doc. No. 359,1980, p. 57; F. Nicklisch, "Multi-Party Arbitration and Dispute Resolution in 
Major Industrial Projects", (1994) 11(4) J. Int. Arb. 57; M. Platte "When Should an Arbitrator Join 
Cases? " (2002)18 Arb. Int 67; V. V. Veeder "Muplti-party disputes: Consolidation under English Law; 
The Vimeira- a Sad Forensic Fable", (1986) Arb. Int. 310. S. Strong, "Intervention And Joinder As Of 
Right In International Arbitration: An infringement Of Individual Contract Rights Or A Proper 
Equitable Measure? " (1998) 31 Vand. J. Transnat'l. L. 915, T. Stipanowich, "Arbitration and the 
Multiparty Dispute: The Search for Workable Solutions", (1987) 72 Iowa L. Rev. 473; A. Mourre, 
"L'intervention des Tiers ä I'Arbitrage", (2000-2002) Les cahiers de 1'arbitrage, Recueil, Vol. I, 
100. 
2 Bernini, ibid, p. 295; Devolve Report, ibid, para 5: J. Lew, L. Mistelis and S. Kroell, Comparative 
International Commercial Arbitration. (Kluwer London 2003), para 16-74; G. A. Born, International 
Commercial Arbitration, (Kluwer Law International 2°d ed. 2001), chapter 10; Fouchard idem; 
Nicklisch idem; A. Redfern and M. Hunter, Law and Practice of International Commercial 
Arbitration. by N. Blackabv and C. Partasides (eds) (Kluwer Arbitration Law 2004) at 3-73.. E. 
Gaillard, Pre-rapport sur l'arbitrage multi partite et la consolidation de procedures arbitrales 
connexes, The International Law Association Report of the Sixty-Third Conference, Warsaw, 1988, 
p. 480: R. Wallace, "Consolidated Arbitration in the US: Recent authority requires consent of the 
parties", (1993), 10(4) J. Int'lArb.. p. 5; Leboulanger, "Multi-Contract Arbitration", (1996) 13(4) 
J. Int. Arb. 43: Platte supra p. 77; M. de Boisseson. Le droit francais de l'arbitrage interne et 
international, (G. L. N 1990) p. 264 ; E. Loquin. « Arbitrage et cuationnement >>, Rev Arb. 1994 p. 
247. 
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The principal argument relates to the contractual character of international 
arbitration. The principle of arbitration's contractual character has acquired among 
scholars the status of a sacred doctrine, which would forbid any third-party 
involvement in the exclusively bilateral arbitration process, unless all relevant parties 
have consented thereto either expressly3 or impliedly. 4 
The second argument emphasises the practical problems that usually result from 
the participation of third parties in arbitration proceedings. Third-party mechanisms 
will, normally, make arbitral proceedings more complicated, which in turn will make 
arbitration more expensive and time-consuming. 5 Issues concerning confidentiality6 
or, even, the payment of the arbitrators? will also arise when third parties intervene in 
arbitration. Therefore, the prevailing contractual view is that a person not bound by an 
arbitration agreement, i. e. a third party, cannot participate into the arbitration process. 
If the parties want the application of third-party mechanisms to their arbitration 
resulting to multiparty proceedings they have to provide for them in the arbitration 
agreement. The principle of procedural party autonomy gives the parties the freedom 
to design multiparty proceedings specifically designed to accommodate the particular 
For case-law, see in France: Cour d'Appel de Paris, December 19,1986 O. LA. E. T. I v Sofidid, (1987) 
Rev. Arb. 93; Cass., Nov. 8,1982, Societe Burmeister et Wain Engineering Cie. Lit. v. Societe Ceusot 
Loire et al., (1984) Clunet 151. 
In England: Oxford Shipping v Nippon Yusen Kaisha, [1984] 3 All E. R. 835; Abu Dhabi Gas 
Liquefaction [ADGAS] v Eastern Bechtel, [1982] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 425, where the courts opted for a 
concurrent hearings rather than consolidation, see at 1061 where Watkins LJ noted that the 
consolidation would be "the ideal solution" but concluded that such a solution was impossible in the 
absence of the parties' consent. 
In the US see, indicatively, United Kingdom v Boeing, 998 F. 2d 68,74 (2nd Cir. 1993); American 
Centennial v National Cas., 951 F. 2d 107,108 (6th Cir. 1991); Baesler v Continental Grain, 900 
F. 2d 1193,1195 (8th Cir. 1990); Del E. Webb Constr. v Richardson Hosp. Auth, 823 F. 2d 145,150 
(5th Cir. 1987); Weyerhaeuser v Western Seas Shipping. 743 F. 2d 635,637 (9th Cir. 1984). 
Stipulated in a multiparty arbitration agreement, binding all the several parties or expressly provided 
in the several arbitration agreements with cross-references. On some occasions, there may be an ad 
hoc agreement between the original parties and the third party providing for participatory rights (see 
Merkin, supra, para 15-1 and Hoesch Export v Hansa Projekt Transport (The World Umpire) [1990] 
1 Loyd's 374. 
Implicit consent may usually be inferred in case of several contracts with `back-to-back' arbitration 
clauses providing for arbitrations with identical characteristics. If the several arbitration clauses 
differ in their main terms, for example they provide for different institutions or different applicable 
law, implicit consent will be impossible to be inferred there even if the several contracts are 
inextricably intertwined or even have a uniform economic character, see Berger, International 
Economic Arbitration, (Kluwer 1993) p. 295: Platte, supra n. 1. p. 71; Nicklisch. supra n. 1, p. 60 and 
71. 
5 M. Schwartz. "Multiparty Disputes and Consolidated Arbitrations: An Oxymoron or the Solution to a 
Continuing Dilemma" (1990) 22 Case. WRes. J.. Int'1 L. p. 341 Nicklish, supra n. 74, p. 64. 
6 See Oxford Shipping r Nippon Yusen Kaisha, [1984] 3 All E. R. 835: also M. Collins. "Privacy and 
Confidentiality in Arbitration Proceedings", (1995) 30 Tex. Int'I. L. J. 121: Nichlish supra n. 1, p. 69. 
I See Strong supra n. 1. p. 931. 
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needs of their commercial agreement. Thus, the several parties may incorporate 
multiparty dispute resolution clauses in the several contracts, conferring jurisdiction 
over the several parties on a single arbitral tribunal. In this regard, the parties have the 
exclusive discretion to provide for the application of third-party mechanisms, be that 
consolidation or intervention or joinder. This is a well-established right of the parties 
particularly in the context of international business transactions and, accordingly, 
courts and arbitral tribunals must honour parties' preference to multiparty 
proceedings. 
The case where the several parties provide for multiparty proceedings in their 
arbitration agreement is a clear-cut case of multiparty arbitration and should not raise 
any difficult issues. Whether or not several parties have consented to multiparty 
proceedings, in these cases, is a matter of interpretation of the relevant arbitration 
agreements. Strictly speaking, when several parties conclude multiparty arbitration 
agreements, all the several parties are genuine rather than third parties. Therefore, the 
thesis will not examine in detail the matter of multiparty arbitration agreements. It is 
for the sake of completion, that the next two sessions will briefly look into two issues 
that often arise in the context of dispute resolution clauses providing for multiparty 
proceedings: first, the issue of equal treatment of the several co-respondents or co- 
claimants in the constitution of the tribunal and, second, the issue of effective 
interpretation of these clauses. 
3.1.1 Equal treatment of the several co-respondents or co-claimants in the 
constitution of the tribunal 
The issue of equal treatment of the several parties in the constitution of the tribunal 
has been the subject matter of an exhaustive discussion in literature, particularly in the 
last decade. 8 The well-know decision of the French Cour de cassation in the Siemens 
AG v Dutco Construction Co. case9 laid down the theoretical premises of the 
discussion. It should be briefly reminded that in Dutco, upon threats by the ICC Court 
to appoint an arbitrator on behalf of the several respondents, the latter jointly 
nominated an arbitrator. At the same time, however, they reserved their right to 
challenge the appointment procedure. The two co-respondents argued that their 
interests in the particular case were conflicting and, therefore, each one of them 
s See indicatively Platte supra n. l, Lew-Mistelis-Kroell. supra n. 2 para 16-11 et seq. 
I Cass. (France) 7.1.1992, [1994] ADRLJ 36. 
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should have been given the right to appoint its own arbitrator. The highest court of 
France held that the appointment procedure had violated the principle of equality of 
the parties in the appointment of arbitrators, which is a matter of public policy. Thus, 
the Cour de cassation disapproved of ICUs practice under its previous rules to allow 
for one side to choose its own arbitrator while obliging the other party to agree on a 
single arbitrator despite their conflicting interests. The Dutco dictum was not 
unanimously acclaimed. There have been voices of concern, noting that it is not 
always workable to provide every party involved in a multiparty arbitration with the 
right to appoint its own arbitrator. 1° Nonetheless, the principles set out by the French 
Cour de cassation have been in general accepted by the arbitration community. As has 
rightly been observed: "the French Cour de cassation simply requires that all the 
parties should have the same rights with regard to the appointment of the arbitrators, 
not that they should all have a right to appoint "their" arbitrator". ' 1 
Accordingly, many arbitration institutions modified their rules in accordance with 
the Dutco principles, providing at the same time for a more workable solution. In 
particular, the new arbitration rules give the multiple claimants and respondents the 
opportunity to nominate a single arbitrator, but in case they fail to do so, the 
institution will appoint the tribunal on behalf of both the sides. 12 This solution is in 
general considered the best possible compromise in the delicate issue of the equal 
treatment of the several parties in the appointment of arbitrators. 13 
3.1.2 Effective interpretation of multiparty arbitration clauses 
As regards the issue of the effective interpretation of the multiparty arbitration 
clauses the following notes should be made. In practice, the parties often fail to draft 
clear dispute resolution clauses, explicitly providing for multiparty proceedings. Thus, 
very often the several parties instead of concluding one multilateral arbitration 
agreement will conclude several bilateral contracts, containing bilateral arbitration 
clauses, with no cross-references. In such cases, it is difficult to infer multilateral 
ýo Lew-Mistelis-Kroell, aupra n. 2. para 16-12: also Redfern and Hunter. supra n. 2 para 3-71; B. 
Hanotiau. Complex Arbitrations, Multiparty. Multi-contract, Multi-issue and Class Actions. (Kluwer 
Law International 2005) para 443 et seq: E. Schwartz, "Multi-Party Arbitration and the ICC: In the 
Wake of Dutco" in (1993) 10 J. Int. Arb. p. 16. 
" P. Fouchard, E. Galliard and B. Goldman, On International Commercial Arbitration, E. Gaillard and 
J. Savage (eds. ) (Kluwer Law International 1999) para 792. 
12 ICC art. 10. LCIA art. 8, Swiss Rules art. 8 paras 3-5. AAA-ICDR art. 6. 
13 See Hanotiau. supra n. 10. para 444: "it seems that in general. all situations of this type have managed 
to find an appropriate solution, through discussion with the parties". 
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consent for multiparty arbitration proceedings, even if the several contracts are 
drafted in view of the same commercial project, and the arbitration clauses are drafted 
in identical terms. 14 
Whenever the contractual provisions of the parties are ambiguous or unclear, the 
courts will normally apply general contract interpretation principles to lift the 
ambiguity and give effect to the agreement of the parties. Thus, provided that the 
clauses are otherwise valid in terms of form and substance, courts and tribunals will 
favour an effective interpretation, which accords with the obvious commercial 
purpose of the agreement. 15 
3.2. THIRD-PARTY MECHANISMS IN ARBITRATION RULES AND LAWS 
Even if the parties have failed to provide for multiparty proceedings in their 
arbitration agreements, third-party mechanisms may still apply by reference to the 
applicable lex arbitri. This section gives a brief overview of the arbitration rules and 
laws regarding third-party mechanisms. As will be shown, the vast majority of the 
arbitration rules and the national laws adhere to the prevailing contractual approach 
providing that third-party mechanisms, such as joinder or consolidation, may not 
apply to arbitration unless all the relevant parties have given their consented thereto. 
Starting from the arbitration rules, there are only few of them providing for third- 
party mechanisms. In general, the majority of the arbitration rules leave the exclusive 
decision on such a delicate issue to the parties. For example, no relevant provision is 
14 Nicklisch, supra n. 2, at p. 71; contra Platte, supra n. 1, p. 68 et seq. 
15 See for example Antaios Compania Naviera v Salen Rederierna [1985] AC 191 at 201; Manai 
Investments v Eagle Star [1997] AC 749 at 771; Siruis International Insurance Company v FAI 
General Insurance Limited [2004] UKHL 54. 
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found in the ICC, '6 the AAA ICDR, 17 the UNCITRAL Rules, 18 the Stockholm 
Chamber of Commerce Arbitration Rules (2007), 19 or the CIETAC Rules. 20 
When arbitration rules expressly provide for third-party mechanisms, they usually 
require consent of all the relevant parties (genuine and third ones). This is, for 
example, the case with the Vienna Rules21 or the Netherlands Arbitration Institute 
rules. " 
There are only a few exceptions to the principle requiring consent of all the 
relevant parties for the application of third-party mechanisms. For example, in some 
institutional rules, such as the LCIA, the CEPANI or the Swiss Rules, consent of all 
the parties is not required for the consolidation of two pending arbitrations between 
several parties, or the joinder of a third party. In these cases, the decision for the 
consolidation or the joinder is entrusted either to the arbitral tribunal or the 
administration body. 23 This "interventionist approach" is more frequent in arbitration 
16 ICC art. 10 refers only to the constitution of the arbitral tribunal in a case where there are multiple 
claimants or respondents. This provision was inserted after the Dutco case in order to preserve the 
equal treatment of the several parties in nominating the party-appointed arbitrator, see above n. 10. 
The policy of the American Arbitration Association is to permit consolidation of proceedings only in 
cases in which all parties agree thereto, or a court orders consolidation (Consolidation of Arbitration 
Proceedings, Lawyers' Arbitration Letter no. 37, American Arbitration Association) : cf Strong, supra 
n. 1: p. 932: "The AAA's experience has been that joinder is more likely in vertical disputes (such as 
those involving an owner, a general contractor, and a subcontractor) than in horizontal disputes (such 
as those involving an owner, a contractor, and an architect). 
18 The drafters of UNCITRAL Rules as of UNCITRAL Model law thought it best to avoid dealing with 
the issue of participatory rights and leave it to party autonomy; see in general (in the context of 
UNCITRAL Model law) the First Working Group Report A/CN9/216 para. 37. 
19 Art. 13(4) is a similar provision to ICC art. 10 referring to the constitution of the tribunal, see note 
above, whereas art. 11 is on consolidation of several claims between the same parties. 
20 Art. 24 is also similar to ICC art. 10. 
21 Art. 10. Vienna rules will also permit joinder in cases where the substantive applicable law 
"positively provides that the claim is to be directed against several persons" (art. 10(1)(a)). For more 
detail on the importance of the substantive applicable law on application of the participatory 
mechanisms see below Chapter 6. 
22 Art. 41. 
23 For example see LCIA art. 22.1(h) where the tribunal will decide, upon the application of a real party 
whether a third party will be joined in the arbitration. LCIA require only the consent of the applicant 
and the third party, but not the consent of the other real party. 
In the CEPANI Rules art. 12, the decision on consolidation, at the request of a party or the tribunal or 
upon the CEPANI's own motion, will be taken by the CEPANI's appointment committee or the 
chairman of the tribunal. 
In the Swiss Rules the decision for consolidation of two proceeding is taken by the administrative 
body (Chambers) (art. 4(1)), whereas the decision for intervention or joinder is taken by the arbitral 
tribunal (art. 4(2)). 
In the Japanese Commercial Arbitration Association Rules, the participation of a third party in 
pending arbitration proceedings requires the consent of the parties to the arbitration (r. 43). For 
multiple related claims to be consolidated in the absence of the written consent of all the relevant 
parties, it is required that the administration of the arbitral tribunal determines that consolidation is 
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rules related to specific industries, such as construction, 24 commodities, 25 securities26 
or maritime. '? 
National arbitration laws also opt for party autonomy, the majority of which avoids 
to include any fall back provisions, let alone any mandatory ones, providing for third- 
party mechanisms. Indeed, no relevant provisions can be found in the US Federal 
Arbitration Act, 28 the Swiss PILA, the French NCCP, the German ZPO or the Model 
Law. 29 
Even when national laws expressly provide for third-party mechanisms, they 
usually take the contractual approach, requiring the agreement of all the parties, 
original and third, to multiparty proceedings. This is the legislative model followed 
for example by the EAA, 30 and the Belgian Judicial Code, 31 where the final decision 
on the application of the joinder or intervention needs to be taken by the tribunal. 
Some other national laws empower the national courts rather than the tribunal to 
necessary (r. 44). Consent is not required only when the multiple requests for arbitration come out of 
the same agreement. 
24 For example, the AAA Construction Industry Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures (Including 
Procedures for Large, Complex Construction Disputes) R-7 (consolidation) or the AAA New Jersey 
Residential Construction Lien Arbitration Rules, s. 5. (Joinder). 
25 For example, the US National Grain and Feed Association, s. 5 (f)-(e). 
2' For example, the AAA Supplementary Procedures for Securities Arbitration s. 2 or the NASD 
Uniform Code of Arbitration s. 10314(d) or the New York Stock Exchange Arbitration Rules 
s. 612(d). 
27 For example, the London Maritime Arbitration Association, s. 14(b)( concurrent proceedings) or the 
Society of Maritime Arbitrators (NY) Arbitration Rules, s. 2 (consolidation). 
28 S. 4, which authorises actions to compel arbitration, does not grant a court the authority to 
consolidate proceedings unless the arbitration agreement provides for consolidation (Glencore v 
Schnitzer Steel Products, 189 F. 3d 264 (2d Cir. 1999)); cf however, Robinson v Warner, 370 
F. Supp. 828 (D. R. I. 1974), ordering the consolidation of two AAA arbitrations between an owner and 
a contractor, on the one hand, and the same owner and the architect on the other, pursuant to s. 4 
FAA. 
29 For the reasons see the First Working Group Report A/CN9/216 para37 (supra n); cf also Dore, 
supra, n. 1 chapter 3 for an extensive analysis of the multiparty issues in the UNCITRAL context in 
general. 
30 S. 35: consolidation or concurrent hearings between two arbitral proceedings on the agreement of all 
parties involved therein. The Advisory Committee on the EAA rejected a proposal to include 
provisions for a court-ordered compulsory consolidation: "In our view it would amount to a negation 
of the principle of party autonomy to give the tribunal or the Court power to order consolidation or 
concurrent hearings. Indeed it would to our minds go far towards frustrating the agreement of the 
parties to have their own tribunal for their own disputes. Further difficulties could well arise. such as 
the disclosure of documents from one arbitration to another. Accordingly we would be opposed to 
giving the tribunal or the Court this power. However, if the parties agree to invest the tribunal with 
such a power, then we would have no objection" (Report on the Arbitration Bill by the Departmental 
Advisory Committee on Arbitration Law. February 1996, para. 180). 
31 Art. 1696(bis) provides for intervention and joinder on the basis of first a new arbitration agreement 
between the third party and the real ones, and second the unanimous consent of the arbitral tribunal. 
Consensus of all the relevant parties is required also by the Netherlands Code of Civil Procedure 
art. 1045 for joinder or intervention of a third party. 
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decide whether a third party will take part in the arbitration proceedings, although 
they still require the consent of the all relevant parties as an indispensable condition. 32 
Only as a rare exception arbitration laws deviate from the contractual approach, 
and provide for compulsory third-party mechanisms ordered exclusively by national 
courts, even without the unanimous consent of the relevant parties. The classic 
example here is the Netherlands Code of Civil Procedure art. 1046,33 which provides 
for compulsory consolidation to be ordered by the President of the Amsterdam 
District Court. 34 
Finally, an interesting approach is taken by the New Italian Arbitration Law: 
echoing analogous provisions in Italian litigation proceedings, art. 816 quinquies 
distinguishes between "voluntary intervention or joining" of a third party, which will 
be admissible only with the agreement of the third party and the original parties with 
the arbitrators' consent, and the intervention or joining of a third party who is 
considered to "be necessary by law" (`litisconsorzio necessario'), which will always 
be admissible, irrespective of the consent of the original parties to the arbitration 
proceedings. 
32 For example, Utah Code Ann. s. 78-31 a-9; California s. 1297.272; Canada, British Columbia 
s. 21, Texas s. 172.173. 
33 This provision was enacted to accommodate the construction industry in Netherlands. The latter, 
however, has not been entirely satisfied with the final result and the way art. 1046 has been applied in 
practice, see Jacomijn van Haersolte-van Hof, "Consolidation under the English Arbitration Act 
1996: A view from the Netherlands". (1997) 13.4 h. hit. p. 427. 
34 Similar provisions can be found in HK Arbitration Ordinance s. 6. B (consolidation or concurrent 
hearings) and s. 7 (interpleading) both applicable for domestic arbitrations; New Zealand Arbitration 
Act s. 2 (Second Schedule), Australia, Queensland s. 26. see also the US Revised Uniform Arbitration 
Act s. 10 (however, in case the arbitration agreement expressly prohibits consolidation, the court 
would have no power to violate the agreement, s. 10(c)); and a number of US national state laws: 
Washington RCW s. 7.04A. 100 (consolidation); Georgia arbitration code: 9-9-6(e) (consolidation); 
Alaska AS 09.43.370 (consolidation): South Carolina S. C. Code Ann. s. 15-48-60 (joinder). 
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CHAPTER 4: EXTENSION DOCTRINES- THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE 
ESTOPPEL 
4.1 GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE DOCTRINE 
The doctrine of equitable estoppel in its traditional meaning reflects the general 
legal principle of non-venire contra factum proprium, found in Roman Law and 
known in many contemporary civil law jurisdictions. ' According to the doctrine, a 
party is prevented from asserting rights against another party, when the latter 
justifiably relied on the conduct of the former and changed his position to his 
detriment as a result of such reliance. 2 The principle, as its name indicates, has an 
equitable character, which makes it difficult to delineate. 3 
In arbitration the doctrine has developed a specific meaning applicable to non- 
signatories in the context of jurisdictionally fragmented multiparty projects with 
E. Gaillard, "L'interdiction de se contredire au detriment d'autrui comme principe general au droit 
du commerce international". (1985) Rev. Arb.. p. 241: Cf also B. Hanotiau, Complex Arbitrations: 
Multipart, Multi-contract, Multi-issue and Class Actions, (Kluwer International 2005) para. 41, who 
notes that the equitable estoppel doctrine is primarily an Anglo-American concept which will rarely 
apply per se in a commercial arbitration in a truly international context, let alone in Continental 
Europe. 
2 See First Union Commercial c Nelson, Mullins, Rile)' & Scarborough (In re Varat) 81 F. 3d 1310, 
(4th Cir. 1996) at 1317; and Lowery v Stovall. 92 F. 3d 219 (4th Cir. 1996) at 223. 
3 Grigson v Creative Artists Agency. 210 F. 3d 524,527 (5th Cir. 2000). per J Dennis (dissenting): 
"[N]early anything can be called estoppel. When a lawyer or a judge does not know what other 
name to give for his decision to decide a case in a certain way, he says there is an estoppel" 
68 
regard to construction works, 4 secured agreements, 5 or string sales contracts. 6 Thus, 
the US courts have repeatedly estopped signatory parties to arbitration agreements 
from initiating court proceedings against non-signatory parties, ordering signatories 
submit their dispute with the non-signatories to arbitration. In the majority of the case 
the doctrine has been employed by the US courts to estop the signatory party "from 
avoiding arbitration with a non-signatory. "7 However, on various occasions the 
doctrine has equally been applied to estop the non-signatory party f om avoiding 
arbitration with the signatory party. 8 
This was the case, for example, in Hughes Masonry v Greater Clark County School Bldg, 659 F. 2d 
836 (7th Cir. 1981); McBro Planning & Development Co i' Triangle Electronic Construction, 741 
F. 2d 342.343 (11th Cir. 1984); Smith/Enron Cogeneration v Smith Cogeneration Int'l, 198 F. 3d 88 
(2d Cir. 1999). 
5 For example in Choctaw Generation v American Home Assurance, 271 F. 3d 403 (2°a Circ. 2001) or in 
Ex Parte Napier, 659 F. 2d 836 (7th Cir. 1981). 
6 International Paper v Schwabedissen Maschinen & Anlagen Gmbh, 206 F. 3d 411 (4th Circ. 2000). 
Smith/Enron Cogeneration v Smith Cogeneration Int'l, supra n. 4, at 98; Thomson-CSF v American 
Arbitration Ass'n, 64 F. 3d 773 (2d Cir. 1995) at 779; Choctaw Generation v American Home 
Assurance, supra n. 5. 
The US case law with regard to equitable estoppel doctrine has caused extensive discussion on the 
issue, particularly in the last decade. See, for example, B. Hanotiau, Complex Arbitrations, supra n. 
1, para 41 et seq.; J. M. Townsend, "Non-Signatories in International Arbitration: an American 
Perspective", in International Arbitration 2006: Back to Basics?, ICCA International Arbitration 
Congress (Kluwer Law International 2007); Williston, On Contracts, (ed Richard Lord) 4th Ed, 
(West Group 2001), Ch. 57: 19; J. Douglas Uloth -J. Hamilton Rial, "Equitable Estoppel As A Basis 
For Compelling Nonsignatories To Arbitrate: A Bridge Too Far? " (2002) 21 Rev. Litig., p. 593: J. 
Douglas Uloth -J. Hamilton Rial, "Enforcing Arbitration Against Nonsignatories" (2002) 65 Tex. 
B. J., p. 802; H. Warren Knight et al., Arbitration By and Against Nonsignatories, in California 
Practice Guide: Alternative Dispute Resolution, (1998) paras 5: 261-5: 288; Jeff DeArman, 
"Resolving Arbitration's Nonsignatory Issue: A Critical Analysis of the Application of Equitable 
Estoppel in Alabama Courts", (1998-1999) 29 Cumb. L. Rev., p. 645; Dileo, "The Enforceability Of 
Arbitration Agreements By And Against Nonsignatories" (2003) 2 Journal of American Arbitration, 
p. 31; Charles Lee Eisen, "What Arbitration Agreement? Compelling Non-Signatories To Arbitrate" 
(2001) 56 Disp. Resol. J., p. 40. 
See for example Denney v BDO Seidman, 412 F. 3d 58 (2nd Cir 2005); International Paper v 
Schwabedissen Maschinen & Anlagen Gmbh, supra n. 6; American Bureau of Shipping v Tencara 
Shipyard S. P. A., 170 F. 3d 349,353 (2nd Cir. 1999); In re Weekley Homes, 180 S. W. 3d 127, (S. C 
Tex. 2005); Carlin v 3V, 928 S. W. 2d 291,296 (Tex. App. 1996) and Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith v Eddings 838 S. W. 2d 874 (Tex. App. 1992); Matter of VMS, 26 F. 3d 50,52 (7th Cir. 1994); 
Deloitte Noraudit A/S v Deloitte Haskins & Sells, F. 3d 1060,1064 (2d Cir. 1993); Amkor Tech. v 
Alcatel Business Systems, 278 F. Supp. 2d 519 (E. D. PA. 2003); Nova Hutt A/S v Kaiser Group Int'l, 
307 B. R. 449 (Del. 2004); E. I. DuPont de Nemours i Rhone Poulenc Fiber & Resin Intermediates, 
S. A. S., 269 F. 3d 187,200 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2001). Cf the wording in Jones ti, Genus Credit, 353 F. Supp. 2d 
598 (U. S. D. C. Maryland 2005), at 602: 
"The law is clear that a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement may enforce (or be bound 
by) the agreement's terms where the claims against the signatory and the non-signatory are 
based on the same facts and are inherently inseparable. " (emphasis added). 
Cf also Griffin v Beach Club II Homeowners Association, 384 F. 3d 157 (4`h Cir 2004), where a real 
party tried to compel a third party to arbitrate (motion denied on other grounds). Contra Thomson- 
CFS v American Arbitration Association. supra n. 7, where the Court rejected the application of the 
doctrine to third parties. 
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4.2 COMMENTARY ON THE DOCTRINE: CONTENT AND CONDITIONS OF 
APPLICATION 
The following observations should be made regarding the content of the doctrine 
as well as its conditions of application 
4.2.1 The application of the doctrine presupposes a thorough analysis of the 
dispute and its factual circumstances 
Courts in order to apply the doctrine must first carefully examine the rights and 
duties arising out of the interrelated contracts between the several parties. This 
examination under the equitable estoppel theory must be particularly thorough by 
comparison with the usual fact-finding analysis. In Choctaw Generation v American 
Home Assurance, ' for example, the Second Circuit noted characteristically: 
"We carefully reviewed the relationship among the parties, the contracts 
they signed (or did not), and the issues that had arisen, to arrive at the 
conclusion that the controversy was arbitrable" [... ] "The tight relatedness of 
the parties, contracts and controversies is easily demonstrated by a (necessarily 
tedious) review of the contract terms in dispute between and among the parties, 
and the parties' competing analyses of them. "lo 
Similarly in Ex paste Isbell, the court stressed that: 
"Any case coming before this Court that involves the right of non- 
signatories to compel arbitration will [... ] be peculiarly fact-specific and will 
require a penetrating analysis of the facts and an application of traditional 
contract principles" 11 
4.2.2 Moving away from its equitable origins: the "intertwined factor" and the 
conditions for the application of the doctrine 
As was indicated, the estoppel doctrine has equitable roots. Applied in its 
traditional meaning, the doctrine would prevent a party that has gained a direct benefit 
from a contract including an arbitration clause from avoiding arbitration. As courts 
have emphasised: 
271 F. 3d 403 (2°d Circ. 2001). 
10 Ibid at 406. 
708 So. 2d at 577-78 (Ala. 1997). 
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"To allow [a plaintiff] to claim the benefit of the contract and 
simultaneously avoid its burdens would both disregard equity and 
contravene the purposes underlying enactment of the Arbitration Act. " 2 
The US courts have several times applied the doctrine on this equitable basis. For 
example, in Deloitte Noraudit A/S v Deloitte Haskins & Sells, 13 a Norwegian 
accounting firm was estopped from denying its obligation to arbitrate under an 
arbitration clause included in a memorandum agreement, which the firm had not 
signed, when the firm had accepted the benefits of the Agreement through its 
continuing use of IP rights, namely the name of the firm. 
Likewise, in American Bureau of Shipping v Tencara Shipyard, 14 the doctrine was 
applied to estop yacht owners (non-signatories) from refusing to arbitrate under an 
arbitration clause in a contract between the yacht's builder and a ship classification 
society (signatories), when the yacht owners had received lower insurance rates and 
has acquired the ability to sail under the French flag due to the contract. 
Equitable considerations also underpinned International Paper v Schwabedissen 
Maschinen & Anlagen Gmbh. 15 Here the buyer of industrial saw was precluded from 
asserting that, as non-signatory party, it was not bound by the arbitration clause 
included in the contract for the sale of the saw between distributor and manufacturer, 
when the buyer's claims against manufacturer were based on and arose out of that 
contract. The Court noted that: 
"A non-signatory is equitably estopped from refusing to comply with an 
arbitration clause when it receives a direct benefit from a contract 
containing an arbitration clause"' 6 
However, on many other occasions, the US courts have given the doctrine a 
dynamic meaning, which seems to have diverged from its traditional equitable 
origins. In this context, the courts have attached less importance to whether the party 
avoiding the arbitration agreement has gained a direct benefit from a contract 
including the arbitration clause, and more importance to two other factors: 
12 Avila Group, Inc. i Norma J. of California, 426 F. Supp. 537,542 (S. D. N. Y. 1977) (also cited in 
International Paper, supra n. 6). Cf Tepper Realtb, v Mosaic Tile, 259 F. Supp. 688. (S. D. N. Y. 1966) 
at 692: "In short, [plaintiff] cannot have it both ways. [It] cannot rely on the contract when it works 
to its advantage, and repudiate it when it works to [its] disadvantage". 
13 9F. 3d 1060 (2d Cir. 1993). 
14 170 F. 3d 349 (2nd Cir. 1999). 
'5 206 F. 3d 411 (4th Cir. 2000). Cf also Ex parse Isbell, 708 Sold 571 (Ala. 1997). 
11 Ibid At 418: "A non-signatory is equitably estopped from refusing to comply with an arbitration 
clause when it receives a direct benefit from a contract containing an arbitration clause. 
" First, the degree to which the dispute between the non-signatory and the 
signatory party is intertwined with the contract between the two signatories 
0 Second, the degree to which the non-signatory is interrelated to the 
signatory parties 
Here, the courts have given emphasis to the "intertwined" factors, rather than to 
equitable considerations. In fact, there have cases where the courts have made no 
reference to the term "equitable estoppel" at all. 17 Instead the "intertwined factor" has 
evolved as the decisive criterion for determining whether a signatory to a bilateral 
arbitration agreement must arbitrate with a party that has never consented to this 
arbitration agreement. '8 
In detail, the two key-elements under the intertwined version of the estoppel 
doctrine are: 
17 No reference to "equitable estoppel" is found in Choctaw Generation v American Home Assurance, 
supra n. 5; McBro Planning & Development Co v Triangle Electronic Construction, supra n. 4; Ex 
Parte Napier, supra n. 5; Denney v BDO Seidman, supra n. 8. 
It seems that the key-phrase "intertwined with the underlying contract obligations" was first added to 
the traditional equitable estopel doctrine by the Seventh Circuit in Hughes. The Court in this case 
basically applied equitable considerations, and it is not clear whether it was in its intention to expand 
the doctrine (J. Douglas Uloth -J. Hamilton Rial, argue in the negative, supra n. 7, p. 609). In any 
event, this phrase was used in McBro Planning Development v Triangle Electrical Construction, 
supra n. 4 applied in J. J. Ryan & Sons v Rhone Poulenc Textile, 863 F. 2d 315 (4th Cir. 1988); and 
Smith/Enron Cogeneration v Smith Cogeneration International, 198 F. 3d 88 (2°d Circ. 1999) and 
finally achieved full recognition in Choctaw Generation v American Home Assurance, supra n. 5271 
F. 3d 403 (2"d Circ. 2001). 
The existence of a different kind of estoppel theory than the traditional equitable one is also 
recognized in Thomson, where after referring to the equitable estoppel, the Court referred to the 
theory of intertwined contracts noting, that "Several courts of appeal have recognized an alternative 
estoppel theory requiring arbitration between a signatory and nonsignatory", supra n 7, at 779. It 
continues: "As these cases indicate, the circuits have been willing to estop a signatory from avoiding 
arbitration with a nonsignatory when the issues the nonsignatory is seeking to resolve in arbitration 
are intertwined with the agreement that the estopped party has signed" (emphasis added). However, 
at the end, the Court in Thomson rejected that theory "`close relationship' and `intimate [ ]' factual 
connection provide no independent basis to require a nonsignatory of an arbitration agreement to 
arbitrate with a signatory, and therefore that a nonsignatory cannot be bound without receiving a 
`direct benefit' from or pursuing a `claim [... ] integrally related to the contract containing the 
arbitration clause. " Thomson-CSF, 64 F. 3d at 778-80. 
The same approach can be found in Fluor Daniel Intercontinental v General Electric. (1999) WL 
637236 (S. D. N. Y. ), at 5-6. 
International Paper, supra n. 6 also refers to the intertwined theory as opposed to the traditional 
equitable estoppel theory, but it avoided examining the issue any further (although applied the 
equitable benefit recognizes the existence of the intertwined relationships). See 418 n. 6. 
Cf J. Douglas Uloth -J. Hamilton Rial. supra n. 7, p. 611: "as courts later began to focus on the 
Seventh Circuit's use of the phrase `intertwined with the underlying contract obligations'. a new 
`intertwined claims' equitable estoppel theory was born". 
ýý 
4.2.2.1 First, the dispute between the signatory and the non-signatory party must be 
intertwined with the contract between the signatories 
Here, the courts will examine the dispute between the non-signatory and the 
signatory party in the light of the contract between the signatories, which includes the 
arbitration agreement. 
For example, in Choctaw Generation v American Home Assurance, a construction 
company had entered into a series of contracts with the owner, under which the 
contractor had to provide engineering and construction services, the performance of 
which were secured by a letter of credit provided by a surety company. An arbitration 
agreement was included in the construction contract between the owner and the 
contractor, whereas the letter of credit (the security contract) had no arbitration 
agreement. The Second Circuit found that the dispute between the surety and the 
owner was strongly intertwined with the underlying construction contract since it 
"concerns the duty to replenish a letter of credit maintained under the 
Construction Contract, and requires a ruling as to whether that duty is 
independent of certain others in the context of the Construction Contract as a 
whole"19 
The court also held that: 
"The underlying dispute between [the contractor] and [the owner], 
concerning [the owner's] entitlement to liquidated damages, is now in the early 
stages of arbitration, and entails the construing of a dozen provisions of the 
Construction Contract. The immediate dispute in this action between [the 
owner] and [the surety], concerning whether [the owner] can compel 
immediate replenishment of the letter of credit to fund the liquidated damages, 
turns upon many of the same provisions"20 
The Court, therefore, concluded that: 
"The controversy presented on this appeal [between the owner and the 
surety] is linked textually to the Construction Contract, and its merits are 
bound up with the dispute now being arbitrated between [the owner] and [the 
contractor] "` 1 
19 Choctaw, supra n. 5, at 406. 
20 Idem. 
21 Ibid. at 407. 
ý^ 
In McBro Planning Development v Triangle Electrical Construction, 22 a 
construction manager contracted with the owner of a hospital with regard to 
renovation work on the hospital, while an electrical engineer executed a separate 
agreement with the owner to perform electrical work on the same hospital. The 
electrical engineer filed a suit before the US courts against the construction manager, 
alleging that the latter had harassed and hampered its electrical work. The 
construction manager invoked the arbitration clause included in its contract with the 
owner and moved for an order to compel the electrical engineer to arbitrate with it. 23 
The Eleventh Circuit, indeed, ordered the electrical engineer to arbitrate the dispute 
with the construction manager as it found that the rights and duties of the construction 
manager with regard to the construction work were entangled in the underlying 
contractual relationship between the owner and the electrical engineer: 
"Although the contract [between the owner and the contractor] disclaims 
any contractual relationship between the [construction manager] and [the 
contractor], the general conditions of that contract are replete with references 
to the [manager's] duties as construction manager, on behalf of the owner, as 
regards supervision of the project, for which [contractor] was a contractor. [... ] 
The contractor's claims are `intimately founded in and intertwined with the 
underlying contract obligations "' (emphasis added)24 
The court made extensive reference to the terms of the construction contract to 
illustrate the tight interrelation between the dispute in question and the underlying 
contract. In particular, under the contract for construction 
"The construction manager would be `engaged to manage the construction 
of the Project"' 
and the 
"Authority to act on behalf of the Owner, and to schedule and coordinate 
work of contractors, to process payment applications and to reject 
nonconforming work, and even giving contractor reasonable veto over owner's 
22 Supra n. 4. 
23 The contract between the electrical engineer and the owner also included an arbitration clause. The 
District Court had taken this arbitration clause into account as an alternative basis for compelling the 
engineer to arbitrate with the construction manager, see McBro Planning v Triangle Elec. Constr., 
No. 82-C-1577-S, Memorandum of Opinion (N. D. Ala., Oct. 14.1982). 
24 Supra, n. 4. at 344. 
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choice of new construction manager and referring any dispute thereon to 
arbitration"25 
Hence, the Court concluded that: 
"In short, the construction manager's duties on behalf of the owner are so 
broad that a contractor-owner contract inevitably involves a close contractor- 
construction manager relationship , 26 
In Hughes Masonry v Greater Clark County School Bldg, 27 in factual and legal 
circumstances almost identical to those in McBro, the Seventh Circuit, on the one 
hand referred to equity principles, 28 but on the other focused on the close interrelation 
between the terms of the contractual relationships of the several parties. 
More specifically, a construction manager entered into an agreement with an 
owner who had also concluded a contract with a masonry company with regard to the 
same construction project (the building of two schools). The masonry company filed 
an action against the construction manager for intentional and negligent interference 
with its contract with the owner. The construction manager invoked the arbitration 
clause incorporated in the contract between the owner and the masonry company and 
moved for an order to compel the masonry company to arbitrate its dispute with it. 
The Seventh Circuit referred the masonry company to arbitration with the 
construction company. The court noted that: 
"In substance [the masonry company] is attempting to hold the [the 
construction manager], to the terms of the agreement [between the masonry 
company and the owner] "29 
and that the masonry company's 
"complaint is fundamentally grounded in the [the construction manager's] 
alleged breach of the obligations assigned to it in the agreement [between the 
masonry company and the owner] "30 
25 Ibid at 344. n. 8. 
26 Ideen. 
27 659 F. 2d 836 (7th Cir. 1981). 
28 Ibid. at 839 "it would be manifestly inequitable to permit [the masonry company] to both claim that 
[the construction manager] is liable to [the masonry company] for its failure to perform the 
contractual duties described in [the owner-masonry company] agreement and at the same time deny 
that [the construction manager] is a party to that agreement in order to avoid arbitration of claims 
clearly within the ambit of the arbitration clause". 
"' Ibid. at 838. 
30 Ideen. 
7 
The Court here, as in McBro, referred to the underlying contract between the 
owner and the masonry company to demonstrate the close interrelation between the 
dispute at hand and the underlying contract. The Court, in particular, underlined: 
"that the agreement [between the masonry and the owner] set forth various 
duties that the [construction manager is] to perform on behalf of the owner, 
including: 
the scheduling and coordination of the masonry company's work on the 
project 
the processing of masonry's payment applications and the certification of 
masonry company's work for payment by the owner 
the authority to approve original and revised work progress schedules 
prepared by the masonry company 
the authority to approve masonry company's operations on the project sites 
and to determine whether materials and equipment used by the masonry are 
defective. , 31 
The Court added that: 
"The masonry construction `shall indemnify ... the Construction Manager 
for certain damage claims arising out of the negligent acts or omissions of the 
masonry or its agents. "' 32 
In Sunkist Soft Drinks v Sunkist Growers, 33 the licensor of a trademark filed a 
claim against the parent company of the licensee for improper interference with the 
license agreement. The parent company although a non-signatory party to the 
arbitration clause, incorporated in the license agreement, filed a motion to compel the 
licensor (signatory party) to arbitrate the dispute with it. The Eleventh Circuit was 
satisfied that: 
"The nexus between [the licensor's] claims and the license agreement, as 
well as the integral relationship between [the licensee] and [the licensee's 
parent company], leads us to the conclusion that the claims are intimately 
founded in and intertwined with the license agreement. "34 
31 Ibid. at 839. 
3' Ibid. 
33 10 F. 3d 753 (11`h Cir. 1981). 
34 Ibid, at 758, see too Fluor Daniel Intercontinental, Inc. i' Gen. Elce. Co., supra n. 18. at 6. 
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In Ex Parte Napier, 35 the dispute arose out of the purchase of a mobile home. In 
addition to a retail installment contract with the seller, the buyer entered into separate 
contracts with an insurance company and a finance company. Only the contract 
between the buyer and the seller included an arbitration clause. Nevertheless, the 
buyer was compelled to arbitrate the dispute not only with the seller but also with the 
insurance and the finance company. The Court pointed out that: 
"[claimants'] claims against the signatory defendants and those against the 
nonsignatory defendants are sufficiently intertwined that all claims must be 
arbitrated. , 36 
4.2.2.2 Second, the non-signatory party must have close contractual or corporate 
links with one of the signatory parties 
The application of the doctrine requires that the non-signatory party is closely 
linked to at least one of the signatory parties. This link is usually contractual. Thus, 
for example, the non-signatory and signatory parties may have executed a 
construction agreement, as in McBro and in Hughes, or a purchase agreement as in Ex 
Parte Napier, or a secured agreement as in Choctaw. 
In some other cases the non-signatory party may have corporate links with one of 
the non-signatory parties. The two interrelated parties may be affiliates or have a 
parent-subsidiary relationship. A corporate relationship of this type is naturally based 
on community of interests37 between the signatory and the non-signatory, which will 
usually result in stronger links than those between the signatory and the non-signatory 
in the context of a typical contractual relationship. 38 The courts have, indeed, 
considered corporate relationships between a non-signatory and a signatory party as a 
decisive factor for applying the intertwined version of estoppel doctrine. 39 
3' 723 So. 2d 49 (Ala 1998). 
36 Ibid. at 53. 
3' See J. Douglas Uloth -J. Hamilton Rial. supra n. 7. p. 620. 
31 Pritzker v Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith. 7 F. 3d 1110 (3d Cir. 1993) The Court in this case 
relied on traditional agency theory to apply an arbitration clause incorporated in the broker 
agreement between a pension plan trustees and a broker, to the financial consultant and the broker's 
sister company (non-signatories): "Relying on Barrowclough, we noted that arbitration agreements 
may be upheld against non-parties where the interests of such parties are directly related to, if not 
congruent with. those of a signatory". at 1121. Cf See also Williston, supra n. 7, para 57: 19. 
i9 This remark brings the 'estoppel theory' close to the 'group of companies doctrine', discussed in 
detail in the next Chapter. 
In Sunkist the Court based its decision to apply the doctrine, inter alia, on "the 
integral relationship" between a licensee [signatory] and its parent [non-signatory] 
company. 4o 
In Smith/Enron Cogeneration v Smith Cogeneration IntI., 41 the Second Circuit 
referred to "the identity of interests" between the parent company (non-signatory) and 
its subsidiaries (signatory) to conclude that Smith Cogeneration International, as a 
parent company, was bound by the arbitration agreement that its subsidiaries had 
signed. 42 
In J. J. Ryan & Sons v Rhone Poulenc Textile, 43 the Fourth Circuit stated: 
"When the charges against a parent company and its subsidiary are based 
on the same facts and are inherently inseparable, a court may refer claims 
against the parent to arbitration even though the parent is not formally a party 
to the arbitration agreement. As the Fifth Circuit explained under similar 
circumstances, `If the parent corporation was forced to try the case, the 
arbitration proceedings would be rendered meaningless and the federal policy 
in favor of arbitration effectively thwarted. ' Sam Reisfeld & Son Import 
Company v S. A. Eteco, 530 F. 2d 679,681 (5th Cir. 1976)" 
ao "The nexus between Sunkist's claims and the license agreement, as well as the integral relationship 
between SSD [licensee] and Del Monte [licensee's parent company], leads us to the conclusion that 
the claims are `intimately founded in and intertwined with' the license agreement. Therefore, we 
hold that Sunkist is equitably estopped from avoiding arbitration of its claims" [emphasis added], 
Sunkist supra n. 32, at 758. 
41 198 F. 3d 88,98 (2d Cir. 1999). 
42 In a complicated factual background, Smith Cogeneration International and Enron Int'l agreed to 
create a joint venture regarding the construction and operation of an electrical power plant. To this 
end an affiliate of SCI and an affiliate of Enron entered into a limited partnership agreement. The 
parent companies (SCI and Enron) assigned their interests in the Power Purchase Agreement to the 
limited partnership, which effectively took over the construction and operation of the power plant. It 
was the arbitration agreement included in this last agreement that Enron invoked in order to compel 
SCI to arbitrate their dispute. The Court, indeed, compelled SCI to arbitration with Enron, referring 
to the theory of piercing the corporate veil, and, additionally, to the intertwined estopel theory. At 97 
the Court noted characteristically: 
"The identity of interests between petitioners and the current Enron signatories to the 1994 
Agreement [... ] is nowhere more apparent than on the assignment instruments themselves: the 
signatures of the assignors in the assignments from ACF and ER to EDR and EDRO are the same as 
the signatures for the assignees. Similarly, virtually all the correspondence between SCI and the 
various Enron petitioners is mailed to the same address in Texas. 'c/o Enron Development Corp. ' 
Perhaps most telling is SCI's own reference to the various Enron companies in its complaint in the 
Dominican Lawsuit as the 'Enron Group, ' 'affiliates, ' and 'Enron"'. 
41 863 F. 2d 315,320-21 (4th Cir. 1988), at 320-321. In this case, four affiliates of a manufacturer 
(Rhone Poulenc Textile) concluded an exclusive distribution agreement, including an arbitration 
clause, with a subsidiary of a distributor (Ryan). The subsidiary assigned the contract to the 
distributor, which brought an action against the manufacturer and its affiliates. The manufacturer, 
although a third party. invoked the arbitration agreement in the distribution agreement and moved to 
compel the distributor to arbitration. 
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4.2.2.3 Concluding remarks on the intertwined version of the equitable doctrine 
The above overview of the relevant case law shows there has been a growing 
acceptance of the "intertwined factor" as the key element for the application of the 
estoppel doctrine in the context of arbitration and third parties. It can be argued that 
the intertwined version of the doctrine now qualifies as a valid version of the 
equitable estoppel doctrine in its own right. This is not to suggest that there has been a 
total shift from the traditional equitable estoppel doctrine to the intertwined version. 
At present, it seems that both versions of the doctrine are applied by US courts, as 
is evidenced by the most recent case-law, 44 although there are signs lately that the US 
courts are concerned about the non-consensual character of the intertwined version. 45 
In any case, it is too early to say whether both versions will advance in parallel or 
whether one of the two will be preferred to the other. 
It should be noted, however, that the "intertwined" version, for all its theoretical 
problems46 is closer to commercial reality than the traditional equitable version is. As 
the above overview of the relevant case-law showed, the courts will usually apply 
commercial standards and business sense in order to determine whether the dispute 
between the non-signatory and the signatory is "intertwined" to the contract between 
the signatory parties, or whether two non-signatory and the signatory have sufficient 
contractual or corporate links. The intertwined version, thus, has a dynamic character 
that follows commercial developments and business practice, while the strictly 
equitable version of the doctrine is based on equitable rather than commercial 
considerations. Characteristically, equitable principles or considerations are too 
subjective to define and, thus, the strictly equitable doctrine is conducive to legal and 
commercial uncertainty. 
For the equitable interpretation of the doctrine see, for example, Griffin v Beach Club II 
Homeowners Ass'n, 384 F. 3d 157 (4t' Cir 2004); In re Weekley Homes, 180 S. W. 3d 127, (S. C Tex. 
2005); In re FirstMerit Bank, INA., 52 S. W. 3d 749 (Tex. 2001); in Employers Ins. of Wausau v 
Bright Metal Specialties, Inc., 251 F. 3d 1316,1322 (11th Cir. 2001). The Court found that the 
plaintiff enjoyed the advantages of the contract and, therefore, must be subject to the contractual duty 
of arbitration. 
For the intertwined interpretation of the doctrine, see for example. E. G. L. Gem Lab v Gem Quality 
Institute, No. 97-7102,1998 WL 314767 (S. D. N. Y. 1998). Fluor Daniel Intercontinental v General 
Electric, supra n. 18; Usina Costa Pinto S. A. Acucar e Alcool v Louis Drev{us Sugar Co.. 933 
F. Supp. 1170,1179 (S. D. N. Y. 1996): Jones v Genus Credit, 353 F. Supp. 2d 598 (Maryland. 2005); 
Denney v BDO Seidman, supra n. 8; JLM Industries v Stolt-Nielsen SA, 387 F. 3d 163,177 (2d 
Cir. 2004) (quoting Choctaw Generation Ltd. v Am. Home Assurance Co., supra n. 5; see also Contec 
Corp. 1, Remote Solution, 398 F. 3d 205,209 (2d Cir. 2005). 
4' See J. M. Townsend, "Non-Signatories in International Arbitration: an American Perspective", paper 
in Conference of the International Council for Commercial Arbitration, Montreal 31 May-3 June 
2006, p. 10. See also Ch. 6.2.3 below. 
46 As will be explained in detail in Chapter 6. 
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4.2.3 Equitable estoppel doctrine and consensual origins of arbitration 
The intertwined version of the equitable doctrine has been applied on a non- 
consensual basis. 47 In determining whether the dispute between the non-signatory and 
the signatory party should be referred to arbitration, the courts have not been 
examining whether the parties have actually indented to arbitrate or not. Here, the 
courts have applied the doctrine against persons that were not contractually bound by 
the arbitration agreement. Strictly speaking, the "non-signatory party", here, is not a 
party to the arbitration agreement at all. It is a person not bound by the arbitration 
agreement, i. e. a third party, rather than merely a non-signatory. 
In Choctaw, for example, the Court, although held that the dispute between the 
surety and the owner had to be referred to arbitration, made clear that the term "party" 
included in the arbitration agreement in the contract between the genuine parties "is a 
defined term that includes only [the creditor] and [the debtor]" and by no means the 
non-signatory surety. 48 
The same position was adopted in Mc Bro. Here, the Eleventh Circuit, although 
ordered the contractor (the non-signatory party) and the construction manager (the 
signatory party) to arbitrate, denied that the two parties had any contractual, 
substantive or arbitration, relationships. The contractor was subject neither to the 
bilateral substantive nor to the bilateral arbitration agreement between the 
construction manager and the owner. The Court mentioned that: 
"The Triangle-St. Margaret's [Contractor-Owner] contract lists McBro as 
construction manager, but the contract itself constitutes an agreement between 
St. Margaret's as hospital owner and Triangle as contractor That contract also 
states, in its general conditions [... ], that `nothing contained in the Contract 
Documents shall create any contractual relationship between the Construction 
Manager [McBro- Real party] and the Contractor [Triangle-Third party]. ' The 
arbitration clause, [... ], of the same contract [between the real parties, the 
owner and the Construction manager] refers to the `parties' or the `other 
party. ' Similarly, the McBro-St. Margaret's [the real parties] contract is an 
agreement between those two parties: it makes no mention of Triangle as 
contractor. '49 
47 Dileo, supra n. 7, at 34. calls equitable estoppel a '*quasi-contract theory". 
49 Supra n. 5. at 405. 
49 McBro. supra n. 4. at 343. 
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It follows that the intertwined version of equitable doctrine places more emphasis 
on the intertwined factor, as shown in the previous section, than on whether the 
signatory and non-signatory party have actually agreed to arbitrate. Therefore, it can 
be argued that the intertwined version of the estoppel doctrine distances arbitration 
from its consensual origins. In fact the doctrine to some extent "objectifies " 
arbitration. 
By contrast, the equitable version of the estoppel doctrine has been consistently 
applied on consensual premises. Here, the US Courts will take into account both 
equitable and consensual considerations it order to decide whether the non-signatory 
and signatory parties have to submit their dispute to arbitration. The fact that the non- 
signatory relies on the substantive clauses of the contract that includes the arbitration 
agreement reveals consent of the non-signatory to the substantive contract and, 
therefore, to the arbitration agreement incorporated therein. In Deloitte Noraudit A/S v 
Deloitte Haskins & Sells the Court noted: 
"We conclude that Noraudit [the non-signatory] is bound by the arbitration 
section of the 1990 Agreement. Noraudit failed to object to the Agreement 
when it received it and offers no persuasive reason for its inaction. In addition, 
Noraudit knowingly accepted the benefits of the Agreement through its 
continuing use of the name `Deloitte'. Thus, Noraudit is estopped from 
denying its obligation to arbitrate"50 
Indeed, the courts in applying the equitable version of the estoppel doctrine will 
examine whether the non-signatory is contractually bound by the arbitration 
agreement as an ordinary contract. 
For example, in American Bureau of Shipping v Tencara Shipyard, 5' the Second 
Circuit noted that: 
"Our first task is to determine whether the Owners of the "Tag Heuer" [the 
non-signatory] can be bound to arbitrate with ABS [the signatory] even though 
they never signed the arbitration agreement. " 52 
Here, the non-signatory party is, in essence, a regarded as a party that has 
consented to the arbitration agreement. It is, therefore, a genuine party the arbitration 
agreement, despite the fact that has failed to sign it. In this regard, the courts have 
50 Supra n. 8, at] 064. 
51 170 F. 3d 349 (2d Cir. 1999). 
52 Ibid. 353. 
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repeatedly distinguished consent to arbitration from the signature requirement. In 
International Paper v Schwabedissen Maschinen & Anlagen Gmbh53 the Fourth 
Circuit mentioned that: 
"[A] party can agree to submit to arbitration by means other than personally 
signing a contract containing an arbitration clause" and 
"[A] party can agree to submit to arbitration by means other than personally 
signing a contract containing an arbitration clause. " 54 
4.2.4 The court rather than the tribunal will determine whether the dispute 
between the signatory and the non-signatory party is arbitrable or not 
The decision of whether a signatory party must arbitrate its dispute against a non- 
signatory party will not be referred by the US courts to the arbitral tribunals. Nor will 
the national courts wait for this issue to be examined by the tribunal first. Instead, the 
courts will make the decision themselves, after they have thoroughly examined the 
factual circumstances of the dispute, as shown above. 
Outside the US, it is open to question whether the national courts should be 
engaged in a full review of the existence and validity of an arbitration agreement and, 
thus, a full review of the tribunal's jurisdiction before the tribunals have first 
considered the issue. 55 The prevailing view is that the courts should, indeed, be 
entitled to proceed to such a full review56 although in some jurisdictions the courts are 
limited to a prima facie review, before the tribunal has examined its own 
jurisdiction. 57 In the US, the courts have consistently engaged in a full review of the 
arbitration agreement, which includes the issue of whether a person is a party to the 
arbitration agreement. 58 Here two brief notes should be made: 
First, this practice of the US courts to engage in a full review of the arbitration 
agreement rather than refer the issue to the tribunals must be accepted as the right 
approach to the issue. Otherwise, it is doubtful whether the tribunals would be able to 
s3 206 F. 3d 411 (4th Cir. 2000). 
54 Ibid. at 416. and Deloitte Noraudit A/S i' Deloitte Haskins & Sells. supra n. 8. at 1063. 
55 See more on this J. Lew- L. Mistelis- S. Kroell. Comparative International Commercial Arbitration, 
(Kluwer Law International 2003). para 14-49 et seq. 
56 See, for example, Model Law art. 8, which according to the prevailing view entitles the courts to a 
full review of the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. The same is provided in the EAA 
s. 9 (C( also EAA s. 32). 
s', See for example French NCCP art. 1458(2). 
58 Interocean Shipping Co. i, National Shipping ca Trading Corp.. 462 F. 2d 673.677 (2d Cir. 1972): 
McAllister Bros., Inc. r A&S Transp. Co.. 621 F . 
2d 519.524 (2d Cir. 1980). 
82 
assume jurisdiction over the non-signatory on the basis of the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel. Research indicates that no arbitral award has applied the estoppel doctrine, 
in either of its versions. It could be argued that if tribunals were to apply the estoppel 
doctrine, they would apply it in a US domestic arbitration only, provided that the 
applicable substantive law would recognize the estoppel doctrine in the context of 
third parties to an arbitration agreement. 59 It is doubtful that the estoppel doctrine 
would be applied in an arbitration outside the US, not least because the non-US 
jurisdictions are not familiar with the doctrine and, therefore, the award would face a 
serious risk of either being annulled. 
Second, the review by the US courts will not extend to the merits of the dispute. 
The determination will be limited to whether the dispute between the non-signatory 
and the signatory party should be referred to arbitration or not. Inevitably, the 
determination of the jurisdiction will touch upon issues relevant to the merits. This is 
particularly the case under the "intertwined version" of the equitable estoppel. Here, 
as shown above, the courts will normally undertake a thorough analysis of the dispute 
and its factual circumstances, in order to determine whether the dispute between the 
non-signatory and the signatory is "intertwined" to the contract between the signatory 
parties, or whether two non-signatory and the signatory have sufficient contractual or 
corporate links. This analysis, however, will never pre-empt the decision of the 
tribunal on the merits. 
In Choctaw, for example, where the Court first examined in detail the rights and 
duties of the owner, the surety and the contractor, 60 the Court concluded: 
"We therefore do not reach the many substantive and procedural issues 
addressed in the district court's careful and comprehensive opinion. We vacate 
that judgment solely to clear the way for rulings on the merits in arbitration, 
and we remand for the framing of an order directing arbitration"61 
by US state laws that recognize the equitable doctrine in arbitration is for example, Louisiana law, see 
Lakeland I nesthesia v CIGN4 Healthcare of Louisiana. 812 So. 2d 695.702 (La. Ct. App. 2002) 
where the Louisiana Appellate court stated that Louisiana courts recognize that equitable estoppel 
may bind third parties to an arbitration agreement although it did not apply the doctrine to the facts 
of the instant case; or Texas Law. see In Re W eeklev, supra n. S. at 131. 
60 Supra n. 5 at 406 
"We carefully reviewed the relationship among the parties, the contracts they signed (or did 
not), and the issues that had arisen, to arrive at the conclusion that the controversy was 
arbitrable" 
61 See Choctaw. supra n. 5. at 404. 
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CHAPTER 5: THE DOCTRINE OF GROUP OF COMPANIES 
This chapter examines the `group of companies' doctrine, arguably the most 
prominent, and controversial of the extension doctrines. The idea that large 
multinational groups, operating through several subsidiaries, associated or holding 
companies, should be regarded as a whole rather than as strictly independent legal 
entities was originally developed in the context of company and tax law. ' Indeed, 
under the law of many countries, groups of companies are treated as one unit for tax 
and accounting purposes. 2 
The doctrine has, however, acquired a particular relevance in the context of 
international arbitration: it has been employed mainly by international arbitral 
tribunals as the theoretical basis for the `extension' of arbitration agreements signed 
by one or more of the several companies to non-signatory parties in the same group. 
The `group of companies' doctrine was introduced into arbitration by the seminal 
award in Dow Chemical v Isover-Saint-Gobain, 3 and has subsequently been 
developed as one of the most challenging theories in the area. For more than two 
The accounting profession has developed techniques and practices of consolidated group accounting 
since 1930's, see T. Hadden, The Control of Corporate Groups. (Institute Advanced Legal Studies- 
University of London 1983), p. 2. For a detailed account on the development and regulation of group 
of companies or multinational enterprises see P. Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law, 
(Blackwell London 1999). 
2 In England for example see s. 258 of the Companies Act 1985. 
3 Interim award in ICC case no. 4131 of 1982. Dow Chemical i" Isover-Saint-Gohain. (1984) Rev. Arb. 
137, (1983) 110 Clunet 899, with note Derains. It should be mentioned. however, that even before 
the Dow Chemical award., arbitral awards had been making tentative references to the `group of 
companies' notion and its important role for the jurisdiction of the tribunals in the context of 
international arbitration. See, for example, the ICC case no. 2138 of 1974, ICC Arbitral Awards 
1974-1985 (Y. Derain and S. Jarvin), p. 934; ICC case no. 1434 of 1975, ibid, p. 263; ICC case no. 
2375 of 1975, ibid, p. 257 and (1985) Rev. Arb., p. 583. 
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decades, the doctrine has been the subject matter of extensive literature, and has 
repeatedly been dealt with by arbitral tribunals and national courts in different 
jurisdictions. 
Despite the fact that it has been widely debated for many years, the discussion on 
the group of companies is by no means settled yet. Thus, the thesis revisits the `group 
of companies' doctrine and provides an analysis of its conceptual characteristics. This 
chapter first gives a brief overview of the history and the legal premises of the 
doctrine. It then studies the relevant case law of arbitral tribunals and national courts. 
Finally, it identifies the conditions required for the doctrine to apply. Particular 
emphasis is placed on the role of `consent'. The question here is whether the `consent' 
of the non-signatory party is required by the tribunals and the courts for the 
application of the doctrine, or whether alternative non-consensual factors may be used 
as a substitute for the requirement of `consent'. The conclusions of this chapter and 
the previous one on `equitable estoppel' will provide the basis for discussion in the 
next chapter, where the thesis presents its overall view on the `extension doctrines' 
and the contractual approach in general. 
5.1 OVERVIEW OF THE DOCTRINE 
As was already mentioned, it was the celebrated Dow Chemical v Isover Saint 
Gobain award that first introduced the `group of companies' doctrine into 
international arbitration. Two subsidiaries of the Dow Chemical Company group 
entered into two separate distribution contracts with Boussois-Isolation, whose rights 
and obligations were subsequently assigned to Isover Saint Gobain. Both distribution 
agreements contained an ICC arbitration clause. When a dispute arose out of the 
distribution agreements, the two Dow Chemical subsidiaries alongside their parent 
company and another subsidiary of the same group initiated arbitration proceedings 
against Isover Saint Gobain. The respondent challenged the jurisdiction of the tribunal 
on the basis that the parent company and the third subsidiary of the claimants were 
not parties to either of the two arbitration agreements incorporated in the distributions 
contracts. The ICC tribunal, comprised of three academics. 4 accepted jurisdiction to 
examine the claims brought by the non-signatory parent and subsidiary company. 
4 Prof. Pieter Sanders (chair). Prof. Goldman and Prof. Vasseur. 
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The tribunal, by an interim award, 5 rejected the respondent's objections that the 
tribunal lacked jurisdiction over the non-signatory parties (l'exception 
d'incompetence), and that the claims brought by those non-signatories were non- 
admissible (exception d'irrecevabilite) of the claims brought by the non-signatories. 
To establish its jurisdiction, the tribunal made specific references to: 
" The factual context of the contractual relationship in question revealing the 
active role of the non-signatories in the conclusion and performance of the 
contracts 
" The common intention of the parties to arbitrate 
" The fact that the signatories and the non-signatories were companies belonging 
to the same group 
" The autonomy of the arbitration agreement from the main contract which 
allowed the tribunal to determine the scope and effects of the arbitration 
agreement in accordance with a law different from that applicable to the merits 
of the dispute. In particular, the tribunal applied substantive rules of 
international commerce, part of which, the tribunal held, was the `group of 
company' concept. 
The respondent challenged the award before the French courts, but the Paris Cour 
d'appel upheld the interim award, and confirmed jurisdiction of the tribunal over the 
non-signatories. 6 
Since the Dow Chemical case, the doctrine has been applied by several tribunals 
and has been accepted by many national courts. The Dow Chemical award has 
become one of the most celebrated arbitration cases and has been the reference point 
in many cases. It is difficult for `arbitral precedent' to develop, due to the 
international character of arbitration and the lack of hierarchy amongst the several 
arbitral tribunals.? Nevertheless, it can be argued that the `group of companies' 
doctrine constitutes the clearest case of `arbitral precedent', with several arbitral 
I Interim award in ICC case no. 4131 of 1982. Dow Chemical r lsover-Saint-Gobain. supra n. 3. 
6 Paris Cour d'appel, 21 October 1983, (1984) Rev. Arb.. p. 98 with note Chapelle. Like the arbitral 
tribunal, the Cour d'appel made also references to the common intention of the parties and to 
substantive rules of international commerce. 
7 See G. Kaufmann-Kohler, "Arbitral Precedent: Dream. Necessity or Excuse? ", 2006 School of 
International Arbitration-Freshfields' Lecture. (2007) 23 (3). Acb. Int'l. p. 357. 
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awards making express reference to the Dow Chemical case and the `group of 
companies' doctrine established thereby. 8 
5.2 LEGAL BASIS OF THE DOCTRINE 
It is not uncommon for companies with strong financial, business and corporate 
ties to maintain separate legal personalities. As was explained in Chapter 2, national 
laws generally provide for the principle of limited liability of the stockholders and the 
principle of separate liability of the parent company. Therefore the several companies 
of the same group are largely treated as separate legal personalities. This, in terms of 
contract law, means that a parent or any other company of the group lacks the 
capacity to bind contractually another company in the same group, except from itself 
Unless acting in accordance with traditional contract law principles, such as agency 
for example, the company concluding a contract will be the only entity of the group to 
assume any contractual duties and rights from that contract. This equally applies to 
arbitration agreements: only the company entering into an arbitration agreement, 
rather than any other company in the group, will be bound by that agreement. 
No national or international law provides for any exception from the traditional 
contract law rules with regard to group of companies. No national or international 
contract law provides for the ability of a company to have other companies in the 
group bound by a contract concluded by the former. Equally, no express arbitration 
rule in national law or international treaty provides for an exception from the 
traditional contract law rules, with regard to arbitration contracts. Accordingly, the 
"group of companies doctrine" in arbitration applies on the basis of arbitral case law 
and international arbitral practice. 9 
This explains why tribunals will normally apply the `group of companies' doctrine 
on the basis of international rules rather than national law. Indeed, the tribunals, in 
order to assume jurisdiction over the several companies in the same group, will not 
apply the national substantive law applicable to the merits of the case or, indeed, any 
national law at all. Based on the doctrine of separability and the principle of 
autonomy of arbitration agreements', the tribunals have on many occasions 
By way of example, see case ICC no. 5103 of 1988,2 (1991) 2 ICC Bull.. p 2O ICC case no. 5920 of 
1989.2 (1991) 2 ICC Bull., p. 27: ICC case no. 10758 of 2000,16 (2005) 2 ICC Bull., p. 87. 
C. Jarrosson. "Conventions d' arbitrage et groups de societes". in Arbitration Agreement - Its 
Multifold Critical Aspects: (1999) ASA Special Series No 8, p. 212. 
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determined the boundaries of the arbitration agreement and, therefore, the boundaries 
of their jurisdiction, on the basis of `usages of international trade', the `common 
intention of the parties', `transnational substantive rules' and `lex mercatoria'. lo 
5.3 CONDITIONS FOR THE APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE 
No distinction should be drawn between the situation where the non-signatory 
company invokes an arbitration clause, and that where a signatory attempts to enforce 
an arbitration clause against a non-signatory. 11 The group of companies doctrine has 
been applied equally to the case where the non-signatory company has acted as 
10 See for example, the arbitral awards: ICC case no. 4131 of 1982, Dow Chemical v Isover-Saint- 
Gobain, supra n. 3: "et en tenant egalement comte [... ] des usages conformes aux besoins du 
commerce international"; ICC case no. 6000 of 1988,2 (1991) 2 ICC Bull., p. 34: "the usages of the 
international trade [... ] would justify and require the extension to this company, party to a group of 
companies, of the arbitration clauses included in the contracts executed" by the other companies of 
the group; the same in partial award ICC case no. 5894 of 1989,2 (1991) 2 ICC Bull., p. 25. ICC case 
no 4131 (Interim Award) of 1982, (1983) 110 JDI (Clunet), p. 899, with note Y. Derains; ICC case 
no 5721 of 1990, (1990) 117 JDI (Clunet), p. 1019, with note Y. Derains; ICC award, on 10 March 
2003, C&M Farming Ltd v Peterson Farms Inc (unpublished). 
See also the decisions of Paris Cour d' appel in Dow Chemical v Isover-Saint-Gobain, supra n. 3, 
upholding the award by reference to the trade usages and art 13.5 of the previous ICC rules (cf ICC 
rules (1998) art 17: "In all cases the Arbitral Tribunal shall take account of the provision of the 
contract and the relevant trade usages" (cf also French NCCP art. 1496(2): "[The arbitrator] in all 
cases shall take the usages of the trade into consideration"); Paris Cour d' appel, 21 Oct 1983, (1984) 
Rev. Arb., p. 98, with note A. Chapelle; Pau Cour d' appel, Sponsor A. B. v Lestrade, 26 November 
1986, (1988) Rev. Arb., p. 153 with note A. Chapelle. 
This is the prevailing view in arbitration literature too: J. Lew, L. Mistelis and S. Kroell, 
Comparative International Commercial Arbitration, (Kluwer London 2003), para 6-73; Fouchard, 
Gaillard and Goldman, On International Commercial Arbitration, E. Gaillard and J. Savage (eds) 
(Kluwer 1999), para 443 et seq.; see also Derain and Schauf, "Clauses d Arbitrages et Groupes de 
Societes", (1985) Rev. Dr. Aff. Int., p. 231; J-F Poudret "L' extension de la clause d' arbitrage: 
approches francaise et suisse, (1995) 122 JDI (Clunet), p. 923; cf S. Jarvin in his note on the ICC 
case no 4504 of 1985-1986, (1986) JDI (Clunet), p. 1130 and M. Blessing, "The law applicable to 
the Arbitration Clause and Arbitrability", van den Berg (ed), ICCA Congress series no. 9, p. 174. 
Contra O. Sandrock, "Extending the Scope of Arbitration Agreements to Non-Signatories", in 
Arbitration Agreement - Its Multifold Critical Aspects; (1999) ASA Special Series No 8, p. 167 and 
0. Sandrock, "Arbitration Agreements and Group of Companies" (1993) 27 International Lawyer, p. 
945. who argues that the contours of lex mercatoria are too vague to provide support to the `group of 
companies' doctrine. Instead, Sadrock argues for the application of national law as determined by the 
relevant conflict of laws rules. 
1 See Interim Award in ICC case 9517 of 2000,16 (2005) 2 ICC Bull., p. 80: "These distinctions are 
not however conclusive. The principles which govern the extension of the clause to non-signatory 
respondents may generally be considered applicable, mutatis mutandis. to a case where a party [... ] 
tries to avail itself of an arbitration clause to which it did not formally adhere. " Same in Fouchard, 
Gaillard and Goldman. idem, para 502, note 200; In the US, although the `equitable estoppel' 
doctrine in principle is applied in both situations also, in the majority of the cases the `equitable 
estoppel' doctrine has been applied to estop a signatory party from avoiding arbitration. 
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respondent, resisting the arbitration agreement, 12 and where the non-signatory 
company has been a claimant attempting to enforce the arbitration agreement. 13 
Likewise, there is no clear evidence that there should be a distinction between the 
case where the non-signatory party is a parent company and that where the non- 
signatory party is a subsidiary company of the group. 14 Thus, tribunals have 
`extended' arbitration agreements to a non-signatory parent company of the group, 15 
to a non-signatory subsidiary, 16 and even to directors and shareholders of the group. 17 
As will be demonstrated in the following sections, analysis of the relevant case law 
suggests that the key-factor for the application of the doctrine is `consent'. Courts and 
tribunals will extend the arbitration agreement to the non-signatory only when they 
are satisfied that that latter has actually consented to the arbitration agreement. 
Therefore, arbitration agreements in the context of `group of companies doctrine' are 
examined exclusively from a contractual viewpoint as an ordinary contract: they bind 
those, and only those, parties that have consented thereto. Indeed, with the exception 
of the argument of the "autonomous validity and effectiveness" of international 
arbitration agreements discussed below, the prominence of consent has never actually 
been challenged in the context of the `group of companies' doctrine. '8 
12 Pau Court d'appel, 26 November 1986, Sponsor A. B. v Lestrade, (1988) Rev. Arb., p. 153 with note 
A. Chapelle; or ICC no. 6000 of 1988,2 (1991) 2 ICC Bull., p. 31. 
13 See, for example, ICC case no 2375 of 1975, (1985) Rev. Arb., p. 583; or the award ICC award, on 
10 March 2003, C&M Farming Ltd v Peterson Farms Inc (unpublished). 
14 See in more details, all the possible factual schemes presented by B. Hanotiau, "Groups of 
Companies in International Arbitration", in Pervasive Problems in International Arbitration, L. 
Mistelis and J Lew (eds), (Kluwer Law International 2006) para 14-11 and B. Hanotiau, Complex 
Arbitrations: Multiparty, Multi-contract, Multi-issue and Class Actions, (Kluwer Law International 
2005), p. 54 et seq. Note however, that Hanotiau argues for the emergence of a rebuttable 
presumption that a parent company binds its subsidiaries but that on the other hand only companies 
that have participated in the conclusion and performance of the agreement will be bound by that 
contact and the arbitration clause" ibid, p. 98. 
is For example, see the Dow Chemical v Isover-Saint-Gobain, supra n. 3, and the decision of Pau Court 
d'appel, 26 November 1986, Sponsor A. B. v Lestrade, (1988) Rev. Arb., p. 153 with note A. Chapelle. 
16 For example see the Paris Cour d'appel, Kis France and other v General and other, (1991) 16 
YBCA, p. 145; (1992) Rev. Arb., p. 90, and the Partial award in ICC case no. 5894 of 1989,2 (1991) 
2 ICC Bull., p. 25. 
17 For example. ICC case no 6519 of 1991. (1991) 118 JDI (Clunet). p. 1065: see also Hanotiau, 
Complex Arbitrations, supra n. 14 p. 98. 
11 Arbitration discourse agrees almost unanimously that the application of the `group of companies' 
doctrine depends on `consent' of the non-signatory: see, for example, Fouchard. Gaillard and 
Goldman. supra n. 10, para 500; Lew, Mistelis and Kroell, supra n. 10, para 7-51; C. Jarrosson. supra 
n. 9, p. 220. Y. Derains, 'L' Extension de la Clause d'Arbitrage aux Non-Signatories- la Doctrine 
des Groupes de Societes". in Arbitration Agreement - Its Multifold Critical Aspects. (1999) ASA 
Special Series No 8. p. 242. 
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In this consensual context, two divergent approaches to the doctrine can be 
identified. The first view challenges the need for a `group of companies doctrine' to 
exist at all. Since the key factor in the doctrine is `consent', the well-established 
principles of contract law will suffice to determine whether a non-signatory party is 
bound by a specific arbitration agreement. ' 9 General principles with regard to the 
formation and interpretation of contracts can be found in every national law. Thus, the 
tribunals, instead of referring to the group of companies' doctrine, should refer to: 
" Legal principles of representation or agency, 20 
Principles governing the ratification of contracts; -1 
19 This is the approach taken by I. Fadlallah, "Clause d'Arbitrage et Groupes de Societes", Travaux du 
Comite Francais de Droit International Prive 1984-1985, (1987), p. 105 et seq.; also, O. Sandrock, 
"Extending the Scope of Arbitration Agreements to Non-Signatories", in Arbitration Agreement - Its 
Multifold Critical Aspects; (1999) ASA Special Series No 8, p. 165. Cf A. Redfern, M. Hunter, N. 
Blackaby and N. Partasides, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, (Kluwer 
Law International 2004), para 3-33: "More established principles of private law-such as 
assignment, agency and succession-thus remain the surest way in which to bind a third party to an 
arbitration agreement". 
Cf the US decision in Sarhank Group v Oracle Corp, 404 F. 3d 657, (2nd Cir. 2005) at 662: 
"While this Court has recognized instances in which non-signatories can be bound to the 
arbitration agreements of others, such cases are limited to instances of incorporation by 
reference, assumption, veil piercing/alter ego and estoppel and the like. See Monegasque De 
Reassurances S. A. M. (Monde Re) v Nak Naftogaz of Ukr., 311 F. 3d 488,495 (2d Cir. 2002. ) In 
all such situations a court has found an agreement to arbitrate, under general principles of 
contract law, that is to say that the totality of the evidence supports an objective intention to 
agree to arbitrate". 
Cf Thomson-CSF, S. A. v. American Arbitration Assn, 64 F. 3d 773,777 (2d Cir. 1995) at 662: 
"[t]raditional principles of agency law may bind a nonsignatory to an arbitration agreement. " Similar 
approach has the English High Court taken in the recent Peterson Farms Inc. vC&M Farming Ltd, 
[2004] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 603. 
20 Which can take the form of the `apparent or ostensible representation' or `agency' in English law; 
the `apparent authority' or `authority by estoppel' or `agency' in US law; the `mandat apparent' in 
French law or the `Duldungsvollmacht und Anscheinsvollmacht' in German and Swiss Law, see M. 
Blessing, "Extension of the Arbitration Clause to Non-Signatories" in Arbitration Agreement - Its 
Multifold Critical Aspects; (1999) ASA Special Series No 8., p. 161 and O. Sandrock, "Extending the 
Scope of Arbitration Agreements to Non-Signatories", in Arbitration Agreement - Its Multifold 
Critical Aspects; (1999) ASA Special Series No 8, p. 170. 
The Partial award in ICC case no. 4402 of 1983, (1984) YCom. Arb., P. Sanders (ed. ), Vol. IX, p. 
138 (seat in Geneva), examined whether an arbitration agreement, singed by the chairman of a 
subsidiary, could be extended to the parent company, on the basis of representation. The tribunal 
finally refused to extend the arbitration agreement on the grounds that the chairman "could not act on 
behalf of the concern and had no power to sign an arbitration clause on behalf of the mother 
company", Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, P. Sanders (ed. ), Vol. IX (1984), p. 140; the same 
view on similar facts was taken in Interim award ICC case 4504 of 1985-1986. (seat also in Geneva). 
(1986) 113 JDI (Clunet), p. 1118. 
For a case of "apparent authority" see Swiss Tribunal Federal, 29 January 1996, (1996) 14 ASA Bull., 
p. 496. noting that an arbitration agreement will be extended only in very particular circumstances 
which justify a bona fide reliance of a party to an appearance caused by the non-signatory. 
Cf also the US case Pritzker v Merrill Lvnch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith. 7 F. 3d 1110 (3rd Cir. 1993), 
where the extension to the sister company non-signatory was mainly premised on traditional 
principles of agency law. 
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9 Third party beneficiary theories; 22 
9 Alter ego and corporate veil theories; 23 
General principles of interpretation. 24 
According to this view, the `group of companies' doctrine is ambiguous and 
confusing. 25 
By contrast, the second approach upholds the doctrine as an important theoretical 
construct in international arbitration. According to this view, the existence of strong 
corporate relationships between the several companies in a group is a factor that must 
be taken into account by tribunals in determining whether the non-signatory members 
of the group have consented to arbitrate or not. 26 Thus, the existence of a corporate 
structure indicates the implied intention of the non-signatory members of the group to 
arbitrate. 27 In other words, the `group of `companies' doctrine should be used by the 
See for example, ICC case no 4504 of 1985-1986, (1986) 113 JDI (Clunet), p. 1118; cf also Derains, 
"L' Extension de ]a Clause d'Arbitrage aux Non-Signatories- la Doctrine des Groupes de Societes", 
in Arbitration Agreement - Its Multifold Critical Aspects, (1999) ASA Special Series No 8, p. 242. 
22 See for example award in ICC case no 2375 of 1975, in ICC arbitral awards 1974-1985 (Y. Derains 
and S. Jarvin), p. 259; or award in ICC case no 6519 of 1991, (1991) 118 JDI (Clunet), p. 1065. It is 
not clear however whether an arbitration agreement should be considered as a beneficial clause, since 
arbitration agreements establish not only rights but also duties vis-ä-vis the parties. 
23 See for example the ICC case no. 6000 (1988) ICC Bull. Vol. 2 no. 2, p. 31; cf the Orri case, Paris 
Cour d'appel, 11 January 1990, Orri v Lubrifiants ElfAquitaine, (1992) Rev. Arb., p. 95, with note D. 
Cohen; (1991) 118 J. D. I., p. 141, with note B. Audit and the decision of Cour de cassation Cass. le 
civ., June 11,1991, Orri v Lubrifiants ElfAquitaine, (1992) Rev. Arb.. p. 73, with note D. Cohen. 
24 For example, ICC case no. 1434 of 1975, ICC Arbitral Awards 1974-1985 (S. Jarvin and Y. Derains 
eds 1990), p. 264, where the tribunal accepted the extension of the arbitration agreement to a non- 
signatory company of a group, on the grounds of implied consent, ascertained by reasonable 
interpretation of the contract. 
25 See O. Sandrock, "Group of Companies and Arbitration", (2005) Tijdschrift voor Arbitrage, p. 6: 
"The doctrine must however, be rejected for several reasons... First, the rules developed under 
this doctrine are not clear-cut and define enough to permit their unambiguous application... 
Secondly, the basic principle of privity of contract is confusingly blurred... Thirdly, there is no 
reason whatsoever to deviate from the traditional approach which guarantees a much higher 
degree of certainty of law and foresee ability.. .. 
Fourthly, this theory often also runs counter to 
the clear intention of the parties". 
Y Derains and S. Schaf, "Clauses d Arbitrages et Groupes de Societes". (1985) Rev. Dr. Aff Inter'l, 
p. 231 ;A Chappelle, "Groupes de Societes: Interventions d'Etat" Rapport General sur 1 'arbitrage et 
les tiers: Le Droit des Personnes Morales. (1988) Rev Arb. p. 475. 
27 B. Hanotiau. Complex Arbitrations, Multiparty. Multi-contract, Multi-issue and Class Actions. supra 
n. 14. p. 51: "the issue of consent to arbitration may take a special dimension when one (or more) 
company(ies) to a complex international transaction is (are) member(s) of a group of companies. 
given the nature of the relationships which exist between the companies of such group. In particular, 
consent to arbitrate may sometimes be implied from the conduct of a company of the group-although 
it did not sigh the relevant arbitration agreement - by reason of its "implication" in the negotiation 
and/or the performance and/or the termination of the agreement containing the arbitration clause and 
to which one or more members of its group are a party" (emphasis added). 
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tribunals as a kind of "facilitator" to assert the implied consent of the non-signatory 
parties. 
In the context of the second approach, specific criteria have been developed by 
case law for the ascertainment of the implied consent of the non-signatories. When 
these conditions are met, tribunals will usually be satisfied that consent of the non- 
signatory party to arbitrate exists and, thus, they will extend the arbitration agreement 
to the non-signatory members of the group by reference to the 'group of companies' 
doctrine. `' Drawing on the analysis of the relevant case law, the conditions for the 
application of the doctrine may be summarised as follows: 
5.3.1 First, the group corporate structure 
Despite their separate legal personalities, the several companies must be structured 
on a group corporate basis. This necessitates that strong group organisational, 
financial and control systems within the group must be proved. 29 It has been held that 
the group corporate structure of the group can be evidenced when: 
" The several companies in the group are structured in a hierarchical order. 30 In 
most cases, there will be a business divisional structure underpinning the 
group. 31 This will be the case, for example, when a parent company holds the 
commanding role in the business strategy of the whole group, 32 with several 
other subsidiaries and sub-subsidiaries, or even dormant companies 
28 See, for example, ICC case no. 6000 of 1988,2 (1991) 2 ICC Bull., p. 31, accepted the extension of 
the arbitration agreement to the non-signatory company, although it did not accept that there was an 
assignment of the main contract or the arbitration agreement; or ICC case 6519 of 1991, (1991) 118 
JDI (Clunet), p. 1065, which also accepted the extension of the arbitration agreement to non- 
signatory company, although it expressly noted that no representation principle was applicable to the 
case in hand. However, as is explained in the next chapter, the tribunals might refer to traditional 
contract law principles, in addition to the 'group of companies' doctrine. 
29 See some very interesting case studies for the complicated group structure in group of multinational 
groups in T. Hadden. supra n. 1. 
y 
3o However, in some cases a `heterarchical' network of cooperative and lateral relationships rather than 
a vertical hierarchical structure may be adopted by the group. P. Muchlinski. supra n. 1, p. 59. 
31 Although in most of the cases a clear symmetry or rationality will be lacking, due to the large 
numbers of the subsidiaries and the sheer organizational complexity of the group. 
32 See for example the case Paris Cour d'appel. Eis France and other v General and other. (1991) 16 
YBCA, p. 145; (1992) Rev. Arb., p. 90, where the parent company had a dominant role vis-ä-vis its 
subsidiaries. 
Q) 
constituting the executive branches of the group. 33 In some cases subsidiaries 
can be set up merely to execute a one-off business project. 
0 The several companies in the group share intellectual property rights, assets, 
financial or human resources including, for example, ownership titles, 
corporate name, offices and premises, officers, bank accounts, trademarks. 34 
" The several companies constitute a `single economic unit' or a `single 
economic reality. 35 For the several companies to constitute a `single economic 
unit' they need to be part of the same business and commercial strategy. It is 
not simply a matter of sharing financial assets. There must be an overarching 
business policy or organizational rationale applying to the several members of 
the group. 36 
For the courts and tribunals to ascertain that a group structure among the several 
companies exists, they need to perform an in-depth, and often complicated economic 
and commercial analysis. This requires a thorough understanding of commercial 
See Partial award in ICC case no. 5894 of 1989,2 (1991) 2 ICC Bull., p. 25: "the subsidiaries though 
they were not sham companies set up solely for the purpose of the said agreements, were operating to 
carry them out under the close control and following the instructions of the parent companies which 
made all the important decisions commercial as well as financial either unilaterally of jointly". 
In the same vein, ICC case no. 1434 of 1975, (1976) 103 JDI (Clunet), p. 978: "The group organises 
the performance of its task in the most efficient manner, using those entities in the group that are best 
adapted to carry out the job". 
34 In ICC case no. 6000 of 1988,2 (1991) 2 ICC Bull., p. 31 the tribunal was satisfied that a close 
business and corporate link between the two defendants existed, as evidenced by the fact that the two 
companies had the same share holders in the same proportion, the same business place, the same 
subject matter of the activities, the same representatives. See also ICC case no 4131 of 1982, (1983) 
110 JDI (Clunet), p. 899 the several companies in the same group were sharing the use of the same 
trademarks. 
35 "Une realite economique unique, dont les tribunaux doivent tenir compte" in ICC case no. 4131 of 
1982, Dow Chemical v Isover-Saint-Gobain, supra n. 3; the same in Pau Court d'appel, 26 
November 1986, Sponsor A. B. v Lestrade, (1988) Rev. Arb., p. 153 with note A. Chapelle:, cf ICC 
case no. 6000 of 1988,2 (1991) 2, ICC Bull., p. 31: "there could not be more clear and obvious 
admission of the fact that [the companies] are one and the same entity (in economic terms)". 
In ICC case no. 5103 of 1988,2 (1991) 2, ICC Bull., p. 20, the tribunal assumed jurisdiction over the 
several claimants and the several respondents on the basis of the "group of companies" doctrine. The 
tribunal undertook a detailed analysis of the corporate structure and the business organization of all 
the companies involved. The tribunal found that both the several claimants and the several 
defendants formed an economic unit. Claimants, for example, were set up, owned and controlled by 
the same natural person; a company of the Claimants group would invoice another company of the 
group for delivery of the goods while the notice of delivery and verification would be in the name of 
a third company of the group. On the other hand. the several respondents had permanently mixed up 
their telexes and business papers. 
In ICC case no. 5891 of 1988,2 (1991) 2 ICC Bull., p. 23, the tribunal underlined the lack of 
structural connection between the companies (different headquarters. different places of registry) and 
accordingly refused to accept jurisdiction on the basis of the group of companies doctrine. 
In ICC case no. 5103 of 1988,2 (1991) 2, ICC Bull.. p. 20, the tribunal noted that the payment 
facilities obtained for a company essentially financed another company of the group. "as the latter 
was the benefciam3' of a group policy aimed at financing its investments"(emphasis added). 
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reality, where the focus must be on the factual rather than the legal circumstances of 
the case. 
5.3.2 Second, active role of the non-signatory companies in the negotiations, 
performance or termination of the contract 
The non-signatory companies must have an active role in the negotiations, the 
performance or the termination of the contract in which the arbitration agreement in 
question is included. 37 Thus, for the doctrine to apply, it is not enough that the several 
companies have a `group structure', in general. This `multi-company structure' must 
be reflected in the specific contractual relationship out of which the dispute arises: the 
non-signatory companies must assume a complementary role to the signatory 
companies of the group in the negotiations, performance or termination of the specific 
contract. 
For example, it is not unusual for the contract to be negotiated or signed by one 
company, and performed by another company of the group. 38 It often occurs also, that 
the several companies of the group sign different but interrelated contracts regarding 
the same business project. This may result in a contractual network of indivisible 
rights and duties, 39 assumed by the several companies as a group rather than as 
37 "... par le role qu' elle on joue dans la conclusion, 1' execution ou la resiliation de contrats contenant 
lesdites clauses", see Societe Sponsor AB v Lestrade (Cour d'appel Paris, (1988) Rev. Arb., p. 154, 
with note A. Chapelle). See also the Dow Chemical award. supra n. 3: "DOW FRANCE, therefore, 
played in the execution of the contracts an equally preponderant role as it did in the establishment of 
the contractual relations" and "played an essential role in the termination of the contract" at 134. 
In ICC case no. 6000 of 1988,2 (1991) 2 ICC Bull., p. 32, the tribunal noted that "the actual 
performance of the contracts by all the parties during the whole period until the notice of termination 
and even after such notice was given [... ] brings persuasive evidence of the factual identity" between 
the several companies. 
In ICC case no 6519 of 1991, (1991) 118 JDJ (Clunet), p. 1065 noted that: "without denying the 
economic reality of a `group of companies' the scope of an arbitration clause may be extended to 
non-signatory companies with separate legal significance only if they played an active role in the 
negations leading to the agreement containing the clause or if they are directly implicated in the 
agreement. " 
The same was held in ICC case no. 5103 of 1988. Three European companies r Four Tunisian 
companies, (1988) 115 JDI (Clunet), p. 1206; 2 (1991) 2 ICC Bull., p. 22. 
In ICC case no. 7604 and 7610 of 1995, (1998) 125 JDI (Clunet), p. 1027, the tribunal examined in 
detail the role of the parent company in the negotiation. conclusion, execution and termination of the 
contract singed by its subsidiary, and concluded that on the face of the evidence the arbitration 
agreement could not be extended to the parent company. The same was held in ICC case no. 7155 of 
1993, Norwegian company v Three French companies, (1996) 123 JDI (Clunet). p. 1037. with note 
J. -J. Arnaldez. 
38 See for example, ICC case no. 5103 of 1988,2 (1991) 2, ICC Bull., p. 20. where the tribunal found 
that one of the companies of the group had the commanding role. whereas, another would be the 
"technical instrument of the Group for the payment of debts" owed by other companies of the group. 
39 See for example ICC award case 8163 of 1996.16 (2005) 2 ICC Bull., p. 77. 
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separate legal entities, 40 in which case the several companies of the group can be held 
jointly and severally liable vis-ä-vis the other signatory party. 41 In situations like this, 
tribunals have found it impossible to isolate the arbitration agreement included in one 
only of the several interrelated contracts. 42 
5.3.3 Third, legitimate impression of the co-contracting party that the non- 
signatory companies are genuine contracting parties 
The group structure and the active role of the non-signatories in the negotiation 
and execution of the particular contract must legitimately lead the co-contracting 
party to believe that the non-signatory companies are genuine parties to the contract 
containing the arbitration clause. 
There are two requirements for this condition to apply. The first is that the co- 
contracting party is, indeed, under the impression that the non-signatory company was 
a genuine party to the contract. Here, tribunals will seek evidence of actual 
impression focusing on behaviour of the co-contracting party. In particular, tribunals 
will explore whether the co-contracting party showed that it actually wanted to deal, 
or had an interest in dealing with the whole group rather than just the signatory 
companies. 43 
40 Pau Court d'appel, 26 November 1986, Sponsor A. B. v Lestrade, (1988) Rev. Arb., p. 153 with note 
A. Chapelle: "En effet, un group de societes possede. en depit de la personnalite juridique distincte 
appartenant ä chacune de celles-ci, une realite economique" (in fact, the group of companies has, 
despite the separate legal personality of the companies comprising the group, an economic reality) 
(author's translation). 
Also, see Partial award in ICC case no. 5894 of 1989,2 (1991) 2 ICC Bull., p. 25: "the agreements 
create a tight network of obligations to be discharged by or for the companies concerned". 
In Kis France and other v General and other, (1991) 16 YBCA, p. 145; (1992) Rev. Arb., p. 90, the 
Paris Cour d'appel found that the several companies of the group had assumed mutual substantive 
obligations which were inexorably linked. 
41 See ICC case no. 5103 of 1988,2 (1991) 2, ICC Bull., p. 20. 
42 "The protocol signed by the parent company was a unit where each of the subsidiaries and the parent 
companies of the two groups were indissolubly bound. There was a network of rights and duties 
which would make the isolation of the arbitration agreement inconceivable" (emphasis added) in 
ICC case no. 2375 of 1975, (1985) Rev. Arb.. p. 583. 
41 In ICC case no. 6000 of 1988,2 (1991) 2 ICC Bull., p. 3: "On their own side the [co-contractor] have 
shown during the performance of the contracts that they considered [the non-signatory company] as 
their true partner in that performance". 
ICC award, on 10 March 2003, C&M Farming Ltd i' Peterson Farms Inc (unpublished), para 87, 
the tribunal pointed out that Peterson knew that it was contracting with the C&M group as a whole 
and that its product would be used in an integrated operation that involved all members of the C R. M 
Group: "In this respect. the Tribunal considered that Peterson, the seller, was aware throughout the 
negotiating period and at the time of contracting that it was dealing with the C&M group and would 
have obligations to all C&M companies" and in para 91: "Furthermore, the draft Sales Right 
Agreement attached to Peterson's Submission in Response to the Claimant's Memorandum on 
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The second requirement is that co-contracting party legitimately had the 
impression that the non-signatory company was a genuine party to the arbitration 
agreement. Here, the tribunal will focus on the behaviour of the non-signatory party. 
For example, the impression of the co-contracting party will be legitimate when the 
non-signatory company adopts `a genuine party behaviour' leading the co-contractor 
to confuse the different companies of the group. 44 In some cases the `genuine party 
behaviour' of the non-signatory company may well border on fraud, particularly if the 
non-signatory actively, or even intentionally, encourages an incorrect understanding 
of the co-contractor. 45 
Jurisdiction dated 28 June 2002, again indicates the parties understanding and intention. The 
Tribunal finds that this supports C&M's contention that Peterson knew it was contracting with and 
would have obligations to all C&M Group companies". 
In the Dow Chemical award, supra n. 3, the tribunal noted that the respondents did not "attach the 
slightest importance to the choice of the company within the DOW Group that would sign the 
contracts" and "it was with the aggregate of these entities that the present defendant's predecessors 
understood themselves to be contracting". 
In ICC case no. 5721 of 1990, (1990) 117 JD1(Clunet), p. 1023, ICC Arbitral Awards 1986-1990 (Y. 
Derains, S. Jarvin and J. J. Arnaldez), p. 400, the tribunal rejected the extension of the arbitration 
agreement to the person controlling the company (respondent) on the grounds that the claimant did 
not establish that it "intended to deal with" that person, or indeed that such person "intended 
personally to he a party to the arbitration agreement". 
44 See ICC case no. 4505 in 1985 and 1986, (1986) 113 JDI (Clunet), p. 1118; ICC Arbitral Awards 
1986-1990 (Y. Derains, S. Jarvin and J. J. Arnaldez), p. 279, the same person would give the 
impression that he represented all the several companies of the group the several companies. 
See also the ICC Award No. 1434 in 1975, ICC Arbitral Awards 1974-1985 (S. Jarvin and Y. 
Derains 1990), p. 264; (1976) 103 JDI (Clunet), p. 978, with note Y. Derains: the tribunal held that 
the person signed the several agreements was representing the whole group, since "throughout the 
conclusion of the agreements requiems by the transaction behaved in conformity with what he was in 
essence, the manager in charge the leader of this large industrial group". 
The same in ICC case no. 2375 of 1975, French company v Two Spanish companies, (1976) 103 JDI 
(Clunet), p. 973. 
45 In which case moral considerations may come into play in determining whether the arbitration 
agreement should be extended the non-signatory party, cf Fouchard, Galliard and Goldman, supra n. 
10, para 501. See arbitral award in ICC case 10758 of 2000,16 (2005) 2 ICC Bull., p. 87: "where a 
corporate structure is used in bad faith as an instrument of deliberate concealment or confusion, or to 
defeat a possible award against the named party to an arbitration agreement, the the Arbitral Tribunal 
might be justified in lifting the corporate veil"; in the Partial Award in ICC case No. 5730 of 1989, 
Lubrifiants Elf Aquitaine v A. R. Orri, (1990) 117 JDI (Clunet), p. 1029); (1992) Rev. Arb., p. 125 
with note Cohen, the tribunal decided that the arbitration agreement had been extended to the 
director of the group as the clause had been signed "in his name, on his instructions and in his 
presence" by his employee "who simply carried out his wishes and had no other involvement"); cf 
the decisions of the Cour d'appel and Cour de Cassation in Orri case confirming the award on the 
ground of fraud: Paris Cour d'appel. 11 January 1990, Orri i' Lubrifiants Elf Aquitaine, (1992) Rev. 
Arb., p. 95, with note D. Cohen: (1991) 118 J. D. L. p. 141, with note B. Audit and the decision of 
Cassation Cass le civ., June 11,1991, Orri vLubrifiants Elf Aquitaine, (1992) Rev. Arb., p. 73, with 
note D. Cohen. 
However. note in ICC case no. 5721 of 1990, (1990) 117 JDI (Clunet), p. 1023; ICC Arbitral Awards 
1986-1990 (Y. Derains. S. Jarvin and J. J. Amaldez), p. 400, the tribunal pointed out that any 
extension of the arbitration agreement must not take place as a way of punishing the behaviour of a 
thire party, and that if the behaviour of a non-signatory party raises issues of fraud the ordinary 
courts should take care of this action, rather than the tribunals. 
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It should be noted that the `genuine party behaviour' of the non-signatory in the 
context of the `group of companies' doctrine bears similarities to principle of agency 
or representation, blurring the boundaries between the group of companies doctrine 
and traditional principles of contract law. 46 Thus, `real party behaviour' adopted by 
the non-signatory company may well be regarded as a case of `apparent or ostensible 
authority', in which case the non-signatory party may be bound by the contract under 
the principles of agency. The `genuine party behaviour' may also bring the US 
principle of `equitable estoppel' into play: if the co-contracting party relied on the 
`genuine party behaviour' of the non-signatory, the latter may well be estopped from 
avoiding the duties arising out of the contract. 
It follows that it is not always easy to separate the doctrine from traditional 
contract law principles. However, it would be a mistake to dismiss the doctrine as 
superfluous and, thus, diminish its contribution to the discussion on `arbitration 
agreements and third parties'. Despite the criticism leveled in the next chapter at the 
extension doctrines and the `group of companies' doctrine in particular, it should be 
emphasised that the latter has brought a new dimension to the debate on `arbitration 
and third parties'. The fact that, twenty years after the Dow Chemical award, the 
`group of companies doctrine' is prominently discussed both in case law and legal 
discourse is a testament to the importance of the doctrine. 47 
4e See the Paris Cour d'appel, Kis France and other v General and other, (1991) 16 YBCA. p. 145. 
(1992) Rev. Arb.. p. 90, made references to both the principle of representation (the parent company 
of a group signed the framework-contract on behalf of its subsidiaries) and the `group of companies' 
doctrine. 
47 See S. Wilske and L. Shore, "The Rise and Fall of the `Group of Companies' Doctrine", (2005) 4 
Journal of International Dispute Resolution. p. 157. arguing that the doctrine after its initial 
remarkable rise in the last decade has now started to fall. 
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CHAPTER 6: CRITIQUE ON THE EXTENSION DOCTRINES 
The previous two chapters reviewed the two most significant doctrines on extension 
of arbitration agreements to third or non-signatory parties: Chapter 4 discussed the 
doctrine of "equitable estoppel, "' while Chapter 5 examined the "group of 
companies" doctrine. This chapter further examines the "extension doctrines". At the 
outset, it provides an account of their positive contribution to the third-party 
discussion. The main purpose of the chapter, however, is to highlight their conceptual 
inefficiencies. 
6.1 POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION OF EXTENSION DOCTRINES 
"Extension doctrines" have been developed to address the intrinsic difficulties 
arising out of multiparty relationships that are "procedurally fragmented2 For all their 
conceptual flaws and practical difficulties, which will be shown in this chapter, 
extension doctrines constitute a radical and, thus, intriguing attempt to accommodate 
As was noted in Chapter 4. the US courts have been employing a negative wording ("estopped from 
avoiding arbitration") when applying the estoppel doctrine. In essence, however, the application of 
the doctrine means that the non-signatory party is bound by the arbitration agreement concluded by 
the original parties. 
2 See Chapter 1 for more details on procedural fragmentation. 
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the perplexing issues of multiparty transactions in the context of arbitration. Extension 
doctrines provoked a fruitful debate on the role of `third parties' in arbitration, 
showing that a party that has neither signed nor ever consented to an arbitration 
agreement may not necessarily be a total stranger to arbitration proceedings between 
two other parties. Extension doctrines shifted the focus of the discussion on the 
contractual interrelatedness between the genuine and the third parties. In other words, 
extension doctrines highlighted the fact that those third parties that are commercial 
partners of two genuine parties to an arbitration agreement should not be overlooked 
in the arbitration proceedings. 
In sum, extension doctrines have drawn attention to the relevance of third parties in 
the context of arbitration, and, thus, their overall contribution to the "third parties" 
discussion is regarded as positive. 
6.2 CONCEPTUAL INEFFICIENCIES OF THE EXTENSION DOCTRINES 
In spite of their positive contribution to the third party discussion, the extension 
doctrines have significant limitations, demonstrated by the following. 
6.2.1 The extension doctrines fail to distinguish between the different types of 
third parties 
Extension doctrines do not distinguish between the various types of `third parties. ' 
As was shown in Part I, not every person not bound by an arbitration agreement is 
relevant to the discussion on arbitration and third parties. Only those third parties with 
an interest in the dispute pending before a tribunal would be relevant, i. e. the false 
third parties. Furthermore, false third parties should be distinguished into different 
groups, on the basis of the difference in the degree of association between the genuine 
and the false third parties. As will be shown in Part III, the degree of contractual 
interrelatedness between the third and the real parties is a key factor for determining 
whether these parties should be brought before the same arbitral tribunal. 
However, courts and tribunals have applied extension doctrines to different types of 
false third parties indiscriminately. The doctrine of equitable estoppel, for example, 
has been applied to a wide range of different types of contractual relationships. It has 
been applied to compel arbitration between a debtor and its surety, 3 between a 
Choctaw Generation i" American Home Assurance, 271 F. 3d 403 (2nd Cir. 2001). 
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licensor and a licensee, 4 and between a yacht owner and a ship classification society. 5 
Likewise, the "group of companies" doctrine has applied to extend the arbitration 
agreement to a parent company', to a subsidiary? and to the chairman of a group of 
companies. g 
There are, however, fundamental differences between the above multiparty 
contractual relationships. It is true that whether arbitration agreements should be 
extended to third parties is a question depending to a large extent on the particular 
factual circumstances of each case. Nonetheless, a rough identification of the types of 
false third parties that are, in principle, conducive to the application of extension 
doctrines, would help the extension doctrines to be applied in a consistently rather 
than indiscriminatingly. In this regard, it would be helpful to determine a priori the 
minimum degree of contractual interrelatedness between the genuine and the false 
third parties that would warrant the participation of a third party in the arbitration 
proceedings between the two genuine parties. 
6.2.2 Limitations of the extension doctrines based on consent (consensual 
extension doctrines) 
As already explained in the previous chapters, `extension doctrines' are, in essence, 
based on the principle of consent. 9 This applies particularly for the doctrine of "group 
of companies": for courts and tribunals to extend an arbitration agreement to a non- 
signatory member of a group of companies, they need to be satisfied that the signatory 
and the non-signatory parties have consented to arbitration. As far as the doctrine of 
"equitable estoppel" is concerned, despite the fact that the `intertwined version' of the 
doctrine seems to have deviated from its equitable origins, the traditional equitable 
'Sunkist Soft Drinks v Sunkist Growers, 10 F. 3d 753 (11th Cir. 1981). 
s American Bureau of Shipping v Tencara Shipyard, 170 F. 3d 349 (2nd Cir. 1999). 
e See, for example, Interim award in ICC case no. 4131 of 198?, Dow Chemical v Isover-Saint-Gobain, 
(1984) Rev. Arb. 137: (1983) 110 Clunet 899, with note Derains; Pau Cour d'appel, Sponsor v 
Lestrade, (1988) Rev. Arb.. p. 153. with note A. Chapelle. 
7 See, for example, ICC case no. 2375 of 1975, in ICC arbitral awards 1974-1985 (Y. Derains and S. 
Jarvin), p. 259. 
I See, for example, Marine Drive Complex i Ghana. (1994) 19 YBCA. p. 11. 
9 Cf J. Hosking "Non-Signatories and International Arbitration in the United States: the Quest for 
Consent". 24 (2004) 3. Arbitration International. at p. 303: "A review of the theories, principles and 
procedures employed to bind non-signatories. reveals - perhaps unsurprisingly - that the 
`touchstone' for this determination is whether or not the relevant entities consented to arbitrate with 
one another". 
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version of the doctrine is largely applied on consensual premised, as was shown in 
Chapter 4.10 
Therefore, it is questionable whether the extension doctrines are even genuine 
"extension doctrine. " Here, the non-signatory party is not a third party in its real 
sense, namely a party not bound by the arbitration agreement. It is merely a party that 
has consented to the arbitration agreement, despite the fact that has failed to sign it. 
Therefore, it is not accurate that an arbitration agreement is "extended" to a third 
party. Rather, it binds the non-signatory party in the same way as the two genuine 
parties. The discussion in the context of the "group of companies" doctrine, in 
particular, relates merely to the formal requirement of signature. The main question 
here is whether there is scope for a party that has not signed the arbitration agreement 
to be, nevertheless, bound by it? In this regard, the term `extension', used in the 
context of the `group of companies', is superfluous if not confusing. 
Indeed, with a few exceptions, " the requirement of consent as fundamental to the 
conclusion of arbitration agreements has never really been challenged by the 
`extension doctrines'. As was shown in the previous chapters, the `multi-company 
group structure' or the `single economic unity' of the several companies in the same 
group are used as factors indicating consent to arbitration on the part of the non- 
signatory party. These factors alone would not be sufficient to provide the conceptual 
premises for the `extension' of arbitration agreements to the non-signatory companies 
of the group. '2 The underlined premise for the extension is, as courts and tribunals 
have consistently, held the "the common intention of all the parties. "13 
10 See discussion in Ch. 4.3.2 above. 
11 See section 4.3.2, on intertwined equitable estoppel above, and section 6.2.3 below. 
12 "L' existence d' un group de societe n'est pas une condition suffisante pour retenir dans ]'arbitrage 
]'ensemble des societes du group" see ICC no 7155 in 1993. (1996) JDI (Clunet). p. 1037, note 7-J 
Arnaldez and ICC cases 7604 and 7610 in 1995. (1998) JDI (Clunet), p 1027; cf D. Vidal, "The 
Extension of Arbitration Agreements within Groups of Companies: The Alter Ego Doctrine in 
Arbitral and Court Decisions", 16 (2005) 2 ICC Bull., p. 73: "Case law does offer any significant 
examples of the extension of an arbitration agreement on the sole basis of the economic unity of a 
group". 
13 The reference to "the common will of all the parties to the proceedings" ("selon la commune volonte 
de toutes les parties") was first found in the seminal Dow Chemical award in ICC Case No. 4131 
(1982). Do", Chemical v Isover-Saint-Gobain. (1984) Rev. Arb. 137; (1983) 110 JDI (Clunet) 899, 
with note Derains. Since then it can be found in many other awards or court decisions applying the 
group of companies doctrine; see for example the more recent arbitral award in ICC case 10758 of 
2000,16 (2005) 2 ICC Bull., p. 87; or the Paris Cour d'appel, Societe Sponsor AB v Lestrade, (1988) 
Rev. Arb. p. 154. with note A. Chapelle; see also the award of the tribunal and the decision of the 
Paris Cour d'appel in the case Re Societe Kis France r Societe Generale (1992) Rev. Arb. p. 90; XVI 
IBCA. 145 (1991). 
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Thus, the `group of companies' doctrine is employed to ascertain implied consent, 
rather than to dispense with it. In this consensual context, the true essence of the 
doctrine is to facilitate the deduction of consent: intention of the non-signatory party 
to arbitrate is more easily inferred when the non-signatory is a member of a group of 
companies. 14 
The fact that the `group of companies' doctrine has, in principle, adhered to the 
requirement of consent has kept the doctrine in line with the contractual origins of 
arbitration. At the same time, however, the insistence on `consent' has created a 
number of theoretical and practical inconsistencies. In fact, it has proved to be one of 
the main weaknesses of the `group of companies' doctrine, as it obliges courts and 
tribunals to engage in a complicated quest for consent. This argument is demonstrated 
by following: 
6.2.2.1 Deduction of implied consent is not always justified 
In the context of group of companies doctrine, courts and tribunals have on many 
instances ascertained "common intention of the parties" to arbitrate by reference to 
the 'group structure' or the `economic unit' of the several companies, or by reference 
to the `active role' of the non-signatories in the negotiations or the performance of the 
contract. 15 It is questionable, however, whether references to the `group structure' or 
the `active role' can warrant deduction of intention to arbitrate. 
For example, in ICC case 5103 of 1988, in order to prove that the several companies 
(claimants) belonged to the same group the tribunal set out a list of facts and 
documents regarding the close corporate relationships between the several companies. 
In particular, the tribunal had regard to financial statements referring to the several 
companies as a group; to consolidated balance sheets of the several companies of the 
group; to the fact that the several companies had the same CEO and common 
headquarters; to the fact that goods were delivered by one company of the group 
whereas another company was invoiced. Therefore, the tribunal assumed jurisdiction 
over all claimants since: 
14 B. Hanotiau. Complex Arbitrations: Multiparh', Multi-contract, Multi-issue and Class Actions, 
(Kluwer Law International 2005). p. 51. see also B. Hanotiau. "Groups of Companies in International 
Arbitration", in, L. Mistelis- J. Lew (eds. ). (Kluwer Law International 2005) Pervasive Problems in 
International Arbitration paras 14-5 and 14-6. 
15 See above n. 13. 
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"The three claimant companies appear to have been at the time of the 
conclusion, execution, non-execution and re-negotiation of their contractual 
links with the [defendants] genuine partners to all these contracts, by the 
common will of the parties to the proceedings" (emphasis added) 16 
Similarly, in ICC no. 6000 of 1988, " in order to prove that the several defendants 
were members of the same group the tribunal made specific references to the fact that 
the several companies had the same owners and the same representatives. The tribunal 
was satisfied that the several companies had very close corporate relationships, if they 
were not substantially identical. In addition to the close corporate relationships 
between the several defendants, the tribunal made specific references to the fact that 
the non-signatory defendant had taken part in the negotiations and the performance of 
the contract. In fact, the active role of the non-signatory in the negotiations of the 
contract led the tribunal to conclude that the arbitration agreement was extended to 
the non signatory company of the group, since: 
"the common will of the parties was obviously that the [non-signatory 
defendant] be fully -and indeed, almost exclusively- involved in the 
conclusion, the performance and the termination of the contracts in dispute. "18 
However, it is difficult to see why the fact that several companies have close 
corporate relationships should be viewed as such a decisive factor for revealing 
"common will" of the parties to arbitrate. Or why, in that matter, close corporate 
relationships should weigh more than the actual fact that the non-signatory and the co- 
contracting party never signed the contract or the arbitration agreement included 
therein. At face value, the decision of all the parties involved in the multiparty 
transaction, not to include the non-signatory company in the contract, incorporating 
the arbitration agreement, should be accepted as a conscious decision of the parties 
not have the non-signatory bound by the specific contract. 19 Or at least it should be 
viewed as a strong presumption that the non-signatory and the co-contracting 
2 (1991) 2ICCBull., p. 20 to 22. 
"2 (1991) 2 ICC Bull. p. 31. 
ýs The references to the active role of the non-signatory are set out under the heading: "common will of 
the parties", ibid, p. 34. 
See Derains, "L'extension de la clause d'arbitrage aux non si(ynatories-La doctrine des groupes de 
societes". in Arbitration Agreement- its Multifold Critical Aspects. (1999) ASA Special Series No S. 
at p. 242). 
10) 
company did not want to arbitrate. In the ICC case no, 10758 of 2000, the tribunal, 
rightly, noted that: 
"By not signing the Contract, [the non-signatory] intended to respect the legal 
independence of [its affiliate signatory]'s legal personality and to be in 
harmony with the privity of contract principle, that is to say precisely not to 
become a party to the Contract nor to its arbitration clause" 20 
Moreover, the fact that the non-signatory company had an `active role' in the 
negotiation or the execution of the specific transaction does not necessarily rebut this 
presumption. 21 It does not prove that the non-signatory has consented to the 
substantive contract. In the context of contemporary business, it is likely that the 
internal division of labour within the group, and its complex structure require that 
different companies of the group will be involved in the performance or the 
termination of the contract. In this regard, a non-signatory company may well take 
part in the performance of the contract merely as an executing branch of the group or 
a supervising unit of the group, rather than as a company that assumes legal duties or 
responsibilities from this contract. 
In the ICC case no in case 10818 of 2001 (Partial Award), '-'- the non-signatory party 
took over the performance of the exclusive distribution agreement signed by another 
company of the group of the contract. The non-signatory party was providing the co- 
contractor (claimant) with technical, marketing and operational support with regard to 
the exclusive distribution agreement. In fact, the claimant was dealing exclusively 
with the non-signatory throughout the period until the contract was terminated. 
Nonetheless the tribunal found that the fact that the non-signatory party contributed to 
the performance of the agreement did not evidence an intention to assume 
responsibilities instead of or in addition to the signatory. 
20 16 (2005) 2 ICC Bull., p. 92. para 25. The same in Partial Award in ICC case no 10818 of 2001,16 
(2005) 2 ICC Bull., p. 94. 
2] Unless is it considered as ratification (consent at a later stage). in which case this should be expressly 
noted in the arbitral awards or the court judgments, cf ICC case no. 4504 of 1985-1986 where the 
active role of a second company in the same group of companies was not considered critical for this 
company to be bound by the arbitration agreement concluded by another company in the group. The 
tribunal noted that "one could not deduce there from [the role of the second company in the 
negotiation and performance of the agreement that the second defendant had ratified the agreement" 
ICC awards 1986-1990 (Y. Derains, S. Jarvin and J. J. Amaldez), p. 279. 
2 16 (2005) 2 ICC Bull.. p. 94. 
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This should be the right approach to the issue. In principle, it is considered 
legitimate commercial practice for a group to adopt a multi-divisional structure where 
certain companies are assigned specific duties and a parent company is merely 
holding a supervisory role. Therefore, the involvement of companies other than the 
non-signatory may be due to a legitimate divisional structure of the group. This does 
not, or at least does not necessarily, reveal an unequivocal intention of the non- 
signatories to be bound by the substantive contract between the two signatories. 
6.2.2.2 Specific arbitral consent is required for the non-signatory to be bound by the 
arbitration agreement 
Moreover, even if it were accepted that the `active participation' of the non- 
signatories to the performance of the contract between the two signatories could 
reveal intention of the non-signatories to be bound by the substantive contract, this 
would not necessarily reveal their intention to be bound by the arbitration agreement 
too ('arbitral intention'). The `active role' of the non-signatory pertains to the 
substantive part of the contract, rather than to the arbitration agreement. 23 Therefore, 
it is questionable whether a specific intention to arbitrate can be ascertained by 
reference to the participation of the non-signatory in the performance of the 
substantive part of the contract between the two signatories. The non-signatory might 
not even be aware of the arbitration agreement in the main contract. 
The French courts, in the context of the `group of companies' doctrine, have held 
that the fact that a non-signatory party has taken part in the negotiation or the 
performance of the contract raises the presumption that the non-signatory party is 
aware of the existence and the scope of the arbitration agreement included in this 
contract. 24 It may be queried whether the view taken by the French courts is correct. 
In fact, it has rightly been criticized, as going too far. 25 
23 The tribunal in ICC case no. 2138 of 1974 succinctly observed "it is not at all certain that if the non- 
signatory had signed itself the contract [... ] it would have accepted the arbitration clause", in ICC 
awards 1974-1985 (Y. Derains and S. Jarvin), at p. 934. 
24 "Their respective situations and activities raise the presumption that they were aware of the existence 
and scope of the arbitration clause. and irrespective of the fact that they did not sign the contract 
containing the arbitration agreement", see for example Paris Cour d'appel, Nov. 30.1988. Korsnas 
Marna v Durand-Auzias. (1989) REV. ARB. , p. 691, with note Tschanz 208 and Paris Cour d' 
Appel, 7 Dec. 1994, V 2000 V Project XJ 220 ITD et autre, (1996) Rev Arb. p. 67, with note C 
Jarrosson; Paris Cour d'appel, 22 March 1995, SMABTP et autre soc Statinor, (1997) Rev. Arb. 
p. 550. 
25 Fouchard, Gaillard and Goldman, On International Commercial Arbitration, E. Gaillard and J. 
Savage (eds) (Kluwer 1999). paras 481 and 505. 
1o 
In any case, even if it were accepted that the non-signatory by its active role is 
presumably aware of the arbitration agreement, this would not be enough for the non- 
signatory to be bound by the arbitration agreement. Unambiguous consent rather than 
mere awareness is the uncompromised threshold for a person to be bound by an 
arbitration agreement, as indeed by any other contract. 
In fact, not even the unilateral consent of the non-signatory would be enough. 
Mutual consent of both the non-signatory and the signatory must be proved. While the 
focus is usually on whether the non-signatory party has given its consent, the intention 
of the signatory parties is not always given proper consideration. In the ICC case 9517 
of 2000 (Interim Award), the tribunal felt that it should underline this point: 26 
"Although this is self-evident, it is worth emphasising that the intention that 
the non-signatories be party to the agreement must be common to the latter and 
the other party(ies) to the arbitration clause" 
It follows that an arbitration agreement must be founded upon a meeting of minds of 
both the signatories and the non-signatories, which must be ascertained by reference 
to specific facts revealing the mutual intention of the parties to resort to arbitration. 27 
The well-established principle of autonomy of arbitration agreements28 must apply 
in its fullest sense in the context of the `extension doctrines': all formal and 
substantive requirements of validity and, above all, intention of all parties to arbitrate 
must be met with regard to an arbitration agreement independently. Therefore, the 
assertion of specific arbitration consent is indispensable for a non-signatory to be 
bound by an arbitration agreement concluded between the signatories. 
In the recent case of Celanese Corporation and Celanese (Nanjing) Chemical Co., v 
The Boc Group Plc, 29 an agreement regarding the construction of a plant in China was 
signed between BOC plc and BOC Nanjing (its wholly owned subsidiary) on the one 
hand and Celanese AG and Celanese Nanjing (its wholly owned subsidiary) on the 
26 16 (2005) 2 ICC Bull., p. 80. 
27 "An agreement implied in fact is founded upon a meeting of minds, which, although not embodied in 
an express contract, is inferred, as a fact, from conduct of the parties showing, in the light of the 
surrounding circumstances, their tacit understanding. " Hercules, Inc. v United States. 516 U. S. 417. 
424 (1996) (quoting Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. v United States. 261 U. S. 592,597 (1923)). 
28 See J. Lew, L. Mistelis and S. Kroell, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration, (Kluwer 
Law International 2003) at para 6-7 et seq: Fouchard. Gaillard and Goldman, supra n. 25. Part 2 
Chapter I; see also Cass. le civ., 7 May 1963, Raumond Gosset v Carapelli, (1963) JCP. Ed. G., Pt. 
II, No. 13,405 (1963). with note B. Goldman: also ICC Case No 2138 of 1974, (1975) JDI (Clunet), 
p. 934 and ICC Case No. 1434 of 1976, (1976) JDI (Clunet), p. 974. 
2' U. S. D. Court Texas 2006. Slip Copy. (2006 WL 3513633). 
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other. However, the parent companies (Celanese AG and BOC plc) were not included 
in the definition of the terms `Party' or `Parties' used in the arbitration clause 
incorporated in the substantive agreement. The terms expressly referred only to the 
subsidiaries. 
When Celanese Corporation and Celanese Nanjing brought an action against the 
BOC Group before the US courts, the latter initiated ICC arbitration proceedings 
against Celanese AG and its subsidiary Celanese Nanjing. At the same time, BOC 
filed a motion before the US courts to stay proceedings under the FAA s. 4, pending 
final award in the ICC arbitration and compel arbitration. The District court refused to 
compel arbitration on the grounds that Celanese Corporation and BOC plc were not 
parties to the arbitration agreement. According to the court, the fact that the parent 
companies had taken part in the negotiations to the contract and, in addition, had 
signed the substantive agreement of the contract did not necessarily reveal their intent 
to arbitrate. The court held: 
"[... ] both BOC plc and BOC Nanjing were signatories to the Agreement, and 
yet BOC plc expressly excluded themself as a party to the arbitration clause. 
Although the arbitration agreement may evidence clear and unmistakable 
intent to arbitrate questions of arbitrability between the two parties to that 
agreement, this hardly evidences a clear intent between BOC plc and Plaintiffs 
to arbitrate questions of arbitrability when BOC plc and BOC Nanjing acted as 
separate entities when negotiating the Agreement and BOC plc chose to be a 
non-party to the arbitration clause"30 
"[... ] Because BOC plc was aware of the arbitration agreement and seemingly 
had an opportunity to participate in such agreement, yet, for whatever reason, 
expressly chose not to do so, the Court cannot now allow BOC plc to force 
Celanese Nanjing and Celanese Corporation to arbitrate their claims against 
only BOC plc"31 
In the ICC case no, 10758 of 2000, the non-signatory parent company became 
actively involved after the contract was signed, at the stage of the negotiations 
attempting to resolve the dispute. The active role of the non-signatory in the dispute 
resolution process leading to arbitration could have been taken as an indication that 
30 Ibid. at 3. 
31 Ibid, at 7. 
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the parent company had the intention to be part of the arbitration proceedings too. The 
tribunal however held that: 
"[... ] this involvement, beginning eight years after the Contract was signed, 
does not reveal any intention to accept either responsibility for the Contract or 
its arbitration clause. A parent company can assist a wholly-owned subsidiary 
in resolving a dispute regarding a major project that the latter is involved with, 
especially when it is mandated by law to supervise its subsidiaries as in the 
instant case, without thereby taking over the project; otherwise, it could 
retrospectively assume liabilities it did not contract for in the first place or 
become itself a party to the dispute or the ensuing arbitration"32 
It has been argued that specific arbitration consent is not always required for the 
existence of arbitration agreements. In particular, Fouchard-Galliard-Goldman 
express the view -at least in the context of assignment and incorporation of arbitration 
agreements by reference-33 that: 
"The principle of the autonomy of the arbitration agreement from the main 
contract raises no obstacle to the validity of an arbitration agreement [... ]. The 
principle of autonomy does not require the arbitration agreement to be 
contained in a separate document in order to be valid. 134 
Their view is based on the premise that: 
32 No 10758 of 2000,16 (2005) 21CC Bull., p. 93 para 27. 
33 Fouchard, Gaillard and Goldman, supra n. 25, para 426 et seq and para 492 et seq. It should be 
noted, though, that there is a fundamental difference between the case of assignment and the case of 
extension of arbitration agreements to third parties. In the former case, the assignee consents to 
assume all the rights and obligations of the assignor vis-ä-vis its co-contractor. In essence, the 
assignee consents to take the place of the assignor. There is no need to distinguish between consent 
to assume the substantive obligations and consent to arbitrate. The general consent of the assignee to 
substitutes the assignor covers every right and obligation vis-ä-vis the co-contractor. On the other 
hand, a `third party' is added to the arbitration agreement. It is as new party in its own right, rather 
than a party that substitutes one of the original ones. Therefore, all validity requirements, and above 
all intention to arbitrate, must be examined autonomously with regard to the third party. 
Fouchard, Gaillard and Goldman rightly argue for the automatic assignment of the obligation to 
arbitrate from the assignor to the assignee. This is correct since "if it was otherwise, the assignee 
could unilaterally alter the position of the remaining party. who had initially agreed with the 
assignor to arbitration" (by reference to the judgment of the Supreme Court of Sweden. Oct. 15, 
1997. MS Emia Braack Shiffahrts KG v Wärtsilä Diesel Aktiebolag. (1998) Rev. Arb.. p. 431 _ with 
note A-C. Hansson Lecoanet and S. Jarvin) However, this argument does not apply to the case of the 
extension of the arbitration agreement to third parties. As has just been noticed, a third party does 
not substitute one of the original parties to the arbitration agreement. It does not interfere with the 
arbitration agreement between the original parties. The third party assumes in its own right vis-a-vis 
the original parties the obligation to arbitrate. Therefore, the obligation of the original parties to 
arbitrate cannot be altered by the third party unilaterally. 
31 Fouchard. Galliard and Goldman. idem. 
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"Any other understanding of the principle of autonomy would resuscitate the 
anachronistic distinction between arbitration clauses and submission 
agreements, thus creating new obstacles to the validity of the arbitration 
agreement, despite the fact that the principle of autonomy was precisely 
intended to promote that validity. " 35 
It is questionable whether this argument is correct. The principle of "autonomy of 
the arbitration agreement" or the principle of separability does not promote the 
validity of arbitration agreements. In fact, the principles pertain to the invalidity rather 
than the validity of arbitration agreements. According to the true meaning of the 
principle of "autonomy of the arbitration agreement" and separability, arbitration 
agreements are not necessarily rendered invalid merely because the main contract is 
invalid. However, the principles cannot salvage the validity of the arbitration 
agreement when the main contract is invalid. By the same token, the fact that the main 
contract is valid is not, by itself, a reason for the arbitration agreement included in the 
contract to be valid too. Therefore, irrespective of the existence or validity of the main 
contract, the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement must be determined 
independently. This necessarily means that for an arbitration agreement to be valid, a 
general intention of a party to be bound by the main contract is not enough. A specific 
intention to arbitrate must exist. 
A specific intention to arbitrate can be inferred from the conduct of the non- 
signatory revealing its tacit consent to the arbitration agreement. This will be the case, 
for example, if the original party to the arbitration agreement initiates court 
proceedings against the non-signatory, which requests a stay by reference to the 
arbitration agreement between the signatories. 36 Alternatively, it may be that the 
35 Idem 
See ICC case no. 7453 of 1994,124 JDI 107 (1997) where the claimant commenced court 
proceedings in the US against both a signatory and a non-signatory. Both defendants objected to the 
jurisdiction of the US courts by reference to the ICC arbitration clause included in the contract 
between the claimant and the defendant signatory. After the claimant commenced arbitral 
proceedings against both defendants the non-signatory contested the jurisdiction of the tribunal this 
time. on the grounds that it had never signed the contract and the arbitration clause therein. The sole 
arbitrator, indeed, refused to assume jurisdiction over the non-signatory. In his view the fact that the 
non-signatory contested the jurisdiction of the US courts did not amount to an arbitration submission 
in the meaning of sec. 2 of the United States Federal Arbitration Act. In particular, the arbitrator 
noted at para 12: 
"In considering the first such possible mode of consent it is appropriate to quote the second section 
of the Act (9 U. S. C. 2) `A written provision in [.. ] a contract [... ] to settle by arbitration a 
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract [.. ] or an agreement in writing to submit to 
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signatory initiates arbitration proceedings against the whole group of companies, 
including both signatory and non-signatory parties, which do not object to the 
jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal. 37 
6.2.2.3 Misapplication of traditional principles of contract law in the context of the 
extension doctrines 
In some cases, the tribunals in addition to references to the `common intention of 
the parties' have supported the extension of the arbitration agreement to non- 
signatories by reference to traditional principles of contract law. In particular, the 
tribunals have often referred to the principles of representation or agency, which are 
basically founded upon consent. 38 
However, reference to traditional principles of contract law in the context of 
`extension doctrines' is problematic. In fact, it is contradictory to the essence of 
`extension doctrines, ' or at least superfluous: once the intention of the non-signatories 
to arbitrate has been "asserted" by reference to the doctrine of `group of companies' 
or `equitable estoppel', any additional reference to traditional principles of contract 
law has no relevance. Autonomous principles of inferring intention to arbitrate have 
been developed in the context of `extension doctrines'. For example, extension 
doctrines do not require an examination of whether the non-signatory acted as agent 
of the signatory. They require an examination of whether there is the "group 
arbitration an existing controversy [... ] shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such 
g , rounds as exist in law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. "' (emphasis added). 
"Here, Counsel for claimant says that the pleadings and briefs amount to an agreement in writing to 
submit to arbitration an existing controversy, namely, the claim against second defendant. I have 
found that those documents were ambiguous as to whether first defendant consented to the joinder 
of second defendant. [... ] The matter therefore falls within the emphasised passage from 9 U. S. C. 2 
quoted above. The contract arising from the pleadings in Federal Court to arbitrate the claims 
against second defendant, if it ever existed, is revocable within the meaning of that passage". 
Arbitrator's decision not to assume jurisdiction over the non-signatory on the above facts is 
questionable. The fact that the non-signatory contested the jurisdiction of the national courts 
invoking the arbitration agreement is conduct that clearly reveals `implied arbitral consent'. Rather 
than relying on the formal requirement of writing provided in the US FAA s. 2, the arbitrator should 
have given effect to the real intention of the non-signatory to arbitrate. 
37 See ICC 5730 of 1988 (The Orri case), (1990) 117 JDI (Clunet) p. 1029: (1992) Rev. Arb. p. 25 with 
note Cohen. where the claimant initiated arbitration proceedings against two companies (enterprise 
X and company X SA) of the same group and an individual, who was a manager and a major 
shareholder of the group. Although a non-signatory, company X SA did not challenge the 
jurisdiction of the tribunal and, therefore. the tribunal naturally assumed jurisdiction over the non- 
signatory company X SA. 
38 ICC award no. 1434 of 1975, (1976) JDI (Clunet) 978: ICC award no. 5721 of 1990, (1990) 117 JDJ 
(Clunet) 1029 or the Orri case, ICC 5730 of 1988, (1990) 117 JDI (Clunet) p. 1029; (1992) Rev. Arb, 
p. 25 with note Cohen. 
110 
structure" or "an active role" of the non-signatory (group of companies doctrine) or 
whether the non-signatory has obtained any benefit from or relies on the contract that 
including the arbitration agreement (equitable estoppel doctrine). 
It follows that traditional contract law principles have independent rather than 
supplementary theoretical premises. Therefore, `consent to arbitrate' is a requirement 
that must be met in full either by exclusive reference to extension doctrines or by 
exclusive reference to traditional principles of contract law. It cannot be a 
combination of the two. If anything, the supplementary reference to traditional 
principles of contract law principles indicates that tribunals, when referring to 
traditional principles of contract law in addition to extension doctrines, are in doubt 
about whether the extension of arbitration agreements to third parties can be justified 
solely on the basis of `extension doctrines'. Arguably, references to traditional 
principles of contract law are employed more to support the `extension doctrines' than 
because the application of the traditional principles themselves is warranted under the 
factual circumstances of the case. 
For example, the arbitral award in C&M Farming Ltd v Peterson Farms Inc39 made 
specific reference to the agency theory in addition to the application of a `group of 
companies' doctrine: 
"The Tribunal considers that it was logical to have the name of one member of 
that group as the contracting partner with Peterson. One company had to take 
formal legal responsibility for the contract with Peterson. C&M Group, as 
such, was not a legal entity and therefore could not contract in its own name. 
There would have been greater uncertainty had it sought to do so. Nasik [later 
changed its name to C&M, ] contracted on behalf of and as the agent for the 
whole C&M Gi^oup. This was clearly understood by Peterson"40 (emphasis 
added) 
The English Court, before which the award was challenged, rightly, commented on 
the application of the agency theory: 
"Far from there being `greater uncertainty' had the Agreement named `C&M 
Group' as a party, on the tribunal's reasoning that would have been both 
accurate and well understood. In contrast the nomination of Nasik on that 
ICC award. on 10 March 2003, C&M Farming Ltd v Peterson Farms Inc (unpublished). 
40 Ibid, para 92. 
reasoning created or at least increased any uncertainty. The last two sentences 
of par. 92 represent all that the tribunal said about `agency'. Not only do those 
sentences ignore the fact that no case in agency was ever advanced by C&M 
before the tribunal but had there been an agency relationship between C&M 
and `the whole C&M Group' there would have been no need for C&M to 
advance the Group of Companies doctrine as it did nor for `one company to 
take formal legal responsibility for the contract'. That company could indeed 
have signed as agent as well as for itself 14l 
6.2.2.4 Conclusions on the extension doctrines based on consent 
In the light of the above, it seems clear that the assertion of implied consent requires 
the application of specific principles and techniques42 of interpretation which must 
reveal the "intention to arbitrate" with a degree of certainty, rather than probability. 43 
In this interpretation process, the principle of in favorem validitatis cannot be 
applicable. 44 There can be no presumption in favour of the existence of the arbitration 
agreement, and therefore, no presumption in favour of the existence of the intention to 
arbitrate. 45 
However, as this chapter demonstrated, it is doubtful whether such an intention to 
arbitrate can be ascertained with the necessary degree of certainty by reference to the 
41 Peterson Farms Inc. v C&MFarming Ltd, [2004] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 603, Langley J, at 610. 
42 See Fouchard, Gaillard and Goldman, supra n. 25, at para 477 et seq. referring to `the principle of 
interpretation in good faith', which seeks to establish the actual intention of the parties, 'the 
principle of effective interpretation', giving favouring the interpretation enabling the clause to be 
effective over the interpretation preventing the clause from being effective, and `the principle of 
interpretation contra proferentem' establishing the presumption that an agreement should be 
interpreted against the party that drafted the clause in dispute. Cf also, ICC case no. 1434 of 1975, 
ICC Arbitral Awards 1974-1985 (S. Jarvin and Y. Derains eds 1990), p. 264, where the tribunal 
accepted the extension of the arbitration agreement to a non-signatory company of a group, on the 
grounds of implied consent, ascertained by reasonable interpretation of the contract. 
43 Cf Fouchard, Gaillard and Goldman, supra n. 25, at para 472 "When determining whether or not the 
parties actually agreed to submit their disputes to arbitration, arbitrators and the courts apply various 
principles of interpretation. In the light of these principles, they establish the degree of certainty 
required for the parties' consent to be effective as well as the scope of that consent. " and at para 482 
"Case law shows that the primary concern shared by both arbitrators and the courts is to give full 
effect to the parties' intention to refer their disputes to arbitration. This is true of both the degree of 
certainty required of the consent given by the parties and its scope". 
as Fouchard, Gaillard and Goldman, supra n. 25, at para 480: "It is equally inappropriate to resort to a 
general principle of interpretation in favorem validitatis or in favorem jurisdictionis, whereby 
arbitration agreements are to be interpreted extensively. Although it is true that arbitration is now a 
normal means of resolving disputes in international trade, and that arbitration agreements should 
therefore not be interpreted "restrictively" or "strictly, " it remains perfectly legitimate to choose to 
have one's international disputes settled by the courts. 
45 See in more detail S. Brekoulakis, "The Notion of Superiority of Arbitration Agreements over 
Jurisdiction Agreements: Is it time to Abandon it? " 24 (2007) 4, JInt'l Arb., p. 341 et seq. 
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`group structure' of the group of companies or the `active participation' of the non- 
signatory company in the negotiation or the performance of the contract concluded by 
other companies of the same group. The above analysis of the relevant case law has 
shown that in some cases the `group structure' or the `active participation' are used as 
presumptions for the existence of the intention of the non-signatory to arbitrate, and 
thus as a presumption in favour of the existence of the arbitration agreement. 46 In this 
way the principle of consent is misapplied. 
This is not to argue that the only safe way to ascertain consent is signature. A strict 
formalistic approach to the issue of consent is increasingly difficult to justify, in the 
context of contemporary international commerce. 47 Signature should be disassociated 
from the assertion of consent, or be used as one of several criteria to evidence consent 
to arbitrate. On the other hand, when the signature of the third party is missing, the 
intention to arbitrate must be ascertained by clear evidence rather than presumed by 
general reference to the "active role" of the third party in the negotiations or the 
performance of the substantive contract. It is inconsistent for the courts and tribunals 
on the one hand to accept that the group of companies must be applied on the basis of 
consent, and on the other hand infer consent on the basis of insufficient evidence 
6.2.3 Limitations of extension doctrines not based on consent (non-consensual 
extension doctrines) 
As has already been explained, `extension doctrines' are based on consensual 
premises: it is necessary that signatories and non-signatories have actually consented 
to arbitrate. Nevertheless, there have been versions of "extension doctrines" which 
have deviated from this rule. Here, other factors than `consent' are critical for the 
determination of whether a third party may be bound by an arbitration agreement. 
Thus, the term `extension' of the arbitration agreement to third parties finds its literal 
meaning: it refers to an arbitration agreement binding a person that has never actually 
ff Hanotiau, Complex Arbitrations. supra n. 14, p. 98 : "The analysis of the arbitral awards also leads 
to the emergence of a rebuttable presumption that the parent company binds its subsidiaries"; Cf 
X. Y. Li. La transmission et l'extension de la clause compromissoire dans 1'arbitrage international, 
1993 (Dijon), p. 321, who also argues that in the context of international arbitration the consent of 
the third party company should be presumed. 
47 See the discussion in Lew-Mistelis-Kroell, supra n. 28. para 7-7 et seq. 
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consented to that arbitration agreement. 48 Two versions of extension doctrines are of 
particular interest. 
The first is the `intertwined version' of the "equitable estoppel" doctrine 
(intertwined estoppel) developed by the US courts. "Intertwined estoppel" suggests 
that a third party is bound by an arbitration agreement concluded between the two real 
parties if the dispute between the third party and one of the real parties is closely 
intertwined with the underlying relationship between the real parties. Here the 
extension of the arbitration agreement depends on how close the contractual 
relationships of the several parties are, rather than on whether the third and the real 
parties have consented to arbitrate their dispute. 49 Thus, it can be argued that the 
requirement of "consent" has been diminished -if not dispensed with- in the context of 
the intertwined version of the estoppel doctrine. 
The second is the argument of the autonomous validity and effectiveness of 
arbitration agreements, advanced by the French courts in the context of the `group of 
companies' doctrine. In particular, it has been argued that an arbitration agreement 
included in an international contract has an autonomous validity and effectiveness that 
calls for the extension of this arbitration agreement to parties that have been involved 
in the performance of the contract. As in the case of `intertwined estoppel', here the 
extension of the arbitration agreement to third parties is not based on whether the third 
parties have actually consented to the arbitration agreement. It was the Cour d'appel 
of Paris in Korsnas Marma v Durand-Auzias, which first noted that: 
"[... ] la clause compromissoire inseree dans un contrat international a une 
validite et une efficacite propres qui commandent d'en etendre 1' application 
aux parties directement impliquees dans 1'execution du contrat et dans les 
litiges qui peuvent en resulter, des lors qu'il est etabli que leur situation et leers 
activites font presumer qu' elles ont eu connaissance de 1' existence et de la 
as Cf ICC case no 5721. ICC Arbitral Awards 1974-1985 (S. Jarvin &Y Derains eds 1990). p. 404, 
where the term extension of arbitration agreements is wrongly employed to refer to the case where a 
non-signatory is bound by an arbitration agreement on the basis of an implied consent. 
49 See in particular Choctaw Generation v American Home Assurance, 271 F. 3d 403 (2nd Cir. 2001) 
and McBro Planning & Development Co v Triangle Electronic Construction, 741 F. 2d 342,343 
(11th Cir. 1984). 
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portee de la clause d'arbitrage, bien qu' elles n' aient pas ete signataires du 
contrat la stipulant. " 50 
Since then, the argument of the autonomous validity and effectiveness of arbitration 
agreements has been reiterated by the Paris Cour d' appel in a number of cases. 51 
Despite the criticism of it, 52 the theory of the `autonomous validity and effectiveness' 
of arbitration agreements carries an intriguing implication, namely that in the context 
of international transactions mere awareness of the arbitration agreement rather than 
consent is enough for the valid conclusion of such an agreement. Moreover, the 
theory suggests that whenever a third party assumes an `direct role'53 in the 
performance of the main contract, this party should be presumed to be aware of the 
existence of the arbitration agreement included in the contract and, therefore, be 
bound by it. Thus, the key factor for a third party to be bound by an arbitration 
agreement is whether it has performed a `direct role' in the performance of the 
substantive contract rather than whether the third party actually had any intention to 
arbitrate. 
However, the argument of the autonomous validity and effectiveness of arbitration 
agreements is in direct conflict with the contractual nature of arbitration agreements. 
This criticism applies equally to the `intertwined estoppel' adopted by the US courts. 
In both cases, the existence of arbitration agreements is in essence presumed, 
irrespective of whether the third party has actually consented to the arbitration 
agreement. The rationale behind both theories is that once the arbitration agreement is 
50 <<... an arbitration clause included in an international contract has an autonomous validity and 
effectiveness, which calls for the clause to be extended to parties directly involved in the 
performance of the contract and in the disputes arising out of the contract, provided that it is 
established that their [the parties'] activities raise the presumption that they [the parties] were aware 
of the existence and the scope of the arbitration clause, and irrespective of the fact that they did not 
sign the contract including the arbitration agreement" (translation of the author); Paris Cour d'appel, 
30 Nov. 1988, Korsnas Marma v Durand-Auzias, (1989) Rev. Arb., p. 691, with note P. -Y. Tschanz. 
51 Paris Cour d'appel, 14 February 1989, Ofer Bros v Tokyo Marine and Fire Insurance, (1989) Rev. 
Arb., p. 691, witt note P. -Y. Tschanz; Paris Cour d'appel, 11 January 1990, Orri v Lubrifiants Elf 
Aquitaine, (1992) Rev. Arb., p. 95, with note D. Cohen; (1991) 118 J. D. I., p. 141, with note B. Audit. 
it should be noted though that the Cour de cassation distanced itself from the argument for the 
autonomous validity and effectiveness of the arbitration agreement, adopted by the Cour d'appel. 
Instead, the Cour de cassation referred to "fraud aimed at concealing the identity of the real 
contractor" (fraude. destine a dissimuler le veritable contractant) in order to uphold the extension of 
the arbitration agreement to the non-signatory (Cass le civ.. June 11,1991, Orri i, Lubrifants Elf 
Aquitaine, (1992) Rev. Arb., p. 73, with note D. Cohen). See also Paris Cour d' Appel, 7 Dec 1994, 
V 2000 v Project XI 220 ITD et autre, (1996) Rev. Arb., p. 67, with note C Jarrosson (but not in the 
context of the group of companies doctrine); Paris Cour d'appel, 22 March 1995. SMABTP et autre 
iv Stationor et autre, (1997) Rev. Arb., p. 550. 
52 See for example. Fouchard. Gaillard and Goldman. supra n. 27 paras 481 and 505. 
53 "... parties directement impliquees dans ]'execution du contrat". 
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validly concluded between the two original parties, fewer validity requirements 
should be needed for this arbitration agreement to bind a third party. Once an 
arbitration agreement `comes into existence' there is no need for it to be concluded 
afresh with regard to a third party. This argument, however, although attractive at first 
sight, finds no support in contract law theory. 
Arbitration agreements do not differ in terns of validity requirements from ordinary 
contracts. 54 For an arbitration agreement to be validly concluded, the general 
principles of contract law must apply. There is no provision in any arbitration law or 
arbitration treaty providing for more lenient validity requirements with regard to 
arbitration agreements than with regard to any ordinary contract. In fact, arbitration 
laws and treaties deal only with formal validity, " exactly because the requirements of 
substantive validity of arbitration agreements are left to general contractual principles. 
The same must apply when determining whether an already existing arbitration 
agreement would bind a third party. The question here is, in effect, whether the minds 
of the third and the original parties actually met with regard to the arbitration 
agreements. The validity of the arbitration agreement must be determined 
independently for the third party. The same principles of contract law, applied for the 
conclusion of the arbitration agreement between the original parties, must also apply 
to determine whether the arbitration agreement has been "extended" to the third 
party. 56 An arbitration agreement, as is the case with any other contract, cannot bind a 
third party merely because it exists between two other parties. 57 
The question of whether a third party is bound by an arbitration agreement or not 
pertains to the existence or validity, rather than to the scope, of the arbitration 
agreement. It is a matter a whether an arbitration agreement between the third and the 
54 See Williston, On Contracts, (4t' ed), ed. R. Lord, (WestGroup 2001) para 57: 1; cf the US Supreme 
Court in Doctor's Associates v Casarotto, 116 S. Ct 1652,517 U. S. 681 (1996) that refused to apply 
the special limits on the validity of arbitration agreements imposed by Montana statute. which limits 
were not applicable to ordinary contracts in general. 
s' See for example, NY art. II(2). 
56 See D. Cohen, note in Cour de cassation, 5 Jan 1999, and Cour de cassation, 19 Oct 1999, (2000) 
Rev. Arb.. p. 92, rightly noting that the validity of a contract does not entail the extension of this 
contract. and. thus. arbitration agreements cannot contravene the general principles of contract law 
in this regard ("la validite d'une convention n'entraine pas sa transmission et on voit mal comment, 
de ce point de vue, la clause d'arbitrage pourrait defier a cc point la theorie generale des 
obligations"). 
Cf also Thomson-CSF v American Arbitration Assn, 64 F. 3d 773 (2d Cir. 1995) at 779. at 780: "A 
non-signatory may not be bound to arbitrate except as dictated by some accepted theory under 
agency or contract law". 
57 "Contrat de fait". 
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genuine parties validly exists, rather than whether the scope of an arbitration 
agreement between two parties covers a third party. General principles favouring 
arbitration and arbitration agreements apply to issues concerning the scope rather than 
the conclusion of arbitration agreements. 58 Therefore, there is no reason why consent 
of a third party should be dispensed with when an arbitration agreement already exists 
between two original parties. All the requirements of substantive validity of an 
arbitration agreement must be fully met with regard to the third party too. 
Therefore, it is concluded that intention of the third party to arbitrate is an 
indispensable requirement for an arbitration agreement to bind this third party. As the 
US 2nd Circuit characteristically observed in Thomson-CSF v American Arbitration 
Ass 'n: 
"a non-signatory [cannot] be bound to an arbitration agreement with a less than 
full showing of some articulable theory under contract or agency law. "" 
Neither the `intertwined' version of estoppel nor the argument for the `autonomous 
validity and effectiveness' of arbitration agreements explains why the fundamental 
requirement of consent of a third party can be dispensed with in the case of arbitration 
agreements as opposed to ordinary contracts. The above theories fail to explain why 
an arbitration agreement, even in an international context, should have such 
autonomous validity and effectiveness deviating from the principle of privity. 
Naturally, thus, the argument for the autonomous validity and effectiveness of 
arbitration agreements has been criticized. 60 Equally naturally, in recent years , 
61 there 
are signs that the US courts are becoming increasingly cautious in applying the 
intertwined version of equitable estoppel. 62 On some occasions lately, the US courts 
have refused to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel to bind a third party by an 
ss See McCarthy v% Azure, 22 F. 3d 351 (1st Cit. 1994), at 355 noting that the federal policy favoring 
arbitration applies to issues concerning the scope of an arbitration agreement entered into 
consensually by contracting parties; it does not serve to extend the reach of an arbitration provision 
to parties who never agreed to arbitrate in the first place. Thus, requiring that arbitration rest on a 
consensual foundation is wholly consistent with federal policy. 
59 Supra note, at 780. 
60 Fouchard. Gaillard and Goldman, supra n. 27 paras 481 and 505; see also D. Cohen. note in Cass 1e 
civ., June 11.1991, Orri iv Lubrifiants ElfAquitaine, (1992) Rev. Arb., p. 73. 
61 Especially after 2000. when International Paper i, Schwabedissen Maschinen & Anlagen Gmbh 206 
F. 3d 411 (4th Cir. 2000) was decided. 
62 J. M. Townsend, "Non-Signatories in International Arbitration: an American Perspective", paper in 
Conference of the International Council for Commercial Arbitration, Montreal 31 May-3 June 2006, 
p. 10. 
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arbitration agreement. Instead, they have emphasized the importance of the consent of 
the third party. 
For example, the 2nd Circuit in Merrill Lynch Investment Managers v Optibase, 63 
characteristically noted that: 
"it matters whether the party resisting arbitration is signatory or not"64 
In the same vein, the 1st Circuit in InterGen N. V. v Grina65 observed that: 
"the courts should be extremely cautious about forcing arbitration in situations 
in which the identity of the parties who have agreed to arbitrate is unclear"66 
6.2.4 The extension doctrines and the "writing requirement" 
Before concluding the discussion on the extension of arbitration agreements to non- 
signatories, a few remarks should be made with regard to the writing requirement for 
a valid arbitration agreement. As has already been explained, the thesis argues that for 
an arbitration agreement to bind a `third party', all the validity requirements for the 
arbitration agreement must be met with regard to this third party. This applies both to 
the formal and substantive requirements of arbitration agreements. There is no reason 
why the writing requirement should be relaxed with regard to the third party. As 
explained above, there are no convincing arguments to support the view that, once the 
arbitration agreement is formally concluded between two original parties, fewer 
validity requirements should be needed for this arbitration agreement to bind a third 
party. 67 Arbitration provisions providing for the writing form, 68 do not distinguish 
63 337 F. 3d 125 (2nd Cir. 2003). 
64 Jbid at 130. 
bs 344 F. 3d 134 (1st Cir 2003). 
66 Ibid at 143, quoting McCarthy v Azure, 22 F. 3d 351,354-55 (ist Cir. 1994) Cf also E. 1 Dupont dc 
Nemours & Co. v Rhone Poulenc & Resin Intermediaries (269 F. 3d 187,204 (3d Cir. 2001)) and 
Comer v Micor, 436 F. 3d 1098 (9th Circ. 2006) confirming that "a non-signatory cannot be bound to 
arbitrate unless it is bound under traditional principles of contract and agency law to be akin to a 
signatory of the underlying agreement". 
67 This was what the Swiss Federal Supreme Court held recently. In particular, in its decision of 16 
October 2003, X. S. A. L., 1'. S. A. L. and AvZ, SARL and ICC Arbitral Tribunal, CCI, BGE 129 III 
727. it held that the writing from is an one off requirement need not to be met with regard to the 
third party. The Swiss Supreme Court held that if the original parties have agreed in writing in the 
first place the non-signatory party may be added to this arbitration agreement without its signature: 
Swiss PILA art. 178(1) does not require that the writing form is met again for the non-signatory. J-F 
Poudret has critised the decision in "Note - Tribunal Federal, Ire Cour Civile, 16 octobre 2003, 
(4P. 115/2003); Un statut privilegie pour ]'arbitrage aux tiers? ", 2 (2004) 2 ASA Bulletin, p. 390. 
In the US cf the Fisser v Intr'1 Bank, 82 F. 2d 231 (2°d Cir. 1960), at 233: "Under Federal Arbitration 
Act a written provision in any maritime transaction to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter 
arising out of such transaction is the sine qua non of enforceable arbitration agreement, but it does 
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between the case where arbitration agreements are concluded for the first time and the 
case where they are "extended" to a third party once they have already been validly 
concluded. 
A relatively recent ICC award stated: 
"We note that when it is alleged, as here, that a non-signatory intended and 
consented to be a party to the arbitration agreement, then that intention or 
consent must be evidenced in writing"69 
After pointing out that the fact that the non-signatory did not sign the contract is 
evidence of the fact that it did not intend to commit itself either to the substantive or 
to the arbitration agreement, the tribunal concluded: 
"No documents were produced from which it could be established: 
" the existence of a written proposal to arbitrate from one party and a 
written acceptance communicated to the other Party; or 
" an express acceptance by Respondent of the arbitration clause 
contained in Article 17 of the contract or; 
" any arbitration agreement signed by [Claimant] and [Respondent] or 
contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams between [Claimant] 
and [Respondent] or in other written communications, made in 
accordance with the formal requirements provided for by Art. 178.1 
PILA. 
This conclusion is sufficient for this Tribunal to decline its jurisdiction"70 
This does not mean that the thesis supports that arbitration agreement should be 
required to be concluded in a writing form. On the contrary, the thesis shares the 
mounting criticism in the literature and caselaw of the writing requirement. 7' Strict 
formal requirements for arbitration agreements have become, in the context of 
not follow that under the Act an obligation to arbitrate attaches only to one who has personally 
signed written arbitration provision". 
6S See for example. NY Convention art. 11(2). Model Law art. 7(2), Swiss PILA art. 178(1). 
69 ICC case no 10758 of 2000,16 (2005) 2 ICC Bull., p. 92 at para 24. 
70 Ibid. para 25. The same in Partial Award in case 10818 of 2001,16 (2005) 2 ICC Bull., p. 94. 
71 See Lew, Mistelis and Kroell. supra n. 28, para. 7-7 et seq. Shpere Drake Insurance r Marine 
Towing, 16 F3d 666 (5`" Circ 1994), or. Swiss Tribunal Federal, 16 January 1995, Compagnie de 
Navigation et Transport v MSC (1996) XXI YBCA 690. 
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contemporary international commerce, increasingly difficult to justify. 72 Therefore, 
the writing requirement should be liberally construed. This, however, should apply 
equally when the courts and tribunals examine whether an arbitration agreement 
exists between the two original parties, and when they examine whether an arbitration 
agreement binds a `third party'. 73 The debate on the writing requirement is not 
relevant to discussion on `arbitration agreements and third parties'. 
From a contractual point of view, there is no way to dispense with the writing 
requirement: an arbitration agreement, as any other contractual agreement, will bind a 
`third party' only if both formal and substantive requirements of validity are fully met. 
That is why tribunals on many occasions have objected to the `group of companies' 
doctrine on grounds of formal validity. 74 As the thesis explains in the next part, the 
writing requirement can be addressed in a more consistent way under a `jurisdictional 
approach' to the issue of arbitration agreements and third parties. 
6.3 CONCLUSIONS ON THE EXTENSION DOCTRINES AND THE CONTRACTUAL 
APPROACH 
In the light of the above discussion, it can be concluded that the main weakness of 
the extension doctrines is the fact that, although they aim to apply to arbitration, they 
are not underpinned by rationale relating to arbitration in particular. 
More specifically, the `extension doctrines' based on consent fail to explain why 
consent of non-signatories to arbitrate should be more easily ascertained with regard 
72 See N. Kaplan, "Is the Need for Writing as Expressed in the New York Convention and the Model 
Law out of Step with Commercial Practice? ", (1996) 12 Arb. Int. p. 27. 
Cf ICC case no. 6769 of 1991, (1992) JDI (Clunet), p. 1019 with note Y. Derains. 
73 See J-F Poudret "Note - Tribunal Federal, Ire Cour Civile, 16 octobre 2003, (4P. 115/2003); Un statut 
privilegie pour F arbitrage aux tiers? ", 2 (2004) 2 ASA Bulletin, p. 390. 
74 Note, however, that there have been tribunals and national courts that have opposed to the 'group of 
companies' doctrine on the grounds that the formal requirement was not met with regard to the non- 
signatory. This would be particularly the case when the lex arbitri or the lexfori expressly provides 
for a writing requirement; see Partial Award in the ICC case no. 4402 of 1983, (1984) IX Yearbook 
Commercial Arbitration, P. Sanders (ed. ), p. 138: here, the seat of tribunal was in Geneva 
(Switzerland); the Canton of Geneva has ratified the Swiss Intercantonal Arbitration Convention; 
article 6 of this Convention is mandatory and provides for a written document containing an 
arbitration clause. This written document has to fulfill the requirements of article 13 ss. of the Swiss 
Code of Obligations. If those are not complied with, a party may not be forced to submit a dispute to 
an arbitral tribunal. 
Cf also the Interim Award in the ICC case no. 4505 in 1985 and 1986, (1986) 113 JDI (Clunet). p. 
1118: ICC Arbitral Awards 1986-1990 (Y. Derains, S. Jarvin and J. J. Arnaldez), p. 279. 
Mustill and Boyd argue that in case the writing requirement is not satisfied the award resulting out 
of the arbitration, would not be enforceable. neither under the EAA ss 66 or 100 nor under the NY 
Convention, see Mustill and Boyd, Commercial Arbitration, 2001 Companion (Butterworths. 2001), 
p. 149. 
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to arbitration agreements than with regard to any other contract. Equally, the 
versions of `extension doctrines', deviating from the requirement of consent fail to 
explain why arbitration agreements, as opposed to ordinary contracts, may dispense 
with the requirement of consent or the principle of privity. 
Accordingly, all versions of `extension doctrines' fail to explain why they should 
apply only to arbitration agreements and not to jurisdiction agreements. 
75 What is the 
difference between an arbitration agreement and any other jurisdiction agreement in 
this respect? 76 Why should the well-established rule of legal independence of the 
several companies in the same group be abandoned in the context of arbitration in 
particular? 
The failure of the extension doctrines to provide answers to the above questions can 
be explained by the fact that they focus only on the contractual characteristics of 
arbitration agreements. In the context of extension doctrines and the contractual 
approach in general, the discussion is limited to `consent' or to the law applicable to 
determine the validity of arbitration agreements. However, from a contractual point of 
view, arbitration agreements have clear constraints: only those parties that have 
consented to arbitration may be bound by arbitration agreements. Moreover, consent 
of the parties has to be deduced in the same way as in any other contract. Any 
exception to these rules is exclusively provided by general principles of contract law. 
However, the latter provides for no exception from the principle of privity in relation 
to arbitration agreements as opposed to any other ordinary contract. No exception is 
provided either from the general contract interpretation principles applied to deduce 
or consent, which exception would allow consent to arbitration agreements to be 
ascertained more easily than in any other agreement. Therefore, the contractual 
See Dayhoff v H. J. Heinz Co, 86 F. 3d 1287 (3`a Circ. 1996), where the Third Circuit, held that an 
arbitration agreement cannot be extended to a third party on the grounds that the third party has 
close corporate links with a signatory party to the arbitration agreement. at 1297-98: "We also point 
out that Heinz Italia and H. J. Heinz Co should not by reason of their corporate relationship with 
Heinz Dolciaria be able to invoke the arbitration and forum selection clauses. for there is no more 
reason to disregard the corporate structure with respect to such claims as there would be to 
disregard it with respect to other legal matters" (emphasis added). Heinz Italia was the parent 
corporation of Heinz Dolciaria and, in turn, was a subsidiary of H. J. Heinz Co. At the end. it was 
held that the "third party" was bound by the arbitration agreement on contract law principles: in 
particular. it was held that the "third party" was as successor in interest to one of the original parties 
to the arbitration agreement in question. 
76 Cf the Supreme Court in Scherk v Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U. S. 506,519.94 S. Ct. 2449.2457,41 
L. Ed. 2d 270 (1974) that classified an agreement to arbitrate before a specified tribunal as "a 
specialized kind of forum-selection clause". 
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approach to the issue of arbitration agreements and third parties is constrained by the 
limitations of arbitration agreements as ordinary contacts. 
A jurisdictional approach is lacking. Arbitration agreements have important 
jurisdictional effects. Arbitration law is not, and should not be viewed merely as an 
advanced version of contract law. Arbitration has significant jurisdictional 
implications that go beyond the contractual origins of arbitration. Focusing 
exclusively on the contractual nature of arbitration agreements obscures the real issue 
here, which is whether arbitration agreements may have any jurisdictional 
implications vis-ä-vis `third parties'. The focus should be on whether arbitral 
tribunals may assume jurisdiction over third parties and if so, under what 
circumstances. 
In this jurisdictional context, the consensual character of arbitration agreements 
clearly remains relevant: an arbitration agreement outlines the jurisdictional basis of 
an arbitral tribunal. However, as the next part will show, in order to determine the full 
spectrum of jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal, discussion should not be limited to the 
scope of an arbitration agreement. There are important jurisdictional considerations 
that should also be taken into account in the discussion of arbitration and third parties. 
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PART III: THE SUGGESTION FOR A JURISDICTIONAL APPROACH TO 
THE ISSUE OF THIRD PARTIES AND ARBITRATION 
The thesis in Part II offered a detailed account of the contractual approach and 
extension doctrines in particular. Chapter 6 demonstrated the conceptual and practical 
limitations of extension doctrines and concluded that the contractual approach cannot 
deal satisfactorily with the problems relating to the issue of third parties in arbitration. 
From a strict contractual viewpoint, arbitration agreements as any other ordinary 
contract have inherent constrains: they bind only those persons that have clearly 
consented thereto. In this contractual context, consent is the indispensable 
requirement for a person to be bound by an agreement, and it can neither be 
substituted nor presumed. Otherwise, fundamental principles of contract law and 
contract interpretation would be violated. 
Part III puts forward the main suggestion of the thesis. It argues for the substitution 
of the contractual with a jurisdictional approach to the issue of arbitration and third 
parties. In particular, the main argument, here, is that the issue of third parties in 
arbitration can be better addressed, if the focus is shifted from the contractual nature 
of arbitration agreements to their jurisdictional effects. Arbitration agreements differ 
from any other substantive contract in that they have significant jurisdictional effects. 
It is suggested that the discussion should be focused on the dispute pending before the 
tribunal and on any implications the dispute may have for third parties, rather than on 
the requirement of consent to arbitration agreements, as is the case with the prevailing 
contractual approach. 
More specifically, Chapter 7 presents in detail the conceptual premises of the 
suggested jurisdictional approach. Necessary corollary of the jurisdictional approach 
is the concept of effective arbitral jurisdiction, according to which a tribunal should 
be able to assume as much jurisdiction as is necessary for the tribunal to achieve its 
main goal, namely the resolution of the pending dispute. Therefore, the pending 
dispute should play a key role for the determination of the jurisdiction of a tribunal. 
As is argued here, a tribunal in order to assert its jurisdiction should not only examine 
the scope of an arbitration agreement but it should also take into account the full 
implications of the dispute pending before it. This is particularly necessary when third 
parties to an arbitration agreement are integral part of the dispute pending before the 
I' , 
tribunal. Indeed, as will be demonstrated, when the pending dispute necessary 
implicates third parties, arbitration agreements may produce jurisdictional effects that 
stretch beyond their contractual boundaries and the genuine parties thereto. In fact, it 
is argued here, arbitration agreements may have collateral jurisdictional effects on 
persons never consented thereto, i. e. third parties. 
Since tribunals should be able to assume as much jurisdiction as is necessary for 
them to resolve the pending dispute and since arbitration agreements may stretch 
beyond their contractual origins, the thesis argues that it is possible for a tribunal to 
assume extra-contractual jurisdiction. As will be particularly emphasised, it is only in 
extremely exceptional circumstances and with particular caution that a tribunal 
should assume extra-contractual jurisdiction. However, the aim of Chapter 7 is to 
demonstrate that as a matter of principle extra-contractual jurisdiction is not 
incompatible with arbitration. 
The argument for extra-contractual jurisdiction and the jurisdictional approach, in 
general, is exemplified first, by reference to the extra-contractual lis pendens effect of 
arbitration agreements which as been repeatedly accepted by case-law (section 7.1.1). 
Secondly, by a cautious analogy to the extra-territorial jurisdiction assumed under 
certain circumstances by national courts (section 7.1.2). 
As is explained in this chapter, tribunals may assume extra-contractual jurisdiction 
over third parties by applying third party-mechanisms, such as joinder, interpleading, 
intervention or consolidation. 
While Chapter 7 establishes that as a matter of principle and under exceptional 
circumstances, a tribunal may assume extra-contractual jurisdiction over third parties 
and apply third-party mechanisms, Chapter 8 addresses some equally important 
issues: first, it examines whether a tribunal should assume extra-contractual 
jurisdiction and apply third-party mechanisms. Here, the thesis embarks on a policy- 
oriented analysis, which will show that third-party mechanisms are necessary in the 
context of international arbitration. There are important policy reasons suggesting that 
arbitration despite its contractual basis should not remain a closed system, reserved 
only for the parties that have agreed to an arbitration agreement. Instead arbitration 
should be a dispute resolution system, which -under particular circumstances- should 
be open to relevant third parties. A procedural system of communication between 
genuine and third parties should be established in arbitration. 
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Secondly, it explores the rationale behind third party mechanisms in general: what 
purposes do they serve and how do they operate. The exploration of this question 
takes place against a comparative background of several national and regional 
procedural systems. It is suggested that the key-element for third-party mechanisms is 
the pending dispute and the implications of this dispute for third parties in terms of 
substantive liability and interests. 
In particular, it will be shown that the extent to which a third party may participate 
in the proceedings between two original parties is directly relevant to the degree of 
association between the third party and one of the original parties, in terms of 
substantive liability and interests. Here, the rule is, the closer the substantive 
association between the original and the third party, the more effective are the third 
party mechanisms provided by procedural systems. More specifically, third-party 
mechanisms of compulsory character are provided when the third party and the 
original parties are strongly associated in substantive terms, whereas third-party 
mechanisms of permissive character are provided when the third party and the 
original parties are contractually interrelated but not strongly associated in 
substantive terms. 
The above analysis puts the discussion on arbitration and third parties in a wider 
comparative context. More importantly though, the outcome of this analysis will used 
in Chapters 9 and 10 as policy guidelines in order for the thesis to determine the 
general conditions required for a tribunal to assume extra-contractual jurisdiction and 
apply third-party mechanisms. Thus, the findings on the rationale behind third-party 
mechanisms in general will be applied to arbitration against the backdrop of the 
particular principles prevailing in arbitration and, in particular, the principle of 
procedural party autonomy. More specifically, Chapter 9 and 10 examine whether 
third-party mechanisms are compatible or not with the widely accepted freedom of 
the parties to determine the forum and the procedures for the resolution of their 
disputes in the way it best serves their commercial interests. It should be noted that 
the analysis here is also taken from a jurisdictional viewpoint. Thus, third-party 
mechanisms are tested against the principle of procedural party autonomy in terms of 
"jurisdictional intensity". 
In particular, Chapter 9 demonstrates that in the majority of the cases the principle 
of procedural party autonomy should prevail, rendering third-party mechanisms 
inapplicable to arbitration. It is argued here that the right of the parties to arrange for a 
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scheme of several bi-lateral procedures rather than providing for third-party 
mechanisms should be upheld by courts and tribunals, even if this scheme would 
result to the jurisdictional fragmentation of the multiparty contractual relationship. 
Jurisdictional fragmentation, despite its unfavourable consequences, should be 
accepted as a legitimate repercussion of procedural party autonomy. 
However, Chapter 10 argues that there are exceptional circumstances where third- 
party mechanisms should take precedence over procedural party autonomy. It is 
suggested that this should happen whenever third parties are strongly interrelated with 
the genuine parties to the arbitration agreement, so that third and genuine parties are 
co-liable or co-holders of rights and duties. This will typically be the case regarding 
false third parties of the first group, as defined in Chapter 2. As will be demonstrated, 
in such a case the several parties (third and genuine) constitute an inseparable unit in 
terms of jurisdiction. This jurisdictional unit, due to the strong substantive 
interrelations of the several parties, should not be separated and, therefore, it should 
prevail over the scheme of several bilateral dispute resolution agreements between the 
several parties. Accordingly, a tribunal should be able to assume jurisdiction over the 
whole jurisdictional unit, of the several genuine and third parties. 
Chapter 11 makes the final remarks on the jurisdictional approach and discusses its 
practical relevance and advantages over the contractual approach. 
The discussion on arbitration and third parties would have been incomplete 
without looking into the effect that arbitral awards may produce on third parties. 
Thus, in Chapter 12, the attention is shifted from arbitration agreements to arbitral 
awards. Here, it is argued that arbitral awards should produce a third-party effect, 
affecting a wider circle of third parties than just the parties to the proceedings and 
their privies. The suggestion lying behind this argument is that the problems arising 
out of multiparty situations may be addressed more effectively by a arbitral award 
than by an arbitration agreement. 
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CHAPTER 7: THE CONCEPTUAL PREMISES OF THE JURISDICTIONAL 
APPROACH: EFFECTIVE ARBITRAL JURISDICTION AND EXTRA- 
CONTRACTUAL JURISDICTION 
Extension doctrines largely view arbitration agreements as ordinary contracts. 
Undisputedly, arbitration agreements have contractual origins. Contract law provides 
for the same requirements for their valid conclusion as for any other substantive 
contract. However, arbitration agreements may extend beyond their contractual 
origins. They have important jurisdictional effects. Arbitration law is not, and should 
not be viewed merely as an advanced version of contract law. It is predominately 
related to jurisdictional issues. Accordingly, arbitration agreements differ from 
ordinary contracts in that they provide tribunals with significant jurisdictional powers. 
These jurisdictional powers are necessary for a tribunal to achieve its primary goal: 
the resolution of the dispute at hand. ' Therefore, in order to achieve its primary goal, a 
tribunal should be able to assume as much jurisdiction as necessary to resolve the 
dispute effectively (the effective arbitral jurisdiction). 
Therefore, as soon as a dispute, which falls under the scope of an arbitration 
agreement, arises the jurisdictional effects of that arbitration agreement take effect. 
An arbitration agreement provides a tribunal with the necessary power to determine 
the pending dispute. However, nonetheless, the jurisdiction assumed by a tribunal has 
repercussions that stretch beyond the contractual constrains of an arbitration 
agreement and the parties that originally concluded this agreement. This can be 
exemplified by the following: 
Cf EAA s. 1(a): "the object of the arbitration is to obtain the fair resolution of disputes... " (emphasis 
added). 
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First, once a tribunal is constituted, its judicial powers are determined by a network 
of national and international provisions in wider terms than is provided in the 
arbitration agreement. 2 These national and international provisions provide tribunals 
with jurisdiction that is to a great extent similar to the jurisdiction assumed by 
national courts. For example, US Federal Arbitration Act s. 7 provides that: 
"the arbitrators [... ] may summon in writing any person to attend before them 
or any of them as a witness and in a proper case to bring with him or them any 
book, record, document, or paper which may be deemed material as evidence 
in the case. [... ]. Said summons shall issue in the name of the arbitrator or 
arbitrators, or a majority of them and shall be signed by the arbitrators, or a 
majority of them, and shall be directed to the said person and shall be served in 
the same manner as subpoenas to appear and testify before the court". 3 
A tribunal may also appoint experts or legal advisers. ' These powers come as a 
corollary of the judicial role assumed by an arbitral tribunal, and are necessary for the 
latter to resolve the dispute. 
Secondly, an arbitral award is enforced as a national judgment rather than as a 
contract. This fact reflects the public character of the judicial mandate assumed by a 
tribunal. In other words, an arbitral award comes as a corollary of the jurisdictional 
power that a tribunal has to determine a dispute in an authoritative way. Hence, an 
arbitral award is vested with the power of res judicata. s 
Thirdly, and most importantly, the lis pendens effect of a dispute covered by an 
arbitration agreement goes beyond the circle of the parties that have concluded the 
arbitration agreement. This can be demonstrated from the following. 
2 See for example EAA s. 33 et seq. and in particular ss. 34,37,38,39,41; cf also Model Law art. 19 et 
seq. 
Cf also EAA s. 38. 
4 See for example EAA s. 37. 
' See Restatement (Second) Judgements. (1982), para. 84; in England see Fidelitas Shipping Ltd v V/O 
Exportchleb, [1965] 1 Lloyd's Rep 13; Merkin. Arbitration Law, (LLP London) para. 16.116. In 
France see NCPC art. 1476 (for domestic arbitration) and art. 1500 (for international), see also Cass. 
Soc. 19 March 1981, (1982) Rev Arb., 44; in the Netherlands Arbitration Act 1986, art. 1059; in the 
Belgian Judicial Code art. 1703(1), in the new Ausrtian CCP s. 607; cf also the Hong-Kong 
Arbitration Ordinance, ss. 2GG (applicable to both domestic and international arbitration), 4013.21 
(domestic only) and 42 (international only). 
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7.1 THE EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL LIS PENDENS EFFECT OF ARBITRATION 
AGREEMENTS IN THE CONTEXT OF MULTIPARTY RELATIONSHIPS 
Enforcement of arbitration agreements is secured by a coherent framework of 
international and national provisions. Thus, by reference to provisions such as the 
New York Convention art. I1(3), the English Arbitration Act 1996 s. 9 or the Model 
Law art. 8, national courts will normally safeguard the exclusive jurisdiction of a 
tribunal, by preventing a party to an arbitration agreement from bringing an action in 
respect of a matter falling under the jurisdiction of a tribunal. 6 However, as their 
wording indicates, the above provisions apply only to genuine parties to an arbitration 
agreement, i. e. persons that are contractually bound by an arbitration agreement. 7 The 
scope of their application does not cover third parties. 8 
Nonetheless, as will be shown, national courts have on several occasions stayed 
proceedings between a party to an arbitration agreement and a third party, on the 
ground that the action was inextricably involved with the subject matter of the 
arbitration agreement in question. Normally, national courts would have jurisdiction 
over a party not bound by an arbitration agreement. However, national courts have 
shown considerable reluctance to examine a dispute involving a third party to an 
arbitration agreement, when this dispute is intertwined with the subject matter of that 
arbitration agreement. National courts would not risk pre-empting the dispute between 
the two genuine parties to an arbitration agreement. In other words, they would not 
risk frustrating the exclusive jurisdiction of a tribunal over this particular dispute. In a 
case like the above, it is the jurisdiction rather than the contractual effect of an 
arbitration agreement that prevents the national courts from examining a dispute 
involving a third party. Ordinary contracts between two parties cannot prevent third 
6 Unless the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed. 
See British Columbia Court of Appeal, Canada, 10 March 2002, published in CLOUT case No. 31; 
British Columbia Supreme Court, Canada, 31 January 1996, published in CLOUT case No. 178; 
Nanhai West Shipping Co. v Hong Kong United Dockyards Ltd, 11 December 1996, (unpublished) 
available at http: i%www. lexis. coni. The same M. Mustill and S. Boyd, Commercial Arbitration, (2nd 
ed.. Butterworths London-Edinburgh 1989 and 2001 Companion) p. 471; cf also the wording of the 
provisions: NY, art 11(3) "... in a matter in respect of which the parties have made an agreement ... 
"; 
EAA s. 9(1) "A party to an arbitration agreement... "; Swiss PILA art. 7 "if the parties have 
concluded an arbitration agreement... " (emphasis added). 
Although EAA s. 82 provides that "a party to an arbitration agreement includes any person claiming 
under or through a partly to the agreement", the phrase "person claiming under or through a party" 
is generally construed quite narrowly, applying for examples to assignees, but excluding persons 
such as guarantors from being treated as parties to the arbitration agreement, see R. Merkin, 
Arbitration Law, (Lloyd's London 1991), para. 1.37. 
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parties from exercising their own rights and claims. It is reasonable to argue that, once 
the dispute arises, an arbitration agreement may have jurisdictional effects that 
stretch beyond the parties to that arbitration agreement. In fact, it may have a 
collateral effect on third parties. This will apply particularly to false third parties, i. e. 
third parties with an interest in the dispute between the two genuine parties to the 
arbitration agreement. 
For example, in Morrie Mages v Thrifty Corporation, 9 a creditor filed a suit 
against a guarantor to recover on the guarantee agreement. The guarantor moved for a 
stay of the court proceedings pending the outcome of the arbitration between the 
creditor and the debtor, although the guarantor was not a party to the arbitration 
agreement binding the creditor and the debtor. While the district court denied the 
motion and proceeded with the merits of the dispute, the seventh Circuit overturned 
the decision of the district court decision and granted the stay. The seventh Circuit 
made clear that the guarantor was not bound by the arbitration agreement including in 
the main contract between the creditor and the debtor. The stay was not granted 
because the guarantor was a party to the arbitration agreement: 
"Thrifty's [the guarantor] alternative claim that it is entitled to a stay because it 
is a party to the arbitration agreement is belied by the record. The Guaranty 
does not contain an arbitration clause and does not incorporate the arbitration 
provision of the Agreement between the Mages [creditor] and MC [debtor]"10 
Nevertheless, the court noted that it had a discretionary power to grant the stay, 
because a decision of the court on whether the guarantor was liable against the 
creditor, would pre-empt the decision of the tribunal on whether the debtor was liable 
or not. In other words, it would frustrate the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunal. 
The court explained that: 
"Under the plain language of the contract as a whole, Thrifty's [the guarantor] 
indisputable absolute liability does not arise until an arbitrator resolves the 
issues of whether MC [debtor] defaulted". ii[] 
"The claim in this case requires a showing of liability against MC, an 
undisputed party to the arbitration agreement, as a predicate to recovery 
916 F. 2d 402 (7th Cir. 1990). 
10 Ibid, at 406 note 1. 
Ibid, at 407. 
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against Thrifty, a disputed party to the arbitration agreement. [... ] The amount 
of Thrifty's liability under the Guaranty (if indeed Thrifty is liable) is 
coterminous with the amount of MC's liability under the Note and Agreement 
[... ] The resolution of the issue of whether Thrifty is liable under the Guaranty 
and the extent of such liability is, thus, completely dependent upon the 
arbitrable issues of the fact and extent of MC's liability" 12 
The Court cited McCowan v Sears, Roebuck and Co. 13: 
"Although fashioned as two separate lawsuits, there is in reality a single 
"controversy" at issue[... ]. " 
the court concluded that the surety is entitled to a stay of the litigation 
"regardless of its status as a party to the arbitration agreement. " 
Otherwise, according to the Court, there would be: 
"a potential for impairment of the issues before the arbitrator due to the 
collateral estoppel effect of the Mages -Thrifty litigation. " 
In Hill, Grimes and Canatxx Energy Ventures vGE Power Systems et al., 14 an 
energy company and a project developer entered into a contract, containing an 
arbitration agreement. Pending arbitration between the two of them, the former filed a 
suit before the US courts against the latter and another company (the lender) that had 
secured the finance of the project. Both defendants applied for a stay of the court 
proceedings on the basis of the pending arbitration, although the lender was neither a 
party to the arbitration agreement nor the arbitration proceedings. 
The Second Circuit held that the claim against the lender was inherently 
inseparable from the claim against the project developer in the main agreement, which 
contained arbitration clause, and, consequently, the court proceedings should be 
stayed even though the lender was not a party to the arbitration agreement. " 
The court was reluctant to determine part of the dispute that was pending in 
arbitration and noted that the stay must be granted whenever 
12 Ideen 
i 908 F. 2d 1099,1106 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied. 498 U. S. 897,111 S. Ct. 250.112 L. Ed. 2d 209 
(1990), at 1106. 
14 282 F. 3d 343 (5th Cir. 2002). 
's The same was held in Subway Equipment Leasing Corp. v Forte. 169 F. 3d 324 (5th Cir. 1999) and in 
Harvey v Jovice 199 F. 3d 790 (5th Cir. 2000). 
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"the determination of factual and legal issues related to the claims brought 
against the non-signatories [... ] would be the subject of an arbitration 
proceeding between signatories to the arbitration agreement". 16 
US courts held similarly in two cases in the context of group of companies. 
First, in Dale Metals v KIWA, 17 a US company and a Japanese manufacturer 
entered into a sales agreement, containing an arbitration agreement. Pending 
arbitration proceedings between the US and the Japanese party, the former alongside 
with its parent company filed a lawsuit before the US courts against the Japanese 
manufacturer and its two US distributors. The defendants applied for a stay on the 
basis of the pending arbitration between the US subsidiary and the Japanese 
manufacturer. Although not all parties in litigation were parties to the arbitration 
agreement or to the arbitral proceedings, the District Court of New York granted the 
stay. The court observed: 
"In short, it is fair to say that in an arbitration proceeding between [the parties 
to the arbitration agreement], every issue that is raised here [under the court 
proceedings] will be vigorously pressed. In such circumstances a stay is 
appropriate even though it affects parties who are not bound to arbitrate"18 
(emphasis added). 
Secondly, in Lawson v Akzona, 19 a dispute arose out of a sale agreement, 
containing an arbitration agreement. Pending arbitration proceedings between the 
parties (Lawson and Blanchard) to the sale agreement over whether the goods sold 
were of the contractual standards, the claimant filed a suit before courts against the 
respondent in the arbitration proceedings and its parent company, on the basis of 
fraud and misrepresentation. The second defendant (parent company) was not a party 
to the sales agreement or the arbitration agreement included therein. Nonetheless, the 
court stayed its proceedings with regard to both defendants by reference to the 
arbitration agreement and the dispute pending before the tribunal. 
The court noticed: 
16 Supra n. 12. at 347. 
17 442 F. Supp. 78 (SDNY 1977). 
's Ibid. at 81. 
14 355 F. Supp. 1146 (S. D. N. Y. ). affd 486 F. 2d 1394 (2d Cir. 1973). 
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"The claims against Akzona [the parent company of the respondent to the 
arbitration] basically involve the allegation that it conspired with and 
encouraged Blanchard to deliver improper, mislabelled goods in order to 
defraud Lawson. The decision of the arbitration as to whether, in fact, Lawson 
has been defrauded will inevitably decide whether non-conforming and 
mislabelled goods were delivered, and, thus, will at least partially determine 
the issues which form the basis of the claim against Akzona. If the arbitration 
finds no mislabelling or misrepresentation, then the claims of plaintiffs against 
Akzona will also be repudiated. "20 
The court made clear that it indented to preserve the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
arbitral tribunal to resolve the dispute by extending the stay to persons that were not 
parties to the arbitration agreement. 
"Lastly, we agree with the statement made by Judge Coffin of the First Circuit 
in Hilti, Inc. 1v Oldach, 392 F. 2d 368 (1968), where he said: `If arbitration ... 
could be foreclosed simply by adding as a defendant a person not a party to an 
arbitration agreement, the utility of such agreements would be seriously 
compromised. ' If this Court were to allow Lawson to prevent the arbitration of 
these issues by the naming of Akzona as a party to this action, the Federal 
policy in favour of arbitration would be thwarted"2' 
Similar decisions of US courts can be found in the context of construction disputes, 
where proceedings between a sub-contractor and the surety of the main contractor on 
its payment bond have been stayed, pending arbitration between the contractor and 
the sub-contractor. 22 
In the same vein, courts in other jurisdictions have stayed court proceedings 
initiated by or against third parties to arbitration agreements. In England, in Reichhold 
Norway A. S. A. and another v. Goldman Sachs International, 23 the defendants had 
been engaged as agents by a Norwegian company to advise in and negotiate the sale 
of one of its subsidiaries to the claimants. The sale was concluded between the 
20 Ibid, at 1151. 
21 Idem. 
22 See United States v Continental Casualty. 214 F. Supp. 947 (U. S. Dist. 1963) and in J&S 
Construction v Travellers Indemnity Company. 520 F. 2d 809 (U. S. App. 1975), Warren Bros. v 
Cardi Corp., 471 F. 2d 1304 (ist Cir. 1973). 
23 [2000] 1 W. L. R. 173. 
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claimants and the Norwegian company. It contained an arbitration agreement 
providing for arbitration in Norway. The claimants began an action in England against 
the defendants, claiming damages for negligent misstatement, and then commenced 
arbitration proceedings in Norway against the seller Norwegian company. The 
defendants, although not bound by the arbitration agreement, asked for a stay of the 
court proceedings, pending arbitration between the claimants and the sellers. The 
Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the High court to grant the stay exercising its 
inherent jurisdiction. 24 This sort of inherent jurisdiction of the court to stay 
proceedings between a genuine and a false third party has been recognised in other 
cases too. 25 
In Singapore, the High Court, granted a stay of the court proceedings between a 
project developer and an architect, pending arbitration between the architect and a 
contractor with regard to disputes concerning the same construction project, although 
the project developer was not a party to the arbitration agreement. 26 
7.2 NATIONAL COURTS AND EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION: THE 
CASE FOR APPLICATION BY ANALOGY IN THE CONTEXT OF 
ARBITRATION 
By analogy, the jurisdictional approach and the extra-contractual jurisdiction of 
arbitral tribunals, suggested here, find further support in the "extra-territorial 
jurisdiction" assumed, under certain circumstances, by national courts. As a general 
rule, jurisdiction in the context of national litigation is determined on a territorial 
basis. More specifically, national courts of a particular state will assume jurisdiction 
over a defendant that is resident, domiciled or present within the geographical 
24 Preserved by section 49(3) of the Supreme Court Act 1981. 
25 See for example McAlpine Construction v Unex, [1994] 38 Con LR 63 (CA); Mabey and Johnson 
Ltd v Jonathan Laszlo Danos, Barr' Joyce, Dervck A Gibson Ltd, Deryck Gibson [2007] EWHC 
1094 (Ch), although in these cases. on the basis of the specific facts the stay was not granted at the 
end. 
26 31 August 2005, Yee Hong Pte Ltd i' Tan Chice Hec, Andrew and Ho Bee Development Pte Ltd, 
published in Lawnet - Singapore Court Judgments, reproduced in www. Kluwerarbiti-ation. com (last 
visited 16 June 2007). It should be noted however, that the court held that a project developer should 
be understood as a person claiming through or under an architect who was a parry to the arbitration 
agreement with the contractor, provided in s. 6 (5) of the Arbitration Act of Singapore. This is an 
unusually wide meaning, to the term "person claiming through or under a party to an arbitration 
agreement"; cf the very narrow construction generally accepted with regard to the same term in 
EAA. see supra n. 8. 
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boundaries of that state. 27 Whenever a dispute involves several persons, national 
courts may assume jurisdiction over all these persons by virtue of multiparty 
mechanisms provided in their national laws. When all the several persons domicile in 
the territory of a single state, national courts of that state will have no difficulty to 
assume jurisdiction over them on the basis of the rule of territorial jurisdiction. 
However, there might be that some of the persons, considered necessary for the 
resolution of the pending dispute, are not linked in territorial terms with the state of 
the national courts exclusively seised of that dispute. In such cases, it is accepted that 
national courts may exercise extra-territorial jurisdiction over those persons, whose 
presence in the proceedings is considered necessary, even though they have no 
domicile, residence or presence in the state of these national courts. 
For example, in England courts have assumed overseas jurisdiction on many 
occasions. 28 In particular, extra-territorial jurisdiction may be assumed by virtue of 
CPR 6.20, entitled "Service out of the jurisdiction where the permission of the court is 
required". Rule 6.20(3) and (3A) read: 
"[... ] a claim form may be served out of the jurisdiction with the permission of 
the court if- 
[... ] (3) a claim is made against someone on whom the claim form has 
been or will be served (otherwise than in reliance on this paragraph) and- 
(a) there is between the claimant and that person a real issue which it is 
reasonable for the court to try; and 
27 See for example French NCPC art. 42, or European Regulation 44/2001 art. 2, under which the 
domicile of the defendant will be the relevant criterion for the courts to determine their jurisdiction. 
In England, under the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 Part II section I art. 2 jurisdiction 
will also be determined in accordance with the domicile of the defendant, whereas under common 
law presence can also be used as a factor to establish jurisdiction, see John Russell and Co Ltd i, 
Cayzer, Irvine and Co [1916] 2 AC 298, HL; cf also Restatement of Judgments (second): para 4 
"The relevance of territorial boundaries to the exercise of jurisdiction by states within the federal 
union, and by courts of this country within the international community, arises from the fact that the 
states and nations are defined as political and legal entities in terms of their geographical 
boundaries. Since these entities are legally defined in terms of geographical place, the geographical 
location of a transaction is significant in determining whether a court of such an entity may properly 
exercise jurisdiction in a particular controversy". 
28 United Film Distribution Ltd i, Chhabria [2001] EWCA Civ 416 [2001] 2 All E. R. (Comm) 865 
(CA); Barings Plc (in Administration) r Coopers & Lybrand, [1997] I. L. Pr. 12; Petroleo Brasiliero 
SA v Mellitus Shipping Inc (The Baltic Flame). [2001] EWCA Civ 418; [2001] 1 All E. R. (Comm) 
993 (CA). See also Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, (5`h ed Oxford 1998) 
p. 301, calling for extra-territorial jurisdiction of national courts for companies that belong to the 
same group of companies. 
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(b) the claimant wishes to serve the claim form on another person who is a 
necessary or proper party to that claim; 
(3A) a claim is a Part 20 claim and the person to be served is a necessary or 
proper party to the claim against the Part 20 claimant" (emphasis added)29 
Similarly, courts in the US30 and other common law jurisdictions have also 
asserted extra-territorial jurisdiction over foreign companies. 31 
Thus, for example, in Frummer v Hilton Hotels International, Inc., 32 where New 
York Courts assumed jurisdiction over Hilton Inc., a company incorporated in 
England. 33 The court noted: 
"We are not unmindful that litigation in a foreign jurisdiction is a burdensome 
inconvenience for any company. However, it is part of the price which may 
29 CPR 6.20(3) replaced the similar Ord. 11 r. l(1)(c) of the 1965 Rules. 
3o See for example cases where courts in the US have assumed jurisdiction over foreign companies: 
Bryant v Finnish Nat. Airline, 15 N. Y. 2d 426,260 N. Y. S. 2d 625,208 N. E. 2d 439 (1965); Taca 
Intern. Airlines v Rolls-Royce of England, 15 N. Y. 2d 97,256 N. Y. S. 2d 129,204 N. E. 2d 329) 
(1965); Wells Fargo & Co. v Wells Fargo Exp. Co. 556 F. 2d 406 (9th Cir. 1977). 
Cf rules Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws, para. 42: 
"Principles Underlying Judicial Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations: 
(1) A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over a foreign corporation if the relationship 
of the corporation to the state is such as to make the exercise of such jurisdiction reasonable. 
(2) The relationships which are sufficient to support an exercise of judicial jurisdiction over a 
foreign corporation are stated in paras 43-52" 
See also Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. rule 4(d)(3,7), (e), (e)(1), (f), (i)(1), 28 U. S. C. A. See 
31 Extraterritorial jurisdiction is also accepted in Canada, see Castel, Canadian Conflict of laws (4fl' Ed, 
1997) para 126; and in New Zealand see NZ High Court Rule 219. 
32 19 N. Y. 2d 533,227 N. E. 2d 851,281 N. Y. S. 2d 41 ((1967). 
33 Cf in general the New York Civil Practice Law Rules para 302, Personal Jurisdiction By Acts Of 
Non-Domiciliaries: 
(a) Acts which are the basis of jurisdiction. As to a cause of action arising from any of the acts 
enumerated in this section, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non- 
domiciliary, or his executor or administrator, who in person or through an agent: 
1. transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the 
state; or 
2. commits a tortious act within the state, except as to a cause of action for defamation of 
character arising from the act; or 
3. commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or property within the state, 
except as to a cause of action for defamation of character arising from the act, if he 
(i) regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or 
derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in the state, or 
(ii) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the state and derives 
substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce; or 
4. owns, uses or possesses any real property situated within the state. 
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properly be demanded of those who extensively engage in international 
trade. "34 
Unlike the case in litigation where the jurisdiction of national courts is determined 
on a territorial basis, the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals is determined on the basis of 
a contract, namely an arbitration agreement. Nonetheless, both arbitral tribunals and 
national courts assume the same type of adjudicatory power, namely the power to 
determine the pending dispute, and the power to issue an award or a judgment with 
the force of res judicata. 
Despite the fact that it stems from an arbitration agreement rather than from 
national rules, jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal is by no means inferior to that of a 
national court. This becomes clear from the following: 
" First, jurisdiction of national courts may also stem from an agreement, namely 
a jurisdiction agreement or choice of court agreement. The rules for extra- 
territorial jurisdiction apply, even when the national courts have initially 
assumed jurisdiction on the basis of a jurisdictional agreement. 35 
" Second, jurisdiction derived from procedural agreements (either jurisdiction or 
arbitration ones) is ultimately based on national or international procedural 
rules. This is exactly the case with jurisdiction assumed on a territorial basis. 
Thus, procedural rules are the original source of jurisdiction in all cases, be that 
jurisdiction based on territorial or jurisdiction based on contractual basis. 36 
Therefore, despite the fact that they are established in different ways, jurisdiction 
of an arbitral tribunal is of the same quality as that of a national court. There is no 
difference between jurisdiction established on a territorial basis and jurisdiction 
established on the basis of an arbitration agreement. Once their power to examine the 
case is confirmed by reference either to a valid arbitration agreement or to the 
applicable procedural rules, arbitral tribunals and national courts assume the same 
34 Ibid. at 45. 
35 This was the case in Sinochem International Oil (London) Co Ltd v Mobil Sales and Supph' Cosp. 
[2000] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 670 where English courts assumed jurisdiction over overseas parties on the 
basis of a jurisdiction agreement. 
36 With regard to arbitration agreements see for example: New York art. 11(3), EAA 1996 s. 9(1), 
French CNPC art. 1458, German Code of Civil Proceedings s. 1032, Swiss PILA art. 7. With regard 
to jurisdiction agreement see for example Council Regulation 44/2001 on "Jurisdiction and the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters" art. 23. In Germany. 
see ZPO ss. 38-40 or England Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 Part II section 6 art. 17. 
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kind of jurisdiction: jurisdiction to determine the dispute at hand in the most effective 
way. 
Therefore, since national courts are allowed to assume jurisdiction beyond their 
territorial boundaries, arbitral tribunals should also be allowed to assume jurisdiction 
beyond the boundaries of the arbitration agreement as an ordinary contract (extra- 
contractual jurisdiction), whenever this is necessary for them to resolve the dispute 
effectively. More generally, it can be argued that when it is necessary for the 
determination of the dispute an adjudicatory forum, be that a national court or an 
arbitral tribunal, may extend its jurisdiction beyond its original boundaries, be that 
geographical territory or an arbitration contract 
This is not to argue that extra-contractual jurisdiction should be the norm. It must 
be emphasised that jurisdiction beyond the territorial or contractual boundaries should 
be allowed only as a rare exception and under strict conditions. 37 Extra-territorial or 
extra-contractual jurisdiction should only be allowed in case the extra-territorial or 
extra-contractual parties and the original parties constitute a necessary procedural 
unit. As already indicated, this requirement applies usually in case all the several 
claimants or several defendants are inextricably tied up with the dispute. Co-liability 
or community of rights and obligations will be the threshold. Mere avoidance of 
multiplicity of the litigation of the dispute should not be accepted as a valid basis for 
the courts and tribunals to assume extra-territorial or extra-contractual jurisdiction. 
However, once the above condition is satisfied, extra territorial or extra-contractual 
jurisdiction as a matter of principle should be equally accepted for both national 
courts and arbitral tribunals. 
37 Cf Cheshire and North's, Private International Law. by PM North and JJ Fawcett (13`h ed 
Butterworths 1999) p. 301, who note with regard to extraterritorial jurisdiction: "There has, for 
many years, been a particular reluctance to exercise the discretion to allow service out of the 
jurisdiction under this head [ie when the party out of the jurisdiction is a necessary or proper party]". 
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CHAPTER 8: THE UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES AND RATIONALE OF 
THIRD-PARTY MECHANISMS 
The previous chapter demonstrated that as a matter of principle an arbitral tribunal 
can assume extra-contractual jurisdiction and apply third-party mechanisms as a 
corollary of the concept of effective arbitral jurisdiction and the jurisdictional 
approach in general. This chapter addresses some equally important issues: first, it 
examines whether the tribunal should assume extra-contractual jurisdiction and apply 
third-party mechanisms. Here, the thesis embarks on a policy-oriented analysis, which 
will show that third-party mechanisms are necessary in the context of international 
arbitration (section 8.1) 
Secondly, it explores the rationale behind third party mechanisms in general: what 
purposes they serve and how do they operate (section 8.2). The exploration of these 
questions takes place against a comparative background of several national litigation 
and regional procedural systems. It is suggested that the key-element for the operation 
of third-party mechanisms is the pending dispute and the implications this dispute has 
for the third parties in terms of substantive liability and interests. 
Such kind of analysis puts the discussion on arbitration and third parties in a wider 
comparative context. More importantly though, the findings on the underpinning 
rationale of third-party mechanisms will be used in Chapters 9 and 10 as policy 
guidelines in order for the thesis to determine the general conditions required for a 
tribunal to assume extra-contractual jurisdiction and apply third-party mechanisms. 
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8.1 THE IMPORTANCE OF THIRD-PARTY MECHANISMS IN INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION 
The question that invariably arises in the context of the discussion on arbitration 
and third parties is why there should be any provision for third parties at all. The 
prevailing contractual approach argues that, since it is a private dispute resolution 
mechanism, arbitration should be available only to those parties that have agreed 
thereto. There should not exist mechanisms for the participation of third parties even 
when the latter have a financial or legal interest in the dispute between the genuine 
parties to the arbitration agreement and proceedings. 
However, in policy terms third-party mechanisms are necessary in the context of 
international arbitration. Although it is a private dispute resolute system, arbitration 
should not remain a closed system, exclusively reserved for those parties that are 
contractually bound by an arbitration agreement. Instead, arbitration should be a 
dispute resolution system, which -under particular circumstances- has to be flexible 
and able to communicate with third parties that have legal and financial interests in 
the dispute before the tribunal. A procedural mechanism of communication between 
the genuine and third parties should be established in arbitration. General legal 
principles, as well as practical considerations, militate for the application of third 
party mechanisms in international arbitration. 
8.1.1 Third-party mechanisms and functional equilibrium between substance 
and procedure in multiparty relationships 
The principle of "contractual freedom" permits commercial parties to structure 
their contractual relationships in the way that best accommodates their commercial 
interests. In cases where several parties are involved in the same commercial project, 
these parties have the right to enter into several bilateral contracts between them 
rather than enter into a single multiparty agreement. These contracts, although 
bilateral, are in most cases inextricably intertwined in terms of substance. The 
performance or non-performance of one of these contracts will necessarily affect the 
others. 
As was illustrated in Chapter one, the contract between an owner and a contractor, 
has in many cases express references to the duties or rights of a sub-contractor. 
Likewise, in several instances a contract between a creditor and a debtor expressly 
provides for a guarantee. In an opposing manner, a subcontract is concluded in view 
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of a work whose specifications are set out in the main contract; or a guarantee 
agreement will secure the specific debt or performance undertaken in the main 
contract. Thus, should a dispute arise between two of the several intertwined parties 
the others would not be strangers in this dispute. This strong contractual interrelation 
amongst the several parties cannot be ignored at the dispute resolution proceedings. 
It is for this reason that national litigation systems provide for extensive third-party 
mechanisms. In this way, the related third parties may be brought in the proceedings 
between two other parties, as they are relevant to the dispute between the original 
parties, and therefore their involvement in the dispute resolution process is considered 
necessary or at least desirable. Thus, the contractual interrelation between the several 
parties at a substantive level is reflected at a procedural level. Generally, it can be 
argued that the procedural status of the parties reflects their substantive status so that 
a junctional equilibrium between substance and procedure is established. As the next 
section will show, this is an overarching principle common to all procedural systems. 
Arbitration, like litigation, constitutes a dispute resolution system. It is true that 
unlike litigation, arbitration borders on contractual law due to its contractual origins. 
However, once the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal is established contractually, 
arbitration assumes a jurisdictional, that is procedural, role. As the previous chapter 
demonstrated, the jurisdictional aspect of arbitration has a predominant role, 
particularly after the dispute arises. Accordingly, this functional equilibrium between 
substance and procedure should, as a matter of general principle, apply to arbitration 
too. Parties that are not bound by an arbitration agreement, but that are nevertheless 
strongly associated with the parties to that arbitration agreement are not strangers and 
should not be altogether excluded from the arbitration process. Such a pure 
contractual approach would create an artificial discrepancy between the substantive 
and procedural side of intertwined multiparty relationships. The substantive 
interrelation between the several parties should be proportionally reflected on the 
arbitration process. The arbitration should, to some extent, be able to interact with 
third parties that are an integral part of the pending dispute. 
It is accepted that the principle of procedural party autonomy in arbitration gives 
the parties the freedom to choose the party with whom they want to arbitrate. 
However, it should be under question whether and to what extent procedural party 
autonomy can altogether overturn the contractual background of the intertwined 
relationships, set out by the parties themselves by virtue of another equally important 
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principle, namely the principle of contractual freedom. The latter gives commercial 
parties the freedom to enter into several bilateral but at the same time interrelated 
contracts in relation to a single commercial project. This interrelation at a substantive 
level should be reflected at a procedural lever. In other words, the principle of 
procedural autonomy in arbitration should operate in line with the principle of 
contractual freedom. The freedom of the parties to choose their party in arbitration 
should be preserved, while at the same time, it should operate within the intertwining 
contractual context. In this way the important functional equilibrium between 
substance and procedure will be preserved. 
8.1.2 Efficiency in arbitration: regulating overlapping parallel proceedings 
Third-party mechanisms prevent the commencement of several bilateral 
proceedings with overlapping subject matters between multiple parties. Parallel 
overlapping proceedings create the risk that the determinations of an arbitral award 
between the two genuine parties to an arbitration agreement might be irreconcilable, 
not to say conflicting, ] with those of a subsequent award or judgment between the 
third party and one of the genuine parties. ` 
Whenever several parties are contractually intertwined in a multi-party commercial 
project, it is very likely that the same issues will come up before the several 
proceedings. 3 As was explained in Part One, in the context of string construction 
The term irreconcilable is preferred to the term conflicting which is more often used in this context, 
because, technically speaking, the terms are slightly different: the former is stricter, referring to 
decisions with mutually exclusive legal consequences between the same two parties, whereas the 
latter is wider referring to merely contradictory decisions in the case of multiparty relationships; 
however, both "conflicting" and "irreconcilable" decisions result in problematic, and thus 
unacceptable situations; in the context of the Brussels Convention and the art. 22 (now 
Reg. 44/2001art. 28), the test of irreconcilability for Advocate General Tesauro. accepted by the ECJ, 
in the Tatry case (The Owners of the Cargo Lately Laden on Board the ship `Tatty' v The Owners of 
the ship `Maciej Rataj', C-406/92 [1994] ECR I-5439) was essentially common issues offact and 
law risking conflict of decisions or reasoning: "The rationale of art 22 is to encourage harmonious 
judgments and to avoid conflicts at the recognition stage even only as to the reasoning of different 
judgments (para. 28)"; cf the European Regulation 44/2001 art. 34.4 which precludes the recognition 
of "irreconcilable" rather than merely "conflicting" judgments, although this term was given a 
narrow meaning in Hoffmann v Krieg, Case 145/86. 
2 Cf McAlpine Construction v Unex, [1994] 38 Con LR 63 (CA) "It is clear that to a considerable 
extent the issues in the arbitration and in the action, if it is fought, will overlap. Clearly this is 
undesirable, and there is a strong case for preventing duplication of proceedings. The parties have 
chosen arbitration to decide the issues which do overlap, and there is thus a presumption that the 
same issues should not be decided in an action also. with the possible risk that the judge in the 
action will arrive at a different decision from the arbitrator on some of those issues. " (Glidewell LJ, 
at 77). 
Consolidation of arbitration proceedings was appropriate where both disputes centered on same 
construction project. principal issue in both proceedings was a question of who was responsible for 
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contracts the issue of causation or liability will probably arise both in the proceedings 
between an owner and a contractor, and in the proceedings between the contractor and 
a subcontractor. Similarly, defects or delay in the work of a subcontractor will affect 
the liability of the contractor vis-ä-vis the employer, and the amount of damages owed 
by him against the employer. 
4 The same applies to web-type construction contracts or 
secured transactions. 
It is, fortunately, the case that inconsistent awards are rare. 
5 However, when they 
do occur, not only do they raise doubts about the reliability of international arbitration 
but they also defeat the expectations of the parties. An arbitral award as a national 
judgment is presumed to be an authoritative determination of the pending dispute. The 
authority of a judgment or an award is established by the doctrine of res judicata 
applicable both to judgments and awards. This does not mean that national judgments 
or arbitral awards cannot be wrong. They are indeed fallible. 
6 It is precisely because 
national legal systems accept the inherent fallibility of a decision, be that a judgment 
or an award, that they safeguard this decision with the authority of res judicata. Res 
judicata renders an award or a judgment final, albeit fallible. In other words, a 
decision, which is merely fallible, i. e. only possibly wrong, is tolerated by legal 
systems, as long as this decision is never exposed as clearly wrong. However, the 
issuance of two irreconcilable decisions with inconsistent determinations on the same 
factual or legal issues renders fallible decisions into clearly wrong decisions. 
Whenever two conflicting decisions are rendered, one of them must clearly be wrong. 
Therefore, irreconcilable decisions negate the purpose of res judicata and expose the 
whole legal system as defective. In fact, irreconcilable decisions constitute a legal 
7 sore. 
extra costs incurred in completion of the project, and resolution of disputes in separate proceedings 
could lead to inconsistent findings; see Cable Belt Convevors, Inc. v Alumina Partners of Jamaica, 
S. D. N. Y. 1987,669 F. Supp. 577, affirmed 857 F. 2d 1461. 
4 See Chapter 2.3. 
s For a recent example of irreconcilable awards see UNCITRAL Arbitration Tribunal, final award, 
September 3,2001, R. S. Lauder v Czech Republic, (2002) 14 World Trade and Arbitration Material 
35 (Final Award); UNCITRAL Arbitral Tribunal, partial award, September 13,2001, CME Czech 
Republic v The Czech Republic. (2002) 14 World Trade and Arbitration Materials 109; and Svea 
Court of Appeals (Sweden), May 15,2003. CME Czech Republic v The Czech Republic, (2003) 15 
World Trade and Arbitration Materials 171. 
Decisions ". .. are not 
final because [they] are infallible but [they] are infallible only because [they] 
are final. " Brown i' Allen, 344 U. S. 443.540 (1953) (Jackson, J. concurring). 
Cf Abu Dhabi Gas Liquefaction [ADGAS] iv Eastern Bechtel, [1982] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 425,427 "As we 
have often pointed out, there is a danger in having two separate arbitrations in a case like this. You 
might get inconsistent findings if there were two separate arbitrators. This has been said in many 
cases [... ] it is most undesirable that there should be inconsistent findings by two separate arbitrators 
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Moreover, irreconcilable awards frustrate the expectations that commercial parties 
have from international arbitration. Parties trust international arbitration as a 
worldwide authoritative mechanism and they resort to it in order to obtain a final and 
binding determination of their disputes. In a case where this dispute happens to 
involve other parties as well, the parties to an arbitration agreement want the award to 
have the authority to determine dispute once and for all. It is reasonable to assume 
that the parties would not want the award to leave room for third parties to challenge 
before a different forum the determinations of the arbitral award. The parties would 
want an arbitral award with as much clout as possible. Their expectations would be 
defeated and the enforceability of their award would become doubtful if this award 
was in conflict with another award or judgment. When parties opt for bilateral 
arbitration against a background of multiparty contractual relationships, they do not 
necessarily waive their expectations for an award that will not be conflicting with 
another award or judgment. For the above reasons, it is concluded that irreconcilable 
awards and decisions challenge the authority of international arbitration, undermine 
its effectiveness and should clearly be prevented. 
8.1.3 Third-party mechanisms and the interests of the several parties to 
arbitration 
Third-party mechanisms should be also examined in view of the various parties 
involved in typical multiparty relationships. 
It is true that some of the parties to the arbitration proceedings would have less 
interest in involving a third party in the bilateral arbitration. This is particularly the 
case for an owner, in the context of vertical construction contracts, or an architect, in 
the context of horizontal construction contracts. Their interests would be better served 
if the dispute against a contractor, in the former case, or an owner in the latter were 
resolved as quickly as possible. The involvement of a third party, be that a 
subcontractor or a contractor, in the pending dispute would complicate the 
proceedings and increase the money and the time needed for the dispute to be finally 
determined. 
However, there are other parties that would benefit from third-party mechanisms in 
arbitration. Thus, in the context of several string contracts, third-party mechanisms 
on virtually the self-same question, such as causation. It is very desirable that everything should be 
done to avoid such a circumstance" (Lord Denning). 
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would benefit the contractor, who stands as the middle party between the two 
successive contracts. For example, in arbitral proceedings between an owner and a 
contractor, the latter will want the subcontractor to be bound by the determinations of 
the arbitral award, particularly in the case the tribunal finds that the delivered work is 
defective and the contractor is liable against the owner. Otherwise, the contractor 
would face the risk that a second tribunal or a court, in subsequent proceedings 
between the contractor and the subcontractor, might find the same work not defective, 
in which case the contractor would be held responsible for work actually done by the 
subcontractor. 
Likewise, in the context of web-type construction contracts an owner would want 
the contractor to be bound by the determinations of the arbitral award issued in 
proceedings between the architect and the owner. 
8 This would particularly be the 
case, if the tribunal found the work defective but the architect not liable. Otherwise, 
the owner would run the risk that the second court or tribunal, in proceedings between 
the owner and the contractor, would find the work not defective or, in any event, the 
contractor not liable, in which case the owner would have no one to recover the 
damage from the defective work. 
The same applies to secured transactions. In a case of a guarantee, for example, a 
debtor would have an interest in the guarantor being bound by the determinations of 
an award in arbitral proceedings between the creditor and the debtor. Otherwise, the 
creditor might obtain a judgment or an award in its favour in second proceedings 
against the guarantor, which would give the latter a claim to recourse against the 
debtor. In this way, the debtor would face the possibility of paying the guarantor for a 
debt for which he has already been found not liable. 
Third-party mechanisms would also serve the interests of some types of third 
parties. As will be explained in Chapter 12, an arbitral award may have collateral 
effects on third parties. In such a case, a third party would have a strong interest to 
intervene into the pending arbitral proceedings in order to prevent any adversary 
effect against its legal position. " Depending on the specific factual circumstances a 
guarantor or a subcontractor, for example, might have an interest to intervene in the 
$ Cf T. Stipanowich, "Arbitration and the Multiparty Dispute: The Search for Workable Solutions". 
(1987) 7? Iowa L. Rev. p. 478. 
Compare the very interesting analysis of the third parties' interests in Alexis Mourre, "L'Intervention 
des Tiers ä 1'Arbitrage", Recueil Vol. 1 (2000-2002) Les Cahiers de 1'Arbitrage, p. 100 arguing for 
the analogous application of national intervention mechanisms in arbitration. 
14; 
pending proceedings between the debtor and the creditor, and the owner and the 
contractor respectively, if they believe that their legal position will be affected by the 
determination of the issues pending before the tribunal. 
Of course, the main question here is whether the interests of third parties should 
bear any relevance in the context of arbitration. While the interests of third parties are 
generally taken into account in the context of litigation, where third parties are 
granted extensive rights to intervene in pending proceedings, 
1° it is arguable whether 
the same should apply to arbitration. Third parties have taken a considered decision 
not to conclude an arbitration agreement, and, therefore it could be argued that they 
have excluded themselves from the arbitration process altogether. 
There is a view arguing that the interests of third parties should be taken into 
account in arbitration, and that participatory rights should be accorded to third parties 
on the basis of equity and due process or public policy considerations. 
" Equity 
See in detail Section 8.2 below. 
" See S. Strong, "Intervention And Joinder As Of Right In International Arbitration: An infringement 
Of Individual Contract Rights Or A Proper Equitable Measure? " (1998) 31 b'and. J. Transnat'l L., p. 
915 arguing, at 981, that the third parties' interests should be taken into account on the basis of the 
principle of `equality of the parties', which should "be read to include all parties to the contract, not 
just those who are participating in the arbitration. " This interpretation of the term equality of the 
parties would include parties that have signed the substantive contract but are not involved in the 
arbitration. Could this broad interpretation be taken a step further and be read to refer to "equality of 
the parties to the dispute", which would include parties that have not signed the main contract but 
are still involved in the dispute? See also T. Stipanowich, "Arbitration and the Multiparty Dispute: 
The Search for Workable Solutions", (1987) 72 Iowa L. Rev., p 473, also arguing for the application 
of participatory mechanism in arbitration; cf the very interesting analysis of the third parties' 
interests in A. Mourre, "L'intervention des Tiers ä ]'Arbitrage", (2000-2002) Les cahiers de 
1'arbitrage, Recueil, Vol. I, p. 100 arguing for the analogous application of national intervention 
mechanisms in arbitration. 
There is also case-law that has by analogy applied national participatory provisions to arbitration. 
See for example, Association of Contracting Plumbers v United Ass. of Journeymen, 841 F. 2d 461, 
466 (2nd Cir. 1988); Woolworth v Miscellaneous Warehousemen's Union, 629 F. 2d 1204,1213 (7th 
Cir. 1980); Holborn Oil Trading v Interpetrol Bermuda, 658 F. Supp. 1205,1206-09 (S. D. N. Y. 
1987), applied US Fed. Proc. R. 24 intervention as of right, Litton Bionetics v Glen, 292 Md. 34,437 
A. 2d 208 (1981), Plaza Development Services v Joe Harden Builder, 294 S. C. 430,365 S. E. 2d 231 
(1988). 
Specific mention should be made of the particularly well-know Compania Espanola de Petroleos v 
Nereus Shipping, 527 F. 2d, 966 (2nd Cir. 1975), ordering the consolidation of arbitration 
proceedings between a ship-owner and its charterer, on one hand and the ship-owner and the 
guarantor of the charterer on the other hand. In this case, the 2nd Circuit applied US Fed. R. Civ. P. 
s. 42(a) to arbitration proceedings by virtue of s. 81(a)(3), which provides that "in proceedings under 
title 9. USC relating to arbitration [... ] these rules apply only to the extent that matters of procedure 
are not provided for in those statutes". Nereus case triggered an extensive debate on the issue of 
compulsory consolidation in arbitration: see for example Dore. Theom, and Practice of Multiparnv 
Commercial Arbitration. (Graham & Trotman/Marinus Nijhoff London/Dordrecht/Boston 1990); T. 
Stipanowich, "Arbitration and the Multiparty Dispute: The Search for Workable Solutions", (1987) 
72 Iowa L. Rev. p. 478. J. Lew. L. Mistelis and S. Kroell, Comparative International Commercial 
Arbitration, (Kluwer Law International 2003) at para 16.77. Nereus was recognized as authority in 
Marine Trading Ltd. v Ore International Corp., 432 F. Supp. 683 (SDNY 1977): Sociedad Anonima 
de Navegacion Petrolera v Cia de Petroleos de Chile. 634 F. Supp. 805 (SDNY 1986). Cable Belt 
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principles are not easy to define, due to their abstract nature. Thus, it is not clear 
whether and to what extent they should bear any relevance in the context of 
international arbitration. '2 Due process and public policy are, indeed, accepted as 
legitimate limitations of party autonomy in international arbitration. 13 However, both 
due process and public policy have an exceptional character, and as result a limited 
application. It is therefore difficult to accept that these principles will be violated if 
third parties are not given participatory rights, unless the interests of the third parties 
in the pending dispute are particularly strong. 
It becomes clear that what should constitute the yardstick for the tribunal to 
determine whether third-mechanisms should apply to arbitration or not is is the 
interests of all the parties involved in the dispute, rather than general principles of 
equity or public policy. 
As will be explained in the next section, this will largely depend on the specific 
factual circumstances and, in particular, on the degree of association between third 
and genuine parties in terms of contractual rights and liability. Only when third and 
genuine parties to an arbitration agreement are strongly associated in substantive 
terms, might their interrelated interests be served better by multiparty proceedings, 
and third-party mechanisms. 14 
Conveyors v Alumina Partners of Jamaica, 669 F. Supp. 577 (SDNY 1987); North River v 
Philadelphia Reinsurance, 856 F. Supp. 850 (SDNY 1994) (refused to order consolidation on other 
grounds) and Specialty Bakeries v Robhal, 1997 WL 379184 (ED pa. 1997) (also refused to order 
consolidation). However, more recent authority suggests that it is at least doubtful whether Nereus is 
still good law. In particular see the following decisions that refused to follow Nereus: Philadelphia 
Reinsurance 1v Employers of Wausau, 61 Fed. Appx. 816 (3rd Cir. 2003); Cavalier Mfg. v Clarke, 
862 So. 2d 634 (Ala. 2003): Hartford Accident and Indem. v Swiss Reinsurance America, 87 F. 
Supp. 2d 300 (S. D. N. Y. 2000); cf Weyebaeuser v Western Seas Shipping, 743 F. 2d 635 (9th Cir. 
1994): United Kingdom of Great Britain v Boeing. 998 F. 2d 68 (2nd Cir. 1993) and Ore & Chemical 
v Stinnes Interoil, 606 F. Supp. 1510 (S. D. N. Y. 1985). 
Unless the parties have expressly provided for the arbitrators to act as amiable compositeurs or ex 
aequo et bono. 
13 See J. Lew. L. Mistelis and S. Kroell, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration, (Kluwer 
Law International 2003). para 21-16 et seq. 26-80 and 26-111 et seq. 
" "Persons having interest in subject matter of litigation which may conveniently be settled therein are 
`proper parties. ' whereas those whose presence is essential to determination of entire controversy 
are `necessary parties. "' See Texas & P. Rv. Co. v Brotherhood of R. Trainmen, W. D. La. 1945,60 
F. Supp. 263. 
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8.2 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THIRD-PARTY MECHANISMS IN THE CONTEXT 
OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION: UNDERPINNING RATIONALE 
AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
8.2.1 Overview and different groups of third-party mechanisms 
National litigation systems have over the course of many decades, developed 
procedural mechanisms ensuring that third parties with a legitimate interest in the 
dispute between two other parties are not excluded from court proceedings dealing 
with the determination of this dispute. Highly technical, if not complicated, third- 
party procedural mechanisms provide many ways in which third parties may 
participate in the proceedings either as co-claimants or co-defendants. Not every third 
party is accorded the right, or is subject to the duty, to participate to proceedings 
between the two original parties. Third-party mechanisms are reserved to third parties 
with an interest, deemed worthy of protection. As the following analysis will show, 
whether a third party may participate in the proceedings, and also the natrue of its 
participation is directly relevant to the degree of association between a third party 
and one of the original parties, in terms of substantive liability and interests. Here, 
the general rule is: the closer the substantive association between an original and a 
third party, the more effective are the third party mechanisms provided by the 
litigation systems. is More specifically, third-party mechanisms become relevant at 
three different stages: 
" At the beginning of proceedings 
" During the proceedings 
" After the judgment is issued 
1. At the beginning of proceedings. At this stage, third parties may come into 
play on the basis of provisions, allowing for 
" Common jurisdictional bases; or 
" Joinder16 of the several parties from the outset of the proceedings. " 
15 In terms of methodology it should be noted that the national procedural systems examined in the next 
sections come from different legal traditions. Finding general principles common to all these 
systems necessarily requires a degree of generalisation. Thus. the analysis emphasises the general 
features rather than the technical procedural details of the different national systems. Otherwise, the 
goal of revealing the rationale behind the third party mechanism and applying it in the context of 
arbitration would be clearly defeated. 
'6 The term joinder, except in England, is used to refer to cases where parties can bring several and thus 
third parties before the same forum, from the outset of the proceedings. In this regard joinder 
proceedings differ from intervention or interpleading or consolidation. proceedings which are used 
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Examples of common jurisdictional bases can be found in the French New Code of 
Civil Procedure art. 42(2), providing that when several defendants domicile in 
different places, the claimant may sue all the several defendants before the court of 
the place where one of them domiciles. '8 Similar provisions can be found in the US, 
19 
the Code of Civil Procedure of Germany (s. 36(l)(3)), 20 the Code of Civil Procedure 
of Greece (art. 31(1))2 ' and the Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001, on Jurisdiction 
and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 
for the 44/2001, art. 6.22 Thus, when several persons who are relevant for the 
resolution of the dispute are subject to the jurisdiction of different courts, national 
procedural laws provide that all of them can be brought before the jurisdiction of a 
single court (common jurisdictional basis). That court will usually be either the court 
of the place where one of the several parties resides or domiciles, or the court of the 
place where an event relevant to the dispute happened (for example, the court of the 
to bring third parties before the same forum only during the proceedings. In England, however, 
joinder has a wider meaning encompassing all cases where a third party and original parties are 
brought before the same court: this either happens at the beginning of the proceedings or at a later 
stage. Thus, in England there is no technical distinction between joinder and intervention or 
interpleading. 
These third-party participatory mechanisms should be distinguished from collective actions 
provided, mainly, in common law systems: class actions in the US (Fed. Rul. 23), Group Litigation in 
England (CPR 19.10 et seq) and the representative actions under the old rule in the Chancery 
Division (see Duke of Bedford v Ellis, [1901] A. C. 1). In civil law systems, there have been some 
attempts to enact class-action legislation, but in most cases there have been either withdrawn 
(France) or still pending (Italy). Collective actions, as opposed to third party mechanisms discussed 
in the thesis, will usually apply in the context of accidents where numerous parties are involved. It 
is, thus, not the quality/type of the relationship between the several parties that requires the 
application of representative actions, although a degree of common interest among the several 
parties must exist. Rather it is the fact that "the parties [are] so numerous that you never could `come 
at justice' ... 
if everybody interested was made a party", Duke of Bedford, at 8; cf US Red Rul. 
23(a)1: "the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable". There are, thus, 
different sorts of considerations underpinning collective actions, which the thesis will not examine. 
18 New Code Civil Procedure (NCPC) Art. 42 (2). This would be applicable, for example, in a case of 
more co-creditors, see Civ 2°d, 27 Feb. 1985, Gaz. Pal. 1985.2. Somm. 262. 
19 Federal courts assume jurisdiction over several parties from different states See Title 28 U. S. C. § 
1367(a) (Supplemental jurisdiction); see further on US federal jurisdiction in D. Siegel, "Changes In 
Federal Jurisdiction And Practice Under The New (Dec. 1,1990) Judicial Improvements Act", 133 
F. R. D. 61. Wright & Miller, 647 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. 3d § 1659. On the other hand long arm 
statutes provide state courts with jurisdiction over several parties from the same state. See, for 
example, Pennsylvania long-arm statute, 42 Pa CS § 5322(b), or South Dacota SDCL § 15-7-2. 
20 Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO) s. 36(1)(3). establishes jurisdiction of special venue for several co- 
defendants. 
21 Code of Civil Procedure, art 31(1) provides common jurisdiction for one court to hear all cases with 
regard to several relevant claims of several parties. This expressly includes the claims against the 
guarantor and the debtor. and the claims of the parties that have a right to intervene 
22 Art. 6 establishes common jurisdiction the court of one Member State for several defendants in 
claims "closely connected" (6(2)) and for the case of a third party warrantor or guarantor (6(3)). 
149 
place of the accident, in case of a tort claim; or the place of the court where the 
contract was concluded, in case of a contractual claim). 
Examples of joinder from the outset of the proceedings can be found in the US 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure r. 19, providing that a person will be joined in a 
claim brought by another party if: 
A. "In that person's absence, the court cannot accord complete relief among 
existing parties; or 
B. That person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so 
situated that disposing of the action in the person's absence may: (i) as a 
practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect the interest; or 
(ii) leave an existing party subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, 
multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations because of the interest" 
Also, US Fed. Rules r. 20 provides that several persons may be joined as co- 
claimants where 
A. "They assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative with 
respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of 
transactions or occurrences; and 
B. Any question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs will arise in the action" 
Similarly, English Civil Procedural Rules (CPR) r. 6.20(3)b provides that a person 
domiciled outside the English jurisdiction may be joined as a co-defendant with a 
person domiciled in England, if the former is "a necessary or proper party to the 
claim". 23 Analogous provisions for joinder can be found in Germany 14 , 
Greece 25 and 
the UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure. 26 
2. During the proceedings. Here, two types of mechanisms regulate the role of 
third parties in relation to pending proceedings: 
First, third party mechanisms brining third parties in before the court examining 
the dispute between the original parties: these are mechanisms by which, after the 
proceedings between the original parties have commenced, third parties may be 
23 The provision will, usually, apply when the several defendants are liable jointly, or jointly and 
severally, or in the alternative. Morris, The Conflict of Laws, D. McClean-K. Beevers (eds). (6`h ed. ) 
(2005) (London Sweet & Maxwell) at 5-017. 
24 German Code of Civil Procedure. s. 59-61. 
's Greek Code of Civil Procedure art. 37(1) and arts. 74-76. 
26 Rule 12.1: " A party may assert any claim substantially connected to the subject matter of the 
proceedings against another party or against a third person who is subject of the jurisdiction of the 
court". 
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brought in before the court hearing the case between the original parties. This can be 
achieved in different ways. 
To begin with, third parties may intervene in the pending proceedings on their own 
initiative. For example, the US Fed Rules Civ. Proc. R. 24(a) provides that the 
"court must permit anyone to intervene who: (1) is given an unconditional 
right to intervene by a federal statute; or (2) claims an interest relating to the 
property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so situated that 
disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the 
movant's ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately 
represent that interest. " 
Similar provisions may be found in England, '? France '28 Germany, 
29 Greece '30 and 
the UNIDROIT Principles of Trans-national Civil Procedure. 31 
Moreover, it is the original parties that may bring third parties in the proceedings 
(interpleader). Thus, the claimant may request a third part to join the proceedings, as 
provided for example in the US Rules of Civ. Proc. R. 22(1): 
"Persons with claims that may expose a plaintiff to double or multiple liability 
may be joined as defendants and required to interplead". 
Equally, the defendant may take the initiative and request a third party to take part 
in the pending proceedings between the original parties, as provided for example in 
the US Rules of Civ. Proc R. 22(2): 
"A defendant exposed to similar liability may seek interpleader through a 
crossclaim or counterclaim. " 
Similar provisions are included in the Codes of Civil Procedure in Germany, 32 
France, 33 Greece34, and the UNIDROIT Principles of Trans-national Civil 
Procedure. 35 
2' England CPR r. 19(2)-19(3). 
21 France, Civil Code of Procedure (CCP) art. 325 et seq. 
29 Germany. Civil Code of Procedure (CCP) s. 66. 
30 Greece, Civil Code of Procedure (CCP) art. 80 et seq. 
31 R. 12 2 first line: "A person having an interest substantially connected with the subject matter of the 
proceedings may apply to intervene". 
32 German CCP s. 72. 
33 French CCP art. 331 (mis en cause or intervention force&). 
34 Greek CCP art. 86-88. 
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Finally, when proceedings between a third party and one of the original parties 
commence in parallel to the proceedings between the original parties, the two or 
several parallel proceedings may be consolidated so that all the relevant parties are 
brought before the same court. 36 National provisions for consolidation include the US 
FRCP r. 42(a), the German ZPO art. 147, the French NCCP art. 367, the Greek CCP 
art. 246 and UNIDROIT r. 12.5. 
Secondly, third party mechanisms that avert the commencement of parallel 
proceedings between the several parties: third-party mechanisms of this type are used 
to avert the commencement or the continuation of two parallel proceedings on the 
same or related subject matter. Here for example the rule established by lis alibi 
pendens is that when proceedings have been initiated on a particular subject matter, a 
second set of proceedings on the same or related matter should be stayed, at least until 
the first decision is rendered. 37 Lis pendens is normally applicable when the parties in 
the two parallel trials are the same, as for example in the case in the EC Reg. 44/2201 
art. 27. However, there are cases where lis pendens applies even when the several 
parties in the two parallel proceedings are not different, in other words where third 
parties are involved. 38 This is for example the case in the EC Reg. 44/2001 art. 28, 
providing that "where related actions are pending in the courts of different Member 
States any court other than the court first seised may stay its proceeding. " Here, even 
different parties in the second set of proceedings will be subject to the litispendens 
effect of the first set. Therefore, lis pendens prevents third parties from commencing 
proceedings regarding an already pending subject matter and, thus it eliminates the 
risk of conflicting decisions. 
35 R. 12 2 second line "The court itself or on motion of a party, may require notice to the person having 
such an interest, inviting intervention". 
36 It should be noted that consolidation is not an exclusive third-party mechanism. It may be used to 
consolidate two parallel related actions that may involve either several different parties or the same 
two parties: cf Attala Hydratane Gas i' Lowiy Tims., N. D. Miss. 1966,41 F. R. D. 164: "Consolidation 
of actions is not limited to actions involving identical parties, but is available to different parties in 
actions having common questions of fact and law". To the extent that it is used to bring original and 
third parties together, consolidation is considered to be an important third party mechanism. for the 
purposes of the thesis. 
37 In the US and England lis pendens is provided as a common law rule see McHenri- i' Lewis (1882) 22 
Ch. D. 397; whereas in international litigation lis pendens is examined in the general context of forum 
non convenience, see Morris supra n. 23. para 5-047, Halsbury's. Laws of England, 4`h ed. (Lexis 
Nexis 2003), para. 355. 
For civil law jurisdictions see France CCP art. 100 et seq, German CCP s. 261(3). Greek CCP art. 222. 
38 The extent to which a third party may be affected by lis pendens or other similar national 
mechanisms is addressed in detail in Chapter 12. 
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3. At a stage after the decision is rendered. A national judgment that is final 
obtains an authoritative status, which prevents the re-litigation of the same subject 
matter of the dispute (the resjudicata effect). 39 As in the case of lis pendens, the rule 
here is that a judgment binds only parties that have taken part in the proceedings. 
However, there are exceptions to this rule, so that third parties may be affected by a 
judgment rendered between the original parties. In other words, a decision may, under 
specific circumstances, produce a third-par ty effect. Both the third-party effect of a 
national judgment, and most importantly, that of an arbitral award are examined in 
dtail in Chapter 12 of the thesis. At this point it suffices to mention that a third-party 
effect of a national judgment, to some extent, may prevent a third party from re- 
litigating issues that have been determined in previous proceedings between the 
original parties. Thus, the third-party effect of a decision operates as a third-party 
mechanism regulating overlapping proceedings between several parties, and reducing 
thus, the risk of conflicting decisions or conflicting determinations on the same issues. 
8.2.2 Policy analysis of the third-party mechanisms: distinctions and 
underpinning rationale 
In policy terms, third-party mechanisms provided by national litigation systems 
have been designed to accommodate the interests of administration of justice in 
general, but also the interests of both the third and original parties in litigation 
proceedings. Their objectives are: 40 
0 First, to achieve consistency in the determination of several related disputes 
and 
39 P. Barnett, Res Judicata, Estoppel and Foreign Judgments, (OUP 2001) para. 1.12: "The doctrine 
encapsulates the principle inherent in all judicial systems which provides that an earlier adjudication 
is conclusive in a second suit involving the same subject matter and the same legal bases". See ibid 
for the legislative history of the principle that goes back to the Ancient Greek and Roman times. It 
was even recognized in the Hindu text of Katyayana. 
ao See, for example, Linder Steel Erection, v Wedemever, D. C. Md. 1984,585 F. Supp. 1530: Bifurcation 
of trials is intended to further convenience, avoid delay and prejudice, and to serve ends of justice; it 
is appropriate only when the court believes that separation will achieve one of these purposes; 
Barvelo v Brown. D. C. Puerto Rico 1978.78 F. R. D. 531: 
"to accomplish greater convenience and economy in the administration of justice and to avoid 
overlapping duplication in motion practice, pre-trial and trial procedures occasioned by 
competing counsel representing different plaintiffs" 
See, also Tetra Moletric Limited v Japan Imports Limited (CA) pointing at "requirements of justice 
and of the efficient conduct of the hearing": In France see an in-depth analysis of all the interests 
served by the involvement of a third party in pending proceedings between the original parties: P-D 
Saint-Hilaire. Le Tiers al 'acte Juridique. L. G. D. J. 2000. 
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0 Second, to permit disposition of the entire subject matter in an economic 
and expeditious way. 
Thus, third-party mechanisms aim to prevent multiplicity of several related claims 
before different courts that would not waste procedural resources and also increase 
the risk of conflicting judgments. 
In order to achieve these objectives most efficiently national procedural laws, as 
was shown above, provide for a variety of third-party mechanisms. This type of 
third-party mechanism applicable to a particular case depends on dispute pending 
between the original parties, and the implications that this dispute has for third 
parties; theseimplications are in turn directly relevant to the contractual interrelation 
between third and original parties. As the following analysis demonstrates, the rule 
here is: the stronger the association between original and third parties in terms of 
substantive rights and liability, the more effective thud party mechanisms are 
provided by national litigation systems. 
This conclusion is in line with the distinction of false third parties into two groups, 
as suggested in Chapter 2. As will be recalled, the distinction depends on the degree 
of association between the original and the false third parties, in terms of substantive 
liability and interests. 41 In particular: 
First group: As was explained in Chapter 2, third parties in this group are strongly 
associated with one of the original parties to the proceedings, in terms of contractual 
interests and liability. Original and false third parties have concurrent interests in the 
pending dispute and the commercial project in general, and are typically co-liable or 
co-holders of rights and duties (community of rights and liability). 
This strong substantive association between an original and a false third party 
makes the presence of the latter in the pending proceedings indispensable for the 
disposition of the claims between the original parties. The final determination of the 
pending dispute will not be possible, unless the final decision binds all the several 
parties, including the false third party involved in the dispute. Justice will be hollow if 
the third party is left out of this process, and the interests of at least one of the original 
41 As regards terminology, it should be mentioned that the term "false third parties" used in Chapter 2 
to describe third parties with an interest in the dispute between two genuine parties to arbitral 
proceedings. is also used here in the context of litigation to describe third parties with an interest in 
the dispute between the two parties originally taking part in court proceedings. 
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parties would be jeopartised. 42 Therefore, due to their strong association in 
substantive terms, original and false third parties of this group constitute an 
inseparable unit in terms ofjurisdiction. 
Take, for example, the case of two co-holders of rights in immovable property. If a 
dispute arises in connection with rights in rem in this property- say for example that 
another person challenges the ownership of the two co-owners in the property- both 
co-owners must be present in the proceedings. The dispute can be finally resolved 
only if all the relevant parties, including of course both co-owners, participate in a 
single set of proceedings, which would result in a single judgment. 43 Here, the final 
judgment must bind both co-owners, otherwise it would not dispose of the overall 
ownership dispute. 44 In case the claimant obtains a judgment in his favour, he would 
need a judgment enforceable against both co-owners. 
Therefore, a third party that is so closely associated, in substantive terms, with a 
genuine party, must be present in the determination of the dispute. Moreover, it must 
be present in autonomously. It cannot be represented by the original party to which it 
is related despite their strong association in terms of interests. This is because he 
interests of the original and the false third party in the dispute concur but they do not 
coincide altogether. For example, the interests of two partners in the same legal entity 
or two co-owners in the same property are in principal very similar, but can 
nevertheless be slightly divergent. This slight asymmetry in their interests means that 
each co-party must participate in the proceedings in its own right in order to protect 
its own interests. 45 
42 Cf US Fed. R. C. P. 19. (a)(2)(ii) "leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk 
of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed 
interest". 
43 Rule. 19: Joinder of Persons Needed for Just Adjudication (a)(1) "in the person's absence complete 
relief cannot be accorded among those already parties... "; see Lowe v Loftus (1970, DC Ga) 314 F 
Supp 620, for an application of r. 19 in the context of a real property dispute. 
44 See Amon v Raphael Tuck & Sons, [1956] 1 QB 357, per J. Devlin J. at 380: "The only reason which 
makes it necessary to make a person a party to an action is so that he should be bound by the result 
of the action, and the question to be settled therefore must be a question in the action which cannot 
be effectually and completely settled unless he is a party"; cf Fire Auto & Marine v Greene, [1964] 
2 Q. B. 687, where John Stephenson J. took a wider view of a "necessary party", as a party that is "at 
least [... ] able to show that some legal right enforceable by him against one of the parties to the 
action or some legal duty enforceable against him by one of the parties to the action will be affected 
by the result of the action" at 697. For the US see J. Rydstrom, "Who must be joined in action as 
person `needed for just adjudication' under Rule 19(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedures". (1975) 
22 A. L. R. Fed 765. 
45 Cf US Fed. R. C. P. r . 
24(a)(2) providing for intervention as a matter of right "when the applicant 
claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the 
applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede 
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Thus, it is concluded that the presence of the false third parties of this group is 
normally considered indispensable for two reasons: first, because this type of false 
third party is strongly interrelated with one of the original parties to the proceedings; 
second, because despite their strong interrelation, the third party cannot be 
represented by one of the original parties. 
Accordingly, with regard to false third parties of this group, national provisions 
procedural systems normally provide for third party mechanisms of mandatory 
character. 
For example, the US Federal Rules of Civil Proceedings provide for intervention 
as a matter of right; 46 or they provide for the mandatory joinder of persons needed for 
adjudication. 47 The English Civil Procedure Rules require that where the third party is 
jointly entitled with one of the original parties, the third party must be joined in the 
proceedings as a matter of necessity. 48 The French New Code of Civil Procedure 
provides that a third party will be forced to join proceedings in case the decision must 
commonly bind the third party and the original parties. 49 
Moreover, once it is joined in the pending proceedings, the false third party 
assumes a procedural position very close to that of the original party, with whom it is 
closely associated. Thus, the two co-parties in the proceedings constitute a procedural 
the applicant's ability to protect that interest... "; the interest of the potential intervenor, although it is 
less than standing to sue; and r. 19(a)(2) providing for joinder of a party needed when it "claims an 
interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in the 
person's absence may as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect that 
interest... "; similarly in France 331(1): "Un tiers peut etre mis en cause aux fins de condamnation 
par toute partie qui est en droit d'agir contre lui ä titre principal". 
See more on this, J. P. Ludington, "When is representation of applicant's interest by existing parties 
inadequate and applicant bound by judgment so as to be entitled to intervention as of right under 
Federal Rule 24(a)(2) and similar state statutes or rules" (Originally published in 1962) 84 
A. L. R. 2d, p. 1412. 
46 US Fed. R. C. P. r. 24(a); see United States v Georgia, 19 F. 3d 1388,1393 (11th Cir. 1994): "Once a 
party establishes all the prerequisites to intervention, the district court has no discretion to denn the 
motion". 
47 US Fed. R. C. P. r. 19. 
48 R. 19.3(1): "where a claimant claims a remedy to which some other person is jointly entitled with 
him. all persons jointly entitled to the remedy must be parties unless the court orders otherwise". 
Cf Halsbury's, Laws of England. (Lexis Nexis Butterworths 2007). para 1080: "Since a joint 
promise creates only one obligation, all the promisors must generally be joined as defendants to the 
action. " [... ] "Indeed, the general rule is that prima facie a joint promisor has the right to insist upon 
the other joint promisors being joined as co-defendants; and that he may apply for a stay of 
proceedings until they are so joined". 
49 Art. 331(2). See also art 332(1): « le juge peut inviter les parties a mettre en cause tous les interesses 
dont la presence luit parait necessaire a la solution du litige n. 
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unit. 50 In fact, the strong procedural ties between these two parties reflect the intensity 
of their substantive links. 
In this way, national procedural rules ensure that a third party that is closely 
interrelated to the dispute between the original parties, will take part in the 
proceedings and, more importantly, it will be bound by the final determination. Only 
in exceptional circumstances will the trial proceed without the participation of a 
"necessary" false third party. 5' 
Second group: This group includes persons that are contractually linked but not 
strongly associated with one of the original parties to the proceedings, in terms of 
contractual interests and liability. Here, original and false third parties will typically 
have interrelated but not concurrent interests. Original and false third parties of this 
group will not normally share liability. They will either be liable in the alternative or 
only one of them will be liable vis-ä-vis the other original party. 
Therefore, the main dispute between two original parties can be determined in 
bilateral rather than multiparty proceedings. It is not imperative that a false third party 
of this group is bound by the final judgment. Indeed, neither the original nor the false 
third party will be running the risk to suffer an irreparable harm, should the false 
third party be left outside the proceedings between the two original parties. It is not 
necessary for the interests of parties, or indeed the interests of the administration of 
justice, that all related claims be tried together and all related parties be bound by the 
final decision. 52 
50 German CCP s. 62: "In the event that a disputed legal relationship can only be determined altogether 
vis-ä-vis all joined or in the event that the joinder of parties is necessary for another reason, then in 
the event that a hearing or term is attended by some joined parties, the defaulting joined parties shall 
be deemed to be represented by the non-defaulting joined parties"; similarly, Greek CCP art. 76. 
s' See US r. 19(d) providing that when the joinder of a person needed is not feasible the "court shall 
determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties 
before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable. The 
factors to be considered by the court include: 
" first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to the 
person or those already parties; 
" second, the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, 
or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; 
" third, whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; 
" fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for 
nonjoinder". 
s" Cf Halsbury's. Laws of England, (Lexis Nexis Butterworths 2007), para 1081, on Joint promisees: 
"Where, by a simple contract or a contract made by deed entered into before 1926, a promise 
was made to a number of persons jointly, they were entitled collectively to performance of it. 
Proceedings to enforce the performance of such a promise could be taken only in the names of 
all the joint promisees; one of them could not sue alone, because the promise was made to all 
of them jointly, and not to any of them separately; Where a joint promisee refused to be joined 
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For example, the claim of an owner against a contractor may, normally, be 
determined without the presence of the subcontractor. A possible judgment against 
the contractor may be enforced even if the subcontractor is not bound by this 
judgment. In principle, the dispute between the original parties may be disposed of 
bilaterally without the participation of the false third party in the proceedings. 
However, third-party mechanisms even in this case are highly advisable for policy 
reasons, since they reduce the risk of irreconcilable decisions, they preserve 
procedural resources, and of course, they accommodate the interests of the parties. 
For example, a false third party would have an interest in preventing a judgment 
against an original party with which it is contractually intertwined. A judgment 
against a contractor would make the subcontractor's position weaker, in the sense that 
it would trigger a claim by the contractor against the sub-contractor himself. 
Thus, in general, a false third party would have an interest in joining the 
proceedings supporting the original party with whom they are substantively 
associated. A decision against the latter would undermine the legal position of the 
former too, and thus a false third party has an interest to join the proceedings and try 
to prevent such decision. 53 This is an interest complementary to that of original 
as a plaintiff in the proceedings, he might, after tender of an indemnity against costs, be made 
a defendant. The effect was that at common law where a promise was made to two or more 
persons jointly, it could be enforced by any of the promisees. This is certainly the case with 
regard to a promisee who has supplied any part of the consideration, and it was probably also 
the case where he had provided no part of the consideration; but there should be distinguished 
the situation of joint and several promisees". 
s3 Cf art 330 NCCP :«... si son auteur a interet pour la conservation de ses droits, a soutenir cette 
partie ... » and see 
TGI Paris, 21 Sept 1983, Gaz. Pal. 1984.51: "the interest of the third party 
consists in preserving its rights that may be compromised by the judgment, to prevent a contingent 
damage on his legal position"; ZPO art. 66: "a person with an interest in the success of one party in 
the action pending between other persons may join such party for the purpose of supporting him; 
Greek CCP art 80 "in case where a third party has legal interest for one of the original parties in 
pending proceedings to win, the third party has a right [... ] to intervene for this original party". 
The interest-threshold for permissive intervention is lower than that for compulsory intervention. 
Thus, permissive intervention does not require a direct pecuniary interest in litigation (Textile 
Workers Union gfAmerica vAllendale, C. A. D. C. 1955,226 F. 2d 765,96 U. S. App. D. C. 401). 
In Greece, the interest required for intervention, in accordance with CCP art. 86, is construed 
liberally: Kapaµ6 g-NiKa; -Kaýaßpög, Ep1KfloXA, ap6p. 80 and Ecpfctp. 470/1994, EkkAIK 
1995.704; however, a mere economic right is not enough: All 1184/1984, NoB 1985,797: no right 
for shareholders to intervene in proceedings in which the company takes part. 
For a compulsory intervention the intervenor must posses "a direct, significant legally protectable" 
interest, see Reich v ABC l ork-Estes Coip., 64 Fad 316,321 (7th Cir. 1995). regarding the 
application of US Fed Rul. 24(a): Securirr Ins. Co. of Hartford v Schipporeit, Inc., 69 F. 3d 1377. 
1380-81 (7th Cir. 1995). But still the intervenor as a matter of right need not have standing to sue 
one of the original parties: U. S. v Board of School Corn 'rs of City of Indianapolis, Ind.. C. A. 7 (Ind. ) 
1972,466 F. 2d 573: requirements for intervention in a pending proceedings should generally be 
more liberal than those for standing to bring suit. Dar i Sebelius, D. Kan. 2005.376 F. Supp. 2d 1022: 
intervenors need not show standing; see also. Carl Tobias, "Standing To Intervene" (1991) Wis. L. 
Rev.. p. 415. 
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parties, rather than a direct one. 54 Nevertheless, it is an interest sufficient for a third 
party to become involved in the proceedings between two original parties in 
proceedings and, therefore, it is an interest worthy of protection. 55 
Thus, with regard to false third parties of this group, third-party mechanisms are 
advisable but not necessary. Accordingly, national procedural laws provide for third- 
party mechanisms, which are, however, of permissive or ancillajw character. In 
particular, national laws usually provide for: 
" Common jurisdictional basis of optional character. 56 
9 Permissive intervention57 as opposed to intervention as of right. 
" Joinder58 of a proper party drafted in permissive terms, 59 as opposed to joinder 
of party necessary for the adjudication. 
" Consolidation 60 in permissive terms. 61 
sa Vincent-Guinchard, Procedure Civile, (27`h ed. 2003), para 1157. 
55 Cf French CCP art. 325: L'intervention n'est recevable que si elle se rattache aux pretentions des 
parties par un lien suffisant. 
sb EC Reg. 44/2001 art. 6, French CCP art. 42, Greek CCP art. 37. 
57 US Fed R. C. P. r. 24(b)(2). 
England CPR r. 19.2, particularly para (b). 
French CCP art 330 (intervention accessoire). 
German CCP s. 66. 
Greek CCP art. 80. 
Cf UNIDROIT r. 12 2. 
Different national provisions use different terms for this type of intervention: voluntary ancillary 
(France), simple ancillary (Greece), intervention of desirable party (England), permissive 
intervention (US). They are all of permissive character, though, In England there was a distinction 
between intervention as an absolute right and intervention in discretionary right, even before the 
new CPR; for the former see In re Metropolitan Amalgamated Estates, Ltd., (1912) 2 Ch. 497 
(receivership); for the latter see Re Fowler, 142 L. T. Jo. 94 (Ch. 1916). 
58 US Fed R. C. P. r. 20(a). 
England CPR r. 19.2. 
Germany CCP s. 60. 
Greek CCP art. 74. 
Cf UNIDROIT r. 12.1. 
Again different terms are found in different national provisions: for example permissive (US). 
joinder of desirable party (England), simple joinder (Greece). 
59 The court has a discretionary right rather than a duty to order a permissive joinder, even when all 
the formal requirements are met (AU 343/1971, EEN 1971.521), whereas once a party establishes 
all the prerequisites to intervention of a right, the district court has no discretion to deny the motion; 
see United States v Georgia, 19 F. 3d 1388,1393 (11th Cir. 1994)). 
60 US Fed R. C. P. r. 42. 
French CCP art. 367. 
German CCP. s. 147. 
Greek CCP 246. 
Cf UNIDROIT r. 12.5. 
61 See the wording of all the above provisions ("the court may order"); cf Kelly v Kelly, N. D. N. Y. 1996, 
911 F. Supp. 66 "Where there is common question of fact or law, cases may be joined in interests of 
efficiency, but consolidation is by no means a necessity": to the same effect Lloyd v Industrial Bio- 
Test Laboratories, Inc., D. C. N. Y. 1978.454 F. Supp. 807: and Williams r National Sur., C. A. 5 (Ala. ) 
1958.257 F. 2d 77 1: consolidation of several actions in the context of vertical construction contracts 
J 5q 
" Interpleading in permissive terms. 62 
Permissive third-party mechanisms are accorded to the relevant parties as a matter 
of discretion rather than duty. In addition, unlike the case in compulsory third-party 
mechanisms, national courts may not permit the application of permissive third-party 
mechanisms, if they decide that multiparty proceedings would not be beneficial in 
view of the circumstances of the particular case. 
63 In this instance, bilateral 
proceedings between the two original parties would go on and, therefore, the 
judgment would bind only the original parties in the proceedings. Multiparty 
proceedings are not compulsory with regard to third parties that have loose 
substantive links with an original party to the proceedings. 
64 
Also, even if the third party is brought in the proceedings between the original 
parties, the several co-claimants or co-defendants will retain a degree of procedural 
autonomy during the proceedings. 65 They will not merge into a procedural unit as 
would be the case when a third party is brought in the proceedings by reference to 
compulsory third-party mechanisms. The weak substantive links between original and 
false third parties of this group are echoed in their procedural relationship. 
is just a matter of discretion; similarly, International Paving Systems v Van-Tulco, E. D. N. Y. 1992, 
806 F. Supp. 17. 
62 US Fed. R. C. P.: art 14 (a), which even allows for cross claims between the third party and the 
original party, and (b). 
England CPR r. 19(2). 
French CCP art. 331(1). 
German CCP s. 72. Greek CCP art. 88. 
63 See for example US Fed. R. C. P. r. 24 (2): "On timely motion, the court may permit anyone to 
intervene", as opposed to r. 24 (1): "On timely motion, the court must permit anyone to intervene" 
64 Dunham v Robertson, C. A. 10 (Wyo. ) 1952,198 F. 2d 316: proper parties are those who have an 
interest in the subject-matter which may be conveniently settled in the suit, but whose presence is 
not essential to the determination of the controversy between the immediate litigants; and see too 
Jones Knitting v Pullen, S. D. N. Y. 1970,50 F. R. D. 311: parties who are jointly and severally liable 
are not indispensable parties but are proper parties who may be joined but who have no substantive 
right to compel joinder. 
65 Thus, it is possible that separate judgments are rendered against each joined defendant 
National Sur v City of Allentown, 27 F. Supp. 515 (E. D. Pa. 1939). Or, as is accepted in France, the 
consolidation of several proceedings by virtue of NCCP art. 367 does not merge the several parties 
or claims; see Civ. 2°d, 9 May 1985, Bull. civ. II, 93 and Vincent para 1166; cf also French NCCP 
art. 324: " les acts accomplis par ou contre Fun des cointeresses ne profitent ni ne nuisent aux 
autres... ". In the US, it is also accepted that consolidated proceedings are not merged: see Zdanok v 
Glidden. C. A. 2 (N. Y. ) 1964.327 F. 2d 944. holding that consolidation does not merge actions into a 
single cause. or change the rights of the parties, or make those who are parties in one suit parties in 
another, see also G. Virden, "Consolidation Under Rule 42 Of The Federal Rules Of Civil 
Procedure". 141 F. R. D.. p. 169. 
In the same vein, German CCP s. 61 provides for loose procedural relationships between the several 
co-parties after the joinder: "unless otherwise provided by the Civil Code or this Act. the joined 
have the status of individual parties vis-ä-vis the opposing party such that the actions of one of the 
joined parties shall not affect the others to their benefit or detriment"; it is indeed provided 
otherwise in art 62 with regard to the joinder of necessai parties, see above. The same provisions 
can be found in Greek CCP arts. 75-76. 
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Furthermore, the application of permissive third-party mechanisms, as opposed to 
compulsory ones, is subject to less stringent conditions. For permissive third-party 
mechanisms to apply, national procedural laws normally require that third party has 
either 
" Some interest66 in the dispute between the original parties; or 
" That the several claims arise out of the same transaction; 67 or 
" That the several claims arise out of a substantially similar factual and legal 
basis; 68 or 
" That there is a common question of law or fact or there is an issue involving the 
new party and an existing party, which is connected to the matters in dispute in 
the proceedings69 
As national courts have repeatedly found, the above condition for the application 
of permissive third party mechanisms are normally met without difficulty in the 
context of false third parties of the second group. Indeed, national courts will 
normally apply third-party mechanisms of permissive character to multiparty 
relationships where the several parties are contractually interrelated but not strongly 
associated in terms of rights and liability, i. e. co-liable or co-holder of rights and 
duties. 
Thus, for example, the US national courts have accepted the application of 
permissive intervention in the context of insurance contracts, holding that an insurer 
should be permitted to intervene in pending proceedings between a co-insurant and 
the insured pursuant to r. 24(b), but not as a matter of right 24(a). 7° It has also been 
held that an indemnitor may intervene in action against a principal debtor. Permissive 
intervention has also been accepted in the context of secured transactions, 71 
construction disputes72 and product liability. 73 Permissive joinder has also been 
accepted in the context of web-type construction contracts where an owner has direct 
66 For example French CCP art. 330 or Greek CCP art. 80, which is usually construed liberally, see 
above note (12 notes above) on the meaning of this interest. 
11 For example, US Fed R. C. CP. r. 20. 
11 For example. German CCP s. 60. 
61) For example English CPR 19(2). 
70 In United States Fire Insurance v Freedom Village Of Sun City Center. 2006 WL 1046946 
(M. D. Fla. ) Insurer's intervention as a matter of right was rejected also in Continental Cas v 
ZHA. M. D. Fla. 1994.154 F. R. D. 281. 
71 See Knapp i' Hankins. E. D. I1l. 1952.106 F. Supp. 43. 
72 Use of Automatic Sprinkler Coip. of America v Fidelity & Deposit. Md., M. D. Pa. 1958.22 F. R. D. 
248. 
71 See Sackmau i' Liggett Group, Inc.. E. D. N. Y. 1996.167 F. R. D. 6. 
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claims against both an engineer and an architect, at least in the alternative; 
74 or in the 
context of secured transaction where a creditor has direct claims against both a surety 
and a debtor. 75 
Finally, consolidation has been accepted in the context of secured transactions, 
76 
whereas interpleading has been accepted in the context of secured transactions77 and 
string construction contracts. 78 
74 In some jurisdictions joinder, even in the permissive form, will not be applicable in the context of 
string contracts or vertical construction contracts. This is because some national civil procedures 
require in order for two persons to be joined as co-defendants the claimant must have a direct claim 
(joint, several or, at least, in the alternative) against both of the co-parties (for example, in the US 
where r. 20 requires that co-parties are liable jointly, or severally or in the alternative, and in Greece 
where CCP art 74 requires a joint or a joint and several, in the least, liability, see Kcpaµsic-NiKuc- 
Kakaßp6;, EpsKIIo). A, ap9p. 74). So, the joinder of the contractor and the subcontractor (or the 
joinder of the seller and the manufacturer) will require that the owner (or the buyer) has a direct 
claim against both the contractor and the subcontractor. In that case the joinder will be possible only 
in the event of tortious or pass-through claims by the owner against the subcontractor or in the event 
of warranty (expressed or implied) liability of the manufacturer vis-ä-vis the buyer. 
See for example, Tyler v Dowell, Inc., C. A. 10 (N. M. ) 1960,274 F. 2d 890, where the second-tier 
subcontractor had a "hold-harmless agreement" with the contractor. The same will apply when there 
is a direct claim based on a bond: U. S. to Use of Par-Lock Appliers of New Jersey v J. A. J. Const., 
E. D. Pa. 1943,49 F. Supp. 85, affirmed 137 F. 2d 584: subcontractor was a `proper party' defendant to 
suit on general contractor's payment bond to recover balance due from the subcontractor's 
subcontractor for labor and materials furnished for construction of a public work. 
But see Mississippi Valley Structural Steel v Huber, Hunt & Nichols, D. C. I 1.1969,295 F. Supp. 139, 
where a second-tier subcontractor, who had no cause of action directly against the general 
contractor, was permitted to join, by virtue of US FRCP r. 20, with a first-tier subcontractor as 
plaintiff when it was alleged that the general contractor's breach of the contract with the first-tier 
subcontractor caused the latter's breach of his contract with the second-tier subcontractor and that 
the general contractor would ultimately be liable. This decision is criticized as erroneous by Wright 
and Miller§ 1656, "because the text of Rule 20 permits joinder only of plaintiffs asserting a right to 
relief against the defendant". 
Minneapolis Brewing v Merritt, D. C. N. D. 1956,143 F. Supp. 146: joinder of principal obligor and 
guarantor as defendants in the same action was permissible; the same Decatur Coca-Cola Bottling v 
Variety Vending, N. D. Ga. 1967,277 F. Supp. 393; Delia Plastering v D. H. Dave, N. D. Ohio 1951,11 
F. R. D. 304: where the surety company was liable jointly and severally with subcontractor on 
contract, surety company was a proper party to the action for breach of subcontract action within 
this rule; cf also Pierce Consulting Engineering v City of Burlington, Vt., D. C. Vt. 1953,15 F. R. D. 
23. 
See Williams 1' National Sur. Corp., C. A. 5 (Ala. ) 1958,257 F. 2d 771: actions by a subcontractor 
against a contractor for the unpaid balance of the contract price and claimed extras and by contractor 
against subcontractor's surety, which impleaded subcontractor, involved common issues of fact and 
law, and consolidation of such actions for trial was matter within trial court's discretion; 
International Paving Systems v Van-Tulco., E. D. N. Y. 1992,806 F. Supp. 17: action brought by a 
subcontractor's concrete supplier seeking payment from general contractor and sureties on public 
construction project would be consolidated with related action in which subcontractor's trustee was 
suing general contractor; both actions involved question of who was responsible for concrete's 
cracking; cf Cruickshank v Clean Seas. D. Mass. 2005.402 F. Supp. 2d 328: separate actions arising 
from damages caused by allegedly defective anti-fouling bottom paint for boats would be 
consolidated, since they involved common parties, all within the manufacture and sales chain, and 
nearly identical facts and some overlapping legal claims, and consolidation would substantially 
reduce judicial time and resources required to manage and try the two cases. 
77 See Commercial Credit Development Corp. v Scottish Inns of America, Inc., 69 F. R. D. 110 (E. D. 
Tenn. 1975) and Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 52 F. Supp. 177 (M. D. 
Ga. 1943): both held that interpleading by virtue of r. 14 is proper in a case where a surety or 
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In England joinder of a third party insurer's bureau as co-defendant was accepted 
in the proceedings between the person injured and the person responsible for the 
injury. 79 It was held that the bureau, which had an obligation under an agreement to 
pay all unsatisfied judgments against motorists was "plainly not `a person who ought 
to have been joined as a party'. 80 The bureau was, nevertheless, a party that should be 
joined in the proceedings so that "all matters in dispute in the cause or matter may be 
effectually and completely determined and adjudicated upon. "81 
In France, courts have accepted permissive intervention for a guarantor to 
participate in disputes between a debtor and a creditor. 
82 
In Greece interpleading has been accepted in the context of a guarantee, 83 an 
insurance company, 84 and in the context of vertical construction contracts. 85 
To sum up, when several parties are contractually interrelated but not strongly 
associated in terms of rights and liability, national procedural laws provide for an 
extensive legal framework of permissive third-party mechanisms. This permissive 
legal framework reflects the intensity of the substantive nexus between original and 
false third parties of this type: the latter are not strangers to the dispute between the 
original parties but they are not indispensable for the determination of the dispute 
either. 
guarantor seeks to enforce the liability of a principal who has agreed to indemnify him or her; 
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v National Sur. Corp., 434 F. Supp. 61 (E. D. N. Y. 1977) held the same 
based on the on the theory of subrogation: see also State ex rel. Neal v Johnson, 33 F. Supp. 850 
(W. D. Okla. 1940): If the original action is brought against the surety and the principal, the principal 
may implead another surety who has also furnished a bond guaranteeing faithful performance of the 
same duties. 
78 See Jeub v B/G Foods, 2 F. R. D. 238 (D. Minn. 1942); Tevington v International Milling, 71 F. Supp. 
621 (W. D. N. Y. 1945) and Altec v FWD, 399 F. 2d 860 (5th Cir. 1968), holding that the seller may 
seek indemnity up the chain of privity, by virtue of art 14 and impleading, through theories of 
warranty either implied or express. See also L. Warden "Right of retailer sued by consumer for 
breach of implied warranty of wholesomeness or fitness of food or drink, to bring in as a party 
defendant the wholesaler or manufacturer from whom article was procured" 24 A. L. R. 2d 913 
(Originally published in 1952), arguing that in the context of string contracts" the trend established 
[... ] is, clearly, that under modern practice statutes such an impleader is proper" at 913. Interpleading 
is liberally permitted in construction disputes in which a court wishes to determine in one action 
whether a material supplier, a subcontractor, or someone else on the site is responsible for the 
defects, see for example LASA Per L'Industria Del Marmo Societa Per Azioni of Lasa v Alexander, 
414 F. 2d 143 (6th Cir. 1969) and Westinghouse Elec. Supply v Nicholas, 28 F. R. D. 8 (D. Minn. 
1961). 
See Curtner v Circuit. [1968] 2 Q. B. 587 (CA). 
80 Under the Rules of Supreme Court Order 15, r. 6(2). 
81 Per Diplock L. J. at 601. 
82 Civ2e, 9 Octo. 1975, JCP 1977.1118580, note Martin Vincent-Guinchard, Procedure Civile, (27th ed. 
2003) para 991. 
83 See All 689/1964. NoB 1965,399. 
84 See AP 88/1984, ApyNop 1984,744. 
85 See EwAO 11789/1987 AprNou 1989.40. 
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8.3 CONCLUSIONS OF CHAPTER 8 
In the light of the above analysis it is concluded that: the procedural relationships 
between false third parties and original parties reflect their association in terms of 
substantive interests and liability. More specifically, the following scheme is 
established: 
0 In the first group of false third parties, where original and false third parties are 
strongly associated in substantive terms (typically co-liable or co-holders of rights 
and duties) 4 compulsory third-party mechanisms and close procedural 
relationships between the several co-parties will be provided by national litigation 
systems. 
0 In the second group of false third parties, where original and false third parties are 
contractually interrelated but not strongly associated (normally liable in the 
alternative rather than co-liable) 4 permissive third-party mechanisms and looser 
procedural relationships between the several co-parties will be provided by 
national litigation systems. 
The above general conclusion is subject to the considerable divergence of the 
various national laws. 86 Nevertheless, it is reasonable to argue that, in principle, the 
above conclusion qualifies as a general guideline on third-party mechanisms. 
Therefore, it will be used in the following chapters as the yardstick to examine 
whether third-party mechanisms can and should be applicable to international 
arbitration and, if yes, in which particular circumstances. 
In the US, the 1966 Amendments liberalised the procedural system with regard to the third-party 
participation into proceedings between original parties. For example the terms "indispensable" and 
"necessary" in the original r. 19 were substituted with the wider term "party needed", - or the 
condition of intervention found in the original r. 24(a)(2) that the third party "is or may be bound by 
a judgment in the action" was omitted (in general, see Advisory Committee Notes on art. 19 and 24). 
The 1966 Amendments have facilitated and expanded the application of third party mechanisms to a 
wider circle of persons. However, they have has not overturned the basic distinction between third 
party mechanisms of permissive character and those that are applicable as a matter of right. 
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CHAPTER 9: THIRD-PARTY MECHANISMS IN THE CONTEXT OF 
ARBITRATION AND THE PRINCIPLE OF PROCEDURAL PARTY 
AUTONOMY 
9.1 RELEVANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF PROCEDURAL PARTY AUTONOMY 
The focus of the discussion in this Chapter shifts from litigation to arbitration. The 
aim here is to determine whether third-party mechanisms should be applied to 
arbitration and, if yes, in which circumstances. The findings of the previous Chapter 
on the underlying principles and rationale of third-party mechanisms in general are 
tested here against the backdrop of the prevailing principles in arbitration specifically. 
Particular attention is focused on the principle of procedural party autonomy, 
according to which the parties have the freedom to choose the forum where they will 
have their disputes resolved and to determine the procedure applicable to the 
resolution of their disputes. Thus, procedural party autonomy gives the parties the 
right to regulate their procedural relationships in a way that best serves their 
commercial interests. 
The choice of procedural party autonomy as the most relevant principle for the 
discussion here was made for three main reasons: First, arguably, party autonomy is 
the most distinctive feature of arbitration, particularly in an international context 
where national considerations and, therefore, national mandatory rules are of less 
importance. 1 
Secondly, other key arbitration principles bear less relevance to the particular 
discussion of arbitration and third parties. As was demonstrated in Part II, the 
J. Lew, L. Mistelis and S. Kroell, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration. (Kluwer 
Arbitration Law 2003), para. 2-44: " party autonomy is the primary source of arbitration and the 
procedure. See also Fouchard. Gaillard and Goldman, On International Commercial Arbitration, 
E. Gaillard and J. Savage (eds) (Kluwer 1999), para 44 et seq. 
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principle of contractual origins of arbitration, for example, while important in other 
areas of arbitration, cannot deal satisfactorily with the problems relating to third 
parties. In fact, the discussion on third parties and arbitration pertains more to 
jurisdiction rather than contract law, and accordingly the principle of contractual 
nature of arbitration has limited relevance here. 
The same applies to the principle of confidential character of arbitration. The latter 
has a conspicuous role in arbitration, and references thereto are frequent even in the 
context of the discussion on third parties. 2 However, it is arguable whether 
confidentiality is an inherent conceptual feature of'arbitration. 3 Confidentiality is not 
ipso facto applicable to arbitration. Rather, it must be expressly provided by an 
arbitration agreement or the applicable arbitration rules. 4 It can be argued, therefore, 
that confidentiality does not have an institutional role in arbitration. This is not to 
suggest that confidentiality, particularly when the parties have expressly provided for 
it, has no bearing whatsoever on the discussion arbitration and third parties. On the 
contrary, whenever applicable, confidentiality will have a role to play, militating 
against the application of third-party mechanisms and the participation of third parties 
in bilateral proceedings which the original parties wanted confidential. However, 
compared to procedural party autonomy, confidentiality would only be one factor of 
relative importance, which tribunals should take into account among other factors in 
determining whether third-party mechanisms should apply to a particular case. 
Third, procedural party autonomy not only is an intrinsic characteristic of 
arbitration, but it is also directly relevant to the jurisdictional viewpoint taken by the 
thesis. As was explained in detail above, the thesis adopts a jurisdictional approach 
focusing on the jurisdictional implications of an arbitration agreement and the dispute 
pending before a tribunal for third parties. In this context, procedural party autonomy 
has a significant pertinence to the discussion here. This is because, procedural party 
autonomy, in effect, regulates the freedom of parties to allocate jurisdiction to the 
forum they think best for their commercial needs. In other words, procedural party 
autonomy is a jurisdictional tool, by which parties make jurisdictional arrangements 
for the resolution of their disputes. Therefore, procedural party autonomy more than 
2 Leboulanger, "Multi-contract arbitration" (1996) 13(4) J'Int'I Arb. 43, p. 65. Nichlish, "Multiparty 
Arbitration and Dispute Resolution in Major Industrial Projects" (1994) J' 1nt'I Arb 57, p. p. 69. 
3 See Lew-Mistelis-Kroell: "Without an explicit agreement between the parties there will be no binding 
obligation of confidentiality under most arbitration laws". supra n. 1, para. 8-45 and the judgment of 
the Swedish Supreme Court. 27 Oct 2000.51(11) MealeY's IAR. B 1, cited therein. 
4 Ideen. 
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any other arbitration principle constitutes the touchstone to determine whether third- 
party mechanisms, by nature jurisdictional, should apply to arbitration. 
9.2 PROCEDURAL PARTY AUTONOMY, AS A RULE, WILL PREVAILS OVER 
THIRD-PARTY MECHANISMS 
The key argument in this Chapter is that, as a rule, procedural party autonomy will 
prevail over third-party mechanisms. The right of the parties to opt for several 
bilateral arrangements rather than a single multilateral agreement for the resolution of 
their disputes should be observed. The scheme of several bilateral dispute resolution 
agreements should be uphold even against the background of a multiparty commercial 
project. Of course, this might result in jurisdictional fragmentation of the multiparty 
project with the several parties involved therein being subject to the jurisdiction of 
different adjudicatory fora. However, jurisdictional fragmentation should be accepted 
as a legitimate side effect of procedural party autonomy, which as a rule should 
prevail over third-party mechanisms. This is demonstrated by the following. 
Jurisdiction, in general is determined on the basis of personal connecting factors, 
usually by reference to the defendant's presence, domicile or residency. 5 In other 
words, jurisdiction is determined on the basis of the unique link between a particular 
court and a particular party. Thus, the rule is that every person will be tried on its 
"personal forum", that is a forum individually identified by reference to the personal 
characteristics of that party. It follows that jurisdiction, as a general rule, is 
determined on individual and party-oriented basis. 
However, third-party mechanisms contravene this rule. Third-party mechanisms 
confer jurisdiction on a single court over several parties, which otherwise would be 
subject to the jurisdiction of another court. ' 
For example, French New Code of Civil Procedure art. 42 provides that, when the 
claimant has a claim against several defendants which are subject to the jurisdiction of 
different courts, the claimant may bring a single claim against all the defendants 
In Germany, see ZPO s. 13 (residence) ; in France, see NCCP art. 42 (domicile): in England see s. 41 of 
the Civil Jurisdicion and Judgments Act 1982 providing for domicile. however, English traditional 
rules on jurisdiction provide for presence, see Morris, The Conflict of Laws, (6`h ed) (London Sweet 
& Maxwell 2005), para. 5-0001 et seq: in Greece see Greek CCP art. 22 (domicile); in the Context of 
European Regulation 44/2001 see art. 2 (domicile); cf also the NY CPLR s. 301 (Presence, or 
domicile). 
6 European Regulation 44/2001 art. 6. or French NCCP art. 42(2), German ZPO s. 36(1)(3), Greek CCP 
art 31(1). 
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before a single court, namely the court of the domicile of one of the several 
defendants. Thus, many of the several co-defendants will be brought before a court 
different from the court of their own domicile, i. e. their "personal forum". Jurisdiction 
for those defendants will not be determined on the basis of their personal connecting 
factors (personal domicile or residence or presence). In order for one court to resolve 
all the matters in dispute, the several defendants will have to be subject to the 
jurisdiction of a court other than their "personal forum". The principle of effective 
resolution of the dispute, here, takes precedence over the rule requiring that 
jurisdiction should be determined on a personal basis. 
Similarly, English Civil Procedural Rules (CPR) r. 19.2(2) provides that: 
"The court may order a person to be added as a new party if (a) it is desirable 
to add the new party so that the court can resolve all the matters in dispute in 
the proceedings; or (b) there is an issue involving the new party and an existing 
party which is connected to the matters in the dispute in the proceedings, and it 
is desirable to add the new party so that the court can resolve that issue". 
Here again, a person that is "connected to the matters in the dispute in the 
proceedings" will be added as a new party to proceedings before a court that most 
likely is not his "personal forum", namely the court that would have been sued at, 
were this party the only defendant. 
Likewise, English CPR r. 6.20(3) provides that service out of the English 
jurisdiction is permitted when: 
"A claim is made against someone on whom the claim form has been or will 
be served (otherwise than in reliance on this paragraph) and (a) there is 
between the claimant and that person a real issue which is reasonable for the 
court to try; and (b) the claimant wishes to serve the claim form on another 
person who is a necessary or proper party to that claim". 
Here, service out of the English jurisdiction will be permitted for a person 
considered necessary for the resolution of the dispute pending between two other 
parties. Thus, this "necessary person" will be subject to the jurisdiction of a court 
determined by reference to residence, presence or any other personal connecting 
factor of the original defendant, rather than by reference to his own residence, 
domicile or any other personal connecting factor. 
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The same applies for third-party mechanisms provided in other jurisdictions, such 
as the US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure r. 14 or r. 19, the EC Regulation 44/2001 
art. 6 or the German Civil Code of Civil Procedure s. 36(1)(3). In all the above cases, 
third-party mechanisms establish jurisdiction of a single court over several parties in a 
way that deviates from the rule according to which jurisdiction has to be determined 
on an individual basis, by reference to the personal connecting factors of the parties in 
the claim. Thus, in the context of third-party mechanisms jurisdiction is established on 
a multiparty basis, by reference to the pending dispute and its implications for third 
parties. Therefore, in third party mechanisms jurisdiction is determined on 
multilateral and dispute-oriented basis. 
Provided that certain conditions are met, this is, indeed, a legitimate deviation. 
However, it still remains a deviation, which allows the reasonable conclusion that 
third-party mechanisms establish the jurisdiction of a particular court on an 
exceptional basis. Third-party mechanisms, therefore, are exceptional in nature. 
Accordingly, the presumption should be for the determination of jurisdiction on a 
personal basis rather than on a multiparty basis. The presumption should be that 
jurisdiction would be determined on the basis of the personal connecting factors of 
the parties, rather than the pending dispute. Therefore, as a matter of general rule, 
third party mechanisms should apply only if exceptional circumstances exist. 
The same applies to arbitration. Here, an arbitration agreement constitutes the 
personal connecting link between the parties, which have entered into an arbitration 
agreement, and the specific arbitral tribunal determined therein. Jurisdiction, as a rule, 
should be determined on the basis of this personal jurisdictional factor, namely the 
arbitration agreement alone. The arbitral tribunal becomes, thus, the "personal forum" 
for the parties to an arbitration agreement. The same, of course, will apply when two 
parties enter into a jurisdictional agreement, which confers exclusive jurisdiction to 
the courts of a particular country, which, therefore, becomes the personal forum for 
the parties to the jurisdiction agreement. 
Consequently, whenever two parties enter into a valid dispute resolution 
agreement, jurisdiction will have to be determined on the basis of this agreement 
alone. Therefore, here again -as in the context of litigation- jurisdiction is determined 
on a individual and party-oriented basis. Therefore, in arbitration the way jurisdiction 
is established follows the general rule. 
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Thus, whenever several parties in the context of a multiparty commercial project 
conclude several bilateral dispute resolution agreements, jurisdiction will have to 
follow the general rule: it should be determined on an individual and party-oriented 
basis, namely on the basis of the several bilateral dispute resolution agreements alone. 
The scheme of several dispute resolution agreements of the parties is in accord with 
the general rule for the determination of the jurisdiction, and therefore this scheme 
should be presumed to have priority over any other mechanism providing otherwise. 
In particular, the scheme of the several bilateral agreements on jurisdiction should be 
presumed to have priority over the third-party mechanisms, in the context of which, 
jurisdiction is determined on a multilateral and dispute-oriented basis. For third-party 
mechanisms to overturn this scheme and bring all the parties before the same forum, 
exceptional circumstances must exist. 
Therefore, in principle, jurisdictional fragmentation of a multiparty commercial 
project, which may result from several bilateral jurisdiction arrangements, must be 
considered perfectly legitimate. The principle of procedural party autonomy, allowing 
the parties to make jurisdictional arrangements in a way that best serves their 
commercial interests, constitutes the rule and, therefore, it should take precedence 
over the third-party mechanisms that constitute the exception. 
This conclusion will apply a fortiori when, as in the majority of the cases, the 
scheme of several bilateral dispute resolution arrangements provide for exclusive 
arbitration or jurisdiction agreements, conferring exclusive power to a specific arbitral 
tribunal or the courts of a particular country. Consequently, it will be even more 
difficult for third-party mechanisms to apply here. In fact, only in rare exceptional 
circumstances will third-party mechanisms overturn procedural party autonomy in the 
context of arbitration. 
9.3 THIRD-PARTY MECHANISMS IN THE CONTEXT OF MULTIPARTY PROJECTS 
WHERE PARTIES ARE CONTRACTUALLY INTERRELATED BUT NOT STRONGLY 
ASSOCIATED IN SUBSTANTIVE TERMS 
The rule, that procedural party autonomy will prevail over third-party mechanisms, 
will particularly apply when, as in the majority of the cases, the parties in a multiparty 
project are contractually interrelated but not strongly associated in terms of interests 
and liability (the second group of false third-parties as defined in Chapter 2). As the 
following analysis will show, when several parties do not share rights or liability no 
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exceptional circumstances will exist in order to overturn the general rule, even if these 
parties are contractually intertwined. 
Here, the analysis is based on the findings of the previous chapter: as was shown 
there, third-party mechanisms of permissive character should be provided whenever 
the several parties are contractually interrelated but not strongly associated in terms of 
interests and liability. However, in terms of jurisdiction, third-party mechanisms of 
permissive character rank below in the hierarchy compared to procedural party 
autonomy. Therefore, they cannot overturn the scheme of several bilateral 
arrangements on jurisdiction of the several parties. 
This is accepted in many jurisdictions. For example, in England it is accepted that 
where there is an effective exclusive jurisdiction clause between two only of several 
interrelated parties the possibility of a multiplicity of proceedings will not necessarily 
prevent it being given effect.? 
In Credit Suisse First Boston (Europe) Ltd v MLC (Bermuda) Ltd, ' the defendant, 
MLC, concluded two bond purchase agreements with Credit Swiss Europe, which 
provided for exclusive jurisdiction of English courts. The defendant had a separate 
customer agreement with a US affiliate of Credit Swiss Europe, Credit Swiss US, 
which agreement contained no jurisdiction clause. Thus, the parties here had opted for 
bilateral jurisdictional agreements: MLC and Credit Swiss Europe were subject to 
exclusive jurisdiction of English courts, whereas MLC and Credit US were subject to 
the jurisdiction of the national courts of either Bermuda (the place of domicile of 
MLC) or the US (place of domicile of Credit Swiss US). 
When a dispute arose out of the sales agreement, Credit Swiss Europe commenced 
proceedings against the MLC before the English courts in accordance with the 
exclusive jurisdiction agreement. MLC responded by commencing legal proceedings 
against the Credit Swiss US and Credit Swiss Europe before the US courts. 
Credit Swiss Europe applied to the English courts for an anti-suit injunction to 
restrain MLC from going on with the US proceedings against the Credit Swiss Europe 
and the Credit Swiss US on the basis of the English jurisdiction clause contained in 
the purchase agreement. In addition, Credit Swiss Europe requested the English courts 
to join Credit Swiss US as a party to the action against MLC. The latter applied for a 
stay of the English proceedings in favour of New York. 
7 Civil Procedure, (The White Book). Brook (ed) (Sweet & Maxwell 2005) at 6.21.29. 
1 [1999] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 767. 
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The English court seised of the dispute had to look, among other issues, into two 
different options: the court could opt for multiparty proceedings, issuing an anti-suit 
injunction against MLC and joining Credit Swiss US to the English proceedings; 
alternatively the court could give effect to the exclusive bilateral agreement between 
Credit Swiss Europe and MLC and allow two parallel set of proceedings to go on 
before two different fora. The English Court, rightly, opted for the latter option. Rix 
J, held that: 
"On the other hand, where different agreements are entered into for different 
aspects of an overall relationship, and those different agreements contain 
different terms as to jurisdiction, it would seem to be applying too broad and 
indiscriminate a brush simply to ignore the parties' careful selection of palette 
[... ] [the dispute resolution clause] is part of a bilateral agreement between a 
seller and a buyer, and the disputes to which such an agreement may give rise 
are prima facie bilateral disputes. " 9 
Similarly, in the US it has been held that "the mere fact of a possibility of 
piecemeal litigation will not be enough to accept participatory proceedings. "' 0 In 
particular, in Snap-on Tools v Mason, " claimant and defendant had entered into a 
dealer agreement that included an arbitration agreement. After a dispute arose, the 
defendant filled court proceedings against the claimant and four other of employees of 
the claimant. The claimant filed for a motion to stay proceedings on the basis of the 
exclusive arbitration agreement. The defendant maintained that the dispute involved 
more persons than the defendant and the claimant, and, therefore, the exclusive 
arbitration agreement should surrender before the risk of multiplicity of proceedings. 
The Fifth Circuit, referring to decision of the Supreme Court in Moses H. Cone, 12 
noticed that the "desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation" was indeed one valid 
consideration that could be taken into account so that the arbitration agreement was 
not given effect and all the several parties were brought before the same court. 
However, this consideration was only one of exceptional character and would apply 
only in view of exceptional factual circumstances. These exceptional factual 
circumstances did not apply in the case at hand, and therefore the bilateral arbitration 
Ibid. at 777. 
10 See Snap-on Tools v Mason, 18 F. 3d 1261,1267 (5th Cir. 1994); see also Dean Witter Reynolds 1, 
Bvrd. 105 S. Ct. 1238,1242 (1985). 
i' 18 F. 3d 1261,1267 (5th Cir. 1994). 
12 460 U. S. 1.103 S. Ct. 927,74 L. Ed. 2d 765 (1983). 
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arrangement should prevail over multiparty proceedings. Accordingly, the Court 
making also reference to the federal policy favouring arbitration, gave effect to the 
arbitration agreement pointing out that 
"However, even if some piecemeal litigation does result, that sometimes is the 
inevitable result of a congressional policy strongly favoring arbitration"13 
In similar facts, the Supreme Court in Dean Witter Reynolds v Byrd, 14 gave effect 
to a bilateral arbitration agreement over third-party mechanisms, noting that 
"The Arbitration Act requires district courts to compel arbitration of pendent 
arbitrable claims when one of the parties files a motion to compel, even when 
the result would be the possibly inefficient maintenance of separate 
proceedings in different forums. By its terms, the Act leaves no room for the 
exercise of discretion by a district court, but instead mandates that district 
courts shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as to which an 
arbitration agreement has been signed. The Act's legislative history establishes 
that its principal purpose was to ensure judicial enforcement of privately made 
arbitration agreements, and not to promote the expeditious resolution of 
claims"15 
The Court, here, recognised the legitimacy and, indeed, supremacy of contractual 
bilateral dispute resolution arrangements and gave effect to the arbitration agreement. 
In all the above examples, the interrelation of the several parties in terms of 
interests and liability was not strong enough to warrant the application of third-party 
mechanisms of compulsory character. Most probably, in the context of litigation, the 
contractual interrelation of the several parties would only warrant the application of 
permissive third-party mechanisms, which could not overturn procedural party 
autonomy. 
Equally, in France permissive consolidation of two cases involving several parties 
is not possible when one of the two disputes falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of 
one court. 16 Also, in the same jurisdiction a party to court proceedings may interplead 
a third party and bring it before the court where dispute is pending between the two 
original parties, even if the third party would not be subject to the jurisdiction of this 
13 Ibid at 1266. 
14 105 S. Ct. 1238,1242 (1985). 
15 1240-1244. 
11 Vincent-Guinchard, Procedure Civile, (27th ed. 2003). para 464. 
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court. However, when an effective arbitration agreement exists between the third 
party and one of the original parties the permissive third-party mechanism of 
interpleading will not be applicable. 17 
The same applies in other civil law jurisdictions, such as Greece for example. 
Permissive joinder cannot be effected when two of the several parties are bound by a 
valid jurisdiction agreement. The parties' right to establish an exclusive bilateral 
forum overrides permissive third-party mechanisms. '8 
Similarly in the context of the Brussels Convention: 19 in Hough v P&O 
Containers, 20 the claimant brought an action in England against his employers, an 
English shipowning company, alleging that he was injured while working for them in 
a drydock in Germany. The defendants asked the court to join the German repairers as 
third parties to the action on the basis that the injuries of the claimant were the result 
of the negligence of the German repairers. The defendants relied on Art. 6(2) of the 
Brussels Convention providing that 
"A person domiciled in a contracting state may also be sued ... 
(2) As a third 
party in an action on a warranty or guarantee or in any other third party 
proceedings, in the court seised of the original proceedings" 
In view of the above provision. the defendants argued that the German repairers 
must be brought before the English courts, as a third party against which the 
defendants would have a claim in case the court decided for the claimant. 
However, the German repairers resisted the joinder relying on an exclusive 
jurisdiction agreement between them and the English shipowning company, which 
provided for exclusive jurisdiction of the German courts. 
The court held that third-party proceedings provided by Brussels Convention 6(2) 
were not applicable in this case, because of the existence of the exclusive jurisdiction 
agreement between the third party and the defendants. The exclusive jurisdiction had 
a mandatory character and it had to take priority over the permissive third-party 
mechanism provided by Brussels Convention art. 6(2). 
See French NCPC art. 333 and Com. 8 Nov. 1982, Gaz Pal. 1983. Pan. 99, note Guinchard. Art 333 
provides: « le tiers mis en cause est tenu de proceder devant la juridiction saisie de la demande 
originaire, sans qu'il puisse decliner la competence territoriale de cette juridiction, meme en 
invoquant une clause attributive de competence ». 
E pA6 5065/1987, (1988) NoB 356: E<pA6 10033/1995. (1996) E%ß, 4 1386. 
Superseded now by the Reg 44/2001. 
20 [1999] QB 834. 
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In the light of the above analysis two conclusions may be drawn: 
First, as a rule procedural party autonomy will prevail over third-party 
mechanisms. Therefore, a scheme of several bilateral arbitration agreements between 
several parties, which constitute an expression of procedural party autonomy, should 
be upheld even against the backdrop of multiparty relationships. The jurisdiction of a 
tribunal should be limited to those parties that have concluded an arbitration 
agreement, rather than extend to third parties. In jurisdictional terms, procedural party 
autonomy prevails over third-party mechanisms. 21 
Secondly, this rule will apply in the majority of the multiparty projects, and 
particularly when the several parties in a multiparty project are contractually 
interrelated rather than strongly associated in terms of interests and liability (the 
second group of false third-parties as defined in Chapter 2). In other words, where the 
substantive links between the several parties would only warrant the application of 
permissive rather than compulsory third-party mechanisms. Thus, in principle, false 
third parties of the second group, such as a guarantor or a subcontractor or a parent 
company would not be able to take part in the arbitral proceedings between a creditor 
and a debtor, or an employer and a subcontractor, or a subsidiary and its co- 
contractor. The association between a false third party of this type and a genuine 
party, in terms of substantive liability and interests, is not strong enough to warrant 
the participation of the false third party in the bilateral arbitration proceedings. Here, 
third party-mechanisms cannot apply and, therefore, the tribunal should not assume 
extra-contractual jurisdiction over false-third parties of this group. 
21 In fact, the application of permissive participatory mechanisms should be excluded a fortiori in the 
context of international arbitration. This is because of the clear pro-arbitration policy found in many 
jurisdictions. Parties are encouraged to conclude arbitration agreements, even if this would 
necessarily entail, in some cases, the jurisdictional fragmentation of interrelated relationships. 
Naturally, thus, in cases where an arbitration agreement is involved the courts will be even more 
reluctant to recognise participatory rights, at least of permissive character; instead, they will uphold 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal as established by a valid arbitration agreement, even 
if this would entail the jurisdictional fragmentation of an intertwined multiparty contractual 
relationship 
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CHAPTER 10: THE EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE THIRD- 
PARTY MECHANISIMS SHOULD APPLY IN ARBITRATION 
The previous chapter established the rule that procedural party autonomy should 
prevail over third-party mechanisms. As was noted, for third party mechanisms to 
overturn the scheme of several bilateral jurisdiction arrangements, bringing all the 
parties before the same forum, exceptional circumstances must exist. 
The aim of this Chapter is to determine those exceptional circumstances. It is 
suggested that third-party mechanisms should apply to arbitration whenever third 
parties are strongly interrelated with the parties to the arbitration, i. e. whenever third 
and genuine parties are co-liable or co-holders of rights and duties (as is typically the 
case in the first group of false third parties, defined in Chapter 2). In such a case the 
several parties (third and genuine) will constitute an inseparable unit in terms of 
jurisdiction. A tribunal should apply third-party mechanisms and assume extra- 
contractual jurisdiction over the whole jurisdictional unit of the several genuine and 
third parties. 
The Chapter first examines the fundamental role of the dispute in the determination 
of the jurisdiction of the tribunal when third parties are relevant to the resolution of 
the dispute (Section 10.1). It then sets out the conditions required for a tribunal to 
apply third-party mechanisms and assume extra-contractual jurisdiction (Section 10.2) 
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10.1 THE FUNDAMENTAL ROLE OF THE PENDING DISPUTE FOR THE 
DETERMINATION OF THE JURISDICTION OF A TRIBUNAL 
Chapter 7 showed that once a dispute arises, arbitration agreements cease to be 
ordinary contracts affecting only those persons that have agreed thereto. Rather, 
arbitration agreements have jurisdictional repercussions that may affect a circle of 
persons wider than that of the parties originally set out in the arbitration contract. 
Arbitration agreements provide tribunals with jurisdictional power similar to that of 
national courts. Therefore, it was argued that a tribunal should be able to assume as 
much jurisdiction as necessary to resolve the pending dispute effectively (the notion 
of effective arbitral jurisdiction). 
Once a dispute arises, there is a clear shift from the contractual to the jurisdictional 
characteristics of arbitration agreements. The dispute is the catalyst that "transforms" 
an arbitration agreement from an ordinary contract to an instrument with significant 
jurisdictional effects. Indeed, at the time of their conclusion, arbitration agreements 
are ordinary contracts. This is why their validity is determined in accordance with 
principles of contract law. However, once a dispute arises the jurisdictional effects of 
arbitration agreements start to take effect: jurisdiction of a tribunal is established over 
the specific dispute, excluding the jurisdiction of national courts. It follows that the 
jurisdictional effects of an arbitration agreement can only be produced in relation to 
and in the context of a specific dispute. Unless a specific dispute arises, it is 
impossible for a court or a tribunal to determine which forum would have jurisdiction 
over two parties bound by an otherwise valid arbitration agreement. Therefore, the 
jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal should always be determined in the light of the 
specific dispute at hand. 
This is not to argue that arbitration agreements have only jurisdictional 
characteristics. Their contractual origins remain present after a dispute arises. It is the 
original arbitration contract that sets out the contractual relationship out of which a 
dispute might arise at a later stage. It is the original arbitration contract that 
determines the principal goal of the tribunal that will be constituted at a later stage, 
namely the resolution of the dispute. ' Accordingly, the jurisdiction of a tribunal is 
founded upon the original arbitration contract: if it is found that an arbitration 
Cf EAA s. 1(a): "the object of the arbitration is to obtain the fair resolution of disputes... " (emphasis 
added). 
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agreement as an ordinary contract was never validly concluded, the jurisdiction of a 
tribunal will be automatically revoked. The award will be hollow. '` This is the 
fundamental difference between jurisdiction of national courts and jurisdiction of 
arbitral tribunals. The contractual origins of the jurisdiction of a tribunal remain 
always present, albeit latent. 
However, once a dispute arises and a tribunal is established in accordance with the 
arbitration contract, the tribunal obtains its own jurisdictional dynamic. The 
jurisdictional character of the arbitration agreement becomes preponderant and vests 
the tribunal with jurisdiction to resolve the dispute in the most efficient way. The 
resolution of the dispute becomes the ultimate goal of the tribunal, and, accordingly, 
the latter should be able to assume as much jurisdiction as is necessary to get 
effectively disposed of the dispute. 
It becomes clear from the above that the jurisdiction of a tribunal should be co- 
determined by both the arbitration agreement and the pending dispute. Otherwise, the 
jurisdiction of the tribunal will be truncated. Therefore, in terms of jurisdiction, it 
matters whether the dispute pending before a tribunal is inextricably tied up with a 
third party. In such a case, the arbitral tribunal should be able to assert its jurisdiction 
over the third party. Otherwise it would not be able to attain its primary goal: the 
effective resolution of the pending dispute. 
Therefore, whether a dispute between two parties to an arbitration agreement has 
any implications for any third party bears significant relevance to the discussion of 
arbitration and third parties. This conclusion is in line with the findings of the 
previous chapter on the way jurisdiction is determined, in general. As was shown in 
Section 9.2 jurisdiction as a general rule is determined on individual and party- 
oriented basis. The jurisdiction of an adjudicatory forum is established by reference to 
personal connecting factors relating to the parties in action. However, it was noted 
that when third parties are so inextricably involved in the dispute that their presence 
in the proceedings is considered necessary for the resolution of the dispute, 
jurisdiction will be determined by reference to the pending dispute and its 
implications for the third parties. In this case the jurisdiction of the adjudicatory 
forum will be determined on multilateral and dispute-oriented basis. Therefore, 
eventually whether jurisdiction will be determined on party-oriented basis or on 
2 CflvTY art. V(1)(a). 
17$ 
dispute-oriented basis depends on the dispute and its implications. It depends on the 
extent to which third parties are involved in the pending dispute. 
The same applies to arbitration. As a rule, the jurisdiction of a tribunal will be 
determined by reference to the arbitration agreements. Here the arbitration agreement 
between two parties will be the connecting factor relevant for the determination of the 
jurisdiction. However, when third parties to this arbitration agreement are inextricably 
involved in the resolution of the pending dispute, jurisdiction of the tribunal should be 
determined by reference to the pending dispute and its implications for the several 
parties. In this case too, the jurisdiction of the tribunals should be determined on 
multilateral and dispute-oriented basis. 
Therefore, the role of the dispute in the discussion relating to jurisdiction and third 
parties is fundamental. In order to determine the scope of its jurisdiction, a tribunal 
should not only focus on the arbitration agreement. It should also examine the 
pending dispute and its implications for any third party. 
10.2 CO-LIABILITY OR COMMUNITY OF RIGHTS BETWEEN THE SEVERAL 
PARTIES AS A THRESHOLD FOR EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL JURISDICTION AND 
THIRD-PARTY MECHANISMS 
The next step is to determine the circumstances under which a dispute pending 
between two parties will have implications for a third party, which will require the 
tribunal to assume jurisdiction over the third party. In other words, the next step is to 
determine the conditions for extra-contractual arbitral jurisdiction. 
It is submitted that a tribunal should assume extra-contractual jurisdiction by 
reference to the dispute only in case a third party is strongly associated with a genuine 
party to an arbitration agreement in terms of substantive rights and obligations. In 
particular, it is necessary that a third party is co-liable or co-holder of rights and 
obligations with one of the genuine parties to an arbitration agreement. Co-liability 
or community of rights and obligations between genuine and third parties will be the 
standards required for the tribunal to apply third-party mechanisms. As will be 
recalled, co-liability and community of rights and duties is the typical characteristic of 
the false third parties of the first group (described in Chapter 2). It should be noted 
that the typical examples of this group, examined in Chapter 2, do not constitute an 
exhaustive list of contractual relationships where third-party mechanisms will apply. 
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Eventually, it will be for an arbitral tribunal to determine whether the specific pending 
dispute has implications for a third party, which would warrant the application of 
third-party mechanisms. The aim of this study is to set out the principles for the 
application of third-party mechanisms, rather than to suggest a complete list of cases 
where third-party mechanisms must apply. 
Thus, in general the tribunal should assume extra-contractual jurisdiction in the 
exceptional circumstances where the presence of a third party in the pending dispute 
between two other parties is considered necessary, rather than merely desirable. As 
national courts have held, this will be accepted in rare cases, where, the multiplicity of 
proceedings would not merely cause inconvenience but it would, for example, 
" Cause the risk that "the interests of justice" are harmed; 3 or 
" Entail a "potential disaster from a legal point of view"; 4 or 
" Make the claims "virtually untriable"5 
This suggestion is in line with the findings of Chapter 8 on the underpinning 
principles of third-party mechanisms: whenever a third and a genuine party are 
strongly associated in terms of substantive interests and liability they will constitute a 
necessary jurisdictional unit, upon which third-party mechanisms of compulsory 
character should apply. In such a case, the third party is an integral part of the pending 
dispute between the two genuine parties, so that third-party mechanisms should apply, 
even at the expense of procedural party autonomy. 
3 Sinochem International Oil v Mobil, [2000] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 670, J. Rix refused to stay the English 
proceedings commenced on the basis of a jurisdictional agreement even if that had the risk of 
multiplicity of proceedings: see at 680 "I do not see in the mere possibility of the multiplicity of 
proceedings, should Sinochem Beijing choose to commence new proceedings in Hong Kong, a 
strong reason why in the interests of justice Sinochem London should be relieved [of a jurisdictional 
agreement establishing jurisdiction of the English courts]". Cf also Reichhold Norway ASA v 
Goldman Sachs International [1999] 2 All E. R. 174. 
However, see The Electric Furnace v Selas Corporation of America, [1987] R. P. C. 23, where the 
Court of Appeal adopted a liberal approach to the term "interest of justice", allowing a third party to 
be served out of jurisdiction despite the fact that it was not a necessary party to the action but merely 
a proper one; cf, however, the CPR r. 19.5 providing for the addition or the substitution of a party 
only when it is necessary. 
See Aratra Potato v Egyptian Navigation (The El Amria), [1981] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 119 (CA). LT 
Brandon, at p. 128: "I do not regard it merely as convenient that the two actions, in which many of 
the same issues fall to be determined, should be tried together; rather I regard it as a potential 
disaster from a legal point of view if they were not, because of the risk inherent in separate trials. 
one in Egypt and the other in England, that the same issues might be determined differently in the 
two countries". 
Mahavir Minerals v Cho Yang Shipping (The MC Pearl), [1997] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 566, J Rix at 569: 
"It seems to me that so far the plaintiffs have shown strong cause why the jurisdiction clause should 
not be enforced. This is indeed a paradigm case for the concentration of all the relevant parties' 
disputes in a single jurisdiction. If in such a case a host of different jurisdiction clauses were to be 
observed, the casualty at the root of the action would become virtually untriable". 
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This close association in substantive terms between a third and genuine party to an 
arbitration agreement may result from 
" First, the particular contractual arrangements between the several parties; or 
" Second, the substantive law applicable to dispute 
10.2.1 First: co-liability resulting from the contractual arrangements of the 
several parties 
Based on the principles of party autonomy and contractual freedom, several parties 
are free to conclude several bilateral contracts with interrelated contractual terms, 
resulting in common rights or co-liability between the several parties. This is 
particularly the case, when the several contracts contain cross-references, setting out 
cross-contract rights and duties, namely rights and duties owned by parties to one 
contract vis-ä-vis parties to another contract. 
Cross-contract rights and duties may well jurisdictional repercussions: the several 
parties to different, albeit intersected contracts, might constitute a necessary 
jurisdictional unit. The Sinochem International Oil (London) Co Ltd v Mobil Sales 
and Supply Corp. 6 case in the context of jurisdiction agreements exemplifies how 
contractual arrangements between several interrelated parties might have 
jurisdictional repercussions. Sinochem London sold crude oil to Mobil Delaware. 
Their contract provided for jurisdiction of the English courts and the application of 
English law (the English contract). The buyer, Mobil Delaware, admitted the sum due 
under the English contract but it claimed to set off sums allegedly due under a 
different contract between Mobil Oil Hong Kong (an affiliate of Mobil Delaware) as 
sellers and Sinochem Beijing (an affiliation of Sinochem London) as buyers. The 
contract between the two affiliates provided for jurisdiction of the Hong Kong courts 
and the application of Hong Kong Law (the Hong Kong contract). 
Clause 18 in the English contract between the two parent companies expressly 
provided: 
"Non-Performance 
All payments under this agreement shall be made without set-off or 
counterclaim and will not be subject to any conditions except as provided in 
the following: 
1 [2000] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 670. 
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Notwithstanding any other provisions of this or any other contract between the 
parties or their affiliates, in the event any party ('the non-performance party') 
shall default in the payment the other party ('the performing party') shall have 
the right to set-off, counterclaim or withhold payment in respect of any default 
by the non-performing party or any affiliate of the non-performing party under 
this agreement or any other agreement between the parties or their affiliates ... " 
When Sinochem London filed a lawsuit against Mobil Delaware for the 
outstanding price before the English courts, which had exclusive jurisdiction on the 
basis of the jurisdiction agreement contained in the English contract, Mobil Delaware 
applied for permission to serve out of the jurisdiction Sinochem Beijing as a 
necessary or proper party to the existing proceedings. Sinochem Beijing and 
Sinochem London challenged the jurisdiction of the English courts with regard to the 
former: Sinochem Beijing was neither a party to the English contract nor a party to 
the jurisdiction agreement concluded exclusively between Sinochem London and 
Mobil Delaware. 
Thus, the English Commercial Court seized of the dispute was faced with a rather 
complicated situation of conflicting jurisdictions: the several parties (the two parent 
and the two affiliate companies) had contractually established two separate 
adjudicatory fora with exclusive jurisdiction. In particular, they had established one 
forum in England with jurisdiction to resolve disputes between the two parent 
companies and another forum in Hong Kong with jurisdiction to resolve disputes 
between the two affiliates. However, because of the substantive interaction of the two 
contracts, the dispute between the two parent companies, falling under the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the English courts, was inextricably involving the affiliates. The 
question before Rix J was, thus, whether the jurisdiction of the English courts, before 
which proceedings had been commenced between the two parent companies, should 
be extended to the affiliates. 
In order to determine the boundaries of the jurisdiction of the English courts, Rix J. 
focused on the pending dispute between the two parent companies. Clause 18 of the 
English contract expressly provided for cross-contract duties and rights between the 
two parent companies parties to the English contract and the two affiliates parties to 
the Honk Kong contract. Thus, the two affiliates, although not parties to the English 
jurisdiction agreement, were directly involved in the contractual arrangements set out 
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in the English contract. Therefore, they were integral parts of the dispute that arose 
out of the English contract. By reference to clause 18 in the English contract, the sum 
due by Mobil Delaware to Sinochem English could be set off against the sum due by 
Sinochem HK against Mobil HK. Consequently, Mobil Delaware and its affiliate 
Mobil H. K. were potentially co-holders of the claim against Sinochem HK under the 
HK contract, while Sinochem England and its affiliate Sinochem HK were potentially 
co-liable for the price due by the latter against the Mobil H. K under the HK contract. 
Thus, there was a discrepancy between the scope of the dispute pending before the 
English courts and the scope of the English jurisdiction agreement: due to the specific 
contractual arrangements the dispute necessarily involved parties falling outside the 
scope of the English courts, which was the forum with the exclusive jurisdiction to 
resolve the dispute. More generally, there was a discrepancy between the substantive 
terms and the jurisdictional terms of the contractual arrangements of the several 
parties. 
Rix J rightly accepted that the jurisdiction of English courts should be determined 
not only by reference to the English jurisdiction agreement but also by reference to 
the specific dispute at hand. Since the affiliates were inextricably involved in the 
dispute at hand, the jurisdiction of the English courts, stemming from the English 
jurisdiction agreement, should be also asserted over the affiliates, despite the fact that 
the latter were not a party thereto. In essence, it was accepted that whenever several 
parties are strongly interrelated in contractual terms, they should be treated as a 
jurisdictional unit. 
Rix J, noted: 
"I come to that conclusion the more readily when I bear in mind that Sinochem 
Beijing is only nominally a different party from Sinochem London, and that the 
latter is of course not only already a party to these proceedings but is the 
claimant in them. I am naturally conscious that Sinochem Beijing has a 
separate legal persona from Sinochem London, and is incorporated in a 
different and foreign jurisdiction. Nevertheless, not only are Sinochem London 
and Sinochem Beijing associated companies, all part of the Sinochem group of 
companies, but the special set-off clause contained in the English contract 
emphasizes just how closelv the contracts of such affiliate companies are to be 
regarded for present purposes. In other words, I think that I am entitled to 
IS-) 
consider the two Sinochem companies as being in a very real sense,. for the 
purposes of the dispute which arises out of the English contract, one entity" 
(emphasis added). ' 
In that way, one forum will have jurisdiction over the whole dispute and, thus, the 
discrepancy between the substantive and procedural arrangements of the several 
parties will be rectified. The jurisdictional arrangements should in effect follow the 
substantive arrangements of the parties, since the latter constitute the primary 
contractual goal of the parties. In this way a functional equilibrium between the 
substantive and procedural aspects of the same multiparty relationship will be re- 
established. In the words of Rix J: 
" it seems to me that I am at least entitled to regard the parties as acting with at 
any rate assumed knowledge of their inter-group contractual relationship and 
as having intended the consequences of their agreement. It follows, therefore, 
that I must regard the English contract as having been agreed in its form, 
containing as it does both its special set-off clause and its exclusive English 
jurisdiction clause, against the general background that a contract between 
affiliates such as would trigger- off a right of set-off under the set-off clause 
might well contain its own jurisdiction clause, as well as against the specific 
background that at the time the English contract was entered into the potential 
dispute arising out of the non-payment under the Hong Kong contract had 
already arisen. In such circumstances, to stay an action under the English 
contract on the basis that it involved a dispute under an affiliates' contract 
which could or even should more appropriately be litigated in another forum 
would be to disregard the carefully balanced agreement which the parties to 
the English contract had seen fit to make. "' 
A similar approach was taken by the ICC tribunal in the case 5894 of 1989,9 in the 
context of arbitration agreements. A bank signed a finance agreement with a French 
company (the parents' agreement). The agreement set out a financing scheme through 
leasing in several countries and it contained an ICC arbitration clause. The framework 
finance agreement was followed by a separate agreement between a US subsidiary of 
7 Ibid. at 680. 
Ibid, at 679. 
Partial award. 2 (1991) 2 ICC Bull., p. 25. 
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the bank and a US subsidiary of the French company (the subsidiaries' agreement). 
The bank and two of its subsidiaries commenced arbitration proceedings against the 
French company and its French subsidiary for sums payable by a US subsidiary of the 
French company to the claimant bank. The respondents, the French company and its 
French subsidiary, alleged that the claim could only be brought by the US subsidiary 
of the claimants against the US subsidiary of the French company, respondent. 
The tribunal noted that the framework agreement between the two parent 
companies provided for rights and obligations not only for parent companies but also 
for their subsidiaries (cross-contract rights and obligations): 
"the framework agreement... provides in its Article VII that all local 
agreements will proceed from it; [... ] Article VIII of the [second] agreement 
applicable to US operations, of which it has already been said that it made 
express references to the [framework] agreement, provides that it will 
terminate immediately if notice of termination of the latter is given. " 
Because of the close interrelatedness between the two agreements, the dispute 
before the tribunal was inextricably involving third parties to the arbitration 
agreement, which provided the foundations of the tribunal's jurisdiction. Thus, the 
tribunal held that it could assume jurisdiction over those third parties that were 
inextricably involved to the dispute. Here as in the Sinochem case, the several 
intersected contractual arrangements were cross-contract rights and obligations 
between the several parties. The several parties were co-liable or co-holders of the 
same rights. Hence, the several parties from the separate contracts constituted a 
jurisdictional unit, over which the tribunal could assume jurisdiction in order to 
resolve the dispute inextricably involving all of them. 
In ICC case no 8817 of 1997,10 the tribunal took a different approach. Here, two 
Danish companies entered into a distribution agreement with a Spanish company. The 
contract contained an ICC arbitration clause. The two Danish companies were 
subsequently bought by X, which terminated the distribution agreement with the 
Spanish company. The latter commenced ICC arbitration proceedings against X, 
claiming damages for unjustified termination of contract. In addition, the Spanish 
company claimed from X certain sums allegedly owed to the claimant by a US 
subsidiary company of X, XX. The Spanish company alleged that although XX was 
1° (2000) 25 YBCA 355. 
185 
not a party to the distribution agreement, and, therefore, to the arbitration agreement, 
the claim for the outstanding sum owed to the claimant by XX was coming out of the 
distribution agreement. The claimant explained that the policy of X was to lower its 
credit towards the Spanish company, and to establish a credit of Spanish company 
vis-ä-vis XX. 
The arbitrator, however, took a strict contractual approach to the jurisdictional 
issue at hand and applied principles of the `group of companies' doctrine. In 
particular, the tribunal examined whether XX was a party to the distribution and, thus, 
to the arbitration agreement by reference to the intention of the parties: 
"The sole arbitrator notes that the effect of an international arbitration 
agreement may extend to other legal entities belonging to the same economic 
group even if they have not signed the agreement at issue. This possibility 
exists where the interests of the various companies of the group are closely 
linked and these companies intend to act jointly. Further, the arbitration 
agreement must show the intention of the parties to apply it to all companies of 
the group, which participate in the execution of the contract. X did not object 
to the application of the arbitration agreement signed by other legal entities. 
However, we cannot infer from the fact that XX was a customer of [the 
Spanish company] that it was also a party to the execution of the exclusive 
distributorship contract which contains the arbitration agreement. " 1 
(emphasis added) 
Therefore the arbitrator refused to assume jurisdiction over XX. It is questionable 
the tribunal took the right approach. Instead, it should have looked, at least prima 
facie, into whether the contractual arrangements between the several parties had 
established a scheme through which X and XX, where co-liable vis-ä-vis the 
claimant. Due to the specific contractual arrangements between the several parties the 
claimant had a claim against a third party (XX) arising out of the distribution 
agreement, containing the arbitration agreement. Thus, the tribunal should have 
focused on whether this claim was an integral part of the pending dispute, rather than 
whether XX, in accordance with the intention of the parties, was to be a party to the 
arbitration agreement. If the dispute between the claimant and the respondent had 
significant implications for the third party, subsidiary of the respondent, the tribunal 
" Ibid. para 44. 
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should have assumed jurisdiction over the third party in order to be able to resolve the 
pending dispute effectively. 
In ICC 5103 of 1988,12 the tribunal examined both the potential liability of the 
several claimants and respondents, and the intentions of the parties in order to 
determine whether it had jurisdiction over third parties. 
On the one hand, the tribunal found that the pending dispute was inextricably 
related to all the several claimants and the several respondents, and, therefore, 
genuine and third parties were, at least potentially, jointly and severally liable vis-ä- 
vis the other party: 
"... the reliability of international commercial relations demands that this 
economic reality be taken into account and that all the companies in the group 
be held jointly and severally liable for the debts from which they have directly 
or indirectly profited" 
On the other hand, however, the tribunal took a contractual approach reference to 
the `group of companies' doctrine, noting that: 
"[all] claimants appear to have been at the time of the conclusion, 
execution, non-execution and re-negotiation of their contractual links with 
the [defendants], genuine partners to all these contracts, by the common 
will of all the parties to the proceedings". (emphasis added) 
Based on the above, the tribunal assumed jurisdiction over all the several claimants 
and respondents, although not all them were parties to the arbitration agreement. 
10.2.2 Second: co-liability resulting from the applicable substantive law 
Two or more persons can be co-liable or co-holders of rights and obligations by 
virtue of express legal provisions rather than several interrelated contracts. For 
example, national laws generally provide that partners in the same legal entity will be 
co-liable on contracts entered into by the firm: 13 or that the maker, the acceptor or 
12 2 (1991) 2 ICC Bull., p. 20. 
13 See Chapter 2.1 above for more details. For example, in the US, section 15 of the Uniform 
Partnership Act provides that partners are liable jointly and severally for tort or breach of trust, but 
jointly on partnership contracts: see also Bullis v Bear, Stearns & Co Inc, 553 N. W. 2d 599 (Iowa 
1996). 
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indorser of the same negotiable instrument will be co-liable vis-ä-vis the holder of the 
instrument. 14 
As was explained in detail in Chapter 2, co-liability is the main characteristic of 
the false third parties of the first group. The rule for the several parties belonging to 
the second group is that they are contractually interrelated but not co-liable. It was 
demonstrated, for example, that in the context of string construction contracts, a 
contractor and a subcontractor will not be co-liable vis-ä-vis an employer. Equally, an 
employer and a contractor will not be co-liable vis-ä-vis a subcontractor. The same 
applies to web-type construction contracts: an architect and a contractor will usually 
be liable in the alternative, rather than co-liable vis-ä-vis an employer. Similarly a 
guarantor and a debtor will not usually be co-liable vis-ä-vis a creditor. Finally, the 
principle of separate legal liability is the prevailing rule in the context of group of 
companies, so that liability from a contract concluded by one company will not be 
shared with other companies in the same group. 
However, exceptionally, even the above parties might be co-liable, by reference to 
some national laws. For example, French law15 and the law of some countries'6 
influenced by French law provide that, under certain conditions, a sub-contractor may 
have a direct action not only against a contractor but also against an employer. The 
same is argued in Swiss law, although not expressly provided by law. 17 In such a case, 
employer and contractor would be co-liable vis-ä-vis the sub-contractor by reference 
to the relevant provisions of the applicable national law. Therefore, the employer 
In England see the Partnership Act 1890 s 9; The liability of the partners of a firm on contracts 
entered into by the firm is joint, not joint and several cf also Halsbury's, Laws of England, (Lexis 
Nexis Butterworths 2007), para 1083. 
'a E. g. promissory notes, bills of exchange, bonds etc. 
In the US, see section 3-118(e) of the Uniform Commercial Code that provides that "unless the 
instrument otherwise specifies" two or more persons who sign commercial paper as maker. acceptor 
or drawer or indorser and as part of the same transaction are jointly and severally liable. 
In England, the makers of a promissory note may be liable on it either jointly, or jointly and 
severally, according to the tenor of the note; but the acceptors of a bill of exchange can only be 
liable jointly: see the Bills of Exchange Act 1882 ss 6(2), 85; cf Halsbury's, ibid, para 327. 
15 Law No. 75-1334 of December 31,1975. See further on this, C. Seppala, "French Law on 
Subcontracting" [1991] ICLR, p. 78. 
See for example. Algerian Code art. 565. Egyptian Code art. 662, Libyan Code art. 661. 
17 See F. Chaix and S. Marchand, "The right of Recourse of an Employer against a Subcontractor", 
(1998) 15 ICLR, p. 21: they argue that the Code of Obligations art. 339(3) ("if the agent has 
assigned the obligation to a third person (... ) the Principal may bring any claims which he has 
against his agent directly against the third person") regulating the relationships between agent- 
principal and the third party should be applied by analogy to the contractors for work and materials. 
Swiss law, however, expressly provides for a direct action of the owner against the subtenant art. 
Swiss Code of Obligations 262 (3). cf also Swiss Supreme Court ATF 120 II 112). 
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would be inextricably involved in the dispute between the contractor and the 
subcontractor, which in turn means that employer and contractor would constitute a 
necessary unit in jurisdictional terms. Even if there is an arbitration agreement 
between the contractor and the subcontractor, the tribunal should in this case be able 
to assume jurisdiction over both the contractor and the employer in order to dispose of 
the claim of the sub-contractor. 
International tribunals have assumed jurisdiction over parties not bound by an 
arbitration agreement on the basis of common rights or co-liability between a third 
and a genuine party, provided directly by the applicable substantive law. 
The most characteristic example is the preliminary ICC award in Westland 
Helicopters. " Westland, a UK company, entered into a `Shareholders Agreement' 
with the Arab Organisation for Industrialisation (AOI) comprised by four Arab States. 
The shareholders agreement provided for a `joint stock company' (The Arab British 
Helicopters Company - ABH). The agreement contained an ICC arbitration clause. 
Westland commenced ICC proceedings against the four Arab States and the AOI. The 
four Arab States contested the jurisdiction of the tribunal on the grounds that none of 
them was a party to the arbitration agreement. The tribunal held that it had jurisdiction 
not only over the AOI but also over its members, based on principles of general 
partnership: 
"A partner is bound by the arbitration clause, entered into by a general 
partnership (Societe en nom collects of which he is a partner, and the co- 
contracting party may rely upon the arbitration clause if he brings his action 
against the partner instead of bringing it against the partnership" 19 
The tribunal put emphasis on the common obligations arising out of the partnership 
between the several respondents, provided by the applicable substantive law: 
"The question whether the four States are bound by the arbitration clause 
concluded by the AOI in its own name (Shareholders Agreement contracted 
with Westland, clause 12.1) is exactly the same as the substantive law question 
whether the four States are bound in general by the obligations contracted by 
the AOL If the obligations under substantive law flowing from the 
Shareholders Agreement are obligations not only of the AOI, but also of the 
Preliminary award in ICC case no 3879, (1986) 11 YBCA 127. 
19 Ibid, Para 5. 
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four States, if the locus standi to conduct the defence in relation to those 
obligations can be attributed not only to the AOI, but also to the four States, 
then the latter are therefore bound by the arbitration clause, just as they might, 
had they been summoned before an ordinary Court, have availed themselves of 
this clause as a ground in their defence. ' 20 
In effect, the tribunal noted that an arbitration agreement is not the sole factor to be 
taken into account by a tribunal, when determining its tribunal. Attention should also 
be focused on the nexus of the substantive contractual commitments of all the parties 
involved in the pending dispute, as this nexus is determined by reference to the 
applicable substantive law: 
"The mandatory force of the arbitration clause cannot be dissociated from that 
of the substantive contractual commitments; the reply to the question as to 
whether the four States are bound by the acts of the AOI must always be the 
same, whether the procedural aspect of the arbitration clause is involved or that 
of the substantive law concerning the financial obligations of the four 
States. "21 
The award was set aside by the Swiss Federal Court, 22 which took the view that 
AOI was a public international law entity and, therefore, Swiss principles of general 
partnership regarding private law entities could not apply to the public law 
Organisation. In effect, the disagreement between the Swiss Federal Court and the 
arbitral tribunal was on which law was applicable to the shareholders agreement. The 
Swiss Federal Court held that international law should be applicable, while the 
tribunal held that private law principles would apply to the dispute, even though the 
context arose in the context of public international law. However, there is nothing to 
indicate that the Swiss Federal Court would not have accepted that the tribunal would 
have had jurisdiction over the third parties, should AOI and the Arabian States were 
private law entities, in which case Swiss principles of general partnership would 
apply. 
20 Ibid para 7. 
21 Idem. 
2: (1989) Rer. Arb. p. 525; (1991) 16 F. B. Corn. Arb. p. 180. 
I90 
In ICC case no 9762 of 2001,23 a contractor commenced arbitration against, among 
others, the Ministry of Agriculture and Food of state Z that had singed an agreement 
contained the arbitration agreement, and State Z that was not a party to that arbitration 
agreement. The tribunal assumed jurisdiction over both respondents, making 
reference to the fact that both respondents were responsible and liable vis-ä-vis the 
claimant. The tribunal noted that: 
"The right of a claimant to act against all possible responsible subjects cannot 
be denied. "24 
and that 
"no distinction can be made between the liability of first respondent [the 
Ministry] and third respondent [State Z] (if any). "25 
As far as arbitration rules are concerned, only Vienna Arbitration Rules of the 
Austrian Federal Economic Chamber-26 make express reference to the substantive law 
applicable to the merits as a factor that the tribunal should take into account in 
asserting jurisdiction over parties not bound by the arbitration agreement as an 
ordinary contract. More specifically, Vienna Rules Art ? 0(l)(a) reads: 
"Multiparty Proceedings 
23 (2004) 29 Y. B. Com. Arb., p. 26. 
24 Ibid, para 55. 
25 Ibid, para 58. It should be noted, however, that it is not clear whether the shared liability of the 
Ministry and the State, was the main basis for the tribunal to assume jurisdiction over the latter. At 
some point the tribunal seems to take a traditional contractual approach to the issue of the 
jurisdiction, implying that the Ministry was acting also an agent, on behalf of the State, so that the 
latter was bound by the arbitration agreement, as a contract, on the basis of representation. The 
tribunal mentioned that: 
"The binding effect of the arbitration agreement against parties who did not sign it is a 
question widely discussed both in doctrine and in jurisprudence. It is generally accepted that if 
a third party is bound by the same obligations stipulated by a party to a contract and this 
contract contains an arbitration clause or, in relation to it, an arbitration agreement exists, such 
a third party is also bound by the arbitration clause, or arbitration agreement, even if it did not 
sign it. In other words, the mandatory force of the arbitration clause (or arbitration agreement) 
cannot be dissociated from that of the substantive contractual commitments. This may be the 
case of companies belonging to the same 'group of companies', whenever there is a sufficient 
evidence of the global liability of the 'group'. This may be the case of an individual partner 
being bound by an arbitration clause signed by a general partnership. This may also be the case 
of States when engaging in transactions of an economic nature through one of their 
administrative bodies, or even through a separate legal entity provided, in this last case, that 
the State has full control over it and is bound by the acts of it" ibid, para 49- 55. 
11 With effect from I January 2001. 
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1. A claim against two or more Defendants shall be admissible only if the 
Centre has jurisdiction for all the Defendants and in case of proceedings 
before an arbitral tribunal if all Claimants have nominated the same 
arbitrator, and: 
a. If the applicable law positively provides that the claim is to be 
directed against several persons" 
Vienna Rules art. 10(l)(b)-(e) list four more cases where a tribunal may proceed 
with multiparty proceedings, all of which are based on the express or implied consent 
for multiparty arbitration of all the relevant parties. For example, in accordance with 
art. 10(l)(b), multiparty proceedings may be held "if all parties are bound by the same 
arbitration agreement"; or in accordance with art. 10(l)(c) "if the admissibility of 
multiparty proceedings has been agreed upon". By contrast, under art. 10(l)(a), 
multiparty proceedings are based on the fact that the law applicable to the merits 
expressly implicates several parties to the dispute, rather than on unanimous consent 
of all parties to an arbitration agreement. Accordingly, by virtue of Vienna Rules 
art. 10(l)(a), the tribunal may assert jurisdiction over all persons co-liable even if 
some of them are not be bound by the arbitration agreement. 
Art. 10(1)(a) will only apply whenever several co-respondents are co-liable 
("... the claim is to be directed against several persons"). It does not seem to cover the 
case where several co-claimants are co-holders of the same rights against the same 
respondent or against several co-respondents Nonetheless, it takes the right approach 
to the issue of multiparty proceedings: on the one hand, it provides for multiparty 
proceedings on the basis of multiparty consent; on the other hand, it recognises the 
jurisdictional dimension of arbitral tribunals and puts emphasis on the dispute and 
the law applicable to the merits. 
It is suggested that the adoption of analogous provisions by other popular 
arbitration rules would offer an effective solution to the complicated issue of 
multiparty proceedings in arbitration. 
In the light of the above, the parties' choice on the substantive applicable law 
becomes crucial not only with regard to the determination of their contractual rights 
and duties, but also with regard to the jurisdiction of the tribunal. 
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10.2.3 No lower threshold than co-liability or community of rights and duties 
warrants extra-contractual jurisdiction and third-party mechanisms 
As showed above the threshold for a tribunal to assume extra-contractual 
jurisdiction is community of rights or co-liability between a party to an arbitration 
agreement and a third party thereto. Only then, third and genuine party will constitute 
an inseparable unit in terms of jurisdiction. Therefore, community of rights and co- 
liability between a genuine and a third party constitutes a limitation for the tribunal to 
assume extra-contractual jurisdiction through the application of third-party 
mechanisms. 
Accordingly, other sort of considerations, such as a general policy to avoid 
multiplicity of proceedings over the same factual and legal issues, will not warrant 
extra-contractual jurisdiction. As was shown in Chapter 8, procedural systems in the 
context of litigation provide for third-party mechanisms when several actions, 
pending before several courts between several parties, involve a common question of 
law or fact. `? However, as was explained, in such a case third-party mechanisms of 
permissive character will usually be provided. Third-party mechanisms may apply for 
reasons of procedural convenience, rather than because the several actions cannot be 
tried separately. The several parties in this case will not constitute a necessary 
jurisdictional unit, and therefore it will not be mandatory for all them to be brought 
before the same forum. 
Similarly, in the context of arbitration, whenever several actions pending before 
different tribunal between several parties involve a common question of law or facts, 
it will not be necessary for all of the parties to be brought before the same tribunal. 
The disputes pending before the several tribunals will be tried and determined 
separately. Therefore, there will be no sufficient ground for one tribunal to assume 
extra-contractual jurisdiction over third parties. The several bilateral proceedings 
should proceed in accordance with the several bilateral arbitration agreements. 
In Credit Suisse First Boston (Europe) Ltd v MLC (Bermuda) Ltd, 28 the defendant, 
MLC, concluded two bond purchase agreements with Credit Swiss Europe. The 
purchase agreements provided for exclusive jurisdiction of English courts. The 
defendant had a separate customer agreement with a US affiliate of Credit Swiss 
See for example Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 42 (consolidation), and in more detail, 
Chapter S. 
28 [1999] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 767. 
193 
Europe, Credit Swiss US, which agreement contained no jurisdiction clause. A 
dispute arose out of the purchase agreement and Credit Swiss Europe commenced 
proceedings against MLC before the English courts in accordance with the exclusive 
jurisdiction agreement. At the same time MLC commenced legal proceedings before 
the US courts against both Credit Swiss US and Credit Swiss Europe. 
Credit Swiss Europe applied to the English courts for an anti-suit injunction to 
restrain MLC from going on with the US proceedings on the basis of the English 
jurisdiction clause contained in the purchase agreement. In addition, Credit Swiss 
Europe asked the English courts to join Credit Swiss US as a party to the action 
against MLC. The latter applied for a stay of the English proceedings in favour of the 
New York proceedings. 
The English court seised of the dispute had to examine, among other issues, 
whether the jurisdiction of the English courts, stemming from a jurisdiction clause in 
the purchase agreement between Credit Swiss Europe and MLC, should be asserted 
over Credit Swiss US too. 
Rix J, held that, in this case, English jurisdiction could not be exercised over the 
third party, Credit Swiss US, because the claims between Credit Swiss US and MLC 
were separate from the claims between Credit Swiss Europe and MLC. Credit Swiss 
Europe and Credit Swiss US were not co-liable in the dispute before the English 
courts. Indeed, there was an express provision in the Purchase agreement that: 
"[Credit Swiss US] shall otherwise have no liability in respect of this 
Agreement or such Transaction except for its gross negligence or wilful 
misconduct, or its failure to comply with applicable U. S. securities laws and 
regulations, in performing its duties as facilitating agent hereunder. " 
Therefore Credit Swiss Europe and Credit Swiss US did not constitute a necessary 
unit in terms of jurisdiction. Here, there was no reason supporting the extra- 
contractual jurisdiction of the English courts over the third party, Credit Swiss US. 
The English proceedings between the two parties to the jurisdiction agreement should 
proceed in parallel to the US proceedings between Credit Swiss US and MLC, even 
though it was high likely that the two proceedings would turn to the same legal and 
factual issues. 
Here, the English courts rightly refused to apply extra-contractual jurisdiction. 
There was not sufficient ground not to let the sets of proceedings (one in New York 
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and another in London) to go ahead separately, in accordance with the jurisdictional 
arrangements of the parties. The association of the several parties in terms of 
substantive rights and liability was not so strong as to warrant multiparty proceedings. 
Therefore, the procedural arrangements made by the parties in their different 
contracts, leaving room for different set of proceedings, should be upheld: 
"On the other hand, where different agreements are entered into for different 
aspects of an overall relationship, and those different agreements contain 
different terms as to jurisdiction, it would seem to be applying too broad and 
indiscriminate a brush simply to ignore the parties' careful selection of palette 
[... ] [the dispute resolution clause] is part of a bilateral agreement between a 
seller and a buyer, and the disputes to which such an agreement may give rise 
are prima facie bilateral disputes. Indeed, it is I would have thought axiomatic 
that, at any rate in the absence of plain language to the contrary, a contract 
seeks neither to benefit nor to prejudice non-parties: even where such plain 
language is used, it is black-letter law that the non-party can himself neither 
take the benefit nor suffer the burden of the contract. "29 
In view of the specific facts, Credit Swiss US and Credit Swiss Europe did not 
constitute a necessary unit in terms of jurisdiction. The unwelcome risk of multiplicity 
of proceedings over the same factual and legal issues could not alone overturn the 
procedural arrangements of the several parties: 
"Claims against Credit Swiss US [... ] would not be injuncted because however 
undesirable it was in principle to have parallel litigation in two jurisdictions, it 
seemed that the duplication of litigation did not in itself make it in the interests 
of justice to injunct the New York proceedings in so far as the claims against 
Credit Swiss US [... ] were concerned; the claims against CS US were made 
either under Federal statute law or New York common law or under the 
Customer Agreement; to the extent that such claims were free-standing of any 
contract between MLC and CS US no jurisdiction clause applied". " 
29 Ibid, at 777. 
30 Ibid, at 769. 
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Similar approach was taken by Lord Denning in the well known ADGAS case, " 
regarding the construction of huge tanks for the purposes of liquefying gas from oil. 
When cracks appeared in one of the tanks, the employers claimed against the main 
contractors, which in turn claimed against the sub-contractors. The main contract 
provided for arbitration in London. The contractor concluded two subcontracts, one 
for the installation and erection of the tanks, which provided for arbitration in 
London, and another for the supply of the materials, which provided for arbitration in 
Japan. Lord Denning examined, inter alia, whether two separate sets of arbitration 
proceedings should be allowed to go on or the two proceedings should be 
consolidated. 
It was held that the mere fact that the two parallel arbitration proceedings could 
turn to the same legal and factual issues would not warrant multiparty proceedings. 
The risk of inconsistent findings, however undesirable it was, could not support the 
decision of the court to thwart the scheme of several bilateral procedural agreements 
of the parties. 
As is well known, Lord Denning M. R, came up with the solution of appointing the 
same arbitrator for the two separate proceedings. However, he felt that he could not 
order all the parties in the dispute to appear before a single tribunal despite the fact 
that: 
"There is a danger in having two separate arbitrations in a case like this. You 
might get inconsistent findings if there were two separate arbitrators. "32 
Also that: 
"It is most undesirable that there should be inconsistent findings by two 
separate arbitrators on virtually the self-same question, such as causation. "33 
Only when the parties have expressly provided so in their dispute resolution 
agreements, can the risk of inconsistent findings on the same factual and legal issues 
in different proceedings provide the basis for multiparty proceedings. Indeed, there 
are cases where the parties expressly provide for multiparty proceedings on the 
condition that disputes between different parties will raise the same and legal issues. 
3' Abu Dhabi Gas Liquefaction Co. Ltd. r Eastern Bechtel Corporation and Chivoda Chemical 
Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd. r Ishikawajima-Harima Hearn, Industries Co. Ltd. [1982] 2 
Lloyd's Rep. 425 (CA). 
32 At 427 per. 
33 Idem. 
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For example, in City & General (Holborn) Limited vA YH Pic, 
34 a contractor 
entered into a contract with an employer and agreed to carry out works of 
refurbishment and rebuilding at a construction project. The contract incorporated the 
JCT Standard Form of Building Contract 1998 Edition with amendments. The 
employer entered into a contract (deed of appointment) with a project manager who 
agreed to administer and supervise the construction works. The two agreements, 
contractor-employer and employer-project manager, were linked in terms of 
jurisdiction and arbitration proceedings. In particular, clause 17 of the deed of 
appointment between the employer and the project manager provided that: 
"17.2. If the dispute to be referred to arbitration under this Deed raises issues 
which are substantially the same as or are connected with issues raised in 
related disputes between either party to this Deed and any other person, and if 
the related dispute has already been referred to determination to an Arbitrator, 
the parties to this Deed agree that: 
17.2.1 The dispute under this Deed shall be referred to the Arbitrator appointed 
to determine the related dispute, [... ] and 
17.2.2 The Arbitrator shall have power to make such directions and all 
necessary Awards in the same way as if the procedure of the High Court as to 
joining 1 or more Defendants or co-joining Defendants or 3rd parties was 
available to the parties and to him. " 
Here, the parties had made express arrangements for a single forum and a single 
set of arbitration proceedings, in case the dispute arising out of one contract raised 
issues that were "substantially the same as or are connected with issues raised in 
related disputes". In other words, the parties here had provided for different but 
interlinked dispute resolution procedures. They had, in fact, established a scheme 
where the separate contracts were convergent in jurisdictional terms. In such a case, 
the lower threshold of "common questions of law or fact" between the two disputes 
may warrant multiparty arbitration proceedings. 
The English High Court even noted that: 
34 [200 5] EWHC 2494 (TCC). 
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"It is not necessary [... ] for every single issue in dispute B to be substantially 
the same or connected with an issue in dispute A. "35 
A mere convergence of the legal or factual issues in both disputes would be 
enough for a single tribunal to assume jurisdiction over all the several parties. In this 
context, the avoidance of multiplicity of proceedings would certainly be relevant: 
"It is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, which (as is well known) generate 
excessive costs and carry the risk of inconsistent findings. Bearing in mind the 
commercial objective, I do not think that the threshold of clause 17.2 should be 
set too high. It is not necessary that the majority of issues in dispute B should 
be the same as or connected with issues in dispute A. In my judgment, it is 
sufficient if a material portion of the issues in dispute B have that 
characteristic. Once a material portion of the issues in dispute B are the same 
as, or are connected with, issues in dispute A, then it makes obvious 
commercial sense for both disputes to be dealt with by the same tribunal. "36 
The same approach was taken in Trafalgar House Construction (Regions) Limited 
v Railtrack plc. 3' Here, R employed T as the main contractor for the construction of 
certain works whereas T entered into two nominated subcontracts with TA and BW. 
Both the main contract and the two subcontracts contained a dispute resolution 
provision quite similar to the clause 17.2 in the City & General (Holborn) case. 
Different disputes arose between the several parties to the above contracts. Lloyd J 
held that the dispute in the subcontracts should: 38 
"Be referred to the arbitrator appointed under the main contract provided of 
course that the sub-contract dispute raises issues which are substantially the 
same as or connected with the main contract dispute and provided that this is 
done before an arbitrator has been agreed or appointed to determine the sub- 
contract dispute. " 
Otherwise: 
35 Ibid, para 43. 
36 Ibid, para 47. 
37 [1995] 75 BLR 55. 
31 Ibid. para 86. 
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"Multiplicity of proceedings is likely to lead to different tribunals reaching 
different conclusions on the same facts and, thus, substantial injustice may 
result" 
In Lafarge Redland Aggregates Ltd. v Shephard Hill Civil Engineering Ltd. ", the 
parties had expressly provided for joint proceedings on the condition that the dispute 
in the main contract "touched or concerned the subcontract works". More specifically, 
the subcontract was in a F. C. E. C. Standard Form of Subcontract, which under clause 
18(2) provided that: 
"If any dispute arises in connection with the main contract and the contractor is 
of the opinion that such dispute touches or concerns the subcontract works, 
then, provided that an arbitrator has not already been agreed or appointed in 
pursuance of the preceding sub-clause, the contractor may by notice in writing 
to the subcontractor require that any such dispute under this subcontract shall 
be dealt with jointly with the dispute under the main contract in accordance 
with the provisions of clause 66 thereof. In connection with such joint dispute 
the subcontractor shall be bound in like manner as the contractor by any 
decision of the engineer or any award by an arbitrator. " 
The majority of the House of Lords4° agreed with the view taken by the Court of 
Appeal that such a dispute resolution clause would allow for a tripartite arbitration 
between employer, contractor and subcontractor. 41 Here, the parties in their contracts 
had expressly provided for certain dispute resolution mechanisms, which, although 
formally separate, were to become interlinked if the dispute in the main contract 
"touched or concerned the subcontract works". 
Whenever this condition was qualified, in the opinion of the contractor, the 
disputes would be tried jointly. Thus, because of the specific dispute resolution 
arrangements between the several parties, multiparty proceedings were possible 
whenever "the disputes in the main contract touch[ed] or concern[ed] the subcontract 
works" 
39 [2000] HL. 
40 Two members of the House of Lords disagreed. 
41 Although at the particular case such a tripartite arbitration was held not be possible because the 
contractor. had not initiated the procedure against the main employer within a reasonable time, as he 
was obliged under the main contract. 
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In more general terms, the parties in the above cases, had expressly conditioned 
multiparty proceedings upon the threshold of "common questions of law or fact" or 
"avoidance of multiplicity of proceedings" or "disputes in one contract that touch 
upon the subject matter of the other contract". In all these cases the threshold is lower 
than "co-liability or community of rights and obligations". However, the scheme of 
"jurisdictional convergence" of the several contracts established by the parties 
allowed a single tribunal to assume jurisdiction over all the several parties, despite the 
fact that the parties were not co-liable. 
Conversely, when the dispute resolution clauses in the several contracts are not 
interlinked or contain no cross-references, the threshold for multiparty proceedings 
between all the several parties necessarily involved in the pending dispute will be the 
higher threshold of co- liability between the several parties. Thus, for example, in the 
City & General (Holborn), 42 had the parties not provided for the specific clause 17(2), 
the constitution of a single forum for the whole dispute would not have been possible. 
As was explained in detail in Chapter 2, contractor and project manager are normally 
liable in the alternative rather than co-liable vis-ii-vis the employer. Thus, the 
presence of a project manager in the proceedings between an employer and a 
contractor will not be warranted. 
42 Supra n. 70. 
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CHAPTER 11: FINAL REMARKS ON THE JURISDICTIONAL APPROACH 
This chapter concludes the discussion on the jurisdictional approach looking into 
three issues. Firstly, how a tribunal should apply third-party mechanisms to arbitration 
proceedings (Section 11.1). Second, whether the examination of the dispute for 
jurisdictional purposes might lead to the merits of the case being prejudged (Section 
11.2). Third, what is the practical relevance of the jurisdictional approach and which 
are its practical advantages over the contractual approach (Section 11.3). 
11.1 APPLYING THIRD-PARTY MECHANISMS IN ARBITRATION: THE THIRD 
PARTY WILL REMAIN A PARTY NOT BOUND BY THE ARBITRATION 
AGREEMENT 
The tribunal, under the jurisdictional approach, may assume jurisdiction over a 
third party whenever the latter is strongly associated with a genuine party in terms of 
substantive rights, interests and liability. In such a case, jurisdiction of the tribunal 
will not be based on contractual grounds: the third party will remain a third party as 
far as the arbitration agreement is concerned. In other words, extra-contractual 
jurisdiction of a tribunal over the third party will be circumstantial. The tribunal will 
assume jurisdiction over a third party, because the latter is an integral part of the 
pending dispute. rather than because the third party has a contractual right in its own 
to participate in the proceedings. It is not suggested here that the several interrelated 
contracts between the several parties constitute a contractual unit in legal or and even 
economic terms. Thus, the several parties will constitute a jurisdictional not a 
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contractual unit. This constitutes a fundamental difference between the jurisdictional 
approach suggested here and the prevailing contractual approach. ' 
This in practice means that the arbitration agreement cannot actually be enforced 
by or against the third party. Therefore, a third party can only be joined to the 
proceedings as co-claimant or co-respondent to the genuine parties; or intervene 
thereto; or be interpleaded by one of the original parties to the proceedings. 
Accordingly, if one of the genuine parties to a bilateral arbitration agreement brings a 
claim against a third party alone rather than join a third party in a claim against the 
other genuine party, the tribunal should reject this claim as inadmissible to the 
proceedings. The same should apply if the third party alone rather than as a co- 
claimant to a genuine party to an arbitration agreement, brings a claim against the 
other genuine party. 
It follows, for example, that a parent company will not have a right to file claims 
alone against the co-contractor of its subsidiary in order to recover damages occurred 
to the subsidiary, even if the parent company was found by the tribunal strongly 
associated with the subsidiary in terms of substantive rights. Since the parent 
company is not contractually bound by an arbitration agreement, it will not have the 
right to enforce it. The parent company will need to bring the claim as a co-claimant 
alongside its subsidiary, and request the tribunal to assume jurisdiction over it on the 
ground that parent and subsidiary constitute a necessary unit in terms of jurisdiction 
on the basis of the specific factual circumstances. 
For example, in General Electric Company v Deutz AG, 2 Deutz guaranteed the 
performance assumed by its subsidiary in a contract with General Electric. When 
General Electric filed a claim before the US courts against Deutz, the latter 
challenged the jurisdiction of the US courts on the basis of an arbitration agreement 
1 Cf in France contractual approach suggests that arbitration agreements should extend as a contractual 
terms to all the interrelated contracts ("ensemble contractual") with the same economic and 
operational purpose, irrespective of whether the arbitration agreement has actually been inserted into 
one or some of the several contracts. See F-X Train, Les contrats lies devant 1 'arbitre du commerce 
international, (L. G. D. J 2003), para 42 et seq, for the several variations of the theory of interrelated 
contracts having close economic links ("lies economiques etroit), or having the same economic 
operation aiming at the same object "une operation economique unique qui concourt au meme 
objet'. See also P. Leboulanger, "Multi-Contract Arbitration" 13 (4) J Int'l Ach, (1996), p. 43; 
P. Delebecque, "La notion de groupe de contrats: quells criteres? ", 4 Cah. Dr. Entr. (1989) p. 25; and 
P. Fouchard, E. Galliard and B. Goldman, On International Commercial Arbitration, E. Gaillard and 
J. Savage (eds. ) (Kluwer Law International 1999), para.. par 518 et seq,; and B Hanotiau, Complex 
Arbitrations, Multiparty, Multi-contract, Multi-issue and Class Actions (Kluwer Law International 
2005) p. 101 et seq. 
2 270 F. 3d 144 (3rd Cir. 2001). 
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included in the main contract between its subsidiary and General Electric. At the same 
time Deutz commenced ICC arbitration proceedings in London against General 
Electric alone. The US courts rejected the argument of Deutz and assumed 
jurisdiction over it. In the same vein the tribunal rejected the right of Deutz to enforce 
the arbitration agreement. 
Both the US courts and the tribunal took the right approach. Deutz, as a parent 
company or a guarantor, was never a party to the arbitration agreement concluded by 
its subsidiary. Therefore, it had no right to enforce the arbitration agreement. The 
tribunal could have assumed jurisdiction over the parent company, only if the 
subsidiary, which was the genuine party to the arbitration agreement, had joined the 
parent company as co-claimant against General Electric. It would then have been for 
the tribunal to decide whether, in the light of the factual circumstances of the 
particular case, parent company and subsidiary were strongly associated in 
substantive terms, and, therefore, they should be viewed as a jurisdictional unit. 
11.2 EXAMINING THE DISPUTE AT THE STAGE OF DETERMINATION OF THE 
JURISDICTION DOES NOT LEAD TO PREJUDGMENT OF THE MERITS OF THE 
DISPUTE 
As was explained already, the jurisdictional approach suggests that a tribunal in 
order to determine its jurisdiction should examine both the arbitration agreement and 
the dispute at hand. However, this does not necessarily mean that the tribunal will 
have to determine the merits of the case before determining its jurisdiction. The 
ordinary course of action in the arbitral proceedings will not be reversed. 
Determination of the jurisdiction will not pre-empt the final decision on the rights, 
duties or liability of the parties. This is evidenced by the following. 
As is suggested here, co-liability or community of rights and obligations between a 
third and a genuine party is necessary for the tribunal to assume jurisdiction over the 
third party. Accordingly, the tribunal in order to determine its jurisdiction will have to 
look into the substantive links between the several parties involved in the dispute. 
However, the standards of proof of co-liability required for the determination of the 
jurisdiction are much lower than the standards required for the final determination of 
the dispute. In the latter case, the proof-threshold will be that of reasonable degree of 
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probability or even higher, 3 whereas in the former case the proof-threshold will be 
that of mere possibility. A tribunal, in order to assume extra-contractual jurisdiction 
over a third party, needs to be satisfied prima facie that the several parties are possibly 
co-liable. Therefore, a tribunal will not have to go beyond a prima facie examination 
of the merits: parties that are potentially co-liable or co-holders of rights and duties 
may constitute a jurisdictional unit. 
In Sinochem International Oil (London) Co Ltd >> Mobil Sales and Supply Corp, for 
example, the English courts assumed extra-contractual jurisdiction over third parties, 
on the basis that the third parties seemed to be closely interwoven with the dispute at 
hand. The court was satisfied prima facie that Moblil England had a debt to Sinochem 
London and that this debt could in principle be set off against the debt prima facie 
owed by Mobil Oil Hong Kong against Sinochem Beijing. The court did not decide 
whether either debt was finally valid or whether the debts were actually set off. This 
decision was left for the stage of the merits. The question at the stage where 
jurisdiction was determined was whether the English courts could have jurisdiction 
over the claim against Sinochem Beijing, as a third party to a jurisdiction agreement. 
For that purpose it was enough for the court to examine that the debt of Mobil 
England to Sinochem London could be set off against the debt of Sinochem Beijing to 
Mobil Oil Hong Kong. 
Even under the contractual approach, where the examination will focus on whether 
an arbitration agreement as an ordinary contract is valid, arbitrators will have to touch 
upon issues relating to the substance of the dispute, in order to determine their 
jurisdiction. Very often, the question of which persons are bound by an arbitration 
agreement necessarily involves the examination of issues closely related to the main 
contract and, therefore, to the dispute at hand. For example, the tribunal, at the stage 
of jurisdiction, will have to examine whether the substantive contract including the 
arbitration agreement was ever concluded; or whether the substantive contract, and, 
therefore, the arbitration agreement, was validly assigned to a third party; 4 or whether 
a person was acting as an agent of another person when concluding the substantive 
contract and, therefore, the arbitration agreement. ' 
3 A. Redfern, "The Standards and Burden of Proof in International Arbitration", 3 (1994) 10 Arb. Int'l, 
p. 317. 
SCC case 17 of 1997, in SCC Arbitral Awards 1999-2003 (edited by S. Jarvin and A. Magnusson). 
p. 1. 
5 ICC case 5721 of 1990, (1990) 117 JDI (Clunet), p. 1019. 
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The same applies to litigation. National courts in order to assume jurisdiction over 
a claimant and a defendant, they have to examine whether a prima facie contractual 
relationship between these two parties exists. Similarly, whenever a claim is brought 
by several claimants or against several defendants, courts will have to examine 
whether the several co-claimants or co-defendants are prima facie joint co- 
contractors, in order to decide whether all parties should be joined at the same claim. ' 
A prima facie determination of co-liability will suffice for the parties to be joined. ' In 
all the above cases, the standards of proof required for the courts to determine their 
jurisdiction are, thus, lower than the standards required for the final determination of 
the dispute. ' 
Therefore, the fact that according to the jurisdictional approach the courts or 
tribunals have to take a prima facie look into the merits of a dispute in order to 
determine their jurisdiction should not create any theoretical or practical difficulties. 
11.3 PRACTICAL RELEVANCE OF THE JURISDICTIONAL APPROACH 
The suggestion for a jurisdictional approach to the matter of arbitration and third 
parties has not only theoretical but also practical relevance. In fact, it exhibits two 
important practical advantages over the contractual approach. 
11.3.1 The law applicable to the validity and the interpretation of the arbitration 
agreement 
First, it diminishes the relevance of the discussion on the law applicable to the 
validity and interpretation of the arbitration agreement, which has often caused 
conceptual and practical problems. Under the jurisdictional approach, the focus is 
shifted from the contractual boundaries of an arbitration agreement to the implications 
that the pending dispute may have for third parties. Therefore, the issue of which law 
would be applicable to the validity and interpretation of an arbitration agreement 
becomes less relevant, at least in terms of jurisdiction. 
6Fardell Traction Haulage Co Ltd v Basset (1899) 15 TLR 204, CA: Norburv Nattio & Co Ltd v 
Griffiths [1918] 2 KB 369 (CA): "it is sufficient that the defendant makes out a reasonable and 
probable case of a joint contract". 
Halsbury's, Laws of England, (Lexis Nexis Butterworths 2007), para. 108. 
8 Hargrave v Fireboard, 710 F. 2nd 1154 at 1161 (5th Cir. 1983). 
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More specifically, as was explained in Part II, the discussion in the context of 
extension doctrines and the "group of companies" doctrine in particular focuses on 
the boundaries of arbitration agreements as substantive contracts. Consequently, the 
question of which rules apply to determine the boundaries of the arbitration contract 
has been at the centre of this discussion. The question becomes even more important 
given the fact that no national law recognises a "group of companies" doctrine in 
relation to arbitration agreements in particular. Accordingly, the presumption that a 
parent company is bound by an arbitration agreement signed by its subsidiary would 
not be accepted by any national law, as no national law would accept such 
presumption with regard to any other substantive agreement. Similarly, no national 
law accepts that consent of a parent company can be deduced more easily with regard 
to an arbitration agreement than with regard to any other substantive agreement. 
9 
Naturally thus, in order to avoid the constraints of national laws, international 
tribunals have held that the "group of companies" doctrine would apply by reference 
to `usages of international trade', or `transnational substantive rules' and `lex 
mercatoria', rather than by reference to national law. 10 
' See above Part II. 
10 See for example, the arbitral awards: interim award in ICC case no. 4131 of 1982, Dow Chemical v 
Isover-Saint-Gobain, (1984) Rev. Arb. 137; (1983) 110 Clunet 899, with note Derains: "et en tenant 
egalement comte [... ] des usages conformes aux besoins du commerce international"; ICC case no. 
6000 of 1988,2 (1991) 2 ICC Bull., p. 34: "the usages of the international trade [.. ] would justify 
and require the extension to this company, party to a group of companies, of the arbitration clauses 
included in the contracts executed" by the other companies of the group; the same in partial award 
ICC case no. 5894 of 1989,2 (1991) 2 ICC Bull.. p. 25; in ICC case no 5721 of 1990, (1990) 117 
JDI (Clunet), p. 1023; ICC case no 4131 of 1982, (1983) 110 JDI (Clunet), p. 899, with note 
Y. Derains; ICC case no 5721 of 1990, (1990) 117 JDI (Clunet), p. 1019, with note Y. Derains; the 
award in C&M Farming Ltd v Peterson Farms Inc. (unpublished). 
See also the decisions of the French national courts: Paris Cour d' appel in Dow Chemical v Isover- 
Saint-Gobain, Paris Cour d'appel, 21 October 1983, (1984) Rev. Arb., p. 98 with note Chapelle 
upholding the award by reference to the trade usages and art 13.5 of the previous ICC rules (cf ICC 
rules (1998) art 17: "In all cases the Arbitral Tribunal shall take account of the provision of the 
contract and the relevant trade usages"; cf also French NCCP art. 1496(2): "[The arbitrator] in all 
cases shall take the usages of the trade into consideration"; Paris Cour d' appel, 21 Oct 1983, (1986) 
Rev. Arb., p. 98, with note A. Chapelle; Pau Cour d' appel, Sponsor A. B. v Lestrade, 26 November 
1986, (1988) Rev. Arb., p. 153 with note A. Chapelle. 
This is the prevailing view in arbitration literature too: J Lew, L. Mistelis and S. Kroell, 
Comparative International Commercial Arbitration, (Kluwer London 2003). para 6-73; Fouchard, 
Gaillard and Goldman, On International Commercial Arbitration, E. Gaillard and J. Savage (eds) 
(Kluwer 1999). para 443 et seq.: see also Derain and Schauf, "Clauses d Arbitrages et Groupes de 
Societes", (1985) Rev. Dr. Aff. Int., p. 231: J-F Poudret "L' extension de la clause d' arbitrage: 
approches francaise et suisse, (1995) 122 JDI (Clunet), p. 923; cf S. Jarvin in his note on the ICC 
case no 4504 of 1985-1986, (1986) JDI (Clunet), p. 1130 and M. Blessing, "The law applicable to 
the Arbitration Clause and Arbitrability", van den Berg (ed). ICCA Congress series no. 9. p. 174. 
Contra O. Sandrock, "Extending the Scope of Arbitration Agreements to Non-Signatories", in 
Arbitration Agreement -Its Multifold Critical Aspects: (1999) ASA Special Series No 8, p. 167 and 
0. Sandrock, "Arbitration Agreements and Group of Companies" (1993) 27 International Lawyer, p. 
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This approach taken by tribunals is questionable. First, it is rather doubtful whether 
there is actually such an "international trade usage" or a "transnational substantive 
rule" ready to recognise the "group of companies" doctrine. " More importantly 
though, when the parties have expressly subjected their contact to a particular national 
law, references to "lex mercatoria" or "transnational substantive rules" will in effect 
negate this choice make by parties themselves. To overcome this, tribunals have held 
that, by reference to the doctrine of separability and the principle of "autonomy of the 
arbitration agreement", different sets of rules should be applicable to the arbitration 
agreement and the substantive contract. '' Therefore, according to several arbitral 
awards, the validity of an arbitration agreement should be determined on the basis of 
"the common intent of the parties" or "a-national or transnational substantive rules", 
despite the express reference of the parties in their contract to the national law of a 
particular country. 
However, national courts have not always been keen to accept the above practice 
of international tribunals. For example, in the well know Peterson Farms Inc. vC& 
M Farming Ltd case, 13 the parties in their contract had made express reference to 
Arkansas law as the law governing their contract. The tribunal applied the "group of 
companies" doctrine and held that the parent company of the C&M group was bound 
by the arbitration agreement, concluded by a subsidiary of the same group. The 
tribunal applied the doctrine by reference to "the common intent of the parties" and 
the principles of separabity and "autonomy of the arbitration agreement. "14 
945, who argues that the contours of lex mercatoria are too vague to provide support to the `group 
of companies' doctrine. Instead, Sadrock argues for the application of national law as determined by 
the relevant conflict of laws rules. 
11 In general. a commercial practice will qualify as a trade usage, only under very strict requirements. 
These requirements would include a practice adopted by individuals or groups in business and 
mercantile transactions for a considerable amount of time. It would also require that the persons 
adopt this practice being aware of the fact that it constitutes the general commercial practice. 
iý See case law and literature as in footnote 81 supra. 
13 Peterson Farnes Inc. vC&M Fanning Ltd, [2004] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 603, at 612: "The evidence on 
Arkansas law showed that Arkansas law was the same as English law. English law treated the issue 
of agency as one subject to the chosen proper law of the Agreement, and that excluded the `group of 
companies' doctrine"; see also M. Mustill and S. Boyd, The Law and Practice of Commercial 
Arbitration in England, (2nd ed) (London Butterworths 1989). p. 149, where they argue that an 
award based on the `group of companies' theory will not be enforceable in England: on the same 
issue see also J. Leadley and L. Williams, "Peterson Farms: There Is No Group Of Companies 
Doctrine In English Law". 7 (2004) 4. Int. A. L. R., p. 112. 
14 Para 86 of the award (unpublished): 
"The tribunal does not accept Peterson's arguments. Under the doctrine of separability, an 
arbitration agreement is separable and autonomous from the underlying contract in which it 
appears. The autonomy of arbitration agreements has become a universal principle in the realm 
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English court rejected that the "group of companies" doctrine could be applicable 
in this case, and set part of the arbitral award aside, by virtue of EAA s. 67. In essence, 
the court did not accept that the issue of jurisdiction should be determined not by the 
law expressly agreed on by the parties. The court noted that: 
"The autonomy of the arbitration agreement is not in point. " 
As indicated, under the jurisdictional approach the dilemma on whether national or 
a-national rules would apply to the validity and interpretation of the arbitration 
agreement is irrelevant to the issue of the jurisdiction of a tribunal over third parties. 
Under the jurisdictional approach, the focus is shifted from the boundaries of an 
arbitration agreement to the implications that the dispute may have for third parties. 
The pending dispute rather than the arbitration agreement as a substantive contract is 
at the heart of the examination: tribunals should examine whether a third party, in the 
light of the dispute, is strongly associated with one of the genuine parties. 
Accordingly, this examination will be done by reference to the law applicable to the 
merits of the dispute. Naturally, thus, if the parties have expressly agreed on that law, 
the question of whether the dispute has any implications for any third party will have 
to be determined exactly by the law agreed by the parties. 
If the tribunal in Peterson Farms had taken the jurisdictional approach suggested 
here, the question of whether the tribunal had jurisdiction over the parent company of 
the C&M group, would effectively be a question of whether the parent company was 
entitled to claim damages for losses suffered by its subsidiary. This is a question 
relevant to the dispute, and, accordingly, it should have been determined by reference 
to the law applicable to the substance, in this case Arkansas law. In other words, the 
tribunal should have looked into the Arkansas law, the express choice of the parties, 
in order to determine whether, in accordance with that law, the damage suffered by a 
subsidiary may have any implications for the parent company. In other words, the 
tribunal should have examined whether, in accordance with Arkansas law, the parent 
company was entitled to pursuit damages suffered by its subsidiary. If the answer to 
of international commercial arbitration. A corollary to the separability doctrine is that the law 
applicable to the arbitration agreement may differ from the law applicable both to the 
substance of the contract underlying the dispute and to the arbitral proceedings themselves. 
The right of C&M to make claims for the C&M Group is a question of interpretation of the 
arbitration agreement contained in the Agreement, including the intention of the parties. In the 
absence of any choice of law made by the parties with regard to the arbitration agreement 
itself, this tribunal will determine this question in accordance with the common intent of the 
parties". 
208 
the above question were in the affirmative, the tribunal would have been entitled to 
assume jurisdiction over the claims of the parent company, despite the fact that the 
parent company was not a party to the arbitration agreement. It is likely that English 
courts would have upheld this approach. 15 
Furthermore, this approach is consistent with the principle of `party autonomy'. 
The parties by reference to the principle of party autonomy are free to subject their 
contractual relationship to a specific substantive law. In fact, whenever the parties 
refer to a substantive law in their contract, they expressly annex their relationship to 
this particular law. This is the law to which the parties entrust the fate of their 
relationship as a whole. The expectations of the parties are that arbitrators in order to 
resolve the dispute will seek guidance from this particular law. Accordingly, 
whenever the parties have made an express reference to a national law, this law 
should be the primary source that arbitrators should turn to. In such a case, given the 
indisputable prevalence of party autonomy in arbitration, it seems difficult to 
reconcile the parties' express reference to a particular national law with the 
application of a-national rules by arbitrators. 
It is contrary to the expectations of the parties, if arbitrators apply the "group of 
companies" doctrine by reference to transnational rules, while the parties have 
expressly agreed to submit their contract to a national law that does not recognise the 
"group of companies" doctrine. It is reasonable to argue, that whether a third party 
parent company will have the right to recover damages from a genuine party is an 
issue that should be determined by reference to the substantive law expressed to 
which the parties have subjected their relationship, rather than by reference a-national 
rules which the parties presumably never envisaged. 
The contractual approach by reference to the principle of "autonomy of the 
arbitration agreement" completely separates jurisdiction from the substance of the 
dispute. According to the contractual approach, on the one hand the dispute is to be 
resolved in accordance with the rules agreed by the parties, while on the other hand 
jurisdiction of the tribunal over this dispute is to be determined exclusively by 
contractual a-national rules. The strict dichotomy between procedure (determination 
of the jurisdiction of tribunal) and substance (resolution of the dispute) seems 
15 In this case, the court asked from the parties to furnish evidence on whether Arkansas law recognised 
the doctrine of group of companies. The evidence showed that Arkansas law was adherent to the 
principle of `separate legal entity' and did not recognise the "group of companies doctrine". 
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artificial, incompatible with the expectations of the parties, and certainly parochial. 
16 
By contrast, the jurisdictional approach recognises that jurisdiction and substance are 
interrelated. Jurisdiction cannot be separated from the dispute. The law applicable to 
the dispute should be relevant to determine whether the tribunal would assert 
jurisdiction over a third party, which brings the issue closer to the expectations of the 
parties. 
11.3.2 Jurisdiction in accordance with the jurisdictional approach is determined 
on a basis closer to commercial reality 
Second, the jurisdiction of the tribunal is determined on a basis closer to 
commercial reality. Here, the focus is on the dispute rather than on the arbitration 
agreement and its contractual boundaries. The commercial implications of the dispute 
for third parties become relevant for the determination of the jurisdiction. The 
allocation of liability between genuine and third parties will be under scrutiny. 
Accordingly, business and economic standards may well come into play, when a 
tribunal will assess the actual business relationships between third and genuine 
parties. This is particularly true for disputes involving multinational group of 
companies. 
Nowadays multinational groups adopt new corporate structures, more sophisticated 
than the linear parent-subsidiary type of organisation. Groups often reorganise their 
structures along the process of `divisionalisation', 17 which may result to a "shift of 
emphasis away from a hierarchical, vertical control structure to a `heterarchical' 
network of cooperative and lateral relationships". '8 This, in effect, means that new 
models of corporate organisation, that have been followed in recent years by several 
16 See K. Kerameus, "Procedural unification: the need and the limitations", I. R. Scott (ed. ), 
International Perspectives on Civil Justice, Essays in honour of Sir Jack I. H. Jacob Q. C. (London 
1990), at 53-55. The court in Peterson Farms, alluded to that, albeit not clearly, by noting that "The 
identification of the parties to an agreement is a question of substantive not procedural law", supra 
n. 13 at pars 43. 
iý "Divisionalization is defined as the process by which the structure of a group of companies is 
changed from the traditional relationship of parent and subsidiary company to one where all the 
operation functions of several, or possibly all of the wholly-owned subsidiaries, are performed 
within one corporate entity, and the discreet functions are organised within separate divisions of that 
company. The previous structure in which each function had a separate formal and legal corporate 
existence is dispensed with" see Deloitte. Haskins and Sells, Corporate structure- subsidiaries or 
divisions? (August 1983) cited in P. Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law, (Blackwell 
London 1999). p. 59. 
18 Muchlinski, ibid, p. 59 et seq.; J. H. Dunning, Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy, 
(Addison Wesley, 1992), chapter S. 
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multinational groups, do not fit anymore into the legal types provided in the 
traditional company law. Therefore, the legal forms of the several companies 
belonging in the same group do not always reflect the real allocation of the decision- 
making power in the group. Consequently, it is difficult for a tribunal to assess the 
actual relevance that each company in the group has to a contractual relationship 
and the dispute, on the basis of the already known legal types of companies. Tribunals 
in order to allocate liability within a group of companies might need to apply new 
liability theories developed in the context of company law. 
While the principle of "separate legal personality" is still prevailing, 19 new 
theories, such as the "managerial control" theories, have been developed relatively 
recently in the context of company and economic law. 20 These new theories take into 
account the significant changes in the conventional notion of the group of companies 
as linear corporate structures. They are, thus, better equipped to allocate liability 
within the group in the context of contemporary business. Analysis on the basis of 
managerial control theories is not limited to equity-based groups, where the several 
companies of the group are linked by shares held by the parent and its intermediate 
holding companies. Analysis extends to any group, in which one entity can exercise a 
significant influence over another company through contractual rather than equity 
means, such as international consortia or franchising agreements. 
2' Therefore, this 
type of analysis goes beyond the traditional examination of the stereotypical linear 
forms of parent-subsidiary relationships, in the context of the theory of `piercing the 
corporate veil'. 
19 See Chapter -2 above. 
20 See, for example, the "managerial control" theories and in particular the "enterprise entity" theory. 
The "enterprise entity" theory differs from the existing concepts of group liability as it attempts to 
assert parent liability from the degree of the economic rather than the corporate integration between 
the companies of the group. The theory recognises the corporate group as a distinct form of business 
association, see P. Muchlinski. supra n. 17, p. 328 et seq. 
See also the "network liability" approach put forward by Prof Teubner regarding the lift of the 
contractual veil in transnational contractual network enterprises, see G . 
Teubner "The many-headed 
Hydra: networks as higher order collective actors", in S. McCahery, S. Picciotto.. C. Scott, (Eds). 
Corporate Control and Accountability: Changing Structures and Dynamics. (1991 Authority F 
University Press), p. 59. 
21 Muchlinski. supra n. 17, p 63 et seq. and p. 327 et seq. In such cases, the question that arises is 
whether the contractual rather than corporate veil between the contractually associated parties can be 
lifted, so that the controlling party could be held liable along with the controlled party for acts 
causing loss to third parties in which both contracting parties have participated by reason of the 
economic and business relationship underlying the contract between them where the managerial 
control is. Cf also Teubner. idem. 
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When determining their jurisdiction in cases involving groups of companies, the 
tribunals should benefit from the latest theoretical developments on economic and 
company law. The jurisdictional approach suggested here, focuses on the dispute, the 
rights and liabilities of the genuine and third parties. Therefore, the jurisdictional 
approach allows the theories to come into play so that they provide a better 
understanding of the boundaries of the dispute, the rights and liabilities of all the 
parties involved. A detailed assessment of the business organisation and operation of 
the group, on the basis of managerial theories, may reveal the true degree of 
integration of the several companies in the group. The more integrated the several 
corporations are in the group, the more likely it is for them to constitute a necessary 
procedural unit. Therefore the jurisdictional approach may assist the tribunal to 
determine the jurisdiction on a basis closer to contemporary business reality. 
By contrast, the analysis in the context of the contractual approach examines an 
arbitration agreement as a substantive contract and, therefore, it is limited to the 
interpretation of the scope and the contractual boundaries of this agreement. 
Naturally, the discussion in the context under the contractual approach is usually 
confined to the requirement of "consent" and traditional principles of contract law. 
Here, the examination is focused on whether the parent company is contractually 
bound by the arbitration agreement signed by the subsidiary rather than on whether 
liability can potentially be allocated within the group so that the group may constitute 
a jurisdictional unit. 
It follows from the above, that the tribunal may assert jurisdiction over more 
companies in the same group whenever more companies are potentially co-liable, i. e. 
whenever liability can be allocated along the group. Having said that, it is only when 
co-liability between a parent and a subsidiary is determined by reference to the 
applicable substantive law, that parent and subsidiary will constitute a jurisdictional 
unit. This would make it very difficult for the a parent and a subsidiary to be held co- 
liable. As explained in Chapter 2, the principle of separate liability between a parent 
and a subsidiary still prevails in the majority of national jurisdictison. Group liability 
is provided only as a rare exception in the area of tax law or insolvency law. 
'-' 
Consequently, when the parties have made provisions in their contract for a national 
law to apply, there would be no room for the group liability theories to apply. 
22 See Chapter 2.5 for more details. 
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Accordingly, under the jurisdictional approach, the tribunal could not assert 
jurisdiction over more companies in a group. 
When, however, the parties have expressly provided for a-national or transnational 
rules to apply or, when the parties have failed to provide for any rules or law and the 
tribunal decides that a-national or transnational rules should apply, there would be 
room for a tribunal to look into group liability theories and assume jurisdiction over 
the whole group. In such cases, a tribunal would be allowed to take a non-national 
approach and take into account new developments on liability within multinational 
groups. 
Of course, one has to ask whether the above developments in literature would 
constitute sufficient evidence that a new rule providing for allocation of liability 
within group of companies has emerged in the context of international corporate law. 
The thesis does not suggest that liberal managerial theories should necessarily be 
adopted in order to impute liability to parent companies. If anything it should always 
be born in mind that the principle of separate legal personality, despite its limitations, 
has, in general, enhanced efficiency of business and has proved beneficial for 
international commerce. 23 
Nevertheless, it can be argued that there are signs in legal discourse24 and case 
law25 indicating that the principle of "separate liability" although still prevailing 
23 This is also admitted by Muchlinski, supra n. 17, p. 329. 
24 See the discussion in Blumberg, "American Law of Corporate Groups"; McCahery, Picciotto and 
Scott (eds. ) Corporate Control and Accountability (OUP 1993) and in particular T. Hadden 
"Regulating Corporate Groups" therein; T. Hadden, The Control of Corporate Groups, (Institute 
Advanced Legal Studies- University of London 1983): Muchlinski, supra n. 17; K. Hofstetter, 
"Parent Responsibility for Subsidiary Corporations: Evaluating European Trends", 39 (1990) Int'l 
Comp. L. Q 578 et seq. 
25 See in the US indicative case law suggesting that corporate liability may be asserted on the basis of 
equitable considerations International Financial Services Corp. v Chromas Technologies Canada, 
Inc., 356 F. 3d 731,2004 WL 103311 (7th Cir. 2004); Cosgrove Distributors, Inc. v Haff. 343 Ill. 
App. 3d 426,278 Ill. Dec. 292,798 N. E. 2d 139 (3d Dist. 2003); Smith v Grand Canyon Expeditions 
Co., 2003 UT 57 (Utah 2003). 
In France. see Com 4 March 1997, Bull Civ IV, n. 65: D. Affaires 1997. p. 449, holding that the 
several companies of Econom group were co-liable for the breach of a contract concluded by 
another company of the same group. The French commercial court allocated group liability for 
breach of contract. on the basis that the several companies in the group were strongly interrelated, 
rather than because the non-signatory companies of the group were bound by the contract. The 
strong interrelation among the companies resulting to the lack of autonomy in business terms was 
the decisive factor for the group liability: « que c'est par une "decision du groupe" qu'il a ete decide 
de mettre fin aux activite de la societe Econocom software avant l'achevement de ]'execution du 
contrat ; qu'ayant ainsi caracterise ]'absence d'autonomie de cette societe et l'immixtion des autres 
societes du groupe dans sa gestion, la cour d'appel a ainsi pu, par une decision legalement justifiee, 
les condamner a supporter les consequences de l'inexecution du contrat ». 
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should have to be revisited, so that liability is allocated within groups on a basis of 
actual decision making. 
In any case, this question relates more to company and economic law, and 
certainly goes beyond the scope of this work. The aim of this section was: 
9 First, to show that there is a ongoing discussion in international 
company law on the issue of liability within multinationals. This 
discussion on liability may have relevance to the issue of jurisdiction 
in the context of arbitration. 
" Second, to show that the focus with regard to jurisdiction of tribunals 
over group of companies should be shifted from the contractual 
characteristics of an arbitration agreement to the pending dispute; from 
"consent" to "liability"; from traditional rules of contract law to 
commercial reality and the new corporate structures of modem 
multinational groups. 
" Third, to argue that the jurisdictional approach allows the new 
developments in company and economic law to come into play and 
affect the decision on the jurisdiction. 
In Germany. see the ITT case. Bundesgerichtshof. 65 BGHZ 15. where the German Federal Court 
noting that a parent company with a controlling influence over a subsidiary has fiduciary duties to 
the subsidiary. held that liability can be allocated between parent and subsidiary on the basis of the 
degree of involvement of the parent company in the subsidiary's affairs. See also the Autokran 
decision, 95 BGHZ 330 (1985), holding a parent company, involved in the management of the 
bankrupt subsidiary, was liable directly to the subsidiary creditors. both cases cited in Hofstetter, 
ibid, p. 583. 
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CHAPTER 12: THE EFFECT OF AN ARBITRAL AWARD AND THIRD 
PARTIES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
Until now, the thesis has been focusing on the effect of arbitration agreements 
upon third parties. In this chapter, the attention is shifted to the effect that arbitral 
awards may produce on third parties. Accordingly, the focus will be on persons who 
have not taken part into the arbitration proceedings resulting in an arbitral award: 
third parties to an arbitral award. The main question here is whether third parties with 
a significant interest in the dispute determined by an arbitral award can and should be 
affected by the determinations of this award. 
The discussion on the effects of arbitral awards is inescapably related to the 
doctrine of res judicata. Res judicata has been the main, if not the only, effect 
recognised in relation to arbitral awards. ' Hence, it was considered necessary to look 
See the relative discussion in literature: Interim Report of the International Law Association (ILA), 
Committee on Res judicata and Arbitration (Berlin Conference 2004), available at hLp:, ''wwwv. ila- 
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first into the existing international framework relating to the res judicata effect of 
arbitral awards. In particular, Section 12.1 undertakes a comparative analysis of 
several arbitral rules and national laws, showing that the current national and 
international framework relating to the effect of an arbitral award is, where it exists at 
all, divergent and incomplete; in any event, it fails to meet the particular needs of 
international arbitration. Section 12.1.2 in particular explores those features of res 
judicata that constitute a common denominator in different legal systems. The results 
of this examination provide the conceptual basis for defining the appropriate effect of 
an arbitral award on third parties in Section 12.3. 
Section 12.2 outlines the problems and limitations of the application of the 
doctrine of Yes judicata vis-ä-vis third parties, namely persons that have not taken part 
in the arbitral proceedings. Here the thesis challenges the practice according to which 
an international award, once it is recognized by a national jurisdiction, is equated to a 
national judgment in terms of its effect. It is argued that this practice overlooks the 
international character of an international award, which character should survive even 
after an award is incorporated into the national legal system. Most importantly, 
though, this practice fails to accommodate the systemic problems arising in 
international arbitration with regard to intertwined multiparty relationships. 
Section 12.3 puts forward the principal suggestion of this chapter. In particular, it 
is argued that arbitral awards should be able to affect a wider circle of third parties 
than the one affected by national judgments in order to compensate for the lack of 
third-party mechanisms at an earlier stage analogous to the mechanisms provided in 
the context of litigation. Thus, it is suggested that arbitral awards should somehow 
affect parties with an interest in the dispute (those have been named in the thesis false 
third parties) rather than just the parties to the proceedings and their privies. In other 
words, the case for a third-party effect of arbitral awards is made. However, as is 
hh 
. orarhtml/lavout committee. 
htm (last visited on 20 Dec 2007); Resolution No. 1/2006 issued by 
the International Arbitration Committee of the International Law Association, at the Conference 
held in Toronto June 4-8,2006, available at http//www ila hg or«ihtml%lavout committee. htm (last 
visited on 20 Dec 2007); final Report Report of the International Law Association (ILA), 
Committee on Res judicata and Arbitration (Toronto Conference 2006), available at 
http: i www ila-hq orc html%iavout committee. htm (last visited on 20 Dec 2007): N. Gallagher, 
"Parallel Proceedings, Res Judicata and Lis Pendens: Problems and Possible Solutions" in L. 
Mistelis and J. Lew (eds), Pervasive Problems in International Arbitration, (Kluwer Law 
International 2006), Ch. 17; Dossiers ICC Institute Of World Business Law (No. 692), Bernardo M. 
Cremades & Julian D. M. Lew (eds)., Parallel State And Arbitral Procedures In International 
Arbitration (2005); Bernard Hanotiau, "The Res Judicata Effect of Arbitral Awards" in Complex 
Arbitrations, ICCArb Bull. Special Supplement, 43 (2003). 
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explained, an arbitral award should affect only some specific groups of third parties, 
and in a different, and certainly less drastic, way than privies. Sections 12.3.2-4 set 
out the content, the boundaries and the qualifications of this third-party effect of 
arbitral awards 
Finally, Section 12.4 completes the discussion on the suggested third-party arbitral 
effect by exploring the legal basis of the effect of an arbitral award at an international 
level. Here, the focus is on the need for a harmonized regulation of the arbitral effect, 
instead of the current fragmented and, on many occasions, conflicting national 
regimes. 
It is essential at the outset to clarify the sense in which resjudicata will be used in 
the thesis. The term res judicata is often used to describe the effect produced both by 
a judgment and an arbitral award. 2 However, as will be shown, resjudicata is a term 
of art developed in the context of national civil procedures, where it refers to a 
particularly technical and sophisticated procedural mechanism. It is thus debatable 
whether the term should be used to describe the effect of an award in the 
fundamentally different context of international arbitration. Accordingly, the 
descriptive term "arbitral effect" is used in the thesis with regard to the arbitration 
award, while the term resjudicata is confined to national judgments. 
12.1 THE ARBITRAL EFFECT 
Despite the great divergence in national jurisdictions, the principle that a valid 
determination, either judgment or award, produces a conclusive effect with regard to 
the subject matter and the parties of the dispute constitutes a fundamental legal 
principle embedded in every legal system. 3 
In the context of international arbitration, in particular, the arbitral effect comes as 
a legal and logical corollary of the jurisdictional nature of an arbitral award. It is true 
that arbitration begins as a contractual phenomenon, with an arbitration agreement 
binding only those parties that have manifestly submitted to its jurisdiction. However, 
as was already explained in detail in the previous chapters, as the arbitral procedure 
2 See, e. g., the 1LA Interim and Final Reports, supra n. 1. 
P. Barnett, Res Judicata, Estoppel And Foreign Judgments. (OUP 2001) para. 1.12: "The doctrine 
encapsulates the principle inherent in all judicial systems which provides that an earlier adjudication 
is conclusive in a second suit involving the same subject matter and the same legal bases. " See id. 
for the legislative history of the principle that goes back to Roman and ancient Greek times. It was 
even recognized in the Hindu text of Katvavana. 
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unfolds, the initial contractual agreement is transformed into a phenomenon with 
jurisdictional dimensions. 4 The result of the arbitral proceedings is an award, which is 
enforceable worldwide. It has authoritative clout and it demands recognition against 
any natural, legal or state entity. This is why an award is not enforced as a simple 
contract, but is enforced with the aid of a state's coercive mechanism as would any 
other judicial judgment. Irrespective of any theoretical debate on the nature of the 
arbitral award, there are important practical implications relating to the arbitral effect. 
It is generally suggested that the conclusive effect of a decision, in general, serves 
both public and private interests. 5 While public concerns, such as the preservation of 
legal resources, are less relevant in the context of international arbitration than they 
are in national litigation, private considerations such as the need for commercial 
security resulting from the finality and repose of the dispute are critical for the 
interests and the expectations of the parties in international arbitration. Parties resort 
to arbitration to have their disputes finally resolved by the award. If the issues 
determined in the first award were open to a fresh determination, possibly leading to 
conflicting awards, parties' expectations of finality and repose of their dispute would 
be thwarted and the effectiveness of arbitration would be compromised. 6 
12.1.1 Legal Framework Regarding Arbitral Effect 
The current arbitration rules and laws constitute a suggested rather than a clear and 
comprehensive legal framework regarding the conclusive effect of an arbitral award. 
In particular, most arbitral rules merely state that "the award shall be binding on the 
parties. "' Similarly unsatisfactory is the way in which national arbitration laws 
address the issue, lacking, as they do, any regulation regarding an arbitral effect 
4 See the discussion in Chapter 7 et seq. Cf also Julian D. M. Lew, The Law Applicable to the Form 
and Substance of the Arbitration Clause, in ICCA Congress Series No. 9. Improving The Efficiency 
Of Arbitration And Awards: 40 Years Of Application Of The New York Convention 114 (Albert 
Jan van den Berg ed., 1999) ("arbitration agreement has both jurisdictional and contractual nature. It 
is contractual by virtue of the required agreement of the parties. It is jurisdictional by virtue of 
conferring jurisdiction upon the arbitration tribunal"). 
Cf. Barnett. supra note 3, para. 1.13 and R. Shell, "Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel Effects on 
Commercial Arbitration", 35 (1988) UCLA p. 623,640-641. for an analysis on the importance of res 
judicata on both public and private grounds. 
6 See UNCITRAL Arbitration Tribunal. final award. September 3.2001. R. S. Lauder r Czech Republic. 
(2002) 14 World Trade and Arbitration Material p. 35 (Final Award): UNCITRAL Arbitral Tribunal, 
partial award, September 13.2001. CME Czech Republic v The Czech Republic. (2002) 14 World 
Trade and Arbitration Materials, p. 109: and Svea Court of Appeals (Sweden), May 15,2003, CME 
Czech Republic v The Czech Republic, (2003) 15 World Trade and Arbitration Materials, p. 171. 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules art. 32(2), American Arbitration Association Rules art. 27(1), CIETAC 
Arbitration Rules art. 60, ICC Arbitration Rules art. 28(6), LCIA Rules art. 29(6), WIPO Arbitration 
Rules art. 64(b). 
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specifically designed for international arbitration. Instead, it is accepted in both civil8 
and common-law9 jurisdictions that international arbitral awards, after their 
recognition by the national domestic jurisdiction, have the same effect as domestic 
judgments: that is, they have the national res judicata effect. Nor can adequate 
regulation regarding the effect of an international award be found in the New York 
Convention, which deals with the enforcement rather than the conclusiveness of 
arbitral awards. This explains the lack of any detailed provision in the New York 
Convention with respect to the arbitral effect of an international award, apart from the 
brief statement in Article III that: 
"[e]ach Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as binding... " 
Laconic, almost cryptic, the above national and international laws and rules fail to 
address a series of important issues with regard to the effect of an arbitral award. 
Thus, a series of questions remains unanswered- 
" To what extent, if at all, does the arbitral award prevent the relitigation of the 
issues that have been determined therein? Does it merely cover the legal claims 
or does it extend to the facts? 
" Does the arbitral effect apply only to the dispositive part of the award or does it 
extend to the reasoning as well? 
8 This is expressly stated in the French NCPC art. 1476 (for domestic arbitration) and art. 1500 (for 
international), see also Cass. Soc. 19 March 1981, (1982) Rev Arb., 44; in the Netherlands 
Arbitration Act 1986, art. 1059. in the Belgian Judicial Code art. 1703(1); in the new Ausrtian CCP s. 
607; in Greece, art 35(2) of the 2735/1999 Act reads in tandem with art. 896 Code of Civil 
Procedure, see also All 448/1969, (1970) NoB 36. Cf UNCITRAL Model Law art. 35(l) and 
German ZPO art. 1055: "the award is binding". These provisions practically refer to national 
provisions regarding resjudicata; cf H. Koch and F Diedrich, Civil Procedure in Germany, (Kluwer 
Law International 1998), para 92. In Swiss Law, it is accepted that a final award produces the 
effects of resjudicata. Swiss law also recognises resjudicata to a foreign arbitral award to the same 
extent that the law of the country in which the award was made would recognise that award. On the 
other hand, these effects cannot go beyond those which the award would have if it was a Swiss 
award made in Switzerland, see art. 190 of the Private International Law Statute (1990) and S. Berti 
(ed. ), International arbitration in Switzerland, (Kluwer Law International 2000). art 190 para. 6 and 
art 194 para. 134 et seq. 
In the US, despite the fact that the FAA lacks any specific reference to the effect of an arbitral award, 
it is good law that that the award has the same effects as a national judgment under the rules of res 
judicata, subject to the same exceptions and qualifications, see Restatement (Second) Judgments, 
(1982). para. 84; Shell, supra n. 5, p. 641 and the relevant case-law therein: "The American courts 
have long held that res judicata applies to arbitration awards. " The same is accepted in England. 
although the English Arbitration Act 1996 (EAA), s. 58(1) merely refers to a "final and binding" 
award: see Fidelitas Shipping Ltd v V"/O Exportchleb, [1965] 1 Lloyd's Rep 13: Merkin, Arbitration 
Law, (LLP London 1996 loose-leaf) para. 16.116; see also EAA s. 101(3): "Where leave [on 
enforcement] is so given, judgment may be entered in terms of the award", ie judgment and award 
are equated after the recognition of the award in the domestic jurisdiction. Cf also the Hong-Kong 
Arbitration Ordinance, ss. 2GG (applicable to both domestic and international arbitration), 40B. 2 
(domestic only) and 42 (international only). 
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" To what extent is a subsequent arbitration tribunal or a national court bound 
by the findings of an award previously rendered? 
" Does the arbitral effect cover any issue that was not raised in the arbitral 
proceedings, but which ought to have been raised? 
More importantly, though, for the purposes of the thesis, the existing legal 
framework regarding the effect of an international award fails to address the question 
of 
" Which persons are bound by the arbitral effect, or 
" Whether an arbitral award can extend to, or in any other way, affect any third 
party' o 
No answer can be given to any of the above questions, since the current arbitral 
framework falls short of providing a sufficient and autonomous regulation of the 
effect of international arbitral awards. Instead, the issue is referred, either expressly or 
impliedly, to the domestic provisions on res judicata that apply to national judgments. 
However, as the following two sections show, the national res judicata regimes are 
not only divergent, but also designed for domestic litigation and national judgments. 
They are thus unsuitable in practical terms for application to international arbitration 
and arbitral awards. 
12.1.2 National Regimes on Res Judicata: Differences and Constituent Elements 
The doctrine of res judicata has developed as one of the most sophisticated, 
technical and overregulated doctrines in national civil procedures. A detailed 
consideration of the different national regimes on res judicata goes far beyond the 
scope of the thesis. The aim of this brief comparative overview is first to highlight the 
divergent approaches taken by legal systems with regard to res judicata, and second 
to ascertain the constituent elements of the meaning of res judicata. 
12.1.2.1 Differences 
There is a great divergence among national legal regimes with regard to res 
judicata. The difference is particularly marked between common and civil law 
jurisdictions. The basic difference in their approach may be summarised as follows. 
10 It must be underlined that with regard to this question, even the ILA Final Report on Res Judicata, 
supra n. 1. expressly avoided to give any guidance to the "because of the complexity of those issues 
and in order not to preempt any such development". 
? 20 
" In common-law countries, case law has developed a broader notion of res 
judicata which prevents the re-litigation not only of the claims" but also that of 
the issues, ' 2 factual and legal, adjudicated in the judgment. From this it appears 
that common-law countries consider that a judgment represents a judicial record 
of what actually happened with regard to the dispute. Res judicata in this sense 
has a fact-determination purpose. It is considered as a means of evidence, as an 
authoritative assertion of the whole "story" of the dispute. The term estoppel per 
rem judicata comes from the term estoppel by record in common law and reflects 
exactly this common-law approach to res judicata, 13 which is closer to the Roman 
rule that "res judicata pro veritate accipitur". 14 
" In contrast, in modern civil procedural systems, the codified res judicata15 is 
normally confined to the claims rather than the issues determined in a judgment. 
16 
The prevailing view here is that the res judicata effect does not apply to the 
factual findings in a judgment. Civil-law countries seem to subscribe to the view 
that a judicial determination is fallible by nature and, in that sense, can only 
determine the legal consequences of what seems to have happened rather than 
determine what actually happened, that is, the facts. Parties are thus free to re- 
litigate facts determined in a judgment simply because res judicata does not bear 
any evidentiary significance for them. 
" In England, the term used is "Cause of action estoppel"; see Barnett, supra n. 5, para. 1-38 et seq, 
Halsbury's, Laws Of England. (4th ed. 2003) para 179-180. In the U. S.. the term used is "Claim 
preclusion"; see Park-lane Hosiery v Shore, 439 U. S. 322 (1979), Restatement, supra n. 9, para. 18- 
20, and Shell, supra n. 5 at 639. 
12 In England, the term used is "issue estoppel"; see Carl-Zeiss Stiftung v Rayner & Keeler Ltd, [1967] 
1 AC 853, and New Brunswick Rv v Britisch and French Trust Corp [1939] AC 1, HL (Lord 
Maugham LC), at 20, referring to issue estoppel ("it is unjust and unreasonable to permit the same 
issue to be litigated afresh"), and Halsbury's, supra n. 11, para 434 ("issue estoppel applies whether 
the point involved in the earlier decision is one of fact or one of law or one of mixed fact and law"). 
In the U. S., the term used is "collateral estoppel"; see Restatement, supra n. 9, para. 27, and Shell, 
supra n. 5, p. 647. 
13 See Halsbury's, supra n. 11, para. 964 
14 Note, however, that the French notion of res judicata seems close to this concept, since resjudicata 
is promulgated by Code Civil, art. 1351 under Section III, which deals with evidentiary 
presumptions, of Chapter VI, which deals with issues of proof. It follows that they too give res 
judicata an evidentiary power: ef also Vincent-Guinchard. Procedure Civile, para. 179 (27th ed. 
2003). 
15 France. NCPC, art. 480. Belgian Code of Civil Procedure, art. 23, German ZPO art. 322, Greece 
Code of Civil Procedure. art. 321 et seq. The doctrine is not codified in Switzerland. 
16 ILA Interim Report. supra note 1 at 16. See also in France. Dalloz. NCPC, 97th ed. (2005), art. 480 
and Vincent-Guinchard, supra note 14 (for France); in Switzerland, Berti, supra note 8, art. 187 
para. 41 and Fabienne Hohl, Procedure Civil, Tom I, (Staempfi Berne 2001), para. 1292 (for 
Switzerland); in Greece, KEpaµeü; Kov o5Xr1; NiKa;. EppKl7o). 4. (16Lxxouka; A" va Osaaa? ovixrl 
2000), art.. 321-334. 
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12.1.2.2 Constituent Elements of Res Judicata 
Having briefly outlined the differences in the approach of the national legal 
regimes to res judicata, it is now necessary to explore conceptual features of res 
judicata which are common to different legal jurisdictions. This common 
denominator will effectively provide the constituent elements of the concept of res 
judicata which, in turn, is essential to determining, in Section 12.3, which is the right 
effect of an international arbitral award. 
The raison d'etre of res judicata is the preservation of a decision's authority. 
While a decision determines the legal status of the dispute in question, res judicata 
ensures that this determination is not circumvented or overturned by subsequent 
conflicting determinations. 17 To achieve this objective, res judicata produces 
different kinds of effects: 
1. Prohibits reassertion: this kind of effect comes into play in a case where the 
subject matter and the parties to the second set of proceedings coincide with those of 
the first set. In these cases res judicata precludes the reassertion of the cause of action 
adjudicated in the first judgment, prohibiting a party to the first set of proceedings 
from even filing an action based on the cause already determined. This type of effect 
reflects the fundamental principle of the ne bis in idem in accordance with which a 
party cannot be granted relief twice on the same cause of action. 18 
2. Preclusive effect: this kind of effect comes into play in relation to pleas rather 
than the cause of action of the first set of proceedings. In particular, it prevents the re- 
litigation of any plea which was determined in the judgment and which plea arises in 
the second set of proceedings not as the main subject matter (cause of action) but as 
an issue necessary to determine the main subject matter. 19 The preclusive effect 
As used here, "resjudicata" encompasses the doctrine of "collateral estoppel" too. 
18 In the common law, the previous cause of action is considered to be merged, and thus extinguished, 
with the first judgment. See Barnett, supra note 3 para. 1.41; cf. Thoday v Thoday, [1964] P 181 CA 
(Diplock LJ) at 197: "... it is a plea that prevents a party in subsequent litigation from asserting or 
denying the existence of a particular cause of action. the non existence or existence of which has 
been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction in previous litigation between the same parties 
or their privies. " In civil-law countries the prohibition on reassertion is considered more like a 
procedural impediment to exercise the same cause of action twice. 
19 Restatement, supra n. 9, ch. 1, Introduction: "`Preclusive effects' refers to limitations on the 
opportunity in a second action to litigate claims or issues which have been or could have been 
litigated in a prior action. In general terms, these limitations include the rules of claim preclusion 
and issue preclusion. " 
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follows from the ne bis in idem principle, but applies only in a case where the subject 
matter in the two sets of proceedings to some extent overlap, rather than coincide. 
20 21 
3. Conclusive effect: Res judicata does not simply prohibit relitigation of an issue 
or a claim that have been litigated in a prior action (negative effect). It ensures that 
the determinations in the first decision will be followed by the second one, whenever 
the same issues arise in the second set of proceedings as issues necessary to determine 
the main subject matter of the second action (positive effect). Thus, in a case where a 
previously determined issue is raised in the second set of proceedings, the second 
forum should accept the determination of the first judgment one these issues as 
conclusive and thus accept this determination as a logical and legal basis of the 
second decision. In other words the determinations of the first decision are binding on 
the second forum. In this sense, res judicata has a harmonising effect, ensuring that 
the two overlapping decisions. Only the combination of preclusive and conclusive 
effects can effectively preserve the authoritative status of the first decision. 
4. Enforcement: The res judicata effect is interrelated with the enforcement of a 
judgment. Res judicata and enforcement are two sides of the same coin and their 
boundaries, in terms of ratione personae, necessarily coincide. 22 Thus, in principle, a 
judgment is enforceable against those parties and only those parties that are bound by 
res judicata. Thus, the enforcement is a legal and logical corollary of the 
20 This preclusive effect under particular circumstances may be extended not only to the issues that 
were actually raised in the proceedings but also to those that, by due diligence, could have been 
raised but eventually were not (the extended form of res judicata). This is clearly the case in 
England, where this type of effect is understood as part of the principle of abuse of process. See 
Henderson v Henderson, [1844] 6 QB 288 and the more recent Johnson v Gore Wood & Co., [2000] 
2 AC l; cf also EAA s. 73(1)d. The extended preclusive effect also operates slightly differently in 
the U. S., see Restatement, supra n. 9 para. 27. In addition, it is found in some civil-law countries, 
but not as part of the abuse of process principle, which is unknown to these jurisdictions. See e. g., 
the Greek Civil Procedure Code, art. 330: "Resjudicata covers those pleas that have been raised, as 
well as those that could have been raised but were not. " 
21 Although there is a fundamental difference between the common and the civil law regarding the 
extent of this effect (it is extended to both claims and issues (factual and legal) in common law but 
only to claims in civil, supra), the preclusive effect constitutes a basic common denominator of the 
resjudicata concept in both legal systems. See Vincent-Guinchard, supra n. 14, para. 179. b. 
22 See Vincent-Guinchard. supra n. 14, para. 178: «1'autorite de la chose jugee s'identifie alors avec la 
force obligatoire de la sentence ». In Switzerland see F. Hohl, supra n. 16, para. 4-1. In England cf. 
s. 58 EAA: " unless otherwise agreed by the parties, an award made by the tribunal pursuant to an 
arbitration agreement is final and binding, both on parties and on any persons claiming through or 
under them" (subjective boundaries of an arbitral award) with s. 82(2): "... a party to an arbitration 
agreement include any person claiming under or through a party to the agreement" (subjective 
boundaries of an arbitration agreement) (emphasis added). See also Koch & Diedrich, supra n. 8, 
para. 133. 
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conclusiveness of the decision. The converse is also the case: res judicata is a 
condition precedent for enforcement. 23 
12.2 RES JUDICATA AND THIRD PARTIES 
12.2.1 The "Same Parties" Requirement: Rule and Exceptions 
The above four different kinds of effect explain how the res judicata effect should 
apply. It is also important, however, to determine the parties that should be affected 
by resjudicata. Hence, this subsection examines the "same parties" requirement, the 
analysis of which will define who is bound by res judicata, including the extent to 
which third parties may be affected. 
The "same parties" requirement means that, as a rule, a decision affects only those 
persons who took part in the proceedings that resulted in the decision, namely the 
parties in action (genuine parties) as opposed to any third party. This requirement 
serves the fundamental principle of due process, that is, the right of the party to be 
heard. This rule, however, is by no means without exceptions. Almost every legal 
system under certain circumstances provides for exceptions to the "same parties" 
requirement, so that even persons not taking part in the proceedings are bound or 
somehow affected by the decision. 
This is true in common, civil and even Shari'a law. 24 The extent of these 
exceptions, of course, differs among jurisdictions, but the extension of the effect of a 
judgment to a "circle" of parties other than the real parties constitutes a general 
principle common to almost every legal system. In civil-law countries this circle of 
third parties, to which res judicata is extended, is limited and is normally determined 
a priori, by civil and procedural codes. 25 In contrast, in common-law countries the 
23 This is not to say that res judicata and enforceability have the same effect. In order to be enforced a 
judgment normally requires an order which is granted by the national courts (ezequatur). All that is 
suggested here is that the res judicata is, as a rule, a condition precedent for the enforcement of a 
judgment, as both effects implement the authoritative determination of the decision. 
For example, the judgment is extended to the heirs of the deceased when it has been issued against 
the deceased and against the debtor if issued against the guarantor. See `Ali Hay Dar Durar Al- 
Hukkam. "Commentaries Of Majalla", Art. 1842, found in Samir Saleh, Commercial Arbitration 
The Arab Middle East. (2°d ed. 2006), p. 70. 
25 Thus, in Germany, the German Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO) ss. 326-327 provides for the 
extension of res judicata to the successors. assignors and executors. In France, as an exception to 
the general rule stipulated in the French Civil Code Art. 1351. it is accepted that res judicata is 
extended to those third parties that are deemed to be represented by the parties to the proceedings. 
The exception is applied in the case of universal successors, assignors, and jointly and severally 
liable debtors of a party. See, in general, Dalloz, Code Civil, Art. 1351, Vincent-Guinchard, supra 
n. 14. para. 179b. 1 and Boyer, "Les effets des jugements a 1'egard des tiers", 49 (1951) Rev. Trim. 
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circle consists of the so-called privies, i. e. persons that are in privity with one of the 
parties in an action. 26 Defining the concept of privy is difficult, not least because it 
has a different meaning in the U. S. 27 from that which it has in England. 28 
In general, the test of whether the res judicata will be extended to a third party is 
the "community of interest" test between this third party and one of the parties to the 
action. More specifically it is required that the third party and one of the parties to the 
action are so closely associated in terms of interests that the third party's interests 
In fact, for the resjudicata effect to be "are represented by a party to the action. "`9 30 
Dr. Civ., p. 163. In Greece, resjudicata extends, inter alia, to the assignor and successor in right, 
the trustee, the executor, and the guarantor (but only in a case where the judgment is for the debtor 
against the creditor). See Greek Code Civil Procedure, Arts. 325-329 All 936/1986, NoB 1987, 
p. 1219; KcpaseÜ; Kov&&, il; Nixa;, supra n. 16, art. 325. 
26 Restatement (First) Judgments, (1942), para. 83: "A person who is not a party but who is in privity 
with the parties in an action terminating in a valid judgment is bound by and entitled to the benefits 
of the rules of resjudicata. " 27 The Restatement (Second), notes, characteristically, "It may be less 
misleading if not much more meaningful to use the term `relationship' between parties instead of 
`privity. "' Restatement (Second), supra note 9, para. 1 (Introduction); and again: "The term 
`privity, ' unless it refers to some definite legal relationship such as bailment or assignment, is so 
amorphous that it often operates as a conclusion rather than an explanation, " Restatement (Second), 
para. 62. 
In general, the U. S. law takes a broad view privies, encompassing all persons that have a title or a 
substantive right of their own but do not take part in the litigation with the real parties, either 
because they choose not to or because they are not allowed to. This includes, for example, the 
executor, administrator, guardian, cases of principal and agent, the assignor-assignee, bailor-bailee, 
and certain cases of partnership; see Shell, supra n. 5, at 640: "The notion of privy in the law of res 
judicata has also been flexible and it simply signifies that parties are in such relationship to one 
another that a judgment involving one may justly be conclusive upon the other"; see, in general, 
Restatement, supra n 9, paras. 34-62 et seq, for a detailed presentation of the different types of third 
parties affected by resjudicata and Herbert Semmel, "Collateral Estoppel, Mutuality and Joinder of 
Parties", 68 (1968) Colum. L. Rev., p. 1460: "some cases have stretched the concept of privity to the 
constitutional limit and perhaps beyond, " referring to the example of Makariw v Rinard, 222 F. 
Supp. 336 (E. D. Pa 1963). 
28 English law takes a much narrower view of privy, limiting the "circle" to parties that claim a title or 
a right under, through or on behalf of another party. This group includes the case of the ancestors 
and heirs (privies in blood) or the case of a successor to rights or liability (privies in title) or the case 
of a trustee-beneficiary (privies in interest). See Halsbury's, supra n. 11, at 452 et seq; Barnett, 
supra n. 3, paras. 3-20 et seq; cf also Carl Zeiss, supra n. 12; cf. EAA ss. 58 & 82(2) and House of 
Spring Gardens v Waite, [1991] 1 QB 241(CA). 
29 Gary Cunningham, "Collateral Estoppel: The Changing Role of The Rule of Mutuality", 41 (1976) 
Mo. L. Rev., p. 522; cf. Shiels v Blakeley. (1986) 2 NZLR 262.268 (NZCA): " there must be shown 
such union or nexus, such a community or mutuality of interest, such an identity between a party to 
the first proceeding and the person claimed to be estopped in the subsequent proceeding that to 
estop the latter will produce a fair and just result. " 
30 This identification is basically substantive: co-owners in property, for example. However, it may 
also be procedural, as is the relationship between the trustee and the beneficiary. It is usually 
contractual but may be tortious. Thus, tortfeasors are considered in privity. See House of Spring 
Gardens 1, Waite, [1991] 1 QB 241 (CA) and in the U. S.. Restatement, supra n. 9, para. 48; different 
in Barnett. supra n. 3. paras. 3-17, who puts tortfeasors under the category of "deemed parties" as 
well. 
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extended to a third-party, the latter and the party to the action must have identical 
interests. 31 
Two conclusions may be drawn from above analysis: First, the exception to the 
"same parties" rule is so well-established in almost every legal system that it may be 
argued that the fact the exception is also a constituent element of res judicata. It 
follows that the "same parties" rule in resjudicata should read: resjudicata applies 
mainly to the parties to the action but also, in exceptional circumstances, to third 
parties. 
Second, the circle of the third parties bound by res judicata is extremely narrow, 
since the extension of res judicata to a third party requires a substantial degree of 
identification, in terms of interests, between the third party and one of the parties to 
action. As the "identification test" is so strict, it is only in very limited circumstances 
that the resjudicata effect is extended to a third party. 
This strict test thus leaves all other third parties beyond the reach of any judgment 
effect. This rule, in principle, applies to arbitration as well, since awards and 
judgments are equated in terms of effect. 32 Thus, the effect of an arbitral award may 
not bind or even affect any person other than one substantially identified with the 
parties to the arbitration proceedings. In effect, only privies to the parties to the 
arbitral proceedings will be bound by the res judicata effect of an arbitral award. By 
contrast, false third parties, who are neither genuine parties to the arbitral proceedings 
nor privies to the parties thereto, will not be bound by the res judicata effect of an 
arbitral award. This applies to both groups of false third parties identified in the thesis 
in Chapter 2. False third parties may be contractually interrelated to, or even co-liable 
with, the parties to the action, however, their interests are not identical to those of the 
parties in the proceedings, and therefore they fall short of privity. 
The following sections show in detail why the res judicata effect recognised for 
arbitral awards is not sufficient to address the problems related to multiparty 
31 Cf. Drouot Assurances S. A. v Consolidated Metallurgical Industries, Protea Assurance and GIE, 
ECJ Case C-351/96, [1998] E. C. R 1-3317 which employs the criterion of "identical and 
indissociable interests": see also para. 19: "there had to be such a degree of identity between the 
interests of the insurer and the insured that a judgment in relation to one would be res judicata for 
the other": cf. Peter Kaye, Law Of The European Judgments Convention, (Chichester: Barry Rose 
Law Publishers 1999). p. 2780: "the fundamental underlying criterion for assessment of whether 
insurer and insured are to be treated as same parties ... 
is whether they have such identical and 
indissociable interests as to satisfy the requirements of the efficient administration of justice and 
avoidance of irreconcilable judgments balanced against fairness to parties without denial of justice 
through trial. " 
32 See Section 12.1 above. 
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contractual relationships in arbitration. As it will be argue the circle of third parties 
that may be affected by an international arbitral award should be wider than that 
affected by res judicata resulting from a judgment. By the same token, however, the 
kind of third-party effect produced by an international award should be different from 
the resjudicata effect produced by a judgment. 
12.2.2 False Third Parties: The Problem 
As was already mentioned, false third parties fall short of privity with the genuine 
parties. The interests of false third parties in the multiparty project, although 
interlinked, are not identical to those of the parties to the arbitral proceedings. This 
applies to both groups of false third parties, namely false third parties that are co- 
liable or simply contractual interrelated to the genuine parties. Nevertheless, there is a 
strong substantive nexus between false third parties and genuine parties. They might 
not be privies, but their contractual rights are inextricably intertwined with the rights 
of at least one of the parties to the arbitral proceedings. 33 This most likely means that 
many of the legal and factual issues arising in the bilateral arbitral proceedings will 
also arise in subsequent proceedings between false third parties and one of the parties 
to the first set of proceedings. There is thus the risk of inconsistent, if not conflicting, 
decisions34 arising out of the several sets of proceedings in relation to the same 
multiparty commercial project. 
As has repeatedly been argued in the thesis, there is a clear need for the 
communication between parallel overlapping proceedings, so that ensuing the 
decisions are to the extent possible harmonised. 
Compare the very interesting analysis of the third parties' interests in Alexis Mourre, "L'Intervention 
des Tiers ä ]'Arbitrage". Recueil Vol. 1 (2000-2002) Les Cahiers de 1'Arbitrage, p. 100 arguing for 
the analogous application of national intervention mechanisms in arbitration. 
i4 There is a slight difference between the terms "conflicting" and "irreconcilable" decisions: the 
former is stricter, referring to decisions between the same two parties but with mutually exclusive 
legal consequences, whereas the latter is wider referring to contradictory decisions in the case of 
multiparty relationships. However, problematic situations may arise not only from "conflicting" but 
also from "irreconcilable decisions. " Cf Council Regulation (EC) no. 44/2001, on Jurisdiction and 
the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters. art. 34.4 which 
provides for resistance to the recognition of "irreconcilable" rather than "conflicting' judgments. 
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12.2.2.1: Solutions in the context of litigation: unification and harmonisation 
mechanisms 
In the context of litigation, there are two ways in which two or more parallel 
proceedings involving the same legal and factual issues are regulated so that 
conflicting decisions are avoided: 
First, by third-party mechanisms that bring all the relevant parties before a single 
forum. This type of third-party mechanisms can be named unification mechanisms. 
Examples of unification mechanisms are: common jurisdictional bases, class actions, 
intervention and joinder, interpleading and consolidation. 35 In this way parallel 
proceedings are avoided altogether, and regulation of multiparty relationships is 
achieved in an early stage, namely in a pre-judgment stage. Unification mechanisms 
bring all the relevant parties in the same set of proceedings in a rather intrusive and 
drastic way. Parties are not allowed to litigate their disputes bilaterally. Instead, 
through unification mechanisms, third parties are brought in the proceedings between 
two other parties, at some times even against the will of the original parties or even 
against the will of the third parties themselves. 36 
Secondly, by mechanisms that merely harmonise the outcomes of the parallel 
proceedings, rather than bring all the several parties before a single forum. Typical 
examples of harmonisation mechanisms are lis pendens and res judicata. Here, the 
several set of proceeding remain parallel, instead of being consolidated. However, lis 
pendens and resjudicata regulate the parallel proceedings, so that conflicting findings 
and decisions are avoided. In particular, lis pendens prevents the continuation of the 
second set of proceedings until a decision in the first set of proceedings is granted. 
Res judicata, either prevents the second set of proceedings to commence at all or 
ensures that the second forum is bound by the determinations of the first decision. 
Both lis pendens and res judicata ensure that the second proceedings do not 
continue without taking the determinations of the first decision into account. In this 
way, the results of the first proceedings are communicated with the second trial so 
35 See in detail Section 8.2 above. 
36 In many instances third party provisions are drafted as compulsory mechanisms: see, for example, 
art. 331 NCPC (intervention force&) or US Fed. R r. 24. (a)(intervention as a matter of right). See 
below for more details; cf Vaccaro 1' Moore-McCormack Lines, S. D. N. Y. 1974,64 F. R. D. 395: 
consent of the parties is not required for a consolidation of actions. rather, it is the trial court's 
decision whether common questions of law and fact indicate that sufficient judicial economy would 
be achieved by consolidation, when balanced against any inconvenience, delay, or expense caused 
to the parties by attending trial of some issues not shared by all. 
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that conflicting judgments are avoided. Thus, harmonisation mechanisms are 
designed to prevent conflicting decisions in a different way than bringing all the 
relevant parties before the same court. Harmonisation mechanisms bring the several 
decisions into accord, rather than they consolidate the several proceedings. 
As a matter of general policy, national civil procedures give precedence to the 
application of unification over harmonisation mechanisms. The former, as explained 
above, are more drastic, achieving the maximum results in terms of preservation of 
procedural recourses and consistency in the determination of the multiparty dispute. 
Thus, in general, third-party unification mechanisms are more broadly applicable 
than harmonisation mechanisms. Indeed, the right of intervention or joinder is 
accorded to a wide circle of third parties, whereas the application of lis pendens or res 
judicata to third parties usually hinges on more stringent conditions, namely the 
"same parties" requirement and the strict test of identification of interests explained 
above. 
Thus, for example, in proceedings between an employer and a contractor, a sub- 
contractor may either intervene on its own37 or be interpleaded by one of the real 
parties. 38 However, a subcontractor will typically not be bound by the res judicata 
effect of the decision between a contractor and an employer, since contactor and 
subcontractor have interrelated but certainly not identical interests in the dispute, and 
therefore they can never be taken as the "same parties". It, therefore, seems clear that, 
whereas unification mechanisms are designed to apply to third parties, harmonisation 
mechanisms are applicable to third parties only as a limited exception. 
The precedence of unification over harmonization mechanism is based on sound 
reasons. 
First, as a matter of general policy, procedural harmonisation of multiparty 
relationships is welcome at as early a stage as possible. It is difficult to resolve 
any inconsistency after conflicting judgments have been given, since at that stage 
both judgments enjoy the status of authority and are presumed to be enforceable. 39 
Thus, it is preferable to apply unification mechanisms, which are available even 
37 For example, French NCPC art 330 or US Fed R. r. 24(b). 
31 For example. French NCPC 331 or US Fed R. r. 14. 
39 ff P. Kaye, Law of the European Judgments Convention, supra n. 3 1, p. 2631: "it is better to prevent 
the situation from arising in the recognition context in the first place by tackling the problem at the 
adjudicatory stage". 
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from the beginning of the proceedings, rather than harmonisation mechanisms 
that are available at a later stage or even after one decision is issued. 
" Secondly, issues of violation of due process may arise with regard to 
harmonisation mechanisms, and res judicata in particular. The extension of the 
drastic effect of resjudicata to third parties raises the question of violation of the 
constitutional right of the third party to be heard. 
40 On the other hand, 
participation of a third party in the proceedings, via unification mechanisms, 
ensures that the third party is, at least, given the opportunity to present its case. 
However, efficient as unification mechanisms may be, their application is not 
always possible. In many cases impediments of jurisdictional nature preclude a court 
from assuming jurisdiction over all the relevant parties or claims. Therefore, 
multiparty proceedings are not possible. In these cases, unification mechanisms fail to 
work and the duty to prevent conflicting judgments passes down to the harmonisation 
mechanisms. 
For example, in the US, the US Federal Rules providing for joinder or intervention 
are not applicable where joinder or intervention of third parties would deprive court 
of jurisdiction by destroying diversity of citizenship. For the third party to be joined 
or intervene all the several parties must be submitted to the jurisdiction of different 
states. 41 Here, the lack of diversity of citizenship constitutes a "jurisdictional 
impediment", precluding the application of unification mechanisms. 
Similarly in the context of the European Regulation 44/2001, a creditor by virtue 
of art. 6(l) of the Regulation can bring a joint action against a debtor and its guarantor 
as co-defendants before a single national court, even if the debtor and the guarantor 
domicile in different Member States. However, as is generally accepted, the joinder 
of a guarantor and a debtor in a single action is not possible where a bilateral 
jurisdiction agreement between the creditor and the debtor exists. 42 In such a case, the 
creditor will have to file two different actions before two different courts in different 
40 See Restatement (Second) Judgments, (1982) para. 29b and Reporters Note: "The proposition that a 
non-party cannot be bound by a judgment. unless he is represented by a party or has interests that 
are derivative from a party. is a rule of Constitutional Law: see also Bernhard 1. Bank of America, 
(1942) 19 Cal. 2d, 122 P. 2d, at 894: res judicata must "conform to the mandate of due process of 
law that no person be deprived of personal or property rights by a judgment without notice and an 
opportunity to be heard". 
41 See Chesapeake Bay Village i, Costle (1980, DC Md) 502 F Supp 213 and Bakia r County of Los 
Angeles (1982 Cal) 687 F2d 299,34 FR Serv 2d 1527. 
42 See Hough vP&0 Containers Ltd [1999] Q. B. 834; Cf Morris, The Conflict of Laws, (6`h ed) 
(London Thomson Sweet & Maxwell 2005). para 4-038. n. 7. 
230 
Member States: one against the debtor in accordance with the jurisdiction agreement, 
and another against and the guarantor in accordance with the general rules on 
jurisdiction (Chapter II of the Reg. 44/2201). Here, the joinder of a debtor and a 
guarantor in a single action before a single court will not be possible. The exclusive 
jurisdiction agreement between the creditor and the debtor will constitute a 
"jurisdictional impediment", precluding the application of the unification mechanism 
of Reg. 44/2001 art-6(1) . 
However, when the regulation of the several proceedings by reference to 
unifications mechanisms is not possible, harmonisation mechanisms may come into 
play to avoid conflicting decisions. 
Indeed, even if the application of Reg. 44/2001 art. 6(1) fails to apply and a 
creditor has to bring two separate actions against a debtor and a guarantor, the two 
sets of proceedings will not necessarily result into conflicting decisions. The 
harmonisation mechanism of lis pendens, provided by Reg. 44/2001 arts. 27 and 28 
will come into play, in order to harmonise the two parallel proceedings so that 
conflicting judgments are avoided. Thus, the second proceedings, say between a 
creditor and a guarantor, will most likely be stayed until the first proceedings between 
the creditor and the debtor are completed and a decision is finally given. 
43 
The conclusion that can be drawn from the above is that unification third-party 
mechanisms are, indeed, given precedence over harmonisation mechanisms. 
However, when unification is not possible due to an overriding jurisdictional 
impediment, such as the existence of an exclusive jurisdiction agreement between two 
only of the several parties, harmonisation mechanisms may take over and regulate the 
parallel proceedings. 
Art. 28, rather than art. 27, is more likely to apply in this example. In Drouot Assurances v CMI et 
alia, supra n. 31, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) held that art. 21 of the Brussels Convention 
1968 (ie art. 27 in the Reg. 44/2004) is not applicable with regard to two parallel proceedings 
between a barge insurer against the cargo owner and the cargo insurer on the one hand, and the 
barge owner/insured against the same parties on the other hand. However, as Advocate General 
Fennelly mentioned in his opinion (European Court Reports 1998, page 1-03075. at para. 30) article 
22 (ie art. 28 now in the Reg. 44/2001) has a broader scope and, thus, could apply in this context 
instead of art. 21. It should be noted that. according to the most persuasive view, art. 28 is not subject 
to art. 23 and, thus, it would apply notwithstanding the existence of an exclusive jurisdiction 
agreement, see P. Kaye, Law of the European Judgments Conventions, supra n. 31, p. 2784: cf also, 
The Linda [1988] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 175, where insurers were involved in the first proceedings but not 
in the second. Sheen J. noted, at 179: "If. as I assume, the insurers have a right of subrogation, then 
adding their names as plaintiffs may be a necessary procedure in the Netherlands, but it adds 
nothing of substance. In my judgment, art. 21 applies and the Court must give effect to it by 
declining jurisdiction. If I am wrong in that decision, then art. 22 must apply". 
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12.2.2.2 Solutions in the context ofArbitration 
As has been shown in detail in the previous chapters, third parties cannot in 
general be brought before arbitral proceedings between two genuine parties thereto . 
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The principle of party autonomy expressed in the form of an arbitration agreement 
will, as a matter of rule, prevail over the desirability to bring the several parties before 
a single arbitral tribunal. The existence of an arbitration agreement between two of 
the several parties involved in a multiparty commercial project constitutes a 
overriding "jurisdictional impediment", which precludes the application of unification 
mechanisms to international arbitration. Therefore, the policy of an early regulation 
of the parallel proceedings applicable in litigation will normally not apply to 
arbitration. 
In this way, arbitration is left without any means of regulation for multiparty 
disputes at all. False third parties, namely third parties with a significant interest in 
the outcome of the arbitration between two other parties, are left totally outside the 
arbitration both during the proceedings and after the award is given 
" At the pre-award stage, intervention or joinder or consolidation is generally not 
allowed, due to the principle of party autonomy. 
" At the stage after the award has been made, the arbitral award obtains the status of 
a judgment and thus has limited third-party effects, or at least third-party effects 
that do not extend to false third parties. 
Hence a subcontractor, a surety, a partner, an affiliated company and many other 
cases of false third parties remain, as a rule, unaffected, both by the arbitral 
proceedings and the award, between the genuine parties. 
It can be argued thus that the regulation of multiparty disputes should be passed 
down to harmonisation mechanisms: lis pendens and res judicata or another type of 
arbitral effect. In the context of multiparty disputes, the arbitral proceedings and the 
arbitral award should affect a wider circle of persons than those who are parties to the 
arbitration agreement. In this way, arbitration can accommodate the intrinsic 
problems arising out of multiparty relationships and disputes and compensate for the 
lack of third-party mechanisms at an earlier stage analogous to the mechanisms 
provided in the context of litigation 
44 Unless, the jurisdictional approach suggested here is taken with regard to the false third parties of the 
first group. 
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As regards the arbitral proceedings and lis pendens, courts have accepted in may 
cases that the lis pendens effect of arbitral proceedings has been extended to false 
third parties. This has been demonstrated in detail in Chapter 7.1 and needs not to be 
repeated here. It suffices to say, that pending arbitration proceedings between the two 
parties to an arbitration agreement, national courts may stay proceedings between a 
party to an arbitration agreement and a false third party, on the ground that the second 
action is inextricably involved with the subject matter of the pending dispute before 
the tribunal. 45 Thus, the parallel interrelated proceedings are attuned. 
The same should be accepted with regard to arbitral awards. Arbitral awards 
should have an effect extending the genuine parties to arbitration proceedings in order 
to harmonise the parallel proceedings. However, as explained, any third-party effect 
of arbitral awards is not possible, because arbitral awards obtain the status of a 
national judgment, whose res judicata effect is limited only to the parties in action 
and their privies. 
It follows that an arbitral award should obtain a different status from that of a 
national judgment, which would allow an arbitral award to produce a different kind of 
effect on false third parties, than the res judicata effect. This arbitral effect on false 
third parties should be analogous to the degree of association between false third 
parties and parties to the arbitral proceedings, in terms of interests. 
As was explained, a party in an action and its privy are considered to have 
identical interests and therefore the res judicata effect is extended to the privy. 46 
False third parties, however, have interlinked, but certainly not identical interests with 
the parties to arbitral proceedings. If the res judicata effect extended to false third 
parties, issues related to due process and their right to be heard would arise. 
45 For example, in the US see Lawson v Akzona. 355 F. Supp. 1146 (S. D. N. Y. ). affd 486 F. 2d 1394 (2d 
Cir. 1973); Dale Metals v KIRA, 442 F. Supp. 78 (SDNY 1977); Morrie Mages v Thrifty 
Corporation, 916 F. 2d 402 (7th Cir. 1990); Subway Equipment Leasing Corp. v Forte, 169 F. 3d 324 
(5th Cir. 1999) and in Harvey v Joyce 199 F. 3d 790 (5th Cir. 2000); Hill, Grimes and Canatxx 
Energy Ventures vGE Power Systems et al., 282 F. 3d 343 (5th Circuit 2002). In England, see for 
example, Reichhold Norway A. 
S. A. and another v Goldman Sachs International, [2000] 1 W. L. R. 
173. 
46 Cf. ECJ Drouot Assurances S. A. v Consolidated Metallurgical Industries, Protea Assurance and 
GIE. supra n. 30, which employs the criterion of "identical and indissociable interests"; see also 
para. 19: "there had to be such a degree of identity between the interests of the insurer and the 
insured that a judgment in relation to one would be resjudicata for the other"; cf. P. Kaye, Law Of 
The European Judgments Convention, supra n. 31, p. 2780: "the fundamental underlying criterion 
for assessment of whether insurer and insured are to be treated as same parties ... 
is whether they 
have such identical and indissociable interests as to satisfy the requirements of the efficient 
administration of justice and avoidance of irreconcilable judgments balanced against fairness to 
parties without denial of justice through trial". 
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Consequently, a full res judicata effect of an award to false third parties should be 
rejected as excessive and thus inappropriate for arbitration. Therefore, an arbitral 
award should affect the false third parties, in a way that reflects the degree of their 
association in terms of interests with the parties to the proceedings. 
The next section argues for a suitable and thus proportional third-party effect of 
arbitral awards, which would simultaneously keep intact the principle of due process 
and accommodate the desirability to regulate the outcomes of the several proceedings 
arising out of multiparty relationships. 
12.3 THE SUGGESTED THIRD-PARTY ARBITRAL EFFECT 
The solution suggested here is: 
9 First, to recognize a third-party effect of an arbitral award, which would be 
analogous to the association between false third parties and parties to the 
arbitral proceedings, in terms of interests. This is outlined in this section. 
" Second, to recognize this effect as an autonomous, inherent element of 
international arbitral awards, rather than an effect recognised by national legal 
systems depending on divergent conditions. This legal basis of the third-party 
arbitral effect is considered in Section 12.5. 
12.3.1. Examination of the Suggested Effect 
Chapter 8 estbalished the principle that the procedural relationships between the 
false third parties and the original parties reflect their association, in terms of 
substantive interests and liability. Applied to judgments this principle suggests that 
the degree of substantive interrelation between a third party and the parties in the 
proceedings will determine the impact of the ensuing judgment upon the third party. 
Indeed, there are examples in the context of litigation showing that while the res 
judicata effect will be only extended to privies, a judgment may produce a different 
sort of effect upon third parties who, although fall short of privity, are interrelated to 
the parties in the proceedings. 
For example. in the US the collateral estoppel effect rather than the res judicata 
one may apply to a wider circle of third parties, not just privies to the parties in the 
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action. 47 It should be noted that collateral estoppel relates only to the preclusive 
effect of a judgment, and it has thus narrower effect than res judicata, which, as 
explained above, also relates to prohibition of reassertion, the conclusive effect and 
the enforcement of a judgment. Thus, a kind of more limited effect of a national 
judgment (collateral estoppel), than the drastic res judicata, is extended to a wider 
circle of third parties that are simply interrelated rather than identified with the parties 
in action. Indeed, it seems that the U. S. courts, due to the abandonment of the 
requirement of mutuality with regard to collateral estoppel, have greatly expanded 
the applicability of collateral estoppel to third parties in civil cases. 48 They have also 
extended the right of third parties to a prior litigation to assert both offensive and 
defensive collateral estoppel in a subsequent action against a person who was a party 
in the prior case. 49 Thus, a third party, either as a claimant or as a defendant in 
subsequent proceedings may rely on an issue determined in a first judgment against 
one of the real parties (third-party preclusive effect). 
5° 
Similarly, civil law jurisdictions recognise a kind of third-party effect that is 
different from that of res judicata. Indeed, in principle, a judgment may have an 
impact which is weaker than that of resjudicata upon third parties whose interests are 
interrelated but not identical to those of the parties in the proceedings. 51 This effect is 
47 Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U. S. 313,329 (1971), on 
remand, 334 F. Supp. 2d 47 (N. D. Ill. 1971), of 'd, 465 F. 2d 380 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. den., 409 U. S. 
1061, (1972); Park-lane Hosiery v Shore, 439 U. S. 322 (1979). In contrast, English law remains firm 
on the doctrine of mutuality. 
Hence, 
any preclusive effect requires that both parties have taken part 
in both proceedings in the same right. See, however, Lord Denning's attempt to change this view in 
Mcllkenny v Chief Constable of the West Midlands, [1980] QB283,317 (CA): "If a decision has 
been given against a man on the identical issue arising in previous proceedings - and he had full and 
fair opportunity of defending himself in it - then he is estopped from contesting it again in 
subsequent proceedings"(contra Goff L. J. and Sir George Baker). The mutuality principle was 
confirmed by the House of Lords in Hunter v Chief Constable of the West Midlands, [ 1982] AC 529 
(HL): in Carl Zeiss, supra note 12, and the recent Sun Life Insurance Company of Canada i' The 
Lincoln National Life Insurance Company, [2004] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 606. 
48 See Restatement, supra n. 9, Reporter's note, para. 29; Semmel, supra n. 27, p. 1457. 
49 Restatement, supra n. 9, Reporter's note, para. 29. 
51 However, the converse does not apply, so that the real party may not use against a third party a 
judgment issued in proceedings where the former did take part but the latter did not. See DeWitt v 
Hall, 225 N. E. 2d 195 (1967); Bernhard v Bank of America Nat'l Sav. & Trust Ass'n, 122 P. 2d 892 
(1942); Blonder-Tongue Laboratories v University of Illinois Foundation 402 U. S. 313 (1971). 
See, c. g.. the French NCPC. art. 581 and ef. art. 1481 for arbitration: they provide for "tierce 
opposition. " a means by which a third party may attack a judgment. that just affects the third party 
rather than binding it with a res judicata effect. The effect may prejudice the interests of the third 
party. See Dalloz, Art. 583, para. 7 for those parties that may use the "tierce opposition": only those 
that are neither parties to the proceedings not represented by the real parties. Cf. Civ. 2e. 16 May 
1973, Bull. Civ. II, No. 165. However, it should be noted that the "tierce opposition" is not 
applicable in the context of international arbitration: see NCPC art. 1507. See also A. Mourre, supra 
n. 32, p. 104. A similar means of recourse available to third parties against a judgment made 
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more like an adverse effect or a prejudice vis-ä-vis third parties rather than a full 
extension of resjudicata. It usually requires previous notice of the proceedings to the 
third party, which, if it does not intervene in the ongoing proceedings between the 
real parties, loses the right of recourse against the judgment. Also, the final judgment 
will be enforced by or against the third party. Nevertheless, again the same pattern 
applies: a kind of more limited effect of a national judgment, than the drastic res 
judicata, is extended to a wider circle of third parties that are simply interrelated 
rather than identified with the parties in action. 
Thus this conclusion is in line with the general principle that the degree of a 
substantive interrelation between a third party and the parties in the proceedings 
determines the impact of the judgment upon the third party. This conclusion can be 
verified by way of cautious analogy to lis pendens too. 52 
For example, the European Regulation 44/2001 sets out the following litispendens 
mechanism: 
" Article 27 provides that when two different courts are seized of the same subject 
matter, the court seized of the second case must stay and, after the jurisdiction of 
the first court is established, decline jurisdiction on its own motion. In other 
words, it provides for the litispendens effect of the first set of proceedings upon 
the second one. In order to operate, Article 27 requires that the parties in the 
parallel proceedings be the same or that they be third parties that share a 
substantial degree of identification with them, and that the two claims in question 
almost coincide. 
" Article 28, on the other hand, provides for the situation where the two parallel 
proceedings are not identical but merely similar53 both in terms of the subject 
matter and in terms of the parties. Thus, there is no need for the parties in the 
second set of proceedings to be substantially identified, in terms of interest, with 
the parties in the first. Even substantially different third parties in the second set 
may be subject to the litispendens effect of the first set. It is enough that the third 
party in the second set and one of the parties in the first set are contractually 
between two other persons is also provided in the Greek Code of Civil Procedure, art. 92 and art. 
583 et seq (where again a third party may attack a judgment by which it is not bound by res 
judicata). 
52 Here, the focus is on the impact of a set of proceedings (lis pendens) rather than that of a judgment 
(resjudicata) vis-ä-vis third parties. 
Le.. "closely connected. " 
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intertwined and have, thus, interrelated interests. However, the consequences in 
Article 28 are different: the court, on the application of one of the parties, has 
mere discretion, rather than an ex officio obligation, to stay54 the proceedings. 55 
It follows that for Article 27 to apply the threshold requirement of a substantive 
degree of identity is high and the resulting litispendens effect is accordingly drastic: 
an ex officio duty to decline jurisdiction. However, for Article 28 to apply the 
threshold requirement of similar, rather than identical proceedings, is lower and the 
litispendens effect is accordingly less drastic: the mere discretion to stay the 
proceedings on application of one of the parties. In this way, the Regulation provides 
for a different kind of litispendens effect depending on the degree of substantive 
identification of the two cases and the parties. 
In the light of the above analysis, it is submitted that the following third-party 
effect mechanism can be considered in respect of either a set of proceedings (judicial 
or arbitral) or a decision (judicial or arbitral): 
" Looser conditions (looser identity / contractually intertwined parties) 4 less 
drastic effect 
" Strict identity of parties + claim 4 more drastic effect 
This system may also apply to arbitration: the degree of substantive association 
between a genuine and a party to an arbitration should determine the intensity of the 
arbitral effect upon the third party, that is, the extent of procedural repercussions for 
the third party. Thus, where third parties share a great degree of substantive 
identification with genuine parties an arbitral award should produce a full resjudicata 
effect vis-ä-vis the third parties. This is the case with privies where their interests are 
almost identical to those of the parties in action, and therefore a full extension of the 
arbitral effect to the privies is justified. However, where the parties in the proceedings 
and the third parties are interrelated rather than identified in terms of interests, as in 
the case of false third parties, an arbitral award should still have an impact upon the 
"false third party, " but, this time, a lesser one. 
54 Or decline only in case the stricter conditions of Reg. art. 28(2) apply. 
ss Substantive interrelation has procedural repercussions also in the case of the common-law rules of 
Forum Non Conveniens: the courts in exercising their discretion to decline jurisdiction should take 
into account the existence of proceedings abroad that are substantively connected to the 
proceedings. In England, see P. Kaye, Civil Jurisdiction And Enforcement Of Foreign Judgments. 
(1987), p. 1233-1234. 
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12.3.2 Characteristics of the Third-Party Arbitral Effect- Distinction from Res 
Judicata 
The suggested third-party effect of an arbitral award should be clearly 
distinguished from the res judicata effect, which is particularly drastic and linked to 
the enforceability of the award. In particular, the third-party arbitral effect should not 
include: 
1. A prohibition against reassertion: The first arbitral proceedings between the 
genuine parties have a different subject matter from that of the proceedings between a 
false third party and one of the genuine parties. Thus, the false third party will not be 
prohibited from bringing his claim against a genuine party, and vice versa, before a 
different tribunal or national court. The first arbitral award will not extinguish the 
claim of the false third party. It falls outside the jurisdiction of the fist tribunal to 
decide on a false third party's claim that it is not the subject matter of the arbitration. 
2. The enforceability effect: The first award cannot be enforced by or against the 
false third party. A second trial is indispensable for the false third party's claim to be 
determined. Any claim or objection with regard to the false third party should be the 
subject matter of a new trial and a new decision, which, in turn, would be enforceable 
by or against the false third party. Otherwise, the extension of the enforceable effect 
of the award against a third party would clearly violate the due process principle. The 
parties bound by an arbitration agreement should coincide with those bound by the 
ensuing arbitral award. Since an arbitration agreement cannot and should not be 
enforced by or against any third party, 56 neither should the ensuing arbitral award be 
enforced by or against this false third party. 
However, an arbitral award should produce both a conclusive and preclusive effect 
vis-ä-vis the false third party. 57 This kind of double effect is a necessary corollary of 
the strong contractual interrelation typically found between genuine and false third 
parties. Due to this substantive proximity, it is most likely that the second 
proceedings would have to examine factual and legal issues already examined and 
determined by the first award. Thus, the preclusive effect of the first award should 
prevent any re-litigation of these issues, while the conclusive effect would provide the 
logical and legal basis for the second forum to reach a decision in accordance with the 
determination of the first arbitral award. Applied in this way, the combined arbitral 
51' See discussion in Chapter 6 and 7 above. 
57 In the sense in which they have been explained above in Section 12.1.2.2 
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effect will harmonise the legal and factual ground of the multiparty relationship and 
will ensure that any contradictory result is avoided. 
More particularly the arbitral third-party effect should cover: 
" Both legal and factual issues determined in the first arbitral proceedings: As 
has already been mentioned, most civil-law jurisdictions do not extend the res 
judicata effect to facts on the ground that a judgment or an award is inherently 
fallible and thus can never completely determine the truth. However, the 
conclusiveness of a decision stems precisely from the concession that courts 
and tribunals are not infallible. Decisions ". .. are not 
final because [they] are 
infallible but [they] are infallible only because [they] are final. "58 Decisions are 
agents of justice rather than the truth. The law of resjudicata is a "convention 
designed to compensate for man's incomplete knowledge and strong tendency 
to quarrel. "59 Thus, any conclusive effect of a determination in a decision 
effectively constitutes a convention: although the decision may, by nature, be 
fallible, all issues, factual as well as legal, must, at some point, be finally 
determined, infallibly or not, so that the dispute is eventually laid to rest. 60 For 
this reason, the suggested effect of an arbitral award should include legal issues 
as well as facts. 61 Moreover, distinguishing between factual legal issues would 
be would be wrong in practical terms, since it is, on many occasions, too 
difficult to separate facts from law. 62 
" All issues that are common in both proceedings: As explained, it is likely that 
issues examined and finally determined in the first award will arise in the 
second proceedings. This legal and factual ground, common to both 
proceedings, should be subject to the preclusive and conclusive effect of the 
first award. All determinations that can be clearly inferred from the first award, 
regarding issues that have been examined, proved and authoritatively 
ss Brown v Allen, 344 U. S. 443,540 (1953) (Jackson, J. concurring). 
54 Restatement (Second) Judgments, supra n. 9, Ch. I. Introduction. 
60 Ideen, "The law of res judicata cumulatively reinforces the authoritativeness of the law itself' and 
"compels repose. " Sec also id., "The rules of resjudicata in modem procedure ... may 
fairly be 
characterized as illiberal toward the opportunity for relitigation" and this applies to the re-litigation 
of either claims or a facts. 
61 Cf the ILA Final Report and Res. 1/2006, supra n. l, suggesting that "a more extensive notion of res 
judicata than is known in civil law jurisdictions in relation to issue estoppel, as in Recommendation 
42" should be adopted in arbitration. 
62 There are cases where factual and legal issues are inextricably tied up. See idem para. 28. referring to 
"genuinely mixed issues of fact and law". 
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determined, should not be re-litigated. It should be noted, however, that 
preclusion of re-litigation should be hinged on the condition that the issue in 
question before the second forum must have been essential for the first award, 
in the sense that the relevant issue directly supports the operative part of the 
award. 
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12.3.3 Requirements of the Arbitral Effect 
The following conditions are required for the effect to apply: 
"A contractually intertwined multiparty relationship, with closely interwoven 
rights and duties, arising out of common factual circumstances. These 
multiparty cases cannot be exhaustively determined a priori. There is a need 
for an ad hoc investigation, depending on the specific facts at hand. However, 
in general the third party effect should apply to the two groups of false third 
parties determined in Chapter 2. 
" Jurisdictional fragmentation of this relationship, where some of the several 
parties to the multiparty relationship have agreed on arbitration whereas others 
have agreed on litigation or a different arbitration. 
"A valid arbitral award, resulting from proceedings between two of the several 
parties involved in the multiparty relationship. 64 
" Previous invitation to the false third party to join the first arbitral proceedings. 
As argued above the tribunal only in exceptional circumstances should be able 
to assume jurisdiction over a false third party, " without the general consent of 
all the parties involved in the proceedings and the false third party. In any case, 
though, an arbitrator faced with an intertwined multiparty relationship should 
assume the initiative and suggest to the parties the joinder of a false third party. 
If all the parties agree that the false third party should be joined to the 
proceedings, then the proceedings should go on as multiparty. If however, one 
of the parties to the proceedings or the false third party rejects the joinder then 
63 Cf.. Hanotiau, supra note 1 paras. 34-35. This is also required in litigation. See, e. g., the English case 
Carl Zeiss. supra note 12; in the U. S. cf. Restatement, supra note 9, para. 27 and Bahler v Fletcher, 
474 P. 2d 329,338 (Ore. 1970). holding that collateral estoppel applies only to those issues that have 
"necessarily been decided in the prior action and [are] decisive of the present action. " This principle 
is applied in civil law as well, where obiter dicta are not covered by res judicata. See, for example 
in Greece. All 1366/1996, (1997) Enidvr7,1785. 
1 All arbitral awards, in principle, are presumed valid and enforceable in accordance with the N. Y. 
Convention unless they are proved otherwise. 
65 See Ch. 11 above, exceptional circumstances will be when false third party and a genuine party to an 
arbitration agreement are co-liable. 
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multiparty proceedings will not be possible. In this case, the third-party effect 
of the arbitral award will arise and will apply, particularly, to the party that 
rejected the joinder. 
"A second set of arbitral or judicial proceedings, between one of the genuine 
parties to the first arbitration and a false third party. Here the role of the second 
tribunal or court becomes crucial. The latter should make an in-depth analysis 
of the contractual relationship in question and determine whether, and to what 
extent, it is intertwined with the subject matter of the first award. In a case 
where the subject matter of the award and that of the pending proceedings are, 
indeed, closely interwoven, the second forum should refuse to re-examine 
issues determined in the award (preclusive effect) and accept the determination 
therein of these issues as conclusive (conclusive effect). This is of particular 
importance where the first award has undergone a fact-finding procedure, the 
result of which can be deduced from the award. 66 The use of different 
standards of proof or different evidentiary procedures by the tribunal should 
not be taken as an argument against the third-party effect of the award, as long 
as the arbitral proceedings met the standards of due process. 67 
" Discretionary application by the courts or tribunals: the decision on the third- 
party effect rests in the discretion of the second tribunal or court, which should 
exercise this discretion taking into account all the relevant factors and the 
competing interests. 
" Relief from the effect: A false third party should be given the opportunity to 
obtain relief from the conclusive effect of an arbitral award in case of fraud or 
collusion between the original parties. 68 In such a case the award cannot be 
determinative. Therefore, the second forum should ignore it and make a fresh 
examination of common ground between the two proceedings. 69 
66 It is true, however, that awards are not always particularly detailed, making any inference difficult. 
See Shell, supra n. 5 at 660. 
67 Under the N. Y. Convention scheme, once the award is issued, it is presumed to meet due process 
standards. The due process requirement. in the context of international arbitration. is determined by 
international standards rather than by procedural technicalities of national laws. See J. Lew, L. 
Mistelis and S. Kroell, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration, (Kluwer Law 
International 2003), para. 28-80 et seq: cf. Semmel. supra n. 27. p. 1469. 
68 Cf. also Restatement. supra n. 9, Ch. 5. 
69 The burden of proving the fraud or collusion would lie upon the third party according to the 
fundamental procedural rule that each party should prove the facts upon which it relies. See Lew- 
Mistelis- Kroell. supra n. 67, para. 22-25. 
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12.3.4 The Parties Affected 
While res judicata regulates the relations between the original parties to 
proceedings, the third-party effect refers to the relations of the genuine parties with a 
false third party. There are two occasions on which the relevance of the third-party 
effect could arise: 
1) The effect can be relied upon by a false third party in a second set of 
proceedings against one of the genuine parties acting either as claimant or as a 
defendant. Take, for example, the case of a secured transaction where a surety has 
guaranteed the performance of a seller. In the first arbitration between the seller and 
the buyer, the seller is awarded the full price of goods sold and delivered. This award 
necessarily includes an implied decision that the goods involved were of the quality 
specified in the sales contract. This determination of the award should be conclusive 
on the buyer in the event of a second trial against the surety. This is a straightforward 
application of the third-party effect and should not create any theoretical difficulties. 
The genuine party had a full day in court, where he had the opportunity to present his 
arguments and defend his legal position. 70 Any inconvenience caused to the genuine 
party should yield before the need for an effective arbitral award that would 
harmonise the jurisdictionally fragmented multiparty relationship and prevent 
conflicting decisions. 7' This is accepted in some national procedural systems with 
regard to the binding effect of national judgments, 72 while it has also has been 
accepted and applied in some arbitral cases. 73 
2) The converse situation, however, calls for a more careful analysis of the 
competing interests. The question that arises here is whether the genuine party should 
rely on issues determined by the arbitral award against a false third party. What is 
70 Cf. Lord Denning in Mcllkenny v Chief Constable of the West Midlands, [1980] QB 283,317 (CA): 
"If a decision has been given against a man on the identical issue arising in previous proceedings - 
and he had full and fair opportunity of defending himself in it - then he is estopped from contesting 
it again in subsequent proceedings ...... 
There is authority suggesting that we should distinguish between the case where the party in the first 
set of proceedings is claimant in the second set and the case where it is defendant. According to this 
view we should accept the preclusive effect of the first decision against the claimant in the former 
case, but we should reject it in the latter, on the ground that it would be unfair to establish liability 
for the defendant in this way. See Cunningham. supra n. 28 at 530 and case law therein. However. 
the fact that the party in the first proceedings has been given a fair and full opportunity to litigate 
should be enough, whether it acts as claimant or as defendant in the second proceedings. See 
Park-lane Hosiery v Shore, 439 U. S. 322 (1979). Popp i. ' Eberlein, 409 F. 2d 309 (7th Cir. 1969), cent 
denied. 396 U. S. 909 (1969). 
72 This is the case particularly in the U. S., where the mutuality requirement has been abandoned. 
73 See Blumberg v Berland, 678 F. 2d 1068 (11th Cir. 1982), Sports Factory v Chanoff, 586 F. Supp. 
342 (E. D. Pa 1984): cf. Shell. supra n. 5. p. 667-668. 
242 
really at stake in this case is the fundamental74 due process right of the third party to 
present his case. The general rule is that only parties that have taken part in the 
proceedings should be bound by the ensuing award. However, even if the suggested 
third-party effect is applied against the genuine party due process is duly observed, 
since: 
9 First, as mentioned above, an arbitrator faced with an intertwined multiparty 
relationship should assume the initiative and suggest to the parties the joinder 
of the false third party. Thus, on the condition that the latter was invited and 
refused to join the arbitral proceedings between the genuine parties thereto, the 
false third party should not be able to challenge the factual and legal issues 
determined in the first award, and which will then arise in the second set of 
proceedings. An opportunity for a party to be heard in the proceedings is 
enough to meet the due process standards. 75 A party that wastes this 
opportunity, standing by and choosing the wait-and-see tactic, should have to 
accept any adverse consequence arising from such tactic. This is a principle 
that can be found in different legal systems. 76 
9 Second, after the award is rendered, the false third party is given the means to 
obtain relief from the conclusive effect of the award in the case of fraud or 
collusion by the original parties. 77 
The false third party thus is not left without recourse against a third-party arbitral 
effect. On the contrary, it is given a twofold "protection" which safeguards its right to 
be heard: the pre-award invitation to join and the post-award possibility of obtaining 
relief. 
In any case, there is a fundamental difference between the case where a third party 
is bound by an award and the case where he is merely affected by an award. In the 
former case the full effect of an award -in the sense of resjudicata- is extended to the 
third party. In contrast, in the case of the suggested third-party arbitral effect, the third 
party is merely affected rather than bound by the award. The effect does not pre-empt 
any of the false third party's rights or duties. In fact, the award has not authority to 
11 See in the U. S.. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories v University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U. S. 313. 
329, (1971) and Restatement, supra n. 9. para. 34. 
75 Cf. Lew- Mistelis- Kroell, supra n. 67, para 26-86. 
76 See, e. g., the Henderson i" Henderson principle of abuse of process, supra n. 20, or Semmel, supra n. 
27, p. 1474-77 and Cunningham. supra n. 29, p. 526. 
77 C% also Restatement- supra n. 9, para. 75. 
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refer to the false third party at all: if it does so, it will exceed its jurisdiction. The 
award may only refer to factual and legal issues which relate to the genuine parties. 
However, since all parties, genuine and false third, are involved in the same 
contractual multiparty relationship, it is very likely that the false third party's legal 
position is, to some extent, affected by the determination of the award between the 
two genuine parties. The factual and legal issues common in both sets of proceedings 
should be determined only once, binding all the relevant parties. This comes as a 
logical corollary of the inextricable interrelation between the several parties rather 
than an argument against the third- party effect. 
It should also be noted that a false third party is not a contingent stranger to the 
genuine parties. It becomes contractually involved in a multiparty situation, which it 
necessarily accepts in the first place. A surety, for example, accepts the risk that a 
debtor may fail to perform and activate its own liability. Parties are aware of the 
commercial and thus legal implications of a multiparty business relationship. 
Finally, the burden of proving that the issue in question in the second action is 
identical to the issue which has been determined in the first will lie with the real 
party. This can prove a difficult burden to discharge, especially in those not 
infrequent arbitration cases where the awards are written in a concise form, avoiding 
disclosure of detail on the matters determined. 78 This burden may, thus, to some 
extent mitigate any inconvenience caused to the false third party. 79 
The above sets out an adequate protective framework for a false third party that 
would justify the use of the effect even against it. Thus, extending the secured 
transaction example, if an award finds that the quality of the goods was not as agreed, 
this determination should also be opposed by the buyer against the surety in 
subsequent proceedings. A second example is that of a construction dispute between 
an employer and a contractor, where the award, based on a meticulous fact-finding 
process involving several experts, witnesses, onsite inspections etc, finds that the 
work actually carried out is defective. There should be no valid reason for this 
authoritative determination not to constitute the basis of subsequent proceedings 
between the contractor and the subcontractor. 
It is not suggested here that the first award should be conclusive of the 
subcontractor's liability. This would not, in any event, be possible since the 
11 See supra n. 66. 
79 See Cunningham. supra n. 29. n. 55; contra Semmel. supra n. 27, p. 665. 
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subcontractor's liability would fall outside the subject matter of the first arbitration. 
Only factual and legal issues common to both proceedings should be covered by the 
third-party effect. The subcontractor's liability could not arise, let alone determined, 
in the proceedings between the employer and the contractor. This is an issue that falls 
exclusively under the jurisdiction of a second set of proceedings between the 
contractor and the subcontractor, during which the latter will have the opportunity to 
make use of any personal defense vis-ä-vis the contractor and, possibly, escape 
liability in accordance with the terms of the subcontract. The first tribunal, however, 
has the exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether the contractor was liable or not, a 
determination which, as a legal and logical necessity, presupposes the determination 
of whether the work actually performed by the subcontractor was defective. 
12.4. THE LEGAL BASIS OF THE EFFECT OF AN INTERNATIONAL AWARD 
This section makes a tentative rather than an exhaustive suggestion as to the legal 
basis of the effect of an arbitral award, which suggestion is not necessarily limited to 
the third-party arbitral effect. In fact, it extends beyond this to the legal basis of the 
effect of international arbitral awards in general. 
As has been mentioned above, the international arbitration framework lacks a 
harmonised regulation of the effect of an international award. Instead, different 
national regimes result in a confusing divergence in this respect. This falls short of 
the unparalleled uniformity that the New York Convention has established with 
regard to the enforcement of international arbitral awards. 
The New York Convention abolished national technicalities and created a self- 
regulated international arena where arbitral awards have achieved independence from 
national regimes. The validity and enforceability of an international award are 
generally examined in accordance with uniform and international standards 
established by the Convention, rather than national standards set out in domestic 
legislation. This policy has promoted equality and predictability in international 
business, and has enhanced the effectiveness of the arbitral award as a means of 
international dispute resolution. 
This unrivalled success of the New York Convention has strengthened the 
argument in favor of de-nationalisation of international arbitration. Thus, harmonised 
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a-national procedural8° and substantive8' standards develop and become more 
relevant in international arbitration than ever before. In fact, one of the few aspects of 
international arbitration that remains in the exclusive domain of national jurisdictions 
is the regulation of the effect of an arbitral award. The practice whereby an arbitral 
award is equated to a national judgment in terms of its effect causes unpredictability 
and undermines the effectiveness of the international award. Thus, the effects of an 
international arbitral award depend on the different, and, in many cases conflicting, 
regulations of the different national jurisdictions. For example, an international award 
between a creditor and a debtor, depending on which jurisdiction will be enforced: 
" May have no effect vis-ä-vis a surety; 82 or 
" May be res judicata vis-ä-vis a surety, in a case where it is favorable to the 
debtor, but not in a case in which it is favorable to the creditor; 83 or 
" Maybe used as prima facie evidence vis-ä-vis a surety. 
84 
Because of the lack of international regulation on the effects of arbitration awards, 
the international status of an arbitration award disappears after it is recognised and 
enters the national jurisdiction. Thus, the harmonised effects of the New York 
Convention do not extend further than the conditions for the recognition of an 
international arbitral award. This, however, is in conflict with the spirit of the 
Convention, which has created an international arena where the enforcement and, 
thus, the free movement of awards is facilitated. 85 It follows that enforceable awards 
80 The fundamental principles of "due process" and "fair hearing" constitute basically the unified 
procedural principles in international arbitration. See Lew- Mistelis-Kroell, supra n. 67, para. 5-68 
et seq. See also Alex Baum, "International Arbitration: the Path toward Uniform Procedures", in 
Global Reflections On International Law, Commerce And Dispute Resolution, Liber Amicorum In 
Honor Of Robert Briner (Gerald Aksen et al. eds., ICC pub. No. 693,2005), p. 51. 
81 E. g. the application of lex mercatoria or international sets of rules such as the INCOTERMS, UCP, 
UNIDROIT principles etc. See in general Lew-Mistelis-Kroell, supra n. 67, para. 18-41 et seq. 
82 This will be the case in England for example, See Re Kitchin, exp Young, (1881) 19 ChD 668 and 
Bruns i' Colocotronis (The "Vasso"), [1979] 2 Lloyd's Rep 412, (Commercial Court). 
83 This will be the case, for example, in Greece: see Greek Code of Civil Procedure, arts. 896 and 328. 
84This will be the case, for example, in the US: Norris v Mersereau, 74 Mich 687,690; 42 NW 153 
(1889); Sauer v Detroit Fidelity & Surety Co, 237 Mich 697,702; 213 NW 98; 51 ALR 1485 
(1927); Kent Probate Judge v American Employers Insurance Co. 283 Mich 328,334-335: 278 NW 
85 (1938); PR Post Corporation v Maryland Casualty Company, 68 Mich. App. 182: 242 N. W. 2d 
62_ (Mich. App. 1976) where it was held that the award will have be used as "prima facie" evidence 
against a third party (surety). See also the cases Fidelity and Deposit v Parsons & Whittemore 
Contractors, 48 N. Y. 2d 127 (N. Y. 1979) and Madawick Contracting v Travelers Insurance 
Company, 307 N. Y. 111; 120 N. E. 2d 520 (N. Y. 1954) where it was held that the award between the 
contractor and the subcontractor is binding upon the surety with regard to the issue of the 
subcontractor's liability, which should not be re-litigated in a later suit of the contractor against the 
surety. 
85 Cf. Lew-Mistelis-Kroell, supra n. 67. para. 26-36. 
246 
should obtain the maximum degree of effectiveness within the international arena. 
Allowing divergent regulation of the arbitral effect by national systems reduces the 
effectiveness of the international award and hampers the free movement of 
international awards. 
National states are reluctant to relinquish their right to control and regulate the 
effects of a judgment or an award, the consequences of which are "felt" within their 
own jurisdiction. This may be a reasonable argument as far as national judgments are 
concerned, where enforcement is effected by divergent domestic standards rather than 
by reference to uniform standards determined by an international convention such as 
the New York Convention. Allowing foreign judgments, from several different 
jurisdictions to carry their own national status and effect into the country of 
enforcement, would cause chaotic divergence and uncertainty. It is necessary, 
therefore, that the enforcing country should regulate and determine the effects of 
foreign judgments, assimilating their effects with those of domestic judgments. 86 
The argument, however, is less persuasive in the context of international 
arbitration. An international arbitration, by definition, has no national forum. Thus, 
the arbitral award is not the product of a particular national legal system, and, in any 
case, the seat of arbitration bears no relation to the effect of an arbitral award. An 
international arbitral award does not carry any national res judicata status. It is 
"given" the status of res judicata only after it enters national jurisdictions. It seems 
contradictory that an international award rendered and recognised exclusively 
according to international standards should be given a national status with regard to 
its conclusiveness and effect. Instead, international awards should have an 
international harmonised effect, designed for the particular needs of international 
arbitration, an effect which an arbitral award should carry into national jurisdictions. 
There should be a shift from a national to an international viewpoint as regards the 
effects of arbitral awards. National jurisdictions should retain, as a safety net, the 
right to reject the effect only if this violates the international public policy of the 
See Restatement, supra n. 9, para. 98. See also Panama Processes v Cities Service, 796 P. 2d 276 
(Okl. 1990): in enforcing a Brazilian judgment. the U. S. courts decided to apply their domestic law 
of res judicata as opposed to Brazilian law. Cf. McCord v Jet Spray, 847 F. Supp. 436 
(D. Mas. 1994). assuming that the Belgian concept of resjudicata was comparable to the American 
concept the U. S. court concluded that it would recognize the judgment with the conclusive power 
that it would have under Belgian law. See also Berti. supra n. 8, Art. 194, para 134 et seq: Swiss 
law also applies resjudicata to a foreign arbitral award to the extent that the law of the country in 
which the award was made, would recognize that award. On the other hand, these effects could not 
go beyond those who the award would have if it were a Swiss award made in Switzerland. 
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country in question. This, in fact, is the real scope of the N. Y. Convention, Article 
V(2)(b). Enforcement is the judicial process that gives effect to the mandate of the 
award. 87 In other words, enforcement is the vehicle by which the effects of the award 
are transplanted to the enforcement country. In cases where the courts of the 
enforcement country consider that the effects of the award to be enforced manifestly 
violate its public policy, they will not allow the enforcement process to proceed. 
Thus, the New York Convention, in Article V(2) (b), determines the boundaries of the 
legitimate authority of the national state over an international award regarding the 
effects of the award. The national state has, indeed, a legitimate interest in reviewing, 
rather than determining as a whole, the effects of an international award. The 
legitimacy of this interest, however, is strictly related to public policy considerations 
and cannot be extended beyond public policy boundaries. 
12.5. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this Chapter has been to show that the technical mechanism of res 
judicata recognised in relation to national judgments is not always suitable for 
international awards. The principal argument outlined here has been that the arbitral 
award should produce a third-party effect, which differs from the res judicata effect, 
and is designed for the needs of international arbitration. The content and boundaries 
of this third-party effect, as well as the conditions of its application have also been 
considered here. Finally, a tentative suggestion as to the legal basis of the arbitral 
effect, in general, has been made. The suggested third-party effect of an international 
arbitral award strikes a satisfactory compromise between the several conflicting 
interests: 
" It accommodates the problems arising out of multiparty contractual 
relationships in the context of international arbitration. 
0 It reduces the chances of conflicting awards. 
9 It is consistent with the principle of party autonomy. 
0 It is flexible, giving the courts and tribunals the discretion to recognise a third- 
party effect, on a case by a case basis. 
" It promotes the efficiency of international commercial arbitration. 
81 See Lew. Mistelis and Kroell. supra n. 67. para 26-12. 
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This is not to suggest that the proposal is ideal. The problems arising out of the 
relationship between arbitration and third parties are arguably the most complicated 
and delicate problems in the area of international arbitration. On many occasions the 
scholar or the practitioner finds himself in a "catch-22" situation. On the one hand, 
bringing all the parties in a multiparty situation before a common arbitral forum may 
violate the fundamental principle of procedural party autonomy. On the other hand, 
allowing the several parties to bring overlapping claims before different fora leaves 
the door open for conflicting decisions. 
This may undermine the effectiveness of international arbitration and frustrate 
parties' expectations. The suggestion lying behind this Chapter is that the problems of 
a multiparty situation may be addressed more effectively by the arbitral award than 
by an arbitration agreement. In other words, in international arbitration, unlike 
litigation, the necessary harmonisation of parallel proceedings may be achieved more 
effectively at the stage after the first award is issued rather than at the stage of the 
hearings. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this study was to examine the role of third parties in relation to 
arbitration. The result produced from this work was twofold: first, existing views on 
the topic were challenged; secondly, some new suggestions were made. 
REMARKS ON EXISTING VIEWS ON ARBITRATION AND THIRD PARTIES 
Arbitration and third parties is one of the most frequently discussed subjects in 
arbitration literature and practice. However, as the thesis showed, in spite of the 
extensive literature the discussion on the topic has been incomplete and it has not 
yielded general solutions. 
To begin with, attention has been focused exclusively on the effect of arbitration 
agreements upon third parties, whereas the effect of arbitral awards upon third parties 
has been largely understudied. Moreover, even with regard to the effect of arbitration 
agreements, the discussion remained limited to a contractual approach, focusing 
merely on issues of "signature" and "evidence of consent". 
Within this contractual approach two different views have been adopted. 
According to the first, arbitration agreements cannot have any impact whatsoever on 
any person, who has not clearly consented to arbitration, as this consent is evidenced 
by his signature. According to the second, taken by what is known as "extension 
doctrines", it is possible under certain conditions for non-signatories to enter into an 
arbitration agreement, notwithstanding their failure to sign it. However, as the thesis 
demonstrated, neither of the above views succeeds in giving satisfactory answers to 
the problem of arbitration agreements and third parties. 
The first view, by treating all persons who have not signed an arbitration 
agreement as total strangers to the arbitration process, contravenes commercial 
reality. Very often, modern international transactions require the participation of 
several persons for the delivery of large-scale projects. All persons participating in a 
multiparty project will naturally have invested financial interests therein. Therefore, 
any dispute arising in the context of this project will most likely affect their legal 
position, even when the dispute arises between two other persons which take part in 
the same project and which are exclusively bound by a bilateral arbitration agreement. 
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As the thesis illustrated in Chapter 8, even persons who have not agreed to an 
arbitration agreement might have a legitimate interest in participating in the 
arbitration proceedings. Likewise, it was showed that the interests of parties to an 
arbitration agreement might be better protected if third parties with an interest in the 
dispute could somehow participate in the arbitration process. 
Consequently, it was argued that in order to achieve its maximum effectiveness as 
a dispute resolution mechanism arbitration must find ways to communicate with third 
parties that sustain strong interests in the dispute pending before an arbitral tribunal. 
The complexity of contemporary commerce can be better served by flexible rather 
than exclusive dispute resolution systems. In the context of multiparty relationships 
this would require that when a dispute between two parties to an arbitration agreement 
has implications for third parties, the latter should be take into account in the 
arbitration between the two original parties, rather than be treated as total strangers. 
By contrast, the second view acknowledges this last point. What the thesis has 
named "extension doctrines", such as the `equitable estoppel' and the `group of 
companies' doctrine, argue for the `extension' of arbitration agreements to non- 
signatories. The thesis demonstrated in Part II the theoretical and practical limitations 
of the extension doctrines. As was explained there, the theoretical premise of the 
extension doctrines is that consent to arbitrate is not necessarily evidenced by 
signature. Therefore, in the context of multiparty projects arbitration agreements may 
bind persons involved in the project, even if they have failed to sign this arbitration 
agreement. 
In essence, the extension doctrines have been developed and employed to facilitate 
deduction of implied consent to arbitrate. Thus, intention of the non-signatory party to 
arbitrate can be more easily inferred in the context of the `equitable estoppel' or the 
`group of companies' doctrines. In some cases, the `group of companies' doctrine has 
even gone as far as setting presumptions for the existence of consent: it is enough for 
a party to prove that several companies constitute an `economic unit' or that the non- 
signatory company has taken an `active role in the negotiation or the performance of 
the contract containing the arbitration agreement' to presume consent of the non- 
signatory party to arbitrate. 
However, while it may be correct to argue that consent to arbitrate cannot only be 
proved by signature or an agreement in writing, it is wrong to suggest that consent to 
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arbitration agreements should be presumed or ascertained more easily than consent to 
any other procedural or substantive agreement. As the thesis demonstrated, the 
question of whether a third party is bound by an arbitration agreement or not pertains 
to the validity rather than the scope of the arbitration agreement. Therefore, the 
assertion of implied consent requires the application of specific principles and 
techniques of interpretation which must reveal the "intention to arbitrate" with a 
degree of certainty rather than probability. In this interpretation process, the principle 
of in favorem validitatis cannot apply. There can be no presumption in favour of the 
validity of an arbitration agreement, and therefore, no presumption in favour of the 
existence of an intention to arbitrate. Analysis of the relevant case law showed that, in 
many cases, courts and tribunals have misapplied the principle of consent by 
wrongfully accepting presumptions for the existence of an intention to arbitrate on the 
part of a non-signatory, and, therefore, accepting presumptions in favour of the 
validity of arbitration agreements. 
In fact, there is an inherent contradiction in all extension doctrines: while they 
principally adhere to the requirement of consent, they argue at the same time that 
consent to arbitrate should be more easily inferred or even presumed. This is exactly 
where the main weakness of these doctrines lies: they focus exclusively on the 
contractual characteristics of arbitration agreements, and thus necessarily adhere to 
the requirement of consent. In the context of extension doctrines, the discussion is 
limited to issues relating `consent' or the law applicable to validity of an arbitration 
agreement. A strict contractual approach to arbitration agreements is adopted, and 
thus the latter are examined only as ordinary contracts. 
However, under this strict contractual viewpoint, it is difficult to explain why 
consent of the non-signatories should be more easily ascertained with regard to 
arbitration agreements, as opposed to any other substantive or, indeed, jurisdiction 
agreement. If attention is focused on the contractual nature of the arbitration 
agreements, there is nothing that would justify any kind of concession with regard to 
the requirement of consent for arbitration agreements in particular. 
From a contractual point of view, arbitration agreements have clear constraints as 
any other substantive contract: only those parties that have consented to an arbitration 
agreement will be bound by this contract. Moreover, consent of the parties has to be 
deduced in the same way as in any other contract, in accordance with general 
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principles of contract law and interpretation. The latter provide for no exception to the 
principle of privity in relation to arbitration agreements. Nor do they provide that 
consent for arbitration agreements can be ascertained more easily than in the case of 
other agreement. Thus, the contractual approach to the issue of arbitration agreements 
and third parties is naturally constrained by the general principles of contract 
law 
applicable to any ordinary contract. 
Generally, the discussion on arbitration agreements and third parties has failed to 
pay sufficient attention to the specific characteristics of arbitration agreements, as 
opposed to ordinary contracts. The theory behind the existing views on arbitration 
agreements and third parties is related to contract rather than arbitration law. 
As regards the effect of an arbitral award upon third parties, the sole viewpoint 
here equates arbitral awards to national decisions. Consequently, the question of 
whether an arbitration award may have any sort of impact upon third parties depends 
on the national provisions regarding res judicata, which, as the thesis explained in 
Chapter 12, largely provide that the res judicata effect is strictly limited to the parties 
in action and their privies. Therefore, as far as an arbitral award is concerned, any 
person other than the parties in the proceedings or their privies is regarded as a 
complete stranger. 
The thesis challenged this view, showing that equating awards to national 
judgment overlooks the differences in nature and function between international 
awards and national decisions. While national procedural systems provide for ways in 
which third parties can be brought in the proceedings between the original parties, 
arbitration in general lacks any kind of third-party mechanism. 
In this way, arbitration is left without any means of communication with third 
parties at all: on the one hand, arbitration agreements have no effect upon any third 
party unless the latter has consented to the arbitration agreement; on the other, arbitral 
awards obtain the status of national judgments and thus have no effect upon any party 
that has not taken part in the proceedings. 
In sum, the main problem appearing in the existing views on the effect of 
arbitration agreements and arbitral awards on third parties is that they all adopt an "all 
or nothing" approach to the topic: "third parties" with a legal or financial interest in a 
dispute between two genuine arbitration parties are regarded 
0 Either as total strangers to the arbitration between two genuine parties; or 
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" As "contractual parties" to an arbitration agreement between the two 
original parties, in which case the arbitration agreement and the ensuing 
arbitral award will be enforceable by and against the third party. 
This approach, however, fails to distinguish between the various types of third 
parties, which exist in the context of modern business practice. It becomes obvious 
therefore, that a more flexible than the "all or nothing" approach is required in order 
to accommodate the nuances of commercial reality. 
SUGGESTIONS OF THE THESIS ON "ARBITRATION AND THIRD PARTIES" 
To address the above problem, the thesis suggested, in Chapter one, that different 
groups of `third parties' should be identified. More specifically, the notion of "false 
third parties" was introduced as a group of third parties with a significant legal or 
financial interest in the dispute between the two genuine parties to an arbitration 
agreement or to arbitration proceedings. 
To begin with, the group of "false third parties" was distinguished from persons 
such as a principal, an assignee, a consingee and a successor in a contract containing 
an arbitration agreement. The thesis showed that, although they are some times taken 
as third parties, the above persons should be considered genuine parties to arbitration 
agreements rather than third parties, since they will be contractually bound by an 
arbitration agreement by reference to rules of contract law. 
Then, the thesis focused on the notion of "false third parties", in particular, and 
distinguished between two different groups thereof The distinction was based on the 
difference in the degree of association between genuine and false third parties, in 
terms of contractual interests and liability. 
Thus, persons in the first group are third parties strongly associated with one of 
the genuine parties to an arbitration agreement or the arbitration proceedings, in terms 
of contractual interests and liability. Here, genuine and false third party will typically 
be co-liable or co-holders of rights or duties. 
Persons in the second group are third parties contractually linked but not strongly 
associated with one of the genuine parties to an arbitration agreement or the 
arbitration proceedings, in terms of contractual interests and liability. Here, genuine 
and false third party will be contractually linked but they will not be sharing the same 
rights, duties or liability. Either they will be liable in the alternative or only one of 
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them will be liable vis-ä-vis the other genuine party. False third parties of this group, 
as was shown in detail in Chapter 2, will typically include a subcontractor or an 
architect in the context of several construction contracts; a guarantor in the context of 
security agreements; a parent or another affiliated company in the context of 
transactions with a multinational group. 
The distinction between these two groups of third parties constituted the basis for 
the principal suggestions of the thesis on the effect of arbitration agreements and 
arbitral awards on third parties. 
Then the thesis contemplated the effect of arbitration agreements on third parties: 
as opposed to the contractual approach taken by the extension doctrines, the thesis 
suggested that a jurisdictional approach should be adopted. It was underlined that 
arbitration agreements are not like any other substantive contract; they have important 
jurisdictional effects. As was emphasised throughout the thesis, arbitration law is not, 
and should not be viewed merely as an advanced version of contract law. 
Accordingly, as was shown in Chapter Seven, arbitration has significant 
jurisdictional implications that go beyond the contractual origins of arbitration and 
may affect parties other than those consented to an arbitration agreement. This was 
illustrated, in Section 7.2 by reference to case law showing that national courts have 
on several occasions stayed proceedings between a person that is party to an 
arbitration agreement (genuine party) and a person that is not (third party), on the 
ground that the action was inextricably involved with the subject matter of that 
arbitration agreement. This demonstrates that arbitration agreements may, in certain 
circumstances, have collateral jurisdictional effects to third parties, namely extra- 
contractual effects. Therefore, it was argued that arbitral tribunals should, in 
principle, be able to assume extra-contractual jurisdiction over third parties. 
Here, the important role of the dispute was underlined: arbitral tribunals will 
assume jurisdiction over third parties, only when this is necessary for them to resolve 
the dispute effectively. Necessary corollary of the jurisdictional approach adopted by 
the thesis is the concept of effective arbitral jurisdiction, according to which a 
tribunal should be able to assume as much jurisdiction as is necessary for the tribunal 
to achieve its main goal, namely the resolution of the pending dispute. Therefore, the 
jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal should always be determined in the light of the 
specific dispute at hand. 
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The suggestion that arbitral tribunals should in principle be able to assume extra- 
contractual jurisdiction if this is necessary for the effective resolution of the dispute 
finds further support, by analogy, in the "extra-territorial jurisdiction" assumed by 
national courts. Section 7.3 illustrated that despite the fact that their jurisdiction stems 
form a different source, national courts and arbitral tribunals assume jurisdiction of 
the same quality. There is no difference between jurisdiction established on a 
territorial basis (as in the case of national courts) and jurisdiction established on the 
basis of an agreement (as in the case of arbitral tribunals). Once their power to 
examine the pending dispute is confirmed by reference to either a valid arbitration 
agreement or the applicable procedural rules, arbitral tribunals and national courts 
assume the same jurisdictional duty: to resolve the dispute at hand in the most 
effective way. Therefore, it was submitted that, since national courts are allowed to 
assume jurisdiction beyond their territorial boundaries, arbitral tribunals should also 
be allowed to assume jurisdiction beyond the boundaries of the arbitration agreement 
as an ordinary contract (extra-contractual jurisdiction). More generally, it was argued 
that when it is necessary for the determination of the dispute, an adjudicatory forum, 
be that a national court or an arbitral tribunal, may extend its jurisdiction beyond its 
original boundaries, be that a state territory or an arbitration contract. 
It was accordingly concluded that, in principle, third parties could be brought into 
play in arbitral proceedings between two genuine parties to an arbitration agreement. 
This conclusion is supported by a policy analysis undertaken in Section 8.1, 
showing that third-party mechanisms allowing the participation of third parties in the 
arbitral proceedings are important for international arbitration. As was explained 
there, third-party mechanisms are not incompatible with arbitration. On the contrary, 
they are necessary for a number of reasons: 
" First, to sustain a functional equilibrium between substance and procedure in 
the context of multiparty commercial relationships; 
" Second, to promote efficiency in arbitration by minimizing the risk of 
irreconcilable awards and judgments, which will frustrate the expectations of 
the parties in arbitration; 
" Third, to serve the interests of, at least, some of the parties to the arbitration. 
In sum, the above demonstrated that 
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" First, as a matter of principle, arbitration agreements may have jurisdictional 
effects on third parties, which would allow the tribunal to assume extra- 
contractual jurisdiction over third parties 
" Second, that the participation of third parties in arbitration is not necessarily 
incompatible, in policy terms, with arbitration. On the contrary, in some cases, 
it may enhance efficiency in arbitration and promote the interests of the parties. 
Although it was demonstrated that third-party mechanisms might in principle apply 
to arbitration, this was not to suggest that the participation of third parties in 
arbitration should be the norm. On the contrary, it was stressed that, as in the case of 
extra-territorial jurisdiction in litigation, extra-contractual jurisdiction in arbitration 
should be accepted only in exceptional circumstances. It was illustrated that the rule 
in litigation is that jurisdiction is determined on an individual basis, in view of a 
personal link between a particular defendant and a particular forum (the rule of 
individually determined jurisdiction). Third-party mechanisms, enabling several 
parties to come before a single forum, constitute derogation from the rule of 
individually determined jurisdiction, and therefore they should apply only in 
exceptional circumstances. 
The next step of the thesis aimed at when should arbitral tribunals assume extra- 
contractual jurisdiction and bring third parties in arbitral proceedings. In order to 
achieve this goal, the thesis sought guidance from national and regional litigation 
systems regarding the participation of third parties in court proceedings. This 
comparative study provided useful insight on third-party mechanisms in general. 
More specifically, it was found that the extent to which a third party may participate 
in the proceedings between two original parties is directly relevant to the degree of 
association between the third party and one of the original parties, in terms of 
substantive liability and interests. Here, the rule is, the closer the substantive 
association between the original and the third party, the more effective are the third 
party mechanisms provided by the litigation systems. 
In particular, the following scheme was established: 
" When one of the original parties in the proceedings and a third party are 
strongly associated in substantive terms (they are typically co-liable or co- 
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holders of rights and duties), ' the original parties and the third party are 
considered a necessary unit in terms of jurisdiction, and, therefore, 
compulsory third party mechanisms will be normally provided. 
" When one of the original parties in the proceedings and a third party are 
contractually interrelated but not strongly associated (they are typically liable 
in the alternative rather than co-liable), '` the original parties and the third party 
are not considered a necessary unit in terms of jurisdiction and, therefore, 
permissive third party mechanisms will be normally provided. 
As was demonstrated in Chapter 8, the above scheme applies to the majority if not 
all national and regional procedural systems and, therefore, it would be safe to argue 
that it constitutes a general principle on the role of third parties in the context of 
litigation. 
The thesis, then, sought to apply this principle to arbitration, taking into account 
the particular principles and unique characteristics of international arbitration. Here, 
as was explained in Section 9.1, the most relevant principle to take into account was 
the principle of procedural party autonomy, according to which commercial parties 
have the right to regulate their procedural relationships in a way that best serves their 
commercial interests. 
By contrast other arbitration principles, such as the principle of contractual origins 
of arbitration or confidentiality, although important in other areas of arbitration bear 
less relevance to the purposes of the thesis. With regard to former it was demonstrated 
that the discussion on third parties and arbitration does not pertain to the principle of 
contractual nature. Rather, it pertains to the jurisdictional aspect of arbitration. 
Whether third parties may participate in arbitration is a matter related to jurisdiction 
rather than contract law, and therefore, the principle of contractual nature of 
arbitration agreements should not be directly relevant here. Similarly, confidentiality 
is not an inherent conceptual feature of arbitration, and would apply only if the parties 
provide for it, either in their arbitration agreement or by reference to the applicable 
arbitration rules. Thus, confidentiality does not have an institutional role in 
arbitration. and therefore, compared to the principle of procedural party autonomy has 
less relevance for the purposes of the thesis. Accordingly, the principle of party 
' Persons that the thesis has identified as false third parties of the first group. 
2 Persons that the thesis has identified as false third parties of the second group. 
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autonomy rather than the principle of the contractual nature of arbitration or 
confidentiality will provide the benchmark for the determination of the circumstances 
under which third parties should be brought before bilateral arbitration proceedings. 
Procedural party autonomy includes the right of the parties to choose the 
arbitration tribunal where they will have their disputes decided, but also their right to 
choose their opponent in arbitration. Procedural party autonomy is materialised 
through arbitration agreements where the parties set out their arrangements on 
jurisdiction. Thus, it is perfectly legitimate and consistent with procedural party 
autonomy for the parties to agree on several bilateral arbitration proceedings rather 
than a single set of multiparty proceedings. Accordingly, it was argued in Section 9.2, 
that the scheme of several bilateral dispute resolution agreements should be upheld 
even against the background of a multiparty commercial project. Since third-party 
mechanisms are of exceptional character and party autonomy is the overarching 
principle prevailing in arbitration any conflict between the two should be in principle 
lifted in favour of procedural party autonomy. The presumption should be for 
procedural party autonomy to prevail over third-party mechanisms, even if this would 
result in procedural fragmentation of a multiparty relationship. 
This rule will particularly apply when, as in the majority of the cases, the parties in 
a multiparty project are contractually interrelated but not strongly associated in terms 
of interests and liability (the second group of false third-parties as defined in Chapter 
2). As was demonstrated in Section 9.3, when the several parties are contractually 
intertwined but they do not share rights or liability, no exceptional circumstances 
would exist in order to overturn the general rule. The scheme of several bilateral 
agreements on jurisdiction should be given precedence. This conclusion is consistent 
with the general rule established in Chapter 8 on third-party mechanisms: mechanisms 
of permissive only character would be provided whenever the several parties are 
contractually interrelated but not strongly associated in terms of interests and liability. 
However, as was showed by reference to various national jurisdictions, third-party 
mechanisms of permissive character, in terms of jurisdiction, rank below in the 
hierarchy compared to procedural party autonomy. Therefore, it was concluded that 
they could not overturn the scheme of several bilateral arrangements on jurisdiction of 
the several parties, and thus they should not apply to arbitration. In this case the loose 
links between the several parties, in terms of interests and substantive liability would 
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not warrant the participation of third parties in bilateral arbitration proceedings. This 
would mean, for example, that in the context of a multiparty security relationship a 
guarantor could not take part in the arbitration proceedings between a creditor and a 
debtor. The scheme of two separate bilateral agreements -for example, an arbitration 
agreement between a creditor and a debtor, and another arbitration or jurisdiction 
agreement between a creditor and a guarantor- should be upheld. In such a case, no 
third-party mechanism should be accepted to allow the participation of the guarantor 
in the bilateral arbitration proceedings between the two other parties. The same would 
apply to the scheme of separate bilateral agreements between an employer, a 
contractor and a subcontractor, or to any other multiparty relationship of this type. 
Therefore, as a matter of rule, third-party mechanisms should not apply to 
arbitration. For third-party mechanisms to overturn the scheme of several bilateral 
personal jurisdictions, and bring all the parties before the same forum, exceptional 
circumstances must exist. 
Chapter 10 ventured to determine those exceptional circumstances. It was 
suggested there that third-party mechanisms should apply in arbitration whenever the 
third parties are strongly interrelated with the parties to the arbitration, so that third 
and genuine parties are co-liable or co-holders of rights and duties, as is typically the 
case in the first group of false third parties, defined in Chapter 2. In such a case the 
several parties (third and genuine) would constitute an inseparable unit in terms of 
jurisdiction. This jurisdictional unit, due to the strong substantive interrelations of the 
several parties, should not be separated. Thus, third-party mechanisms should apply to 
give jurisdiction to a tribunal over the inseparable unit of several parties. In fact, 
third-party mechanisms in such circumstances should apply despite the existence of a 
scheme of several bilateral dispute resolution agreements between the several parties. 
Therefore, a tribunal should be able to assume extra-contractual jurisdiction over the 
whole jurisdictional unit, including all the genuine and third parties. 
This conclusion is also consistent with the general rule established in Chapter 8 on 
third-party mechanisms: co-liability or community of parties between several parties 
normally warrants the application of third-party mechanisms of compulsory character. 
As was demonstrated in Chapter 10, in terms of jurisdiction, third-party mechanisms 
of compulsory character are strong enough to overturn the scheme of bilateral 
arrangements between several parties. Therefore, it was suggested that the threshold 
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required for a tribunal to assume extra-contractual jurisdiction and allow a third party 
in the proceedings is co-liability or community of rights and obligations. In particular, 
it will be required that a third party will be co-liable or co-holder of right and 
obligations with one of the genuine parties to an arbitration agreement. As was 
illustrated, co-liability or community of rights and obligations between several parties 
may result from 
. Either the contractual arrangements between several parties 
" Or the applicable substantive law 
In the last chapter the thesis turned to the effect of arbitral awards upon third 
parties. It was argued that arbitral awards should not be equated to national judgments 
in terms of their effect. Rather, the effect of arbitral awards should be determined in 
view of the unique needs and characteristics of arbitration. Accordingly, it was 
suggested that arbitral awards should affect a wider circle of third parties than in the 
case of national judgements. 
The suggestion was based on the following grounds. In the context of litigation, 
there are two ways in which two or more parallel proceedings involving the same 
legal and factual issues are regulated in order for conflicting decisions to be avoided: 
First, by third-party mechanisms that bring all the relevant parties before a single 
forum, named by the thesis unification mechanisms. In this way parallel proceedings 
are avoided altogether and regulation of multiparty relationships is achieved in an 
early stage, namely in a pre judgment stage. Examples of this type of third-party 
mechanisms are common jurisdictional bases, class actions, intervention and joinder, 
interpleading and consolidation. Secondly, by mechanisms harmonising the outcomes 
of the several parallel proceedings, rather than bringing all the several parties before a 
single forum. Typical examples of harmonisation mechanisms are lis pendens and res 
judicata. Here the several sets of proceeding remain parallel, instead of being 
consolidated. However, lis pendens and res judicata regulate the parallel proceedings, 
so that conflicting findings and decisions are avoided. In particular, lis pendens 
prevents the continuation of the second set of proceedings until a decision in the first 
set of proceedings is granted. Res judicata, either prevents the second set of 
proceedings to commence or ensures that the second forum is bound by the 
determinations of the first decision. Thus, the regulation of multiparty relationships is 
achieved after the first decision has been issued: it is the decisions of the parallel 
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proceedings that are brought into accord ("harmonised"). The multiple parties will not 
be brought before the same forum, as in the case of unification third-party 
mechanisms. 
The thesis showed that as a matter of general policy the procedural regulation of 
multiparty relationships is welcome at as early a stage as possible. Thus, in the 
context of national civil procedures, unification third-party mechanisms are given 
priority over harmonisation mechanisms. Therefore, national procedural systems 
provide extensive possibilities for a wider circle of third parties to intervene or be 
joined by the original parties, whereas the application of lis pendens or res judicata is 
limited to a narrow circle of third parties and usually hinges on more stringent 
conditions. 
However, as was noted, the policy of an early regulation of the multiparty 
proceedings cannot apply to arbitration. According to the prevailing contractual 
approach, at least, third parties cannot be brought before the arbitral proceedings 
between two parties bound by a bilateral arbitration agreement. Thus, arbitration is 
left without any means of procedural regulation of multiparty relationships at all: at 
the pre-award stage third party cannot be brought into the proceedings, while at the 
post-award stage arbitral awards obtain the status of national judgments and thus have 
an effect which is limited to privies only. False third parties, such as a subcontractor 
or a surety, remain unaffected both by the arbitration proceedings and the award 
between two genuine parties to a bilateral arbitration. 
Accordingly, it was argued that arbitral awards should be able to affect a wider 
circle of third parties than the one affected by national judgments. A wider arbitral 
effect would compensate for the lack of unification mechanisms at an earlier stage in 
arbitration analogous to the mechanism provided in the context of litigation. It was 
suggested, in particular, that arbitral awards should somehow affect the false third 
parties rather than just the privies to the parties in action. 
However, this effect should be different than the effect upon privies. The legal 
position of a party in action is almost identical to that of its privy, in terms of 
substantive rights and interests. Naturally thus, it is accepted a privy is bound by the 
res judicata effect of the award issued between its privy and another person. In other 
words the award can be enforced by and against a privy, although the latter has not 
taken part in the arbitral proceedings. 
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The legal position of false third parties, on the other hand, is contractually 
interrelated but not identical to that of the parties to the proceedings. They could not 
be bound by res judicata. Otherwise issues of due process would be raised. Therefore, 
it was argued that an arbitral award should affect false third parties, albeit in a 
different, and certainly less drastic, way than privies are. 
This suggestion accords to the general principle underpinning the whole work 
here: that the procedural relationships between several parties must correlate to their 
relationships in substantive terms. 
Accordingly, Section 12.4 determined the content and boundaries of the effect that 
an arbitral award should produce on false third parties. More specifically, it was 
argued that arbitral awards should have both conclusive and preclusive effects on 
false third parties. Thus, the preclusive effect of an award between two parties will 
prevent re-litigation of any factual and legal issue that might arise again in the second 
set of proceedings between a false third party and one of the parties in the first set of 
proceedings. In addition, the conclusive effect of the award between two parties will 
provide the logical and legal basis for the second forum (court or tribunal) to reach a 
decision in accordance with the determination of the first award. Applied in this way, 
the combined arbitral effect will harmonise the several sets of proceedings, in the 
context of a multiparty relationship, and it will ensure that any conflicting awards are 
avoided. 
As was explained, this type of arbitral effect will be less effective than the res 
judicata effect. The award will merely affect rather than bind a false third party. The 
award given in proceedings between the two genuine parties will not be able to be 
enforced by or against the false third parties. This third-party effect will not pre-empt 
any of the third party's rights or duties. A second trial will be required for the third 
party's claim to be determined. 
It was argued that this type of arbitral effect can be particularly used by the third 
party in the second set of proceedings against one of the genuine parties acting either 
as claimant or as defendant. It was also suggested that one of the parties in the first set 
of arbitral proceedings should be able to use the arbitral effect against the false third 
party. This however will require, as a condition precedent, that the former will have 
invited the latter to join the first arbitral proceedings, and the latter will have refused 
to do so. 
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This kind of arbitral effect will basically apply to any third party that has a 
significant interest in the dispute between two other parties bound exclusively by an 
arbitration agreement. It will thus apply to guarantors, or subcontractors and any other 
third party covered by the term false third parties of the second group, as this was 
determined in the thesis. A 
. 
fortiori, this kind of arbitral effect will also apply to false 
third parties of the first group (co-liable or co-holders of rights or duties with one of 
the two parties in the arbitral proceedings), on the condition that the latter have not 
taken part in the arbitral proceedings on the basis of the suggested jurisdictional 
approach. In case they have take part in the proceedings, false third parties of the first 
group will, of course, be bound by the res judicata effect of an award, as genuine 
parties to arbitral proceedings. 
Finally, and with regard to the legal basis of the effect of arbitral awards, it was 
argued that the effects of arbitral awards should be determined at an international 
level rather than by national provisions. It was suggested that international awards 
should acquire an international status, which they should carry into national 
jurisdictions after their recognition and enforcement. Allowing divergent regulation of 
the effects of arbitral awards by national systems reduces the effectiveness of 
international awards and hampers their free circulation. 
Overall, the suggestions on the effect that arbitral awards and arbitration 
agreements may have upon third parties can be summarised in the following scheme 
(see also Table 1, below): 
" First, persons (and their privies) who are contractually bound by an arbitration 
agreement and who take part to the arbitration proceedings, i. e. genuine 
parties to arbitration agreement and proceedings, and their privies 4 
o They will be bound by the arbitration agreement as an ordinary 
contract, thus the arbitration agreement will be enforceable by and 
against them 
o They will be bound by the res judicata effect of the arbitral award, 
thus the award will be enforceable by and against them 
" Second, persons who are not contractually bound by an arbitration agreement, 
but who are strongly associated with one of the genuine parties to the 
arbitration agreement or the proceedings, in terms of contractual interests and 
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liability (false third parties of the first group). These persons will typically be 
co-liable with the genuine parties 4 
o They will not be bound by the arbitration agreement as an ordinary 
contract. However, the tribunal may assume jurisdiction over them, so 
that they may take part in the arbitration proceedings as joined 
claimants or joined respondents 
o If they do take part in the arbitration proceedings, they will be bound 
by the res judicata effect of the arbitral award, thus the award will be 
enforceable by and against tem. If they do not take part in the 
arbitration proceedings, they will be affected by the third-party effect 
of the arbitral award as suggested by the thesis 
" Third, persons who are not contractually bound by an arbitration agreement, 
and are contractually interrelated but not strongly associated with one of the 
genuine parties to the arbitration agreement or the proceedings, in terms of 
contractual interests and liability (false third parties of the second group) 
c They will not be bound by the arbitration agreement as an ordinary 
contract. Moreover, the tribunal may not assume jurisdiction over them 
and, therefore, they cannot be brought into the arbitral proceedings 
between the two genuine parties, unless all the parties (genuine and 
third) agree to this effect. 
o They will not be bound by the res judicata effect of the arbitral award 
between the two genuine parties, and therefore the award will not be 
enforceable by or against them. However, they will be bound by the 
third-party effect of this award, as suggested by the thesis 
The role of third parties in arbitration remains still an enigma. This is largely 
because the discussion on third parties is multifaceted. Indeed, the discussion has a 
policy background. The main question here is whether arbitration should remain a 
closed dispute resolution system, reserved only for those parties that are contractually 
bound by an arbitration agreement: alternatively. whether arbitration should be a 
flexible dispute resolution system, able to communicate with third parties that have 
legal and financial interests in the dispute pending before the tribunal. 
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However, the discussion on arbitration and third parties is not, and should not be, 
exhausted in a policy debate. There is great amount of theory related to the 
discussion. Since third-party mechanisms are jurisdictional in nature, the most 
effective way to assess the role of third parties in arbitration is to focus on whether 
arbitration may have any jurisdictional implications for third parties. Therefore, the 
thesis focused on procedural theory in order to examine and reveal the rationale and 
the principles behind third-party mechanisms. 
It would appear that there is a growing scepticism in arbitration against procedural 
theory. It is feared that study based on procedural doctrine will bring arbitration closer 
to litigation. This view is understandable to some extent. "Proceduralisation" of 
arbitration has to be avoided. Arbitration has to retain a degree of flexibility, staying 
away from unnecessarily complicated dogmatism prevalent in almost all litigation 
systems. 
However, it would be equally wrong to shun any attempt to examine arbitration by 
reference to procedural theory, which was developed to address real commercial 
problems in the first place. It is vitally essential to keep looking into fundamental 
principles underpinning procedural theory, and applying those principles against the 
unique backdrop of arbitration. In this regard, scholar analysis of arbitration has to be 
moderately rehabilitated. 
In this context the discussion on arbitration and third parties is directly pertinent to 
the very nature of arbitration. The outcome of this discussion will depend on the way 
which arbitration will eventually follow. Indiscriminately importing litigation 
mechanisms to arbitration would render arbitration ineffective and eventually alienate 
it from the business community. Avoiding procedural theory altogether will deprive 
arbitration from the academic depth necessary to address real problems in practice. 
It is truly hoped that the delicate balance between theory and substance was 
attained in this study. 
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